Conflict and cooperation in managing international water resources such as the Great Lakes

Land Economics

Volumn 75, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 233-245

  Becker, Nir ^a   Easter, K William ^b  

^a TEL HAI COLLEGE   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; WATER MANAGEMENT;

GREAT LAKES; NORTH AMERICA;

EID: 0032859763     PISSN: 00237639     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3147008     Document Type: Article

References (22)

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