Freedom and opportunity

Political Studies

Volumn 47, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 67-82

  Van Hees, Martin ^a   Wissenburg, Marcel ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0032670094     PISSN: 00323217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9248.00188     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. 1 I. Carter, 'The independent value of freedom', Ethics, 105 (1995), 819-45.
2. 2 A. K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco, Holden-Day, 1970). Sen formulated his theorem in terms of social choice theory. For alternative approaches, see P. Gärdenfors, 'Rights, games and social choice'. Noûs, 15 (1981). 341-56; W. Gaertner, P. K. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura, 'Individual rights revisited', Economica, 59 (1992), 161-77; M. van Hees, Rights and Decisions. Formal Models of Law and Liberalism (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1995).
3. 2 A. K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco, Holden-Day, 1970). Sen formulated his theorem in terms of social choice theory. For alternative approaches, see P. Gärdenfors, 'Rights, games and social choice'. Noûs, 15 (1981). 341-56; W. Gaertner, P. K. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura, 'Individual rights revisited', Economica, 59 (1992), 161-77; M. van Hees, Rights and Decisions. Formal Models of Law and Liberalism (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1995).
4. 2 A. K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco, Holden-Day, 1970). Sen formulated his theorem in terms of social choice theory. For alternative approaches, see P. Gärdenfors, 'Rights, games and social choice'. Noûs, 15 (1981). 341-56; W. Gaertner, P. K. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura, 'Individual rights revisited', Economica, 59 (1992), 161-77; M. van Hees, Rights and Decisions. Formal Models of Law and Liberalism (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1995).
5. 2 A. K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare (San Francisco, Holden-Day, 1970). Sen formulated his theorem in terms of social choice theory. For alternative approaches, see P. Gärdenfors, 'Rights, games and social choice'. Noûs, 15 (1981). 341-56; W. Gaertner, P. K. Pattanaik and K. Suzumura, 'Individual rights revisited', Economica, 59 (1992), 161-77; M. van Hees, Rights and Decisions. Formal Models of Law and Liberalism (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1995).
6. 3 P. K. Pattanaik and Y. Xu, 'On ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice', Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 56 (1990), 383-90; M. Klemish-Ahlert, 'Freedom of choice. A comparison of different rankings of opportunity sets', Social Choice and Welfare, 10 (1993), 189-207; M. van Hees, 'On the analysis of negative freedom', Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
7. 3 P. K. Pattanaik and Y. Xu, 'On ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice', Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 56 (1990), 383-90; M. Klemish-Ahlert, 'Freedom of choice. A comparison of different rankings of opportunity sets', Social Choice and Welfare, 10 (1993), 189-207; M. van Hees, 'On the analysis of negative freedom', Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
8. 3 P. K. Pattanaik and Y. Xu, 'On ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice', Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 56 (1990), 383-90; M. Klemish-Ahlert, 'Freedom of choice. A comparison of different rankings of opportunity sets', Social Choice and Welfare, 10 (1993), 189-207; M. van Hees, 'On the analysis of negative freedom', Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
9. 4 A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, freedom and social choice. A reply', Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 56 (1990), 451-85; A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, preference and freedom', Journal of Econometrics, 50 (1991), 15-29; C. Puppe, 'An axiomatic approach to "Preferences for freedom of choice"' Journal of Economic Theory, 68 (1996), 174-99; P. K. Pattanaik and Y. Xu, 'On preference and freedom' Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
10. 4 A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, freedom and social choice. A reply', Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 56 (1990), 451-85; A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, preference and freedom', Journal of Econometrics, 50 (1991), 15-29; C. Puppe, 'An axiomatic approach to "Preferences for freedom of choice"' Journal of Economic Theory, 68 (1996), 174-99; P. K. Pattanaik and Y. Xu, 'On preference and freedom' Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
11. 4 A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, freedom and social choice. A reply', Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 56 (1990), 451-85; A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, preference and freedom', Journal of Econometrics, 50 (1991), 15-29; C. Puppe, 'An axiomatic approach to "Preferences for freedom of choice"' Journal of Economic Theory, 68 (1996), 174-99; P. K. Pattanaik and Y. Xu, 'On preference and freedom' Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
12. 4 A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, freedom and social choice. A reply', Recherches Economiques de Louvain, 56 (1990), 451-85; A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, preference and freedom', Journal of Econometrics, 50 (1991), 15-29; C. Puppe, 'An axiomatic approach to "Preferences for freedom of choice"' Journal of Economic Theory, 68 (1996), 174-99; P. K. Pattanaik and Y. Xu, 'On preference and freedom' Theory and Decision, forthcoming.
13. 5 A. K. Sen, 'Markets and freedoms: Achievements and limitations of the market mechanism in promoting individual freedoms', Oxford Economic Papers, 45 (1993), 519-54, p. 522.
14. 6 The present discussion reflects many points made earlier in political theory. For a forceful defence of a non-preference based conception of freedom, see J. P. Day, 'On liberty and the real will', Philosophy, 45 (1970), 177-92. Specific cardinal measurements were proposed by H. Steiner 'How Free. Computing Personal Liberty', in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Of Liberty (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 73-89 and I. Carter, 'The measurement of pure negative freedom', Political Studies, 40 (1992), 38-50. The idea that the preferences of reasonable persons should count can be found in S. I. Benn and W. L. Weinstein, 'Being free to act, and being a free man', Mind, 80 (1971), 194-211 and J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971).
15. 6 The present discussion reflects many points made earlier in political theory. For a forceful defence of a non-preference based conception of freedom, see J. P. Day, 'On liberty and the real will', Philosophy, 45 (1970), 177-92. Specific cardinal measurements were proposed by H. Steiner 'How Free. Computing Personal Liberty', in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Of Liberty (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 73-89 and I. Carter, 'The measurement of pure negative freedom', Political Studies, 40 (1992), 38-50. The idea that the preferences of reasonable persons should count can be found in S. I. Benn and W. L. Weinstein, 'Being free to act, and being a free man', Mind, 80 (1971), 194-211 and J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971).
16. 6 The present discussion reflects many points made earlier in political theory. For a forceful defence of a non-preference based conception of freedom, see J. P. Day, 'On liberty and the real will', Philosophy, 45 (1970), 177-92. Specific cardinal measurements were proposed by H. Steiner 'How Free. Computing Personal Liberty', in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Of Liberty (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 73-89 and I. Carter, 'The measurement of pure negative freedom', Political Studies, 40 (1992), 38-50. The idea that the preferences of reasonable persons should count can be found in S. I. Benn and W. L. Weinstein, 'Being free to act, and being a free man', Mind, 80 (1971), 194-211 and J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971).
17. 6 The present discussion reflects many points made earlier in political theory. For a forceful defence of a non-preference based conception of freedom, see J. P. Day, 'On liberty and the real will', Philosophy, 45 (1970), 177-92. Specific cardinal measurements were proposed by H. Steiner 'How Free. Computing Personal Liberty', in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Of Liberty (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 73-89 and I. Carter, 'The measurement of pure negative freedom', Political Studies, 40 (1992), 38-50. The idea that the preferences of reasonable persons should count can be found in S. I. Benn and W. L. Weinstein, 'Being free to act, and being a free man', Mind, 80 (1971), 194-211 and J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971).
18. 6 The present discussion reflects many points made earlier in political theory. For a forceful defence of a non-preference based conception of freedom, see J. P. Day, 'On liberty and the real will', Philosophy, 45 (1970), 177-92. Specific cardinal measurements were proposed by H. Steiner 'How Free. Computing Personal Liberty', in A. Phillips Griffiths (ed.), Of Liberty (Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 73-89 and I. Carter, 'The measurement of pure negative freedom', Political Studies, 40 (1992), 38-50. The idea that the preferences of reasonable persons should count can be found in S. I. Benn and W. L. Weinstein, 'Being free to act, and being a free man', Mind, 80 (1971), 194-211 and J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford University Press, 1971).
19. 7 Sen, 'Markets and freedoms: achievements and limitations of the market mechanism in promoting individual freedoms', p. 522.
20. 8 Pattanaik and Xu, 'On ranking opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice'.
21. 9 Sen, 'Welfare, freedom and social choice. A reply'.
22. 10 A. K. Sen, 'Freedom of choice. concept and content', european economic Review 32 (1988), 269-94; A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, preference and freedom'; A. K. Sen, 'Markets and freedoms: achievemnts and limitation of the market mechanism in promoting individual freedoms'; A. K. Sen, 'Rationality and social choice', American Economic Review, 85 (1995), 1-24.
23. 10 A. K. Sen, 'Freedom of choice. concept and content', european economic Review 32 (1988), 269-94; A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, preference and freedom'; A. K. Sen, 'Markets and freedoms: achievemnts and limitation of the market mechanism in promoting individual freedoms'; A. K. Sen, 'Rationality and social choice', American Economic Review, 85 (1995), 1-24.
24. 10 A. K. Sen, 'Freedom of choice. concept and content', european economic Review 32 (1988), 269-94; A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, preference and freedom'; A. K. Sen, 'Markets and freedoms: achievemnts and limitation of the market mechanism in promoting individual freedoms'; A. K. Sen, 'Rationality and social choice', American Economic Review, 85 (1995), 1-24.
25. 10 A. K. Sen, 'Freedom of choice. concept and content', european economic Review 32 (1988), 269-94; A. K. Sen, 'Welfare, preference and freedom'; A. K. Sen, 'Markets and freedoms: achievemnts and limitation of the market mechanism in promoting individual freedoms'; A. K. Sen, 'Rationality and social choice', American Economic Review, 85 (1995), 1-24.
26. 11 Sen, Welfare, freedom and social choice. A reply', p. 471; Cf. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clanderon, 1986); K. Dowding, 'Choice: its increase and its value', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 301-14 and Th. M, Scanlon, The Significance of choice', in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VIII (University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 151-216 for alternative accounts of freedom and the value of freedom.
27. 11 Sen, Welfare, freedom and social choice. A reply', p. 471; Cf. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clanderon, 1986); K. Dowding, 'Choice: its increase and its value', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 301-14 and Th. M, Scanlon, The Significance of choice', in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VIII (University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 151-216 for alternative accounts of freedom and the value of freedom.
28. 11 Sen, Welfare, freedom and social choice. A reply', p. 471; Cf. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clanderon, 1986); K. Dowding, 'Choice: its increase and its value', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 301-14 and Th. M, Scanlon, The Significance of choice', in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VIII (University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 151-216 for alternative accounts of freedom and the value of freedom.
29. 11 Sen, Welfare, freedom and social choice. A reply', p. 471; Cf. J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clanderon, 1986); K. Dowding, 'Choice: its increase and its value', British Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 301-14 and Th. M, Scanlon, The Significance of choice', in S. M. McMurrin (ed.), The Tanner Lectures on Human Values VIII (University of Utah Press, 1988), pp. 151-216 for alternative accounts of freedom and the value of freedom.
30. 12 Sen, ' Welfare, freedom and social choice. a reply', p. 470.
31. 13 Sen, 'welfare, preference and freedom'.
32. 14 Sen, 'Welfare, preference and freedom', p. 24.
33. 15 Sen, 'Markets and freedoms: Achievements and limitations of the market mechanism in promoting individual freedoms'.
34. 16 Sen, 'Markets and freedoms: Achievements and limitations of the market mechanism in promoting individual freedoms', p. 529.
35. 17 Puppe, 'An axiomatic approach to "Preferences for freedom of choice"'.
36. 18 Puppe, 'An axiomatic approach to "Preferences for freedom of choice"', p. 182.
37. 19 Puppe, 'An axiomatic approach to "Preferences for freedom of choice"', p. 180.
38. 20 D. M. Kreps, 'A Representation theorem for "prefence for flexibility"', Econometrica, 47 (1979), 565-77.
39. 21 K. J. Arrow, 'a Note on Freedom and Flexibility', in K. Basu, P Pattanaikand K. Suzuruma (eds), Choice, Welfare and Development. A Festschrift in Honour of amartya K. Sen, (Oxford, Claredon, 1995).
40. 22 Pattanaik and Xu, 'On preference and freedom'.
41. 23 Pattanaik and Xu, 'On preference and freedom', p. 5. The reader might suggest that objections to the Ban On Women could well be inspired by a feeling that the Ban is unjust, unfair, undeserved or an unjustifiable case of unequal treatment. The reader would be right. Be that as it may, among the reasons one might have to oppose the Ban, the sense that individual liberty is violated here may still play a major role independent of any considerations of justice.
42. 24 Pattanaik and Xu, 'On preference and freedom', p. 6.
43. 25 Pattanaik and Xu, 'On preference and freedom', p. 7. Their approach is strongly influenced by P. Jones and R. Sugden, 'Evaluating choice', International Review of Law and Economics, 2 (1982), 47-65. See also R. Sugden, 'The metric of opportunity', Economics and Philosophy, forthcoming.
44. 25 Pattanaik and Xu, 'On preference and freedom', p. 7. Their approach is strongly influenced by P. Jones and R. Sugden, 'Evaluating choice', International Review of Law and Economics, 2 (1982), 47-65. See also R. Sugden, 'The metric of opportunity', Economics and Philosophy, forthcoming.
45. 25 Pattanaik and Xu, 'On preference and freedom', p. 7. Their approach is strongly influenced by P. Jones and R. Sugden, 'Evaluating choice', International Review of Law and Economics, 2 (1982), 47-65. See also R. Sugden, 'The metric of opportunity', Economics and Philosophy, forthcoming.
46. 26 Pattanaik and Xu, 'On preference and freedom', p. 7.
47. 27 And as one of the referees pointed out to us, Thomas More did prefer decapitation at dawn to becoming a Protestant, a choice which he felt to be reasonable given his circumstances.
48. 28 If an individual's position is indeed unique and non-reproducible, the amount of freedom enjoyed depends not only on the exact situation but also on the particular individual; freedom would not be just determined 'situationally' but even purely subjectively.
49. 29 Carter, 'The independent value of freedom'.
50. 30 For a more comprehensive treatment of the reasonable, see J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 56-8, and B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality. A Treatise on Social Justice Volume II (Oxford, Claredon, 1995), p. 69; traces of this idea can also in Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, Basic, 1974), pp. 48-51.
51. 30 For a more comprehensive treatment of the reasonable, see J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 56-8, and B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality. A Treatise on Social Justice Volume II (Oxford, Claredon, 1995), p. 69; traces of this idea can also in Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, Basic, 1974), pp. 48-51.
52. 30 For a more comprehensive treatment of the reasonable, see J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, pp. 56-8, and B. Barry, Justice as Impartiality. A Treatise on Social Justice Volume II (Oxford, Claredon, 1995), p. 69; traces of this idea can also in Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York, Basic, 1974), pp. 48-51.
53. 31 They might, of course, exclude preference relations that are not orderings.
54. 32 Carter ('The independent value of freedom', p. 844) points out that a similar argumentative loop sometimes occurs in political philosophy when claims are made about the superior degree of freedom that a theory of justice would guarantee, when freedom has first been defined in terms of that same conception of justice.
55. 33 Let C denote the set consisting of all feasible alternatives which maximize utility in at least one utility function with positive probability. Under Arrow's conception of freedom, an agent derives as much freedom from C as from the set of all feasible alternatives X. Thus, in the most extreme case in which there is a utility function with probability one, the singleton set consisting of the most preferred alternative, say {x}, yields as much freedom as X: a government-enforced allocation of only and exactly the one thing x that an individual most wants will give as much opportunity freedom as being able to choose any feasible alternative from a set that includes other elements next to x.
56. 34 For further discussion of the individuation issue see Steiner, 'How Free. Computing Personal Liberty'; Dowding, 'Choice: its increase and its value'.
57. 35 Cf. M. L. J. Wissenburg, Justice from a Distance. An Outline of a Liberal Theory of Social Justice, (University of Nijmegen, PhD thesis, 1994; Revised edition forthcoming with UCL Press, London), p. 65.
58. 36 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 48.