Risk Adjustment for Health Insurance: Theory and Implications

Journal of Risk and Uncertainty

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 167-182

  Selden, Thomas M ^a  

^a AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Author please supply

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032253023     PISSN: 08955646     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1007723730074     Document Type: Article

References (22)

1. Cave, Jonathan A.K. (1985). "Subsidy Equilibrium and Multiple-Option Insurance Markets." In Richard Scheffler and Louis Rossiter (eds.), Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research 6, London: JAI Press Inc.
2. Crocker, Keith J., and Arthur Snow. (1985a). "A Simple Tax Structure for Competitive Equilibrium and Redistribution in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information," Southern Economic Journal 51, 1142-50.
3. Crocker, Keith J., and Arthur Snow. (1985b). "The Efficiency of Competitive Equilibria in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information," Journal of Public Economics 26, 207-19.
4. Cutler, David, and Sarah Reber. (1996). "Paying for Health Insurance: The Tradeoff Between Competition and Adverse Selection." NBER Working Paper #5796, National Bureau of Economic Research.
5. Cutler, David, and Richard Zeckhauser. (1997). "Adverse Selection in Health Insurance." NBER Working Paper #6107, National Bureau of Economic Research.
6. Ellis, Randall P. (1993). "Cream-skimming, Skimping, and Dumping: Provider Competition for Patients." Working paper, Economics Department, Boston University.
7. Enthoven, Alain C. (1978). "Consumer-Choice Health Plan," New England Journal of Medicine 198, 650-58 and 709-20.
8. Enthoven, Alain C. (1988). Theory and Practice of Managed Competition (North Holland: Amsterdam).
9. Farley, Pamela. (1986). "Theories of the Price and Quantity of Physician Services: A Synthesis and Critique," Journal of Health Economics 5, 315-33.
10. Grossman, Herschel I. (1979). "Adverse Selection, Dissembling, and Competitive Equilibrium," Bell Journal of Economics 10, 336-343.
11. Harsanyi, John C. (1975). "Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Moraility? A Critique of John Rawls's Theory," The American Political Science Review 69, 594-606.
12. Miyazaki, Hajime. (1977). "The Rat Race and Internal Labor Markets," Bell Journal of Economics 8, 394-418.
13. Monheit, Alan C., and Thomas M. Selden. (1997). "Adverse Selection and Cross-Subsidization in the Market for Employment-Related Health Insurance." Working paper, Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, Department of Health and Human Services.
14. Neudeck, Werner, and Konrad Podczeck. (1996). "Adverse Selection and Regulation in Health Insurance Markets," Journal of Health Economics 15, 387-408.
15. Newhouse, Joseph P. (1986). "Rate Adjusters for Medicare under Capitation," Health Care Financing Review (suppl.), 21-30.
16. _ . (1994). "Patients at Risk: Reform and Risk Adjustment," Health Affairs 13, 132-46.
17. Pauly, Mark V. (1985). "What is Adverse about Adverse Selection?" in Richard Scheffler and Louis Rossiter (eds.), Advances in Health Economics and Health Services Research 6, London: JAI Press Inc.
18. Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. (1976). "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay in the Economics of Imperfect Information," Quarterly Journal of Economics 90, 629-49.
19. Spence, Michael. (1978). "Product Differentiation and Performance in Insurance Markets," Journal of Public Economics 10, 427-47.
20. Sugden, Robert. (1993). "Welfare, Resources, and Capabilities: A Review of Inequality Reexamined by Amartya Sen," Journal of Economic Literature 31, 1947-86.
21. Van De Ven, Wynand P.M.M., and Rene C.J.A. Van Vliet. (1992). "How Can We Prevent Cream-Skimming in a Competitive Health Insurance Market?" In Peter Zweifel and H.E. Frech (eds.), Health Economics Worldwide, The Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
22. Wilson, Charles. (1977). "A Model of Insurance Markets with Incomplete Information," Journal of Economic Theory 12, 167-207.