Ragged Justice: Loyalist Vigilantism in Northern Ireland

Terrorism and Political Violence

Volumn 11, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 1-31

  Silke, Andrew ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033268839     PISSN: 09546553     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09546559908427514     Document Type: Article

References (74)

1. For a recent review and analysis of the vigilante campaign of the Provisional IRA, the reader is directed to Andrew Silke, 'Rebel's Dilemma: The Changing Relationship between the IRA, Sinn Féin and Vigilantism in Northern Ireland', Terrorism and Political Violence (hereafter TPV) 11/1 (Spring 1999) pp.55-93.
2. These are merely the officially recorded attacks. The actual figure - for beatings at least - is certainly much higher.
3. Jonathan Stevenson, 'We Wrecked The Place': Contemplating an End to the Northern Irish Troubles (London: Free Press 1996) p.27.
4. This figure is based on statistics provided in Steve Bruce, The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992) p.274.
5. It also provides an indication of why relations with elements of the British Army have remained better even as RUC members were burned from their houses in loyalist areas. The British Army has borne the brunt of republican terrorism but has had the least to fear from loyalists.
6. Emma Flynn, 'Loyalist drinking session Paras banned', News Letter, 5 August 1996, p.5.
7. There has been a significant degree of low level co-operation between elements within the British Army and the loyalists. In particular, a few members of the part-time Royal Irish Regiment (previously called the Ulster Defence Regiment) have secretly been active members of the loyalist groups and have been involved in carrying out terrorist attacks. For example, Julian Creaney, a private in the Royal Irish Regiment, was exposed in 1994 as an active member of the UVF ('RIR man jailed for swearing-in UVF members', Irish News, 2 March 1994, p. 10). In 1995, another RIR soldier, Neil Irwin, was also discovered to be a UVF member and was further found to be attempting to recruit other RIR soldiers into the loyalist group ('RIR men face terror charges', News Letter, 15 June 1995, p.13). There have also been a number of cases where security force members have ferried weapons for the loyalists throughout various parts of Northern Ireland (e.g. 'Soldiers jailed on terror charges', News Leiter, 30 June 1995, p.8). But the most common form of support has been the passing of sensitive intelligence to loyalist groups about the activities and personal details of republican figures (for example see 'Royal Marine to face terror charges', News Letter, 27 April 1994, p. 1). As pro-state terrorists the loyalists share the same enemy as the state forces, and the reality of this has encouraged a degree of support to develop between the two. In the words of one British Army collaborator who passed information to the UFF, if the loyalists were going to kill people, they 'might as well bump off the right people' (as quoted in 'Marine gave list of names to terrorists', News Letter, 24 October 1995, p.7).
8. There has been a significant degree of low level co-operation between elements within the British Army and the loyalists. In particular, a few members of the part-time Royal Irish Regiment (previously called the Ulster Defence Regiment) have secretly been active members of the loyalist groups and have been involved in carrying out terrorist attacks. For example, Julian Creaney, a private in the Royal Irish Regiment, was exposed in 1994 as an active member of the UVF ('RIR man jailed for swearing-in UVF members', Irish News, 2 March 1994, p. 10). In 1995, another RIR soldier, Neil Irwin, was also discovered to be a UVF member and was further found to be attempting to recruit other RIR soldiers into the loyalist group ('RIR men face terror charges', News Letter, 15 June 1995, p.13). There have also been a number of cases where security force members have ferried weapons for the loyalists throughout various parts of Northern Ireland (e.g. 'Soldiers jailed on terror charges', News Leiter, 30 June 1995, p.8). But the most common form of support has been the passing of sensitive intelligence to loyalist groups about the activities and personal details of republican figures (for example see 'Royal Marine to face terror charges', News Letter, 27 April 1994, p. 1). As pro-state terrorists the loyalists share the same enemy as the state forces, and the reality of this has encouraged a degree of support to develop between the two. In the words of one British Army collaborator who passed information to the UFF, if the loyalists were going to kill people, they 'might as well bump off the right people' (as quoted in 'Marine gave list of names to terrorists', News Letter, 24 October 1995, p.7).
9. There has been a significant degree of low level co-operation between elements within the British Army and the loyalists. In particular, a few members of the part-time Royal Irish Regiment (previously called the Ulster Defence Regiment) have secretly been active members of the loyalist groups and have been involved in carrying out terrorist attacks. For example, Julian Creaney, a private in the Royal Irish Regiment, was exposed in 1994 as an active member of the UVF ('RIR man jailed for swearing-in UVF members', Irish News, 2 March 1994, p. 10). In 1995, another RIR soldier, Neil Irwin, was also discovered to be a UVF member and was further found to be attempting to recruit other RIR soldiers into the loyalist group ('RIR men face terror charges', News Letter, 15 June 1995, p.13). There have also been a number of cases where security force members have ferried weapons for the loyalists throughout various parts of Northern Ireland (e.g. 'Soldiers jailed on terror charges', News Leiter, 30 June 1995, p.8). But the most common form of support has been the passing of sensitive intelligence to loyalist groups about the activities and personal details of republican figures (for example see 'Royal Marine to face terror charges', News Letter, 27 April 1994, p. 1). As pro-state terrorists the loyalists share the same enemy as the state forces, and the reality of this has encouraged a degree of support to develop between the two. In the words of one British Army collaborator who passed information to the UFF, if the loyalists were going to kill people, they 'might as well bump off the right people' (as quoted in 'Marine gave list of names to terrorists', News Letter, 24 October 1995, p.7).
10. There has been a significant degree of low level co-operation between elements within the British Army and the loyalists. In particular, a few members of the part-time Royal Irish Regiment (previously called the Ulster Defence Regiment) have secretly been active members of the loyalist groups and have been involved in carrying out terrorist attacks. For example, Julian Creaney, a private in the Royal Irish Regiment, was exposed in 1994 as an active member of the UVF ('RIR man jailed for swearing-in UVF members', Irish News, 2 March 1994, p. 10). In 1995, another RIR soldier, Neil Irwin, was also discovered to be a UVF member and was further found to be attempting to recruit other RIR soldiers into the loyalist group ('RIR men face terror charges', News Letter, 15 June 1995, p.13). There have also been a number of cases where security force members have ferried weapons for the loyalists throughout various parts of Northern Ireland (e.g. 'Soldiers jailed on terror charges', News Leiter, 30 June 1995, p.8). But the most common form of support has been the passing of sensitive intelligence to loyalist groups about the activities and personal details of republican figures (for example see 'Royal Marine to face terror charges', News Letter, 27 April 1994, p. 1). As pro-state terrorists the loyalists share the same enemy as the state forces, and the reality of this has encouraged a degree of support to develop between the two. In the words of one British Army collaborator who passed information to the UFF, if the loyalists were going to kill people, they 'might as well bump off the right people' (as quoted in 'Marine gave list of names to terrorists', News Letter, 24 October 1995, p.7).
11. There has been a significant degree of low level co-operation between elements within the British Army and the loyalists. In particular, a few members of the part-time Royal Irish Regiment (previously called the Ulster Defence Regiment) have secretly been active members of the loyalist groups and have been involved in carrying out terrorist attacks. For example, Julian Creaney, a private in the Royal Irish Regiment, was exposed in 1994 as an active member of the UVF ('RIR man jailed for swearing-in UVF members', Irish News, 2 March 1994, p. 10). In 1995, another RIR soldier, Neil Irwin, was also discovered to be a UVF member and was further found to be attempting to recruit other RIR soldiers into the loyalist group ('RIR men face terror charges', News Letter, 15 June 1995, p.13). There have also been a number of cases where security force members have ferried weapons for the loyalists throughout various parts of Northern Ireland (e.g. 'Soldiers jailed on terror charges', News Leiter, 30 June 1995, p.8). But the most common form of support has been the passing of sensitive intelligence to loyalist groups about the activities and personal details of republican figures (for example see 'Royal Marine to face terror charges', News Letter, 27 April 1994, p. 1). As pro-state terrorists the loyalists share the same enemy as the state forces, and the reality of this has encouraged a degree of support to develop between the two. In the words of one British Army collaborator who passed information to the UFF, if the loyalists were going to kill people, they 'might as well bump off the right people' (as quoted in 'Marine gave list of names to terrorists', News Letter, 24 October 1995, p.7).
12. Chris Thornton, 'Grenade "exploded in UVF man's hand"', Ulster News Letter, 19 January 1994, p.5.
13. Based on figures reported in Liz Walsh, 'Winter of discontent', Magill, November 1998, pp.40-43.
14. For an account of the general similarities in methods and motives which lie behind paramilitary vigilantism, the reader is directed to Andrew Silke, 'The Lords of Discipline: The Methods and Motives of Paramilitary Vigilantism in Northern Ireland', Low Intensity-Conflict & Law Enforcement 7/2 (Autumn 1998) pp.121-56.
15. The 'B Specials' were a reserve police force for the RUC. The Specials were notoriously sectarian and were justifiably criticised for their heavy-handed and counter-productive treatment of civil rights marches in the late 1960s. The organisation was unable and -probably more accurately - unwilling to play a constructive role in maintaining law and order as widespread political violence erupted in Northern Ireland in 1969 and early 1970. The Specials were sensibly disbanded in April 1970, with elements being questionably reformed as the Ulster Defence Regiment.
16. Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie, The Provisional IRA (London: Corgi 1987) pp.122-3.
17. See Jeffrey Sluka, Hearts and Minds, Water and Fish: Support for the IRA and INLA in a Northern Irish Ghetto (London: Jai Press 1989).
18. Interview with the author.
19. For more on this, readers are directed to two articles: Andrew Silke, 'In Defence of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland - Part One: Extortion and Blackmail', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21/4 (1998) pp.331-62, and 'Drink, Drugs and Rock 'n Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland - Part Two', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (in press).
20. For more on this, readers are directed to two articles: Andrew Silke, 'In Defence of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland - Part One: Extortion and Blackmail', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21/4 (1998) pp.331-62, and 'Drink, Drugs and Rock 'n Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland - Part Two', Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (in press).
21. This benchmark level is reinforced by the realisation that in 1983 and 1993, the two years when the PIRA tried to abandon its community policing role, the level of punishment attacks dropped to levels normally seen in the loyalists prior to 1985. In essence, during 1983 and 1993, the PIRA were just policing themselves and the most serious criminals, exactly like the earlier loyalist campaign.
22. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Children in Northern Ireland: Abused by Security Forces and Paramilitaries (London: Human Rights Watch 1992) p.43.
23. For a general account of the type and nature of 'crimes' the paramilitaries deem punishable, the reader is directed to Silke, 'The Lords of Discipline' (note 10).
24. These cases are described in Families Against Intimidation and Terror, New Start -Supplementary Report (Belfast: Families Against Intimidation and Terror 1998) p.3.
25. As quoted in Darwin Templeton, 'UDA says "pay up or else"', Sunday Life, 16 February 1997, p. 12.
26. The reasons why this is so are clearly outlined in Silke, 'The Lords of Discipline' (note 10).
27. For more on this case see Darwin Templeton, 'Fugitives from the UVF', Sunday Life, 10 November 1996; and Phelim McAleer, 'Expelled UVF man killed by criminals says Billy Wright', Irish News, 30 October 1996.
28. For more on this case see Darwin Templeton, 'Fugitives from the UVF', Sunday Life, 10 November 1996; and Phelim McAleer, 'Expelled UVF man killed by criminals says Billy Wright', Irish News, 30 October 1996.
29. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (note 17) p.44.
30. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (note 17) p.43.
31. David Smith, 'Unholy Peace', Sunday Times, 7 January 1996, p.17.
32. As quoted in Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (note 17) pp.43-4.
33. Steven McCaffrey, 'UDA blamed for quarry murder', Irish News, 12 November 1997.
34. 'UVF gunman jailed' News Letter, 6 May 1995, p.8.
35. As reflected in comments from local people such as the following: 'The UVF only discipline their own men; they don't go after others.' Quoted in Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (note 17) p.43.
36. Darwin Templeton, 'Loyalists mete out more "punishments"', Belfast Telegraph, February 1994.
37. '"Weak man" stored guns', News Letter, 7 March 1995, p.5.
38. 'Men forced to carry out bombing court told', News Letter, 6 May 1995, p.5.
39. Recent research on terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland clearly shows that the loyalist groups are less effective in carrying out attacks than republican groups. A number of significant factors were identified, including the finding that the terrorist group itself was a significant variable. Policies such as those outlined here almost certainly play a role in explaining why this was so. For more on this research see Andrew Silke, 'Terrorism in Northern Ireland: An Application of Rational Choice Theory', Paper presented at the British Psychological Society Annual Conference, Brighton, April 1996; and Andrew Silke, 'Profiling terrorist behaviour? Possibilities and potentials in a situational perspective', Paper presented at the Division of Criminological and Legal Psychology Annual Conference, Durham, September 1998.
40. Recent research on terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland clearly shows that the loyalist groups are less effective in carrying out attacks than republican groups. A number of significant factors were identified, including the finding that the terrorist group itself was a significant variable. Policies such as those outlined here almost certainly play a role in explaining why this was so. For more on this research see Andrew Silke, 'Terrorism in Northern Ireland: An Application of Rational Choice Theory', Paper presented at the British Psychological Society Annual Conference, Brighton, April 1996; and Andrew Silke, 'Profiling terrorist behaviour? Possibilities and potentials in a situational perspective', Paper presented at the Division of Criminological and Legal Psychology Annual Conference, Durham, September 1998.
41. The vigilante system is open to a level of abuse that is only matched by the most corrupt formal justice system, and certainly the current system in the North - despite its many flaws - is not as vulnerable to personal whims as the paramilitaries 'law and order'.
42. David Smith, 'Unholy Peace' (note 25).
43. Chris Thornton, 'Woman says UDA broke up her home', News Letter, 10 September 1996, p.3.
44. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, To Serve Without Favor: Policing, Human Rights, and Accountability in Northern Ireland (London: Human Rights Watch 1997) p.121.
45. The newspaper reports were backed up by the RUC, who said that they became aware of the development after local officers noticed a significant decline in the number of so-called punishment attacks. In January six punishment beatings were recorded in the Shankill area but by the spring the number had fallen to around one a month. During the last three months only two paramilitary punishment assaults have been recorded at Tennent Street police station. An RUC spokesman said: 'We believe that criminals are being offered a choice of a beating or paying some cash by way of a fine to one of the paramilitary organisations. Fines of between £100 and £1,000 have been reportedly imposed at these kangaroo courts.* (Alan Murray, 'Terror "court" shock', Sunday Life, 29 September 1996, pp.1-2).
46. Ibid.
47. 'Victims hit in pocket', News Letter, 16 November 1996, pp.1, 4.
48. An account of the loyalists' anti-drug-dealing activities can be found in Andrew Silke (note 15).
49. Danny Morrison, 'I'm an IRA sniper and an RUC informer', The Observer, 14 December 1997.
50. For more on this case see Phelim McAteer, 'Minister dies after loyalist beating', Irish News, 25 March 1997, p.1; 'UVF blamed for attack which killed minister', Irish News, 13 November 1997; and Vivek Chaudhary, 'Minister beaten to death after Customs found porn video'. The Guardian, 26 March 1997, p.6.
51. For more on this case see Phelim McAteer, 'Minister dies after loyalist beating', Irish News, 25 March 1997, p.1; 'UVF blamed for attack which killed minister', Irish News, 13 November 1997; and Vivek Chaudhary, 'Minister beaten to death after Customs found porn video'. The Guardian, 26 March 1997, p.6.
52. For more on this case see Phelim McAteer, 'Minister dies after loyalist beating', Irish News, 25 March 1997, p.1; 'UVF blamed for attack which killed minister', Irish News, 13 November 1997; and Vivek Chaudhary, 'Minister beaten to death after Customs found porn video'. The Guardian, 26 March 1997, p.6.
53. Families Against Intimidation & Terror (note 19).
54. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (note 17) p.43.
55. This debate began with Robert White, 'The Irish Republican Army: An Assessment of Sectarianism', TPV 9/1 (Spring 1997) pp.20-55.
56. Steve Bruce, 'Victim Selection in Ethnic Conflict: Motives and Attitudes in Irish Republicanism', TPV9/1 (Spring 1997) pp.56-71.
57. James Dingley, 'A Reply to White's Non-Sectarian Thesis of PIRA Targeting', TPV 10/2 (Summer 1998) pp.106-17.
58. As cited in Liam Kennedy (ed.). Crime and Punishment in West Belfast (Belfast: The Summer School 1995).
59. All the arrest and conviction figures quoted in this paragraph are derived from an answer provided by Sir John Wheeler, then Law and Order Minister, in his response to a parliamentary question. The specific details of Sir John's reply are recounted in 'Beating gangs escape the law', News Letter, 15 March 1997, p.8.
60. Chris Thornton, 'Mystery group's terror threat splits loyalists', News Letter, 4 March 1996, p.5.
61. 'Trio held over "show of strength"', Irish News, 23 August 1996, p.1.
62. Chris Thornton, 'Death threat man denounces "fascism"'. News Letter, 30 August 1996, p.9.
63. Alan Murray, 'New terror group behind shootings', Sunday Life, 9 February 1997, p.8.
64. 'Wright jailed for eight years after staging court walkout', Irish Times, 8 March 1997, p.5.
65. For a good account of the positive impact of the hunger strikes on Sinn Féin see Liam Clarke, Broadening the Battlefield: The H-Blocks and the Rise of Sinn Fein (Dublin: Gill and MacMillan 1987).
66. This is not to say that the loyalist groups have been inactive. On the contrary, both the UDA and the UVF have remained very active. Fund-raising in its many questionable forms has continued virtually unabated, low-level sectarian attacks have continued, and there have been sporadic and short-lived returns to the terror campaign of the pre-cease-fire era. The most notable breech of the cease-fire occurred in January 1998, when the UDA carried out several sectarian attacks, leaving five Catholics dead. While the UDA never called an end to their cease-fire, they nevertheless publicly re-instated it towards the end of the month, after they were strongly linked to the sectarian murders.
67. For an analysis of this dilemma, see Silke (note 1).
68. Chris Thornton, 'Paramilitary "justice" leaves trail of agony', News Letter, 13 January 1995, p.11.
69. 'Leave it to RUC', News Letter, 6 December 1994, p.8.
70. Ibid.
71. Chris Thornton, 'End beatings call by parties'. News Letter, 3 November 1994, p.14.
72. Taken from the UDP's 1997 manifesto, as outlined on the party's internet site at http://www.udp.org/manifesto.html on 29 October 1998.
73. 'Party blasts beatings'. News Letter, 1 November 1994, p.8.
74. Human Rights Watch/Helsinki (note 17) pp.43-4.