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Volumn 54, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 15-22

Strategic wage bargaining with destructive power: The role of commitment

Author keywords

Bargaining; Commitment

Indexed keywords


EID: 0031287014     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1765(96)00924-x     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (5)

References (9)
  • 1
    • 0000234789 scopus 로고
    • Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining
    • Avery, C. and P.B. Zemsky, 1994, Money burning and multiple equilibria in bargaining, Games and Economic Behaviour 7, 154-168.
    • (1994) Games and Economic Behaviour , vol.7 , pp. 154-168
    • Avery, C.1    Zemsky, P.B.2
  • 2
    • 0001104018 scopus 로고
    • Perfect equilibria in a negotiation model
    • Busch, L.-A. and Q. Wen, 1995, Perfect equilibria in a negotiation model. Econometrica 63, 545-565.
    • (1995) Econometrica , vol.63 , pp. 545-565
    • Busch, L.-A.1    Wen, Q.2
  • 3
    • 0003906027 scopus 로고
    • Discussion Paper 1432, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University
    • Dasgupta, P. and E.S. Maskin, 1989, Bargaining and destructive power, Discussion Paper 1432, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Harvard University.
    • (1989) Bargaining and Destructive Power
    • Dasgupta, P.1    Maskin, E.S.2
  • 4
    • 0000491614 scopus 로고
    • Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents
    • Fernandez, R. and J. Glazer, 1991, Striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents, American Economic Review 81, 240-252.
    • (1991) American Economic Review , vol.81 , pp. 240-252
    • Fernandez, R.1    Glazer, J.2
  • 5
    • 0000460377 scopus 로고
    • A letter to the editor on wage bargaining
    • Haller, H. and S. Holden, 1990, A letter to the editor on wage bargaining, Journal of Economic Theory 52, 232-236.
    • (1990) Journal of Economic Theory , vol.52 , pp. 232-236
    • Haller, H.1    Holden, S.2
  • 6
    • 0000369708 scopus 로고
    • Bargaining and commitment in a permanent relationship
    • Holden, S., 1994, Bargaining and commitment in a permanent relationship, Games and Economic Behaviour 7, 169-176.
    • (1994) Games and Economic Behaviour , vol.7 , pp. 169-176
    • Holden, S.1
  • 7
    • 0000666352 scopus 로고
    • Revocable commitment and sequential bargaining
    • Muthoo, A., 1992, Revocable commitment and sequential bargaining, Economic Journal 102 (411), 378-387.
    • (1992) Economic Journal , vol.102 , Issue.411 , pp. 378-387
    • Muthoo, A.1
  • 8
    • 0003019549 scopus 로고
    • Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
    • Rubinstein, A., 1982, Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica 50, 97-109.
    • (1982) Econometrica , vol.50 , pp. 97-109
    • Rubinstein, A.1
  • 9
    • 0001094692 scopus 로고
    • Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model
    • Shaked, A. and J. Sutton, 1984, Involuntary unemployment as a perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model, Econometrica 52, 1351-1364.
    • (1984) Econometrica , vol.52 , pp. 1351-1364
    • Shaked, A.1    Sutton, J.2


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.