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Volumn 10, Issue 8, 1997, Pages 95-99

It takes one counterexample to disprove a theory

(1)  Oren, Shmuel S a  

a NONE

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EID: 0039468333     PISSN: 10406190     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1040-6190(97)80198-4     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (1)

References (3)
  • 1
    • 0004260007 scopus 로고
    • Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole conclude, "game theory lacks a general and convincing argument that a Nash outcome will occur." See. MIT Press
    • Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole conclude, "game theory lacks a general and convincing argument that a Nash outcome will occur." See Fudenberg D., Tirole J. GAME THEORY. 1991;22 MIT Press.
    • (1991) GAME THEORY , pp. 22
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Tirole, J.2
  • 2
    • 85170495504 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Jurgen Weiss, Behavioral Questions in the Restructuring of the Electricity Industry: An Experimental Investigation (Harvard Business School Ph.D. thesis, forthcoming).
    • Jurgen Weiss, Behavioral Questions in the Restructuring of the Electricity Industry: An Experimental Investigation (Harvard Business School Ph.D. thesis, forthcoming).
  • 3
    • 0030675936 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Economic Inefficiency of Passive Transmission Rights in Congested Electricity Systems with Competitive Generation
    • See equation 1
    • Oren Shmuel S. Economic Inefficiency of Passive Transmission Rights in Congested Electricity Systems with Competitive Generation. ENERGY J. 18:(1):1997;63. See equation 1.
    • (1997) ENERGY J. , vol.18 , Issue.1 , pp. 63
    • Oren Shmuel, S.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.