메뉴 건너뛰기




Volumn 31, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 915-932

Bargaining with surplus destruction

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING;

EID: 0032424677     PISSN: 00084085     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/136500     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (20)

References (21)
  • 2
    • 0000368681 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly
    • Ausubel, L. M., and R.J. Deneckere (1999) 'Reputation in bargaining and durable goods monopoly,' Econometrica 57, 511-32
    • (1999) Econometrica , vol.57 , pp. 511-532
    • Ausubel, L.M.1    Deneckere, R.J.2
  • 3
    • 0000234789 scopus 로고
    • Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
    • Avery, C., and P.B. Zemsky (1994) 'Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining,' Games and Economic Behavior 7, 154-68
    • (1994) Games and Economic Behavior , vol.7 , pp. 154-168
    • Avery, C.1    Zemsky, P.B.2
  • 4
    • 0009974977 scopus 로고
    • Asymmetric information and contract renegotiation
    • Beaudry, P., and M. Poitvin (1995) 'Asymmetric information and contract renegotiation,' Canadian Journal of Economics 28, 302-35
    • (1995) Canadian Journal of Economics , vol.28 , pp. 302-335
    • Beaudry, P.1    Poitvin, M.2
  • 5
    • 0001104018 scopus 로고
    • Perfect equilibria in a negotiation model
    • Busch, L.-A. and Q. Wen (1995) 'Perfect equilibria in a negotiation model,' Economatrica 63, 545-65
    • (1995) Economatrica , vol.63 , pp. 545-565
    • Busch, L.-A.1    Wen, Q.2
  • 6
    • 0000491614 scopus 로고
    • Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
    • Fernandez, R., and J. Glazer (1991) 'Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents,' American Economic Review 81, 240-52
    • (1991) American Economic Review , vol.81 , pp. 240-252
    • Fernandez, R.1    Glazer, J.2
  • 7
    • 0001793573 scopus 로고
    • Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information
    • ed. Alvin Roth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
    • Fudenberg, D., D. Levine, and J. Tirole (1985) 'Infinite-horizon models of bargaining with one-sided incomplete information,' in Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining, ed. Alvin Roth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)
    • (1985) Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
    • Fudenberg, D.1    Levine, D.2    Tirole, J.3
  • 8
    • 0000460377 scopus 로고
    • A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
    • Haller, H., and S. Holden (1990) 'A letter to the editor on wage bargaining,' Journal of Economic Theory 52, 232-6
    • (1990) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.52 , pp. 232-236
    • Haller, H.1    Holden, S.2
  • 9
    • 0007100082 scopus 로고
    • The role of negotiators in union-firm bargaining
    • Jones, S.R.G. (1989) 'The role of negotiators in union-firm bargaining,' Canadian Journal of Economics 22, 630-42
    • (1989) Canadian Journal of Economics , vol.22 , pp. 630-642
    • Jones, S.R.G.1
  • 11
    • 0344265046 scopus 로고
    • The timing of arbitration and sequential bargaining
    • McKeana, C.J., and V. Sadanand (1995) 'The timing of arbitration and sequential bargaining,' Canadian Journal of Economics 28, 1180-93
    • (1995) Canadian Journal of Economics , vol.28 , pp. 1180-1193
    • McKeana, C.J.1    Sadanand, V.2
  • 12
    • 0344265045 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strategic bargaining with destructive power
    • Working Paper 96/18, University of Exeter
    • Manzini, P. (1996) 'Strategic bargaining with destructive power,' Working Paper 96/18, Economics, University of Exeter
    • (1996) Economics
    • Manzini, P.1
  • 13
    • 0031287014 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power the role of commitment
    • _ (1997) 'Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power the role of commitment,' Economics Letters 54, 15-22
    • (1997) Economics Letters , vol.54 , pp. 15-22
  • 14
    • 0000291018 scopus 로고
    • The bargaining problem
    • Nash, J. (1950) 'The bargaining problem.' Econometrica 18, 155-62
    • (1950) Econometrica , vol.18 , pp. 155-162
    • Nash, J.1
  • 15
    • 0001058478 scopus 로고
    • Two-person cooperative games
    • _ (1953) 'Two-person cooperative games,' Econometrica 21, 128-40
    • (1953) Econometrica , vol.21 , pp. 128-140
  • 16
    • 0002912577 scopus 로고
    • A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers
    • Perry, M., and P. Reny (1993) 'A non-cooperative bargaining model with strategically timed offers,' Journal of Economic Theory 59, 50-77
    • (1993) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.59 , pp. 50-77
    • Perry, M.1    Reny, P.2
  • 17
    • 0003019549 scopus 로고
    • Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
    • Rubinstein, A. (1982) 'Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model,' Econometrica 50, 97-109
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 97-109
    • Rubinstein, A.1
  • 18
    • 0000176839 scopus 로고
    • A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences
    • _ 1985 'A bargaining model with incomplete information about time preferences,' Econometrica 53, 1151-72
    • (1985) Econometrica , vol.53 , pp. 1151-1172
  • 20
    • 38249004924 scopus 로고
    • Delay in bargaining games with complete information
    • Sákovics, J. (1993) 'Delay in bargaining games with complete information,' Journal of Economic Theory 59, 78-95
    • (1993) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.59 , pp. 78-95
    • Sákovics, J.1
  • 21
    • 0001094692 scopus 로고
    • Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
    • Shaked A., and J. Sutton (1984) 'Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model,' Econometrica 52, 1351-64
    • (1984) Econometrica , vol.52 , pp. 1351-1364
    • Shaked, A.1    Sutton, J.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.