Challenges for democratization and regional development in Southern Africa: Focus on Mozambique

Regional Development Dialogue

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 32-59

  Weimer, Bernhard ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATISATION; DEVELOPING REGION; NEW WORLD ORDER; POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT; REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT; SADC;

AFRICA, (SOUTHERN); MOZAMBIQUE;

EID: 0030423180     PISSN: 02506505     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (93)

1. Boutros Boutros Ghali, "Agenda fuer den frieden: vorbeugende diplomatie, friedensschaffung und friedenssicherung" in Blaetterfuer deutsche und internationale politik 9 (September 1992):1130-50. (in German)
2. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) comprises the following twelve members: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
3. See David Held, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: Reflections on the 200th Anniversary of Kant's Perpetual Peace," Alternatives 20 (October-December 1995):415-29.
4. Ibid., p. 417f.
5. Idem.
6. Ibid., p. 421.
7. Ibid., p. 422 (emphasis in original).
8. SADC, "Declaration, Treaty and Protocol of Southern African Development Community" (Gaborone, 1993).
9. Concerning the frontline states ' (FLS) contribution to the independence of Namibia, see inter alia, Ronald Dreyer, Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonization, 1945-1990 (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994), chapter 5, pp. 105-44.
10. For a preliminary balance of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), see Bernhard Weimer, "The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC): Past and Future," African Insight 7 (2:1991):78-89.
11. A request by Mauritius to join the SADC, submitted in 1994, prompted the elaboration of rules and procedures for admittance of new members; see "Draft Agenda" for the SADC Summit (Johannesburg, 1995), pp. 1ff. Mauritius was officially admitted as the twelfth member on the occasion of the SADC Summit of 1995. An earlier request by Zaire to join the SADCC in the early 1980s was turned down, basically on political grounds.
12. The transaction cost of "coordinated cooperation" in regional development (e.g., the number and frequency of coordination meetings) rises exponentially with the number of members of a regional grouping, whereas the integration approach in the sense of the creation of permanent common decisionmaking bodies significantly reduces such cost. The SADC's decision to change the approach from coordination to integration - although not yet fully implemented - thus also reflected necessities of efficiency and management as a result of increasing group membership.
13. SADC, "Proceedings of Summit Held in Gaborone, Republic of Botswana, 29th August 1994," p. 9. So far activities in this area have been limited to the conducting of workshops and seminars.
14. Ibid.
15. See "Final Report of Conference on Promoting a Culture of Democracy and Human Rights in Southern Africa, Maputo, 7-11 February 1994" (SADC, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), International Commission of Jurists). As in the case of community-building, activities have so far been restricted to seminars and conferences.
16. The creation of a SADC Parliament in July 1996 was announced on the occasion of the 22nd Session of the Joint European Union (EU)-African, Caribbean, and Pacific Countries (ACP) Assembly in Windhoek, Namibia, on 18 March 1996. However, the modalities of the election of its members still remain unclear. The holding of direct elections at SADC level seems possible only in the very distant future.
17. The S ADC has created a new Sector for Diplomacy, Defense and Security and Conflict Resolution, under the auspices of Zimbabwe. This sector embodies and enhances the experience of the FLS, whose raison d'être ceased to exist with the disappearance of the "frontline" with the end of the minority regimes in Namibia and South Africa. A first test case for this sector was the resolution of the conflict in Lesotho, where, in August 1994, King Letsie III deposed the Mokhele Government elected in 1992. A SADC-initiative consisting of Presidents Mugabe, Masire, and Mandela managed to restore legitimacy, constitutionality, and democracy in the Basotho Kingdom by peaceful means, using a "stick and carrot" approach. At the time of writing, the same triad is prevailing upon the King of Swaziland, Mswati III, to consider favourably the further democratization of the kingdom, including the reform of the constitution and the holding of general elections.
18. In September 1994, the SADC and the EU established formal relations of cooperation (the "Berlin Initiative") with institutionalized mechanisms of consultation and defined priority activities, focusing on the combat of drug trafficking, mine clearance, and economic integration in Southern Africa.
19. Address by Sir Ketumile Q. Masire, President of the Republic of Botswana, and Chairman of the SADC on the occasion of the 1994 Summit, 29 August 1994, Gaborone, Botswana.
20. Samuel P. Huntington,The Third Wave: Decentralization in the Late 20th Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); a country by country overview is given by Francis Caas, "Southern Africa - the State of Democracy," Courier 153 (September-October 1995):47-52.
21. Samuel P. Huntington,The Third Wave: Decentralization in the Late 20th Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); a country by country overview is given by Francis Caas, "Southern Africa - the State of Democracy," Courier 153 (September-October 1995):47-52.
22. The outcome of the 1992 parliamentary and presidential elections, stipulated by the Bicesse Accords of 1991, saw the Movimento Popular de Liber tacao de Angola (MPLA) and President José Santos as narrow winners. One of the signatories, Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (UNITA), did not accept the outcome, which led to a renewed outbreak of war and the renegotiation of the Peace Accord which was finalized in Lusaka, Zambia in December 1994.
23. Refer to note 17.
24. The SADCC leaders, taking into consideration the failure of the East African Community (EAC) in the late 1970s, deliberately decided against the early institutionalization of common regional statutory bodies. Thus, sectoral responsibilities and coordination (and the shouldering of financial burdens) were given to individual members, taking into account geographical, technical, and other criteria. Only the SADC Secretariat in Gaborone and the Southern African Transport Coordination Commission (SATCC) in Maputo are truly multilateral SADC institutions.
25. Admittedly, free movement of people within the SADC would - because of extremely unbalanced regional levels of socioeconomic development - most probably result in considerable labour migration to South Africa, the region's economic giant. Hence, South Africa, for the time being, will continue to be extremely careful concerning the liberalization of population movements within the SADC.
26. Held, "Cosmopolitan Democracy," p. 422f.
27. Ibid., p. 423.
28. For example, the "Gaborone Agenda" approved by the Conference on Human Rights and Democracy in Southern Africa, Gaborone, Botswana, 26-28 February 1993, organized by the Democracy Project, University of Botswana, in collaboration with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) Foundation. Participants in the conference included a broad section of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civic associations, trade unions, human rights bodies, and women's organizations from all SADC members. See also Bernhard Weimer, "The Gaborone Agenda: menschenrechte und demokratie in suedlichen Africa," Africa Spectrum (Hamburg) 28 (1993)3:313-425. (in German)
29. See note 24.
30. The SADC region 's professional association of journalists, the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) has on repeated occasions issued statements and reports condemning governments and administrations of SADC for such practices, notorious recent cases in point being in Angola, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
31. There have been attempts to create a Zambezi Valley Water Authority which, however, has not prevented individual countries bordering that river to singlehandly go ahead with their own planning and execution of water supply and utilization schemes, to the potential detriment of other users downstream. Concerning proposals for the creation of an international wildlife reserve and water conservation regime for the unique Okavango-Delta in northwest Botswana, bordering Namibia and linked to southern Angola, see Bernhard Weimer and Olaf Claus, "A Changing Southern Africa: What Role for Botswana?" in Stephan Stedman, ed.,Botswana: The Political Economy of Democratic Development (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993), p. 199.
32. The French economist, Serge Latouche, characterizes the capitalist economic system as a "technoeconomic global megamachine" geared towards the extraction and concentration of resources and wealth in the hands of ever fewer people on the one hand, and the ever-increasing production of material, natural, social, and human waste on the other. See Serge Latouche, La mégamachine: raison technoscientifique, raison economique et mythe du progrès (Paris: Editions La Découvert, 1995). (in French)
33. To illustrate this point: western Germany's direct and indirect financial transfers (including credits) for the reconstruction and integration of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) are valued at DM160 billion annually, double the value of the annual official development assistance (ODA) transferred from the rich countries of the North to the third world.
34. See Prayuadh A. Payutto, Buddhist Solutions for the Twenty-first Century (Bangkok: Buddhadhamma Foundation, 1994).
35. Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
36. Claude Aké, "Demokratisierung des machtslosigkeit" in Jochen Hippler, ed., Demokratisierung der machtslosigkeit politische herrschaft in der dritten welt (Bonn: Transnational Institute, 1994), pp. 32-65. (in German)
37. In Buddhist economic theory, the primary task of any government and administration is the fight against poverty and unemployment. The best indicator for success is the absence of poverty and not the number of millionaires. See Prayuadh A. Payutto, Buddhist Economics. A Middle Way for the Market Place (Bangkok: Buddhadhamma Foundation, 1994), p. 74.
38. All economic figures in this paragraph except for figures on debt are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Country Report on Mozambique and Malawi" (Third Quarter 1995); see also EIU, "Country Profile Mozambique, 1994-95." The debt figures stem from Banco de Moçambique, quoted in MediaFax (Maputo), 975 (21 March 1996), p. 1.
39. All economic figures in this paragraph except for figures on debt are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Country Report on Mozambique and Malawi" (Third Quarter 1995); see also EIU, "Country Profile Mozambique, 1994-95." The debt figures stem from Banco de Moçambique, quoted in MediaFax (Maputo), 975 (21 March 1996), p. 1.
40. All economic figures in this paragraph except for figures on debt are taken from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), "Country Report on Mozambique and Malawi" (Third Quarter 1995); see also EIU, "Country Profile Mozambique, 1994-95." The debt figures stem from Banco de Moçambique, quoted in MediaFax (Maputo), 975 (21 March 1996), p. 1.
41. For a brilliant analysis of the Mozambican economy, see Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco, ed., Moçambique, perspectivas económicas (Maputo: Universidade Eduardo Mondlane FES, 1994). (in Portuguese)
42. See José Luis Magode, ed., Moçambique: etnicidades, nacionalismo e o estado. Transiçao Inacabada (Maputo: Instituto de Relações Internacionais/FES, 1996). (in Portuguese)
43. José Cabaço, "A longa estrada da democraticia Moçambicana" in Brazão Mazula, ed., Moçambique: eleições, democracia e desenvolvimento (Maputo: Inter-Africa Group, 1995), pp. 79-114. (in Portuguese)
44. Basil Davidson, The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation State (New York: Times Books, 1992).
45. For an analysis of the causes of the Mozambican war see, inter alia Christian Geffray, A causa das armas: antropologia de uma guerra contemporãnea em Moçambique (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1991) (in Portuguese); Gueorgui Derlugian, "Social Decomposition and Armed Violence in Post-Colonial Mozam bique," Review 8 (1990)4:430-48; Anders Nilsson sees in postindependence rural socioeconomic stratification processes as well as in the marginalization of parts of the structure of African traditional rule the most important internal causes of the war; see also his "Legitimidade, economia, conflito e a guerra" in Irâe Baptista Lundin and Francisco Jamisse Machava, eds., Autoridade e poder tradicional, Vol. 1 (Maputo: Ministério de Administração Estatal, 1995), pp. 127-44. (in Portuguese)
46. For an analysis of the causes of the Mozambican war see, inter alia Christian Geffray, A causa das armas: antropologia de uma guerra contemporãnea em Moçambique (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1991) (in Portuguese); Gueorgui Derlugian, "Social Decomposition and Armed Violence in Post-Colonial Mozam bique," Review 8 (1990)4:430-48; Anders Nilsson sees in postindependence rural socioeconomic stratification processes as well as in the marginalization of parts of the structure of African traditional rule the most important internal causes of the war; see also his "Legitimidade, economia, conflito e a guerra" in Irâe Baptista Lundin and Francisco Jamisse Machava, eds., Autoridade e poder tradicional, Vol. 1 (Maputo: Ministério de Administração Estatal, 1995), pp. 127-44. (in Portuguese)
47. For an analysis of the causes of the Mozambican war see, inter alia Christian Geffray, A causa das armas: antropologia de uma guerra contemporãnea em Moçambique (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 1991) (in Portuguese); Gueorgui Derlugian, "Social Decomposition and Armed Violence in Post-Colonial Mozam bique," Review 8 (1990)4:430-48; Anders Nilsson sees in postindependence rural socioeconomic stratification processes as well as in the marginalization of parts of the structure of African traditional rule the most important internal causes of the war; see also his "Legitimidade, economia, conflito e a guerra" in Irâe Baptista Lundin and Francisco Jamisse Machava, eds., Autoridade e poder tradicional, Vol. 1 (Maputo: Ministério de Administração Estatal, 1995), pp. 127-44. (in Portuguese)
48. Concerning processes of domination and subjugation in the wake of colonialism and the emergence of castes of professional fighters and power groups, see Malyn Newitt, A History of Mozambique (London: Hurst, 1995).
49. Cabaço, "A longa estrada," p. 98.
50. Concerning the positive evaluation of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) involvement in the Mozambican peace process, see Also Ajello, "O papel da ONUMOZ no processo da Pacificaçao" in Mazula, Moçambique, pp. 125-9; Winrich Luehna, Bernhard Weimer, and Sabine Fandrych, "Conference Report: International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), New York, 27 March 1995" (FES Wissenschaft und Politik) (Ebenhausen, July 1995); and Sabine Fandrych, "Der beitrag der vereinten nationen zur friedenserhaltung und konsolidierung in Mosambik: uebertragbares modell oder erfolgreiche ausnahme?" (M.A. thesis, Ludwig Maximilians Universitaet, Muenchen, 1995). (in German)
51. Concerning the positive evaluation of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) involvement in the Mozambican peace process, see Also Ajello, "O papel da ONUMOZ no processo da Pacificaçao" in Mazula, Moçambique, pp. 125-9; Winrich Luehna, Bernhard Weimer, and Sabine Fandrych, "Conference Report: International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), New York, 27 March 1995" (FES Wissenschaft und Politik) (Ebenhausen, July 1995); and Sabine Fandrych, "Der beitrag der vereinten nationen zur friedenserhaltung und konsolidierung in Mosambik: uebertragbares modell oder erfolgreiche ausnahme?" (M.A. thesis, Ludwig Maximilians Universitaet, Muenchen, 1995). (in German)
52. Concerning the positive evaluation of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) involvement in the Mozambican peace process, see Also Ajello, "O papel da ONUMOZ no processo da Pacificaçao" in Mazula, Moçambique, pp. 125-9; Winrich Luehna, Bernhard Weimer, and Sabine Fandrych, "Conference Report: International Workshop on the Successful Conclusion of the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), New York, 27 March 1995" (FES Wissenschaft und Politik) (Ebenhausen, July 1995); and Sabine Fandrych, "Der beitrag der vereinten nationen zur friedenserhaltung und konsolidierung in Mosambik: uebertragbares modell oder erfolgreiche ausnahme?" (M.A. thesis, Ludwig Maximilians Universitaet, Muenchen, 1995). (in German)
53. It is interesting to note that the demobilization process after the peace accord was accompanied by mutinies against superiors testifying to the severe cleavages and tensions between officers and the rank and file, the latter having often been press-ganged (FRELIMO) or abducted (RENAMO). For the creation of the new army, Forças Armadas da Defasa de Moçambique (FADM), both sides were given a quota of 15,000 men in the Peace Accord. However, in 1994, after completion of demobilization, there were hardly any ex-soldiers available to serve in the new army, being sick and tired of previous experiences. Thus, its strength is presently at some 13,000 men, predominantly officers.
54. The two delegations were led by the former Minister of Transport and Communications, Arnando Guebuza (FRELIMO) and the then Secretary for Political Affairs (RENAMO), Raul Domingos. Both now represent their respective parties as chief whip in Parliament.
55. Concerning details of the negotiations and the Peace Agreement, see Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Mozambico: dalla guerra alla pace; storia di una mediazione insolata. (Milano: San Paulo, 1994) (in Italian); Don Matteo Zuppi, "A comunidade de Santo Egidio no acordo geral de paz" in Mazula, Moçambique, pp. 115-23; Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 1994); and Tamme Hansma, ed., The General Agreement of Mozambique (Amsterdam: African-European Institute, 1993). (in Portuguese and English)
56. Concerning details of the negotiations and the Peace Agreement, see Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Mozambico: dalla guerra alla pace; storia di una mediazione insolata. (Milano: San Paulo, 1994) (in Italian); Don Matteo Zuppi, "A comunidade de Santo Egidio no acordo geral de paz" in Mazula, Moçambique, pp. 115-23; Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 1994); and Tamme Hansma, ed., The General Agreement of Mozambique (Amsterdam: African-European Institute, 1993). (in Portuguese and English)
57. Concerning details of the negotiations and the Peace Agreement, see Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Mozambico: dalla guerra alla pace; storia di una mediazione insolata. (Milano: San Paulo, 1994) (in Italian); Don Matteo Zuppi, "A comunidade de Santo Egidio no acordo geral de paz" in Mazula, Moçambique, pp. 115-23; Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 1994); and Tamme Hansma, ed., The General Agreement of Mozambique (Amsterdam: African-European Institute, 1993). (in Portuguese and English)
58. Concerning details of the negotiations and the Peace Agreement, see Roberto Morozzo della Rocca, Mozambico: dalla guerra alla pace; storia di una mediazione insolata. (Milano: San Paulo, 1994) (in Italian); Don Matteo Zuppi, "A comunidade de Santo Egidio no acordo geral de paz" in Mazula, Moçambique, pp. 115-23; Cameron Hume, Ending Mozambique's War: The Role of Mediation and Good Offices (Washington, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 1994); and Tamme Hansma, ed., The General Agreement of Mozambique (Amsterdam: African-European Institute, 1993). (in Portuguese and English)
59. For details, see Zuppi, "A comunidade."
60. The constitution was changed by FRELIMO in November 1990, providing, inter alia, for multiparty democracy and scrapping any reference to socialism.
61. See Protocols II and III of the Peace Agreement in Hansma, ed., The General Agreement, pp. 12-27.
62. Brazão Mazula, "As eleições Moçambicanas: uma trajectória da paz e da democracia" in his Moçambique, pp. 26-77.
63. Norberto Carrilho, " A legislação eleitoral em Moçambique e a realização política e social" in Mazula, Moçambique, p. 146.
64. Luis de Brito, "O comportamento eleitoral nas primeiras eleições multipartidárias em Moçambique" in Mazula, Moçambique, pp. 485-94.
65. Ibid., p.495.
66. Cabaço, "A longa estrada," p. 106.
67. Ode àPaz (Ode to Peace) had the support of the EU and the FES. Concerning the more technical aspects of civic and voter education, see Juarez de Maia, "O projecto da educaçao cívica no processo eleitoral Moçambicano" in Mazula, Moçambique, pp. 160-229.
68. Cabaço, "A longa estrada," p. 102.
69. In line with the provisions of the Rome Peace Agreement, the donors, in the first place the EU including Italy, to a large extent financed the operations of the national electoral commission (NEC), the trust fund for the support of the political parties (which enabled RENAMO to change from a military organization to a political party), and international electoral observers. It is estimated that the cost of the election, including observation, reached some US$80 million. The RENAMO trust fund is valued between US$16 million and US$20 million. The coordination of the financial support for the Mozambican elections was done through the "Aid for Democracy Group" in close cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project "Support to the Electoral Process in Mozambique." See Michael Turner, "A comunidade internacional e o processo eleitoral em Moçambique" in Mazula, Moçambique, pp. 643-72.
70. Cabaço, "A longa estrada," p. 102.
71. Irâe Baptista Lundin, "A pesquisa sobre a autoridade/poder tradicionalem Moçambique: um somatório comentado e analisado" in Lundin and Machava, Autoridade e poder tradicional, pp. 27-9.
72. See Nilsson, "Legitimidade," p. 143.
73. See Helder Muteia, "Autoridade tradicional e outros paradigmas da democracia em Moçambique" in Comissão para a UNESCO em Moçambique, ed., Cultura de paz e democracia (Maputo, 1995), pp. 33-54; and Tirmiziou Diallo, "Fuuta Jaloo - The Structure of an African State" in Donald Rothchild, ed., Strengthening African Local Initiative: Local Self-Governance. Decentralization and Accountability (Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 1994), pp. 95-108.
74. See Helder Muteia, "Autoridade tradicional e outros paradigmas da democracia em Moçambique" in Comissão para a UNESCO em Moçambique, ed., Cultura de paz e democracia (Maputo, 1995), pp. 33-54; and Tirmiziou Diallo, "Fuuta Jaloo - The Structure of an African State" in Donald Rothchild, ed., Strengthening African Local Initiative: Local Self-Governance. Decentralization and Accountability (Hamburg: Institute of African Affairs, 1994), pp. 95-108.
75. John Paul Lederach, "Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies" (draft), cited in Thania Paffenholz, "Vermittlung-kriegsbeendigung und konfliktregelung durch friedliche einmischung" in Volker Matthies, ed., Vom krieg zum frieden, kriegsbeendigung und friedenskonsolidierung (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1995), pp. 39-56. (in German)
76. John Paul Lederach, "Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies" (draft), cited in Thania Paffenholz, "Vermittlung-kriegsbeendigung und konfliktregelung durch friedliche einmischung" in Volker Matthies, ed., Vom krieg zum frieden, kriegsbeendigung und friedenskonsolidierung (Bremen: Edition Temmen, 1995), pp. 39-56. (in German)
77. Reconciliation which intrinsically unites the elements of truth, mercy, justice, and peace. See ibid.
78. See, for example, Cabaço, "A longa estrada," p. 97.
79. Mazula, Moçambique.
80. See Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: CivicTraditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Concerning civil society and political and economic change in Africa, see John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994).
81. See Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: CivicTraditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Concerning civil society and political and economic change in Africa, see John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, eds., Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994).
82. Muteia, Autoridade tradicional, p. 43ff; José Ibraimo Abudo, "Administração - justiça e terras " in Lundin and Machava, Autoridade e poder tradicional, pp. 123-6.
83. Muteia, Autoridade tradicional, p. 43ff; José Ibraimo Abudo, "Administração - justiça e terras " in Lundin and Machava, Autoridade e poder tradicional, pp. 123-6.
84. José Manuel Guambe, "O problema de decentralização política num contexto democrãtico em Moçambique" in Magode, Mozambique etricidades, nacionalismo e o estado, pp. 145-65.
85. Nilsson, "Legitimidade," p. 143f.
86. Dele Olowu, "Beyond the Failure of the Centralized State in Africa" in Rothchild, Strengthening African Local Initiative, pp. 19-29.
87. António Pinto de Abreu et al., "Perspectivas de economia nacional até o final da décoda" in Castel-Branco, Moçambique perspectivas economicas, p. 204.
88. See República de Moçambique, "Quadro institucional dos distrilos municipals," Lei No. 3/94 (Boletim da República no. 37), First Series, Second Supplement (Maputo, Imprensa Nacional de Moçambique, 1995). (in Portuguese)
89. Dele Olowu and Paul Smoke, "Determinants of Successes in African Local Governments: An Overview," Public Administration and Development 12 (1992) 17:1-17.
90. The reintegration of RENAMO-controlled areas into a unified territorial and public administration - agreed in the Rome peace treaty - works the following way: RENAMO nominates their candidates for the post of district administrator, respectively, chefe do posto (the lower echelon of district administration), who, if their qualifications are compatible with the requirements of the civil service, are recruited and trained, together with their colleagues of the state administration in place. Their syllabus is adjusted to the postwar situation and includes, apart from administrative issues and procedures, an emphasis on the functional distinction between political party and administration, which was blurred during the war both in FRELIMO- and RENAMO-controlled areas. So far, some eighty RENAMO-nominated individuals have been integrated into the public administration, thus putting an end to the problem of double administration. Nevertheless there are still occasional incidences of disobedience and disruption of public order in former RENAMO zones, often caused or instigated by party superiors and militants, for the sake of making political propaganda.
91. Mazula, Moçambique.
92. See, for example, Richard Friedli, Kindoki ist verwirrt. Zairische stadtkonflikte und Afrikanische palaver systeme. Beitrag der afrikanischen palaversysteme an das internationale konfliktmanagement (Bern: Scheweizerische Friedenstiftung, 1995). (in German)
93. The most important premises are the perceptions, reinforced by science, ideology, and socioeconomic practice, that: (a) mankind is separate from nature, respectively, nature is mankind's enemy, (b) fellow human beings are not fellow human beings but animals (hommo homini lupus), and (c) happiness is only possible through an abundance of material possessions. See Payutta, Buddhist Solutions, p. 66f.