Externalities, market power, and resource extraction

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 233-255

  Datta, Manjira ^a   Mirman, Leonard J ^b  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Efficiency; Externality; Market power; Tragedy of the commons

Indexed keywords

FISHERY PRODUCTION; HARVESTING; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0032824257     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1999.1067     Document Type: Article

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