The strange success of the Montreal Protocol: Why reductionist accounts fail

International Environmental Affairs

Volumn 10, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 197-220

  Grundmann, Reiner ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CLIMATE CHANGE; ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS; INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION; OZONE;

EID: 0032448899     PISSN: 10414665     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (95)

1. I do not discuss the question of whether their implementation can be considered successful, too. There are indications that this is indeed the case. See Stephen A. Montzka et al., "Decline in the Tropospheric Abundance of Halogen from Halocarbons: Implications for Stratospheric Ozone Depletion," Science 272 (31 June 1996): 1318-22; and Edward A. Parson and Owen Greene, "The Complex Chemistry of the International Ozone Agreements," Environment 37 (1995): 16-43. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), world production of chlorofluorocarbons was virtually cut in half during the period from 1986 to 1992. UNEP, 1994 Report of the Technology and Economics Assessment Panel (Nairobi: UNEP, 1995), p. 32. In order to keep technical matters as simple as possible, I shall refer throughout this article to ozone-depleting substances as "CFCs," although these are not the only ones.
2. I do not discuss the question of whether their implementation can be considered successful, too. There are indications that this is indeed the case. See Stephen A. Montzka et al., "Decline in the Tropospheric Abundance of Halogen from Halocarbons: Implications for Stratospheric Ozone Depletion," Science 272 (31 June 1996): 1318-22; and Edward A. Parson and Owen Greene, "The Complex Chemistry of the International Ozone Agreements," Environment 37 (1995): 16-43. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), world production of chlorofluorocarbons was virtually cut in half during the period from 1986 to 1992. UNEP, 1994 Report of the Technology and Economics Assessment Panel (Nairobi: UNEP, 1995), p. 32. In order to keep technical matters as simple as possible, I shall refer throughout this article to ozone-depleting substances as "CFCs," although these are not the only ones.
3. I do not discuss the question of whether their implementation can be considered successful, too. There are indications that this is indeed the case. See Stephen A. Montzka et al., "Decline in the Tropospheric Abundance of Halogen from Halocarbons: Implications for Stratospheric Ozone Depletion," Science 272 (31 June 1996): 1318-22; and Edward A. Parson and Owen Greene, "The Complex Chemistry of the International Ozone Agreements," Environment 37 (1995): 16-43. According to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), world production of chlorofluorocarbons was virtually cut in half during the period from 1986 to 1992. UNEP, 1994 Report of the Technology and Economics Assessment Panel (Nairobi: UNEP, 1995), p. 32. In order to keep technical matters as simple as possible, I shall refer throughout this article to ozone-depleting substances as "CFCs," although these are not the only ones.
4. Quoted in Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 7. See also David Leonard Downie, "Road Map or False Trail? Evaluating the 'Precedence' of the Ozone Regime as a Model and Strategy for Global Climate Change," International Environmental Affairs 7, no. 4 (1995): 321-45.
5. Quoted in Richard E. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy: New Directions in Safeguarding the Planet (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 7. See also David Leonard Downie, "Road Map or False Trail? Evaluating the 'Precedence' of the Ozone Regime as a Model and Strategy for Global Climate Change," International Environmental Affairs 7, no. 4 (1995): 321-45.
6. James Q. Wilson, "The Politics of Regulation," in The Politics of Regulation, ed. James Q. Wilson (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 357-94.
7. Kenneth A. Oye, "Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, ed. Kenneth A. Oye (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 1-24.
8. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in International Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Krasner's definition of an international regime as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.
9. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in International Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Krasner's definition of an international regime as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.
10. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Books, 1984); Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in International Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). See also Krasner's definition of an international regime as "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (London: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 2.
11. Compared to prisoners' dilemmas, deadlocks are much more resistant to solution since each side prefers to defect instead of cooperating. The logic of deadlocks has rarely been investigated in the literature on international relations. See George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, pp. 80-117; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, pp. 226-54.
12. Compared to prisoners' dilemmas, deadlocks are much more resistant to solution since each side prefers to defect instead of cooperating. The logic of deadlocks has rarely been investigated in the literature on international relations. See George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph M. Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, pp. 80-117; Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions," in Cooperation Under Anarchy, pp. 226-54.
13. As Robert Keohane and Elinor Ostrom put it: "Before CFCs had been invented, the stratospheric ozone layer was a public good; and since it was provided by nature, there was no problem of underprovision. Now it is a common-pool resource, subject to human depletion." Robert O. Keohane and Elinor Ostrom, "Local Commons and Global Interdependence: Heterogeneity and Cooperation in Two Domains," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994): 417.
14. This would reduce the chances for successful cooperation even where the logic of a prisoners' dilemma applies. Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 153, 193. However, in absolute numbers, few countries produced CFCs domestically. See Downie, "Road Map or False Trail?" p. 334. For a discussion of the influence of the number of actors on the outcome of negotiations, see Keohane and Ostrom, "Local Commons and Global Interdependence."
15. This would reduce the chances for successful cooperation even where the logic of a prisoners' dilemma applies. Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 153, 193. However, in absolute numbers, few countries produced CFCs domestically. See Downie, "Road Map or False Trail?" p. 334. For a discussion of the influence of the number of actors on the outcome of negotiations, see Keohane and Ostrom, "Local Commons and Global Interdependence."
16. This would reduce the chances for successful cooperation even where the logic of a prisoners' dilemma applies. Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982), pp. 153, 193. However, in absolute numbers, few countries produced CFCs domestically. See Downie, "Road Map or False Trail?" p. 334. For a discussion of the influence of the number of actors on the outcome of negotiations, see Keohane and Ostrom, "Local Commons and Global Interdependence."
17. Most notably, Peter M. Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," International Organization 46 (1992): 187-224; Peter M. Haas, "Stratospheric Ozone: Regime Formation in Stages," in Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, ed. Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press; 1993), pp. 152-85; James H. Maxwell and Sanford L. Weiner, "Green Consciousness or Dollar Diplomacy? The British Response to the Threat of Ozone Depletion," International Environmental Affairs 5 (1993): 19-41; Kenneth A. Oye and James H. Maxwell, "Self-interest and Environmental Management," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994): 593-624; Ian H. Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995); James K. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities," International Organization 46 (1992): 323-65; Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, "The Interest-based Explanation of International Environmental Policy," International Organization 48 (1994): 77-105.
18. Most notably, Peter M. Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," International Organization 46 (1992): 187-224; Peter M. Haas, "Stratospheric Ozone: Regime Formation in Stages," in Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, ed. Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press; 1993), pp. 152-85; James H. Maxwell and Sanford L. Weiner, "Green Consciousness or Dollar Diplomacy? The British Response to the Threat of Ozone Depletion," International Environmental Affairs 5 (1993): 19-41; Kenneth A. Oye and James H. Maxwell, "Self-interest and Environmental Management," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994): 593-624; Ian H. Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995); James K. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities," International Organization 46 (1992): 323-65; Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, "The Interest-based Explanation of International Environmental Policy," International Organization 48 (1994): 77-105.
19. Most notably, Peter M. Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," International Organization 46 (1992): 187-224; Peter M. Haas, "Stratospheric Ozone: Regime Formation in Stages," in Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, ed. Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press; 1993), pp. 152-85; James H. Maxwell and Sanford L. Weiner, "Green Consciousness or Dollar Diplomacy? The British Response to the Threat of Ozone Depletion," International Environmental Affairs 5 (1993): 19-41; Kenneth A. Oye and James H. Maxwell, "Self-interest and Environmental Management," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994): 593-624; Ian H. Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995); James K. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities," International Organization 46 (1992): 323-65; Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, "The Interest-based Explanation of International Environmental Policy," International Organization 48 (1994): 77-105.
20. Most notably, Peter M. Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," International Organization 46 (1992): 187-224; Peter M. Haas, "Stratospheric Ozone: Regime Formation in Stages," in Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, ed. Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press; 1993), pp. 152-85; James H. Maxwell and Sanford L. Weiner, "Green Consciousness or Dollar Diplomacy? The British Response to the Threat of Ozone Depletion," International Environmental Affairs 5 (1993): 19-41; Kenneth A. Oye and James H. Maxwell, "Self-interest and Environmental Management," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994): 593-624; Ian H. Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995); James K. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities," International Organization 46 (1992): 323-65; Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, "The Interest-based Explanation of International Environmental Policy," International Organization 48 (1994): 77-105.
21. Most notably, Peter M. Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," International Organization 46 (1992): 187-224; Peter M. Haas, "Stratospheric Ozone: Regime Formation in Stages," in Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, ed. Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press; 1993), pp. 152-85; James H. Maxwell and Sanford L. Weiner, "Green Consciousness or Dollar Diplomacy? The British Response to the Threat of Ozone Depletion," International Environmental Affairs 5 (1993): 19-41; Kenneth A. Oye and James H. Maxwell, "Self-interest and Environmental Management," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994): 593-624; Ian H. Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995); James K. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities," International Organization 46 (1992): 323-65; Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, "The Interest-based Explanation of International Environmental Policy," International Organization 48 (1994): 77-105.
22. Most notably, Peter M. Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," International Organization 46 (1992): 187-224; Peter M. Haas, "Stratospheric Ozone: Regime Formation in Stages," in Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, ed. Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press; 1993), pp. 152-85; James H. Maxwell and Sanford L. Weiner, "Green Consciousness or Dollar Diplomacy? The British Response to the Threat of Ozone Depletion," International Environmental Affairs 5 (1993): 19-41; Kenneth A. Oye and James H. Maxwell, "Self-interest and Environmental Management," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994): 593-624; Ian H. Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995); James K. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities," International Organization 46 (1992): 323-65; Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, "The Interest-based Explanation of International Environmental Policy," International Organization 48 (1994): 77-105.
23. Most notably, Peter M. Haas, "Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect Stratospheric Ozone," International Organization 46 (1992): 187-224; Peter M. Haas, "Stratospheric Ozone: Regime Formation in Stages," in Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes, ed. Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press; 1993), pp. 152-85; James H. Maxwell and Sanford L. Weiner, "Green Consciousness or Dollar Diplomacy? The British Response to the Threat of Ozone Depletion," International Environmental Affairs 5 (1993): 19-41; Kenneth A. Oye and James H. Maxwell, "Self-interest and Environmental Management," Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1994): 593-624; Ian H. Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995); James K. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities," International Organization 46 (1992): 323-65; Detlef Sprinz and Tapani Vaahtoranta, "The Interest-based Explanation of International Environmental Policy," International Organization 48 (1994): 77-105.
24. Oye and Maxwell, "Self-interest and Environmental Management"; George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1971): 1-21; Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
25. Oye and Maxwell, "Self-interest and Environmental Management"; George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1971): 1-21; Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
26. Oye and Maxwell, "Self-interest and Environmental Management"; George J. Stigler, "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2 (1971): 1-21; Mancur Olson Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).
27. Maxwell and Weiner, "Green Consciousness or Dollar Diplomacy?" p. 34.
28. Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, "The Interest-based Explanation of International Environmental Policy."
29. See UNEP, Environmental Effects of Ozone Depletion: 1994 Assessment (Nairobi: UNEP, 1994).
30. Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, "The Interest-based Explanation of International Environmental Policy," p. 93f.
31. Ibid., p. 94 n. 47.
32. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 33.
33. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation"; Peter M. Morrisette, "The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion," Natural Resources Journal 29 (1989): 793-820.
34. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation"; Peter M. Morrisette, "The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion," Natural Resources Journal 29 (1989): 793-820.
35. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation," p. 358. In April 1987, the New Scientist reported that U.S. firms had no technological advantage. It also said that all big CFC producers had taken out patents for the most likely substitutes: "EEC sources say that American companies, including Du Pont, are ahead in the search for replacements and would benefit commercially from the U.S.'s proposals. Du Pont denies this. So does its chief competitor, ICI. 'No one can have a replacement for CFC 11 and 12 on the market before five, or more likely ten years,' says Peter Hollins, ICFs business manager for halomethanes." Debora MacKenzie "Chemical Giants Battle Over Ozone Holes," New Scientist 23, no. 4. (1987): 22; see also Umweltbundesamt, Responsibility Means Doing Without (Berlin: German Federal Environmental Agency, 1989). The same article in New Scientist notes that ICI, Du Pont, and other firms have taken out patents for the substance R 134a and that R 22 had been invented back in 1936. This invalidates the claim that one producer had a technological advantage.
36. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation," p. 358. In April 1987, the New Scientist reported that U.S. firms had no technological advantage. It also said that all big CFC producers had taken out patents for the most likely substitutes: "EEC sources say that American companies, including Du Pont, are ahead in the search for replacements and would benefit commercially from the U.S.'s proposals. Du Pont denies this. So does its chief competitor, ICI. 'No one can have a replacement for CFC 11 and 12 on the market before five, or more likely ten years,' says Peter Hollins, ICFs business manager for halomethanes." Debora MacKenzie "Chemical Giants Battle Over Ozone Holes," New Scientist 23, no. 4. (1987): 22; see also Umweltbundesamt, Responsibility Means Doing Without (Berlin: German Federal Environmental Agency, 1989). The same article in New Scientist notes that ICI, Du Pont, and other firms have taken out patents for the substance R 134a and that R 22 had been invented back in 1936. This invalidates the claim that one producer had a technological advantage.
37. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation," p. 358. In April 1987, the New Scientist reported that U.S. firms had no technological advantage. It also said that all big CFC producers had taken out patents for the most likely substitutes: "EEC sources say that American companies, including Du Pont, are ahead in the search for replacements and would benefit commercially from the U.S.'s proposals. Du Pont denies this. So does its chief competitor, ICI. 'No one can have a replacement for CFC 11 and 12 on the market before five, or more likely ten years,' says Peter Hollins, ICFs business manager for halomethanes." Debora MacKenzie "Chemical Giants Battle Over Ozone Holes," New Scientist 23, no. 4. (1987): 22; see also Umweltbundesamt, Responsibility Means Doing Without (Berlin: German Federal Environmental Agency, 1989). The same article in New Scientist notes that ICI, Du Pont, and other firms have taken out patents for the substance R 134a and that R 22 had been invented back in 1936. This invalidates the claim that one producer had a technological advantage.
38. Morrisette, "The Evolution of Policy Responses to Stratospheric Ozone Depletion," p. 816. A scientist who was never affiliated with the Du Pont company told me: "I also do not have the impression that Du Pont had such a big lead in alternatives at the time. Back in the period 1977 to 1979, each of the major companies (Du Pont, Allied, ICI, perhaps Hoechst) obtained patents on particular methods for making some of the likely substitutes. [The Du Pont decision to phase out CFCs] doesn't sound to me like a decision made because they thought that they had competitive advantage - although they may also have felt that they were in a good position" (interview 16).
39. Forest Reinhardt, Du Pont Freon Products Division, Harvard Business School Case Study (Washington, D.C.: National Wildlife Federation, 1989).
40. Hoechst saw the substitution potential in 1989 as follows: 80 percent for cooling, 25 percent for insulation, 5 percent for aerosols, 30 percent for cleaning, and 0 percent for foams (Europa Chemie 13 (1989): 206). At the same time, Du Pont estimated that HCFCs would cover more than 60 percent of the original market share, whereas outsiders would get 32 percent. Four years later, the first figure sank to 45 percent; the second rose to 49 percent. These estimates notwithstanding, in the last ten years, all producers have built overhead capacities. Prices for HCFCs are falling. See Duncan Brack, International Trade and the Montreal Protocol (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1996), p. 31.
41. "F 134a is considered as an alternative to F 12 for refrigeration and air conditioning applications . . . and appears to be technically the most promising substitute among the fluorocarbons. It also appears to be a feasible aerosol propellant." Umweltbundesamt, Responsibility Means Doing Without, p. 40. In 1989, the German Federal Environmental Agency reported that F 134a would not be available in commercial quantities prior to 1992. Additional information is according to Europa Chemie and Chemische Industrie (1988-1990).
42. "F 141b has hitherto been produced only in small quantities, although a technical manufacturing process is known. . . . [It] is being tested as an alternative to F 11 for use in manufacturing polyurethane plastic foam . . . [and] for use in refrigeration technology" (Umweltbundesamt, Responsibility Means Doing Without, p. 38).
43. I am giving a somewhat stylized account of Haas's position. He has taken pains to avoid a monocausal explantion of the Montreal Protocol himself (see Haas, "Stratospheric Ozone"), but his approach has been taken up by others as "the epistemic community approach" and thus become very influential, which is why I feel legitimized to stylize him the way I do.
44. John J. Nance, What Goes Up: The Global Assault on our Atmosphere (New York: William Morrow, 1991); Ellen R. Shell, "Weather Versus Chemicals," The Atlantic 259 (May 1987): 27-31; Seth Cagin and Philip Dray, Between Earth and Sky: How CFCs Changed Our World and Endangered the Ozone Layer (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993); Sharon Roan, Ozone Crisis: The 15-Year Evolution of a Sudden Global Emergency (New York: Wiley, 1989).
45. John J. Nance, What Goes Up: The Global Assault on our Atmosphere (New York: William Morrow, 1991); Ellen R. Shell, "Weather Versus Chemicals," The Atlantic 259 (May 1987): 27-31; Seth Cagin and Philip Dray, Between Earth and Sky: How CFCs Changed Our World and Endangered the Ozone Layer (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993); Sharon Roan, Ozone Crisis: The 15-Year Evolution of a Sudden Global Emergency (New York: Wiley, 1989).
46. John J. Nance, What Goes Up: The Global Assault on our Atmosphere (New York: William Morrow, 1991); Ellen R. Shell, "Weather Versus Chemicals," The Atlantic 259 (May 1987): 27-31; Seth Cagin and Philip Dray, Between Earth and Sky: How CFCs Changed Our World and Endangered the Ozone Layer (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993); Sharon Roan, Ozone Crisis: The 15-Year Evolution of a Sudden Global Emergency (New York: Wiley, 1989).
47. John J. Nance, What Goes Up: The Global Assault on our Atmosphere (New York: William Morrow, 1991); Ellen R. Shell, "Weather Versus Chemicals," The Atlantic 259 (May 1987): 27-31; Seth Cagin and Philip Dray, Between Earth and Sky: How CFCs Changed Our World and Endangered the Ozone Layer (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993); Sharon Roan, Ozone Crisis: The 15-Year Evolution of a Sudden Global Emergency (New York: Wiley, 1989).
48. If one takes the overlap between model predictions and measurements as an indicator of the underlying scientific understanding, it is said to be somewhere between 60 percent and 90 percent in the case of polar ozone, whereas in the case of the mid-latitudes the fit is only 50 percent (various interviews).
49. Likewise, Ian Rowlands (not to be confused with F. Sherwood Rowland) observes that the politicians "signed the agreement in September 1987, while scientists did not publish their report until March 1988." Rowlands, The Politics of Global Atmospheric Change, p. 89. This invalidates his hypothesis that a "consensus regarding the problem's causal relations is necessary for international cooperation" (p. 30).
50. Paul A. Sabatier, "Policy Change over a Decade or More," Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, ed. Paul A. Sabatier and Hank C. Jenkins-Smith (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 13-40.
51. Mario Molina and F. Sherwood Rowland, "Stratospheric Sink for Chlorofluormethanes: Chlorine-Atom Catalysed Destruction of Ozone," Nature 249 (1974): 810-12.
52. Skeptics with scientific backgrounds have existed from the early days of the debate. See Hugh W. Elsaesser, "Ozone Destruction by Catalysis: Credibility of the Threat," Atmospheric Environment 12 (1978): 1849-56; Fred S. Singer, "My Adventures in the Ozone Layer," National Review (1989): 34-38. See also the account given in Lydia Dotto and Harold Schiff, The Ozone War (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 283. One of the skeptics' standard arguments is that a 1 or 2 percent UV-B increase is not harmful since it is equivalent to moving twenty-five kilometers south. See Hugh W. Elsaesser, "The Unheard Arguments: A Rational View on Stratospheric Ozone," 21st Century (Fall 1994): 44.
53. Skeptics with scientific backgrounds have existed from the early days of the debate. See Hugh W. Elsaesser, "Ozone Destruction by Catalysis: Credibility of the Threat," Atmospheric Environment 12 (1978): 1849-56; Fred S. Singer, "My Adventures in the Ozone Layer," National Review (1989): 34-38. See also the account given in Lydia Dotto and Harold Schiff, The Ozone War (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 283. One of the skeptics' standard arguments is that a 1 or 2 percent UV-B increase is not harmful since it is equivalent to moving twenty-five kilometers south. See Hugh W. Elsaesser, "The Unheard Arguments: A Rational View on Stratospheric Ozone," 21st Century (Fall 1994): 44.
54. Skeptics with scientific backgrounds have existed from the early days of the debate. See Hugh W. Elsaesser, "Ozone Destruction by Catalysis: Credibility of the Threat," Atmospheric Environment 12 (1978): 1849-56; Fred S. Singer, "My Adventures in the Ozone Layer," National Review (1989): 34-38. See also the account given in Lydia Dotto and Harold Schiff, The Ozone War (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 283. One of the skeptics' standard arguments is that a 1 or 2 percent UV-B increase is not harmful since it is equivalent to moving twenty-five kilometers south. See Hugh W. Elsaesser, "The Unheard Arguments: A Rational View on Stratospheric Ozone," 21st Century (Fall 1994): 44.
55. Skeptics with scientific backgrounds have existed from the early days of the debate. See Hugh W. Elsaesser, "Ozone Destruction by Catalysis: Credibility of the Threat," Atmospheric Environment 12 (1978): 1849-56; Fred S. Singer, "My Adventures in the Ozone Layer," National Review (1989): 34-38. See also the account given in Lydia Dotto and Harold Schiff, The Ozone War (New York: Doubleday, 1978), p. 283. One of the skeptics' standard arguments is that a 1 or 2 percent UV-B increase is not harmful since it is equivalent to moving twenty-five kilometers south. See Hugh W. Elsaesser, "The Unheard Arguments: A Rational View on Stratospheric Ozone," 21st Century (Fall 1994): 44.
56. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 13; Paul Brodeur, "Annals of Chemistry: In the Face of Doubt," The New Yorker 9, no. 6 (1986): 70-86.
57. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 13; Paul Brodeur, "Annals of Chemistry: In the Face of Doubt," The New Yorker 9, no. 6 (1986): 70-86.
58. Brodeur, "Annals of Chemistry."
59. Walter Sullivan, "Fluorocarbon's End Sought by Peterson," The New York Times, 18 September 1976, p. 18.
60. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7457(b), quoted in Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 23.
61. Environmental Protection Agency, "Protection of Stratospheric Ozone," Federal Register 52, no. 47491 (1987).
62. x Interaction," Nature 315 (16 May 1985): 207-210.
63. Interview 44. As one scientist told me, "You may make an equally justified plot between the Dow Jones industrial index and the ozone hole. If you have something going up and something going down, then you can always slide the scales and it will look like a correlation, but there is nothing scientific about it" (interview 30).
64. Personal trust was decisive for the advocate's belief in the British team: "I had met G_, who was Farman's colleague, and realized that this was a superb professional and that you would not be going to dismiss their data. They knew what they were doing" (interview 16).
65. Once again, one of the early scientific advocates coined the term "ozone hole." "It was such a simple description, it's a code word that means 'that phenomenon down there"' (interview 45). Initially it was rejected by most scientists and, of course, industry.
66. "Low Ozone Level Found Above Antarctica," The New York Times, 7 November 1985. "We've used up our margin of safety and we've used it up frivolously," Rowland told the campus newspaper in Maryland. He demanded an immediate ban of CFCs in the U.S. and worldwide.
67. It is worth noting that the early metaphors of the "thinning" layer were accompanied by the onomatopoetic reference to the sound of spraycans: Lee Edson, "Not with a Bang, but with a Pfffft," The New York Times, 21 December 1975, section 6, p. 34.
68. See Roan, Ozone Crisis, for an account of the spectacular and heroic expedition.
69. New Scientist, 3 September 1987, p. 24.
70. As one scientist explained to me, "There were three papers, where theory people tried to explain the ozone hole. They all take credit for it, but they were all wrong. The mechanisms were all wrong. The first person who could do it was Mario Molina (interview 15). It should be stressed that the scientist who made this comment belongs to the core group of atmospheric scientists involved in ozone research and not the so-called "backlash."
71. For the notion of policy networks, see Patrick Kenis and Volker Schneider, "Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox," in Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, ed. Bernd Marin and Renate Mayntz (Frankfurt and Boulder, Col.: Campus/Westview, 1991), pp. 25-59.
72. Roan, Ozone Crisis, pp. 46-47.
73. Council on Environmental Quality and Federal Council for Science and Technology, Fluorocarbons and the Environment: Report of Federal Task Force on Inadvertent Modification of the Stratosphere (IMOS) (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 1.
74. This orchestrating of consensus is viewed with skepticism by some scientists, especially those who remain in the minority. Consider the following example: "We are told that there were 159 scientists from 65 countries who found out such and such. But in science there is no democracy, there is the possibility that one is against the majority and is right. I don't wish to think we are playing a democratic game" (interview 28).
75. The involvement of the UNEP was spurred by the NRDC way back in the 1970s. See Cagin and Dray, Between Earth and Sky, p. 220.
76. Allan Mazur and Jingling Lee, "Sounding the Global Alarm: Environmental Issues in the U.S. National News," Social Studies of Science 23 (1993): 681-720.
77. Du Pont had committed itself very early to the results of scientific research. Even before the MRH was published, Du Pont initiated an international research program to "investigate any effects which [CFCs] may produce on plants or animals now or in the future." Manufacturing Chemists Association (MCA), Research Program on Effects of Fluorocarbons on the Atmosphere: Summary (Washington, D.C.: MCA, 1975). On 30 June 1975, the Du Pont company ran a full-page ad in The New York Times that declared: "Should reputable evidence show that some fluorocarbons cause a health hazard through depletion of the ozone layer, we are prepared to stop production of the offending compounds." In the following years, Du Pont took great pains to make this point, namely that reputable evidence was not available. In the same ad the company spelled out the program for the coming decade: "Claim meets counterclaim. Assumptions are challenged on both sides. And nothing is settled." In the end it acknowledged the need for action.
78. Surprised by the speed of the process, Maxwell and Weiner implausibly suggest that there were no real differences in the first place: "The speed with which an agreement was actually reached following discovery of the Antarctic ozone hole provides evidence of a greater convergence of viewpoints than is commonly believed." Maxwell and Weiner, "Green Consciousness," p. 37. For details of the controversies, see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, and Thomas Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International Environmental Governance (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1994).
79. Surprised by the speed of the process, Maxwell and Weiner implausibly suggest that there were no real differences in the first place: "The speed with which an agreement was actually reached following discovery of the Antarctic ozone hole provides evidence of a greater convergence of viewpoints than is commonly believed." Maxwell and Weiner, "Green Consciousness," p. 37. For details of the controversies, see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, and Thomas Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International Environmental Governance (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1994).
80. Surprised by the speed of the process, Maxwell and Weiner implausibly suggest that there were no real differences in the first place: "The speed with which an agreement was actually reached following discovery of the Antarctic ozone hole provides evidence of a greater convergence of viewpoints than is commonly believed." Maxwell and Weiner, "Green Consciousness," p. 37. For details of the controversies, see Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, and Thomas Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes: Institutions for International Environmental Governance (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1994).
81. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, pp. 60-62; Cagin and Dray, Between Earth and Sky, pp. 332-34.
82. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, pp. 60-62; Cagin and Dray, Between Earth and Sky, pp. 332-34.
83. The Wall Street Journal, 29 May 1987.
84. President Reagan eventually came over to this line: The U.S. will go for a 95 percent reduction but settle for a 50 percent compromise. See Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 57; and David D. Doniger, "Politics of the Ozone Layer," Issues in Science and Technology (Spring 1988): 86-92. It may be speculated that the opponents of action had formulated the 95 percent reduction goal as a wrecking maneuver: they expected this to make the negotiations fail, or to result in such patently inadequate results that they could be rejected. It is important to remember that at the time nobody envisaged the possibility of effective international action to ban a class of industrial chemicals (I thank Konrad von Moltke for this suggestion).
85. President Reagan eventually came over to this line: The U.S. will go for a 95 percent reduction but settle for a 50 percent compromise. See Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 57; and David D. Doniger, "Politics of the Ozone Layer," Issues in Science and Technology (Spring 1988): 86-92. It may be speculated that the opponents of action had formulated the 95 percent reduction goal as a wrecking maneuver: they expected this to make the negotiations fail, or to result in such patently inadequate results that they could be rejected. It is important to remember that at the time nobody envisaged the possibility of effective international action to ban a class of industrial chemicals (I thank Konrad von Moltke for this suggestion).
86. The White House seems to have drawn a lesson from this experience, having been much more circumspect in the climate case. See the contributions of William Nitze, "A Failure of Presidential Leadership," in Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, ed. Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 187-200; and Daniel Bodansky, "Prologue to the Climate Change Convention," ibid., pp. 45-74.
87. The White House seems to have drawn a lesson from this experience, having been much more circumspect in the climate case. See the contributions of William Nitze, "A Failure of Presidential Leadership," in Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention, ed. Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 187-200; and Daniel Bodansky, "Prologue to the Climate Change Convention," ibid., pp. 45-74.
88. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 64; Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, pp. 249-51.
89. Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy, p. 64; Gehring, Dynamic International Regimes, pp. 249-51.
90. The decision was based on a clause of the Clean Air Act of 1977. Brodeur, "Annals of Chemistry," p. 85.
91. Edward A. Parson, "Protecting the Ozone Layer," in Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, ed. Peter M. Haas, Robert Keohane, and Marc A. Levy (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 43.
92. See Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 28.
93. The New York Times, 5 November 1986.
94. Washington Post, 31 March 1987.
95. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action.