The political economy of trade policy reform: Social complexity and methodological pluralism

Journal of International Trade and Economic Development

Volumn 8, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 3-26

  Nelson, Douglas R ^a  

^a Murphy Institute of Political Economy   (United States)

Author keywords

Complexity; Policy reform; Political economy

Indexed keywords

POLICY REFORM; POLITICAL ECONOMY; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 0032995447     PISSN: 09638199     EISSN: 14699559     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09638199900000002     Document Type: Article

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