Councils, collectors and communities: Revenue collection and administrative reach in a Tanzanian and a Zimbabwean council

Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 95-120

  Eriksen, Stein Sundstøl ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN INSTITUTE FOR URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; TAX SYSTEM;

TANZANIA; ZIMBABWE;

EID: 0032864605     PISSN: 03063631     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/14662049908447784     Document Type: Article

References (79)

1. World Bank, The Slate in a Changing World, World Development Report (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
2. The article is mainly based on data collected during fieldwork. These were basically of three kinds. First, a number of actors at the local level were interviewed. These included council officers, councillors, traditional leaders, ward and village level political representatives and ordinary citizens. Second, focus group discussions were held with ordinary citizens. Such discussions were held in all types of wards in both districts. Third, official documents, such as plans, budgets and financial statements were collected. The districts were selected on the basis of official documents and discussions with government officials. The following criteria were used: (1) relatively 'average' in terms of economic development in the country; (2) a mix of rural and urban wards and (3) more or less average in terms of administrative performance, as perceived by the government.
3. These points of interaction have also been referred to as the 'interface'. See Norman Long (ed.), Encounters at the Interface (Wageningen: Agricultural University, 1988).
4. William Munro, 'Power, Peasants and Political Development: Reconsidering State Construction in Africa', Comparative Studies in Society and History, 1 (1996), 112-48
5. However, both district were perceived by central government officials in their respective countries as being more or less average in terms of economic development and administrative performance.
6. Theda Skocpol, 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology', in Theda Skocpol (ed.), Vision and Method in Historical Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
7. This sub-section draws heavily on Stein Sundstol Eriksen and Gier Ronning: 'Statens samfunn, samfunnets stat' [The state's society, society's state], in Asmund Birkeland (ed.), Den moderne staten (Oslo: Pax, 1997), where the argument is more elaborated.
8. Michael Mann, Sources of Social Power, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
9. This dimension of sovereignty is not discussed here.
10. The question of where to draw the boundary between the private and the public is likely to be among the most central political issues. As long as it is recognised that such a boundary must be drawn, and that decisions concerning where to draw it must be made by the state, this confirms the state's sovereignty, no matter where and how the boundary is actually drawn.
11. Munro, 'Power, Peasants and Political Development'.
12. Charles Taylor, 'Modes of Secularism', in Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and its Critics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). On the importance of indirect rule, see also Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
13. Charles Taylor, 'Modes of Secularism', in Rajeev Bhargava (ed.), Secularism and its Critics (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). On the importance of indirect rule, see also Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).
14. See Thomas Bierschenk and Jean-Pierre Olivier De Sardan, 'Local Powers and a Distant State in Rural Central African Republic', Journal of Modern African Studies, 3 (1997), 441-68, for an analysis of administrative reach in the Central African Republic.
15. Peter Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy and Structural Change', in Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufmann (eds.), The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), and Mann, Sources of Social Power.
16. Peter Evans, The State as Problem and Solution: Predation, Embedded Autonomy and Structural Change', in Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufmann (eds.), The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), and Mann, Sources of Social Power.
17. Naomi Chazan, 'Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa', in Donald Rothschild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988); and Munro, 'Power, Peasants and Political Development'.
18. Naomi Chazan, 'Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement in Africa', in Donald Rothschild and Naomi Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988); and Munro, 'Power, Peasants and Political Development'.
19. David Nugent, 'Building the State, Making the Nation: The Basis and Limits of State Centralization in Peru', American Anthropologist, 2 (1994), 333-69.
20. This points to the crucial importance of the idea of the nation in legitimising state power. It is by including all individuals and local communities in the national community that the state can claim to represent the whole, and this claim is a central element in the legitimisation of state power. The nation constitutes a 'we', on whose behalf the state can claim to act. For more on nationalism and national identity, see, among others, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso 1983); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993).
21. This points to the crucial importance of the idea of the nation in legitimising state power. It is by including all individuals and local communities in the national community that the state can claim to represent the whole, and this claim is a central element in the legitimisation of state power. The nation constitutes a 'we', on whose behalf the state can claim to act. For more on nationalism and national identity, see, among others, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso 1983); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993).
22. This points to the crucial importance of the idea of the nation in legitimising state power. It is by including all individuals and local communities in the national community that the state can claim to represent the whole, and this claim is a central element in the legitimisation of state power. The nation constitutes a 'we', on whose behalf the state can claim to act. For more on nationalism and national identity, see, among others, Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso 1983); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and its Fragments (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993).
23. In practice, of course, tax collection may be one of the activities of local governments which, from the perspective of the local community, appears least related to the state's role as their representative. Instead, collectors are often seen as simply demanding people's money, without being able to specify how the taxes paid by ordinary people benefit the community. Still, the fact that local authorities' right to collect taxes is legitimised in this way points to the significance of the representative dimension, even here.
24. Joseph Max, The Development of Local Government in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Educational Publishers and Distributors Ltd, 1991).
25. This period also coincided with the policy of villagisation, during which extensive force was used by the government to move people into new villages. It goes without saying that the political climate during this period was less than conducive for establishing popular participation and development from below. On villagisation, see Kjell Havnevik, The Limits to Development from Above (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993), and Gøran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1980); Joel Samoff, 'Popular Initiatives and Local Government in Tanzania', Journal of Developing Areas, 24 (1989), 1-18.
26. This period also coincided with the policy of villagisation, during which extensive force was used by the government to move people into new villages. It goes without saying that the political climate during this period was less than conducive for establishing popular participation and development from below. On villagisation, see Kjell Havnevik, The Limits to Development from Above (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993), and Gøran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1980); Joel Samoff, 'Popular Initiatives and Local Government in Tanzania', Journal of Developing Areas, 24 (1989), 1-18.
27. This period also coincided with the policy of villagisation, during which extensive force was used by the government to move people into new villages. It goes without saying that the political climate during this period was less than conducive for establishing popular participation and development from below. On villagisation, see Kjell Havnevik, The Limits to Development from Above (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1993), and Gøran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (London: Heinemann, 1980); Joel Samoff, 'Popular Initiatives and Local Government in Tanzania', Journal of Developing Areas, 24 (1989), 1-18.
28. In 1996, it was decided that the regional level was to be abolished. However, fieldwork for this article was conducted prior to this, so the analysis refers to the system as it was up until the summer of 1996.
29. In addition, there are some appointed members of the council. Thus, in the district of our fieldwork, which consisted of 13 wards, there were 16 members of the council. Two members were appointed, and in addition, the MP from the district automatically becomes a council member.
30. Joseph Semboja and Ole Therkildsen, Handbook on District Level Administration in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam: Educational Publishers and Distributors Ltd, 1991).
31. We need not here get into the discussion of what it means to be a peasant. On this, see Michael Kearney, Keconceptualising the Peasantry (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996).
32. Given that official statistics are notoriously unreliable, one should not make too much of this. The point of mentioning it here is simply to indicate that in economic terms, there is no reason to believe that Kigoma comprises an extreme case in Tanzania.
33. The exception is the development levy, which is collected by the block level political leaders.
34. Interview with Treasurer, February 1996.
35. Interview with trader, Kigoma, March 1996.
36. Council employees expressed irritation at this argument, claiming that it showed the 'backwardness' of ordinary people. How can they expect to get anything in return, they said, when they don't pay?
37. See Aili Tripp, Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania (London: University of California Press, 1997), for a description of the attitude towards the development levy in Dar es Salaam. The picture that emerges largely fits my findings, except that in Dar, the city council seems to make more of an effort to collect the levy, sometimes by harassing residents.
38. Strangely enough, this practice does not affect the capacity of the council. Because of the almost complete lack of funds, most employees of the council are idle most of the time anyway.
39. At the same time, we found the staff to be very well qualified overall, and with a strong bureaucratic consciousness The other side of this bureaucratic consciousness is its authoritarian tendency, arising from seeing itself as representing 'reason' and 'development'. On this, see Arturo Escobar, 'Planning', in W. Sachs (ed.). The Development Dictionary (London: Zed Books, 1992); and James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development ', Depolitisation and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
40. At the same time, we found the staff to be very well qualified overall, and with a strong bureaucratic consciousness The other side of this bureaucratic consciousness is its authoritarian tendency, arising from seeing itself as representing 'reason' and 'development'. On this, see Arturo Escobar, 'Planning', in W. Sachs (ed.). The Development Dictionary (London: Zed Books, 1992); and James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development ', Depolitisation and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
41. Joel Migdal, Strong Societies, Weak States; State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988).
42. Steven Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals: Anthropology and History in Tanzania (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990).
43. General information on decentralisation and local government in Zimbabwe can be found in A.H.J. Helmsing et al. (eds.), Limits to Decentralisation in Zimbabwe (Harare: University of Harare Press, 1991); and P. de Valk and K.H. Wekwete (eds.), Decentralising for Participatory Planning (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990); and Emery Roe, 'More than the Politics of Decentralization: Local Government Reform, District Development and Public Administration in Zimbabwe', World Development, 5 (1995), 833-43. See also the special issue of the journal: Social Change and Development (Harare, 1995).
44. General information on decentralisation and local government in Zimbabwe can be found in A.H.J. Helmsing et al. (eds.), Limits to Decentralisation in Zimbabwe (Harare: University of Harare Press, 1991); and P. de Valk and K.H. Wekwete (eds.), Decentralising for Participatory Planning (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990); and Emery Roe, 'More than the Politics of Decentralization: Local Government Reform, District Development and Public Administration in Zimbabwe', World Development, 5 (1995), 833-43. See also the special issue of the journal: Social Change and Development (Harare, 1995).
45. General information on decentralisation and local government in Zimbabwe can be found in A.H.J. Helmsing et al. (eds.), Limits to Decentralisation in Zimbabwe (Harare: University of Harare Press, 1991); and P. de Valk and K.H. Wekwete (eds.), Decentralising for Participatory Planning (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990); and Emery Roe, 'More than the Politics of Decentralization: Local Government Reform, District Development and Public Administration in Zimbabwe', World Development, 5 (1995), 833-43. See also the special issue of the journal: Social Change and Development (Harare, 1995).
46. General information on decentralisation and local government in Zimbabwe can be found in A.H.J. Helmsing et al. (eds.), Limits to Decentralisation in Zimbabwe (Harare: University of Harare Press, 1991); and P. de Valk and K.H. Wekwete (eds.), Decentralising for Participatory Planning (Aldershot: Avebury, 1990); and Emery Roe, 'More than the Politics of Decentralization: Local Government Reform, District Development and Public Administration in Zimbabwe', World Development, 5 (1995), 833-43. See also the special issue of the journal: Social Change and Development (Harare, 1995).
47. Government of Zimbabwe, Ministry of Local Government and Urban Development (MILGRUD), Rural District Councils Capacity Building Programme (Harare, 1995).
48. Ibid.
49. Source: Seke District Rolling Plan, 1999-2001, and interviews with various council officials, June-Aug. 1997.
50. Data on local tax collection in Manyame is mainly based on data (interviews as well as government documents) collected during fieldwork conducted in the summer 1997. For a more general discussions on local tax collection in Zimbabwe, see Helmsing et al., Limits to Decentralisation in Zimbabwe, and Derek Gunby and Diana Conyers, Developing the Strategic Plan for RDC Capacity Building, Report no 4, for UNDP and MILGRUD (Harare, 1995). See also Derek Gunby, Rural District Councils' Priorities for Decentralisation (Harare: Planafric, 1996), which contains a survey of RDCs' own perceptions of the issues and the problems they are facing.
51. Data on local tax collection in Manyame is mainly based on data (interviews as well as government documents) collected during fieldwork conducted in the summer 1997. For a more general discussions on local tax collection in Zimbabwe, see Helmsing et al., Limits to Decentralisation in Zimbabwe, and Derek Gunby and Diana Conyers, Developing the Strategic Plan for RDC Capacity Building, Report no 4, for UNDP and MILGRUD (Harare, 1995). See also Derek Gunby, Rural District Councils' Priorities for Decentralisation (Harare: Planafric, 1996), which contains a survey of RDCs' own perceptions of the issues and the problems they are facing.
52. Data on local tax collection in Manyame is mainly based on data (interviews as well as government documents) collected during fieldwork conducted in the summer 1997. For a more general discussions on local tax collection in Zimbabwe, see Helmsing et al., Limits to Decentralisation in Zimbabwe, and Derek Gunby and Diana Conyers, Developing the Strategic Plan for RDC Capacity Building, Report no 4, for UNDP and MILGRUD (Harare, 1995). See also Derek Gunby, Rural District Councils' Priorities for Decentralisation (Harare: Planafric, 1996), which contains a survey of RDCs' own perceptions of the issues and the problems they are facing.
53. Source: Manyame Rural District Financial Statement 1996/97, Beatrice.
54. Source: Interview with council official, December 1997.
55. I should emphasise again that no attempt is made here at assessing the scale or forms of corruption. I am simply comparing the comments made by interviewees in the two cases. In other words, I am comparing the perceptions of different actors on the issue of corruption, not the actual scale of it.
56. Of course, if it is assumed that all actors are 'profit-maximiserser', the level of pay would have no bearing on the scale of corruption. On this assumption, regardless of their level of pay, all officers would take the advantage of any opportunity to secure some extra income. The only factors that would affect their choices would be the size of the prize to be won, seen in relation to the perceived risk of being caught and the severity of sanctions. I think that this assumption is deeply flawed, however, and that at least some officers would prefer not to engage in illegal activities if they can.
57. The author was shown the council's records of payment
58. Officially, VIDCOs as institutions belong to the government, not the party. However, in practice, this distinction is not upheld. At the local level, party affairs and government affairs are considered as more or less the same. Thus, when I visited a ward meeting (in a communal ward), held at the initiative of the councillor in the ward, local party representatives also attended and informed of the latest party news. Also, party songs and slogans were shouted. When asked whether this was a party meeting or a community meeting, the councillor replied that these were one and the same.
59. This, at least, appeared to be the case in resettlement wards. In some communal wards, the VIDCO representatives expressed strong anti-government attitudes, one even going as far as saying that things were much better during colonialism.
60. William Munro, 'Building the Post-Colonial State: Villagisation and Resource Management in Zimbabwe', Politics & Society, 1 (1995), 107-10.
61. The same applies to the allocation of land, one of the most contentious political issues in Zimbabwe. Village headmen have, despite attempts by the state to take over this function, been able to maintain their position as the legitimate authority in issues of land distribution. In recent years, the state has given up its attempt to substitute itself for the traditional leaders, and come to accept that land allocation belongs to the realm of traditional leaders (Sam Moyo, The Land Question (Harare: SAFES, 1994); Munro, 'Building the Post-Colonial State').
62. The same applies to the allocation of land, one of the most contentious political issues in Zimbabwe. Village headmen have, despite attempts by the state to take over this function, been able to maintain their position as the legitimate authority in issues of land distribution. In recent years, the state has given up its attempt to substitute itself for the traditional leaders, and come to accept that land allocation belongs to the realm of traditional leaders (Sam Moyo, The Land Question (Harare: SAFES, 1994); Munro, 'Building the Post-Colonial State').
63. Interview with village headman, Manyame district, 20 June 1997.
64. Focus group discussion, Mapfuti ward, November 1997.
65. For a historical account of state policies towards farm workers, see Blair Rutherford, 'Another Side to Rural Zimbabwe: Social Constructs and the Administration of Farm Workers in the Urungwe District, 1940s', Journal of Southern African Studies, 1 (1997), 107-26.
66. It was decided that they be given this right in the summer of 1997, with effect from the local elections to be held in December. The implications of this decision will be interesting to follow. Will they now get access to council services? Do they have to pay tax? Will commercial farmers be completely marginalised in the council, and if so what are the consequences?
67. The Herald, Harare, 7 Aug. 1997.
68. This is not the only factor constraining the council's capacity to collect. The factors pointed out by Gunby and Conyers, Developing the Strategic Plan -low revenue base, lack of revenue raising powers and controls imposed by the central government, are obviously also relevant.
69. One possible explanation for this is that the headmen are afraid of pushing too hard to collect the levy, since this could undermine their position in the community. By getting too closely identified with a widely unpopular state, the headmen could risk weakening their own community-based authority. From the perspective of the state, the reintroduction of headmen as tax collectors could be seen as an attempt at reviving its own legitimacy.
70. Source: Interviews with council officials and Manyame Rural District Development Plans, 1993-94 and 1996-97.
71. Jean-Francois Bayart (The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, London: Longman, 1993) describes this blurring of boundaries as 'straddling'. While he is correct in insisting on the importance of this phenomenon, the term is somewhat unfortunate, since it seems to indicate that the boundary between state and society exists in the first place. For discussions of this separation in Western countries, see Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (London: MacMillan, 1981); Timothy Mitchell, 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics', American Political Science Review, 1, 85 (1991), 77-96; and Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
72. Jean-Francois Bayart (The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, London: Longman, 1993) describes this blurring of boundaries as 'straddling'. While he is correct in insisting on the importance of this phenomenon, the term is somewhat unfortunate, since it seems to indicate that the boundary between state and society exists in the first place. For discussions of this separation in Western countries, see Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (London: MacMillan, 1981); Timothy Mitchell, 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics', American Political Science Review, 1, 85 (1991), 77-96; and Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
73. Jean-Francois Bayart (The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, London: Longman, 1993) describes this blurring of boundaries as 'straddling'. While he is correct in insisting on the importance of this phenomenon, the term is somewhat unfortunate, since it seems to indicate that the boundary between state and society exists in the first place. For discussions of this separation in Western countries, see Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (London: MacMillan, 1981); Timothy Mitchell, 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics', American Political Science Review, 1, 85 (1991), 77-96; and Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
74. Jean-Francois Bayart (The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, London: Longman, 1993) describes this blurring of boundaries as 'straddling'. While he is correct in insisting on the importance of this phenomenon, the term is somewhat unfortunate, since it seems to indicate that the boundary between state and society exists in the first place. For discussions of this separation in Western countries, see Anthony Giddens, A Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism (London: MacMillan, 1981); Timothy Mitchell, 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics', American Political Science Review, 1, 85 (1991), 77-96; and Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
75. Bayart, The State in Africa.
76. Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Peter Evans, 'The State and Economic Transformation: Towards an Analysis of Conditions Underlying Effective Intervention', in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
77. Akhil Gupta, 'Blurred Boundaries', American Ethnologist, 2 (1995), 375-402.
78. Quote from official interviewed in Kigoma, Tanzania, February 1996.
79. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania.