NATO burden sharing: 1960-1992

Defence and Peace Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 115-133

  Khanna, Jyoti ^a   Sandler, Todd ^b  

^a Center for Language and Brain   (United States)

^b IOWA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Alliances; Burden sharing; Exploitation hypothesis; Joint product model; NATO; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 0013515990     PISSN: 10242694     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10430719608404846     Document Type: Article

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