Peacekeepers and local social actors: The need for dynamic, cross-cultural analysis

Global Governance

Volumn 5, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 403-424

  Pouligny, Béatrice ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0033266726     PISSN: 10752846     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1163/19426720-00504002     Document Type: Review

References (70)

1. Steven R. Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 24.
2. As noted, for instance, by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osier Hampson, "Making Peace Settlements Work," Foreign Policy, no. 104 (fall 1996): 69. Typically, "NGOs and Civil Society in Peacekeeping" was one of the themes of the 1998 annual meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations System, at which an earlier version of this article was presented.
3. As noted, for instance, by Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osier Hampson, "Making Peace Settlements Work," Foreign Policy, no. 104 (fall 1996): 69. Typically, "NGOs and Civil Society in Peacekeeping" was one of the themes of the 1998 annual meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations System, at which an earlier version of this article was presented.
4. Some of the international and local organizations concerned have already published papers critical of this new kind of collaboration with the UN structure. See, among many publications, Amnesty International, Peacekeeping and Human Rights (London: Amnesty International, 1994); Human Rights Watch, The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); Aspen Institute, Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti - Recommendations for the United Nations (New York: Aspen Institute, Justice and Society Program, 1995); reports published on specific missions.
5. Some of the international and local organizations concerned have already published papers critical of this new kind of collaboration with the UN structure. See, among many publications, Amnesty International, Peacekeeping and Human Rights (London: Amnesty International, 1994); Human Rights Watch, The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); Aspen Institute, Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti - Recommendations for the United Nations (New York: Aspen Institute, Justice and Society Program, 1995); reports published on specific missions.
6. Some of the international and local organizations concerned have already published papers critical of this new kind of collaboration with the UN structure. See, among many publications, Amnesty International, Peacekeeping and Human Rights (London: Amnesty International, 1994); Human Rights Watch, The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and UN Field Operations (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); Aspen Institute, Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace: Lessons from El Salvador, Cambodia and Haiti - Recommendations for the United Nations (New York: Aspen Institute, Justice and Society Program, 1995); reports published on specific missions.
7. This is, among others, the common perception favored by the World Bank and most international organizations in the development area. On this point, see the analysis by Jenny Pearce, "Building Civil Society from the Outside: The Problematic Democratization of Central America," Global Society 12, no. 2 (May 1998): 188.
8. See Bertrand Badie, "Formes et transformations des communautés politiques," in Madeleine Grawitz and Jean Leca, Traité de science politique, vol. 1 (Paris: PUF, 1991), p. 647. Some research undertaken in African contexts is very revealing of this; see especially the interesting contributions by T. M. Callaghy, "Civil Society, Democracy and Economic Change in Africa: A Dissenting Opinion About Resurgent Societies," and Donald Rothchild and Letitia Lanson, "The Interactions Between State and Civil Society in Africa: From Deadlock to New Routines," in John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 231-253, 255-281.
9. See Bertrand Badie, "Formes et transformations des communautés politiques," in Madeleine Grawitz and Jean Leca, Traité de science politique, vol. 1 (Paris: PUF, 1991), p. 647. Some research undertaken in African contexts is very revealing of this; see especially the interesting contributions by T. M. Callaghy, "Civil Society, Democracy and Economic Change in Africa: A Dissenting Opinion About Resurgent Societies," and Donald Rothchild and Letitia Lanson, "The Interactions Between State and Civil Society in Africa: From Deadlock to New Routines," in John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 231-253, 255-281.
10. See Bertrand Badie, "Formes et transformations des communautés politiques," in Madeleine Grawitz and Jean Leca, Traité de science politique, vol. 1 (Paris: PUF, 1991), p. 647. Some research undertaken in African contexts is very revealing of this; see especially the interesting contributions by T. M. Callaghy, "Civil Society, Democracy and Economic Change in Africa: A Dissenting Opinion About Resurgent Societies," and Donald Rothchild and Letitia Lanson, "The Interactions Between State and Civil Society in Africa: From Deadlock to New Routines," in John W. Harbeson, Donald Rothchild, and Naomi Chazan, Civil Society and the State in Africa (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1994), pp. 231-253, 255-281.
11. Among other things, capitalist modernization, urbanization, the dissolution of traditional bonds and the decline of religious consciousness, and the shift in the nature of solidarity.
12. See Jean-François Bayart, "L'historicité de l'État importé," Les Cahiers du CERI (Paris), no. 15 (1996); see also Bayart, ed., La greffe de l'État (Paris: Karthala, 1996).
13. See Jean-François Bayart, "L'historicité de l'État importé," Les Cahiers du CERI (Paris), no. 15 (1996); see also Bayart, ed., La greffe de l'État (Paris: Karthala, 1996).
14. See Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn, Civil Society: Challenging Western Models (London and New York: Routledge and European Association of Social Anthropologists, 1996), pp. 16-17.
15. Among different proposals made to capture this, see the very interesting proposals made by Denis-Constant Martin, "La découverte des cultures politiques: Esquisse d'une approche comparatiste à partir des expériences africaines," Les Cahiers du CERI (Paris), no. 2 (1992).
16. Following the expression proposed by Clifford Geertz. This "system of meanings" allows the actors to situate themselves in the social game and give a particular meaning to the action and the social institutions in the collectivity concerned. The culture so defined does not create permanent identities but organizes the behavior of the different actors (including those who take power). See Clifford Geertz, "The Politics of Meanings," in The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 89.
17. See Ferdinand Tönnies, Communauté et société: Catégories fondamentales de la sociologie pure (Paris: Retz, 1977).
18. I have developed this point in "Les ONG, acteurs particuliers des 'relations internationales': Analyse socio-politique à partir du cas des ONG de défense des droits de l'homme," in J.-P. Deler, Y.-A. Faure, A. Piveteau, and P.-J. Roca, eds., ONG et développement: Société, économie, politique (Paris: Karthala, 1998), pp. 525-542.
19. See the analysis by Dennis McNamara, former director of the component, "UN Human Rights Activities in Cambodia: An Evaluation," in Aspen Institute, Honoring Human Rights and Keeping the Peace (Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute, 1995), p. 57.
20. Ligue Cambodgienne pour la Promotion et la Défense des Droits de l'Homme (LICADHO), Human Rights Vigilance of Cambodia, Outreach. Even if the financial help given has been less massive, other organizations created during the same period and working on issues close to human rights have also profited from support by UNTAC.
21. Interviewed by the author, Phnom Penh, 17 November 1995. This aspect has been reinforced for the fourth organization, created at the end of the mission, by two former Cambodian members of UNTAC (who were international interpreters): the Institut Cambodgien des Droits de l'Homme. Like most of the individuals concerned, they confirm that they feel themselves "foreigners in [their] own country, expatriates." Meng Ho Leang and Kassie Neou, vice-president and director, respectively, of the Institut Cambodgien des Droits de l'Homme, interviewed by the author, Phnom Penh, 1 December 1995.
22. In Haiti, the human rights mission is not part of the UN peacekeeping operation. A mixed mission under the auspices of the UN and the Organization of American States (MICIVIH) had been deployed previously, in 1993, and remained distinct after 1995. But, at least for local NGOs, this specific configuration (in comparison with other missions, which take a human rights component) was not decisive in their interaction with the UN.
23. The six most important are: Tutela Legal (Roman Catholic organization Justice and Peace) and its Protestant equivalent (DDH Sinodo Luterano Salvadoreño), Comisión de Derechos Humanos de El Salvador (CDHES), Instituto de Derechos Humanos de la UCA (Universidad Centroamericana/IDHUCA), Centro para la Aplicación del Derecho (CESPAD), and Instituto de Estudios Jurídicos de El Salvador (IEJES).
24. Not all of the nine members of the Plate-forme des Organisations Haïtiennes des Droits de l'Homme have the defense of human rights as their main objective.
25. The movement generated around the candidacy of the Rev. Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the 1990 presidential elections was called the Lavalas Political Organization.
26. Daniel Compagnon, ́Fausses pistes,́ Politique Africaine, no. 50 (June 1993): 131. See also Antonio Torrenzano, L'imbroglio somalien: Historique d'une crise de succession (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995), p. 105ff.; Roland Marchal, "Somalie: La normalisation malgré tout?" in Marchal and Christine Messiant, Les chemins de la guerre et de la paix: Fins de conflit en Afrique orientale et australe (Paris: Karthala, 1997), p. 231.
27. Daniel Compagnon, ́Fausses pistes,́ Politique Africaine, no. 50 (June 1993): 131. See also Antonio Torrenzano, L'imbroglio somalien: Historique d'une crise de succession (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995), p. 105ff.; Roland Marchal, "Somalie: La normalisation malgré tout?" in Marchal and Christine Messiant, Les chemins de la guerre et de la paix: Fins de conflit en Afrique orientale et australe (Paris: Karthala, 1997), p. 231.
28. Daniel Compagnon, ́Fausses pistes,́ Politique Africaine, no. 50 (June 1993): 131. See also Antonio Torrenzano, L'imbroglio somalien: Historique d'une crise de succession (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995), p. 105ff.; Roland Marchal, "Somalie: La normalisation malgré tout?" in Marchal and Christine Messiant, Les chemins de la guerre et de la paix: Fins de conflit en Afrique orientale et australe (Paris: Karthala, 1997), p. 231.
29. René Lemarchand, "Uncivil States and Civil Societies: How Illusion Became Reality," Journal of Modern African Studies, no. 30 (June 1992): 187.
30. See Eboe Hutchful, "The Civil Society Debate in Africa," International Journal (Toronto) 51, no. 1 (winter 1995/96): 71.
31. It is important to note that the configuration of the conflict and the forms of troop deployment often introduce discrepancies among areas. These have been particularly strong in Somalia - between what happened in Mogadishu and what happened in the rest of the country. This was also true for Bosnia, with the specific situation of Sarajevo and the "areas of protection."
32. Interviews by the author in suburbs of south San Salvador and with former members of ONUSAL, August-September 1995.
33. The program was directed toward 60,000 internally displaced people, 26,000 repatriates, and about 1.5 million people from 115 districts considered particularly affected by the war. Among the different forms of reinsertion, the program of land transfer was the most important (64 percent) and, at least for its first phase, was directly connected to ONUSAL's mandate. See "Apoyando a nuevos protagonistas en la agricultura salvadoreña" (San Salvador: UNDP, December 1993), p. 19; see also Secretaría de Reconstrucción Nacional (SRN), "Costos de los programas y proyectos dentro del marco de los Acuerdos de Paz," October 1994.
34. The program was directed toward 60,000 internally displaced people, 26,000 repatriates, and about 1.5 million people from 115 districts considered particularly affected by the war. Among the different forms of reinsertion, the program of land transfer was the most important (64 percent) and, at least for its first phase, was directly connected to ONUSAL's mandate. See "Apoyando a nuevos protagonistas en la agricultura salvadoreña" (San Salvador: UNDP, December 1993), p. 19; see also Secretaría de Reconstrucción Nacional (SRN), "Costos de los programas y proyectos dentro del marco de los Acuerdos de Paz," October 1994.
35. When ONUSAL began its work, many communities counted not only repatriated families but also people who had been internally displaced.
36. Cordinadoras de Comunidades y Repoblaciones, now called Cordinadoras de Comunidades para la Reconstrucción, exist in the regions of Chalatenango, San Vicente, La Paz, San Miguel, and Morazán.
37. Interviews by the author in Chalatenango and San Vicente areas, September 1995.
38. See, for instance, Robert E. Maguire, "Nouveaux acteurs et institutions établies: La mobilisation par le bas en Haïti," in Justin Daniel, ed., Les îles caraïbes: Modèles politiques et stratégies de développement (Paris: Karthala, CRPLC, 1996), pp. 297-320.
39. This is a central part of daily life and covers a large range of rituals concerning such matters as the organization of work, land, water, and justice; solidarity with the poor; health (remèd fèy); service of the spirits (lwa); and the resolution of conflicts (in a country where there is no functioning judicial system). Throughout Haitian history, it has also played a central role in the construction of collective identity, allowing the reconstruction of symbolic lineages (in vodou, there are nations composed of different families of protecting spirits, or lwa). See Laënnec Hurbon, Les mystères du vaudou (Paris: Ed. Découvertes Gallimard, 1993), p. 48; Hurbon, "Vodou et modernité en Haïti," Iberoamericana 42, no. 1 (1991): 43-60; John Merrill, "Vodou and Political Reform in Haiti: Some Lessons for the International Community," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 20, no. 1 (winter-spring 1996): 35, 40.
40. This is a central part of daily life and covers a large range of rituals concerning such matters as the organization of work, land, water, and justice; solidarity with the poor; health (remèd fèy); service of the spirits (lwa); and the resolution of conflicts (in a country where there is no functioning judicial system). Throughout Haitian history, it has also played a central role in the construction of collective identity, allowing the reconstruction of symbolic lineages (in vodou, there are nations composed of different families of protecting spirits, or lwa). See Laënnec Hurbon, Les mystères du vaudou (Paris: Ed. Découvertes Gallimard, 1993), p. 48; Hurbon, "Vodou et modernité en Haïti," Iberoamericana 42, no. 1 (1991): 43-60; John Merrill, "Vodou and Political Reform in Haiti: Some Lessons for the International Community," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 20, no. 1 (winter-spring 1996): 35, 40.
41. This is a central part of daily life and covers a large range of rituals concerning such matters as the organization of work, land, water, and justice; solidarity with the poor; health (remèd fèy); service of the spirits (lwa); and the resolution of conflicts (in a country where there is no functioning judicial system). Throughout Haitian history, it has also played a central role in the construction of collective identity, allowing the reconstruction of symbolic lineages (in vodou, there are nations composed of different families of protecting spirits, or lwa). See Laënnec Hurbon, Les mystères du vaudou (Paris: Ed. Découvertes Gallimard, 1993), p. 48; Hurbon, "Vodou et modernité en Haïti," Iberoamericana 42, no. 1 (1991): 43-60; John Merrill, "Vodou and Political Reform in Haiti: Some Lessons for the International Community," The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 20, no. 1 (winter-spring 1996): 35, 40.
42. Individuals in various urban and rural neighborhoods of Haiti and members of UN missions in Haiti, interviewed by the author, 1995-1996.
43. In Cambodia, Buddhism has been superimposed on former animist cults, which continue to play a part in many aspects of daily life, especially among people in rural areas. Ang Choulean, Les êtres surnaturels dans la religion populaire khmère (Paris: Cedoreck, 1986); Alain Forest, Le culte des génies protecteurs au Cambodge: Analyse d'un corpus de textes sur les Neak Ta (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992).
44. In Cambodia, Buddhism has been superimposed on former animist cults, which continue to play a part in many aspects of daily life, especially among people in rural areas. Ang Choulean, Les êtres surnaturels dans la religion populaire khmère (Paris: Cedoreck, 1986); Alain Forest, Le culte des génies protecteurs au Cambodge: Analyse d'un corpus de textes sur les Neak Ta (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992).
45. This term is very difficult to translate; it is the "occupied place" (l'endroit habité) and is generally translated as "village." Its size varies. See Jacques Népote, Parenté et organisation sociale dans le Cambodge moderne et contemporain: Quelques aspects et quelques applications du modèle les régissant (Geneva: Olizane, 1992); interviews by the author with ethnologists who are investigating this subject in various areas of Cambodia.
46. Former Khmer interpreters for UNTAC, former UN volunteers, and chiefs of phum, interviewed by the author.
47. This link between several phum is symbolized by the deposit of the ashes of ancestors at the pagoda.
48. Individuals in various areas of the country and former UNTAC members (mainly UN volunteers in charge of these aspects), interviewed by the author.
49. Two anthropologists working on this subject, Fabienne Luco and Maurice Eisenbruch, have explained to the author how, in different areas, this network had been decisive in the process of acceptance or rejection of the former refugees.
50. Robert A. Rubinstein, "Cultural Aspects of Peacekeeping: Notes on Substance of Symbols," Millennium 22, no. 3 (1993): 550.
51. As proposed by Johan Galtung and Ingrid Eide in their pilot study on the Gaza Strip. By "acceptance," the authors mean that "there were few or no overt displays of aggression against [the UN forces]." See Johan Galtung and Ingrid Eide, "Some Factors Affecting Local Acceptance of a UN Force: A Pilot Project Report from Gaza," in Galtung, Peace, War and Defence: Essays in Peace Research, vol. 2 (Copenhagen: Ejlers, 1996), p. 240.
52. Various actors concerned in Bas Artibonite and UN members, interviewed by the author, April-May 1995.
53. This expression may be translated as "we don't care about them," although the neglect appears stronger in Creole. People also sometimes say: "Nou pa okipe moun yo" or "Nou pa annafè ak blan," which basically mean the same (expressed by individuals and groups in different suburbs of Port-au-Prince and in provinces, interviewed by the author, April-May 1995, March 1996). This coincides with the perceptions of UN military personnel and policemen (reported in meetings with the author) regarding the kind of reception they received in the suburbs, where their visits had become increasingly rare.
54. Given that UN members (including UN volunteers) were not able to communicate directly with the people.
55. Mainly, in this case, between civil administration, police, and human rights. Former UNTAC members (UN volunteers and members of electoral, human rights, civil administration, and police components), former UNTAC interpreters, chiefs of phum and of districts, superintendents and governors (or vice-governors) in different provinces and in Phnom Penh, interviewed by the author, November-December 1995.
56. ONUSAL has been implicated, for instance, in a conflict at the Rosales hospital in February-March 1994 and at the Instituto del Seguro Social (ISS) in November 1994.
57. See Ioan Myrddin Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea, 1994), pp. 170-171; Lewis, "The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism," in Georges Nzongola-Nta-laja, ed., Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Atlanta: African Studies Association, 1991), p. 94. David D. Laitin and Saïd S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder: Westview; London: Gower, 1987), p. 46.
58. See Ioan Myrddin Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea, 1994), pp. 170-171; Lewis, "The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism," in Georges Nzongola-Nta-laja, ed., Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Atlanta: African Studies Association, 1991), p. 94. David D. Laitin and Saïd S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder: Westview; London: Gower, 1987), p. 46.
59. See Ioan Myrddin Lewis, Blood and Bone: The Call of Kinship in Somali Society (Lawrenceville, N.J.: Red Sea, 1994), pp. 170-171; Lewis, "The Ogaden and the Fragility of Somali Segmentary Nationalism," in Georges Nzongola-Nta-laja, ed., Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Atlanta: African Studies Association, 1991), p. 94. David D. Laitin and Saïd S. Samatar, Somalia: Nation in Search of a State (Boulder: Westview; London: Gower, 1987), p. 46.
60. A very similar reality appears in Haiti with Creole and - even if it has been largely underestimated, given that Spanish is an international language - in El Salvador with the Spanish spoken there.
61. The specialists of the Khmer language and popular education and former UNTAC interpreters interviewed by the author all considered that, at best, 5 percent of the UNTAC message had been received.
62. An expression often heard in the various countries, with slight variations due to language differences.
63. This has been symbolized in Cambodia by the July 1997 coup and the compromise made after the 1998 elections; and in Haiti by institutional blockage of the situation (blockage of the results of the elections and absence of government) since June 1997.
64. In both cases, this is partly linked to the problem of legitimacy of the electoral process. In El Salvador, as rightly emphasized by Ian Johnstone, "The irregularities in registration and voting undermined efforts to convince a skeptical population that the system had become more fair. . . . ONUSAL did not help the situation by quickly endorsing the first round of elections without simultaneously pointing out the problems that had to be remedied for the second round." See Ian Johnstone, Rights and Reconciliation: UN Strategies in El Salvador (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, for International Peace Academy, 1995), p. 53. The same kind of process occurred in Haiti in 1996 and 1997, contributing to the institutional blockage that followed. In both countries, this contributed to the high level of abstention in subsequent elections. Concerning both legislative and municipal elections in El Salvador in 1997, most observers have stressed the importance of the results of the FMLN. Very few, however, have remarked on the high level of violence during the electoral campaign and the level of abstention (around 65 percent), confirming what had already happened in the 1994 elections (less than 50 percent voter participation). According to various polls conducted between 1995 and 1997, such levels are directly connected to distrust of the electoral process and a perception that participation in the vote would not change anything. See Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública, serie de informes nos. 51, 61 (San Salvador: UCA, October 1995 and February 1997). In Haiti, elections in spring 1997 saw participation of less than 5 percent in most districts.
65. In both cases, this is partly linked to the problem of legitimacy of the electoral process. In El Salvador, as rightly emphasized by Ian Johnstone, "The irregularities in registration and voting undermined efforts to convince a skeptical population that the system had become more fair. . . . ONUSAL did not help the situation by quickly endorsing the first round of elections without simultaneously pointing out the problems that had to be remedied for the second round." See Ian Johnstone, Rights and Reconciliation: UN Strategies in El Salvador (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, for International Peace Academy, 1995), p. 53. The same kind of process occurred in Haiti in 1996 and 1997, contributing to the institutional blockage that followed. In both countries, this contributed to the high level of abstention in subsequent elections. Concerning both legislative and municipal elections in El Salvador in 1997, most observers have stressed the importance of the results of the FMLN. Very few, however, have remarked on the high level of violence during the electoral campaign and the level of abstention (around 65 percent), confirming what had already happened in the 1994 elections (less than 50 percent voter participation). According to various polls conducted between 1995 and 1997, such levels are directly connected to distrust of the electoral process and a perception that participation in the vote would not change anything. See Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública, serie de informes nos. 51, 61 (San Salvador: UCA, October 1995 and February 1997). In Haiti, elections in spring 1997 saw participation of less than 5 percent in most districts.
66. According to what is increasingly highlighted by international specialists themselves. See, for instance, Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, ́The New Social Movements,́ in Camilleri and Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1992), pp. 199-235; Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman, eds., Innovation and Transformation in International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
67. According to what is increasingly highlighted by international specialists themselves. See, for instance, Joseph A. Camilleri and Jim Falk, ́The New Social Movements,́ in Camilleri and Falk, The End of Sovereignty? The Politics of a Shrinking and Fragmenting World (Aldershot: Edward Elgar Publishers, 1992), pp. 199-235; Stephen Gill and James H. Mittelman, eds., Innovation and Transformation in International Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
68. This citation is from Michel Crozier, who explains the underlying intuition of this approach: ́There must be an opening somewhere, we must succeed in finding it and, if we really look for it, we will finally find it,́ in Francis Pavé, ed., L'analyse stratégique: Sa genèse, ses applications et ses problèmes actuels (Paris: Colloque de Cerizy, Seuil, 1994), p. 377.
69. See, for instance, Stephen John Stedman's analysis, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," International Security 22, no. 2 (fall 1997): 5-53.
70. For instance, in the case of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) -which has now been in the area for twenty years - Marianne Heiberg notes: "Inevitably, during this period, the Force has been sucked into the economic and political fabric of the wider society in which it operates and of which it has become an integral part." The examples she gives of the role played by UNIFIL in the restoration of the mouktars' political position or the emergence of new types of political leaders are quite revealing. See Marianne Heiberg, "Peacekeepers and Local Populations: Some Comments on UNIFIL," in Indar Jit Rikhye, The United Nations and Peaekeeping: Results, Limitations and Prospects (Basingstoke, England: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 147-169.