Water diversion from the Great Lakes: Is a cooperative approach possible?

International Journal of Water Resources Development

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 53-66

  Becker, Nir ^a   Easter, K W ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

WATER DIVERSION;

COST ACCOUNTING; FORECASTING; GAME THEORY; INTAKE SYSTEMS; LAKES; RESERVOIRS (WATER);

WATER SUPPLY;

COOPERATIVE APPROACH; GAME THEORY; INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENT; WATER DIVERSION; WATER MANAGEMENT; WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;

NORTH AMERICA, GREAT LAKES;

EID: 0031100777     PISSN: 07900627     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/07900629749926     Document Type: Article

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