Economic policy reform and political transitions in sub-Saharan Africa

Democratization

Volumn 5, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 127-155

  Wieland, Carolina ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC REFORM; POLITICAL REFORM; REGIONAL ECONOMY; REGIONAL POLITICS;

(SUB-SAHARA); AFRICA;

EID: 0032418072     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510349808403575     Document Type: Article

References (87)

1. See Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1981); also see Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1987) and Anne Krueger, 'Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development' American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol.83, No.2 (1993), pp.351-5.
2. See Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1981); also see Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1987) and Anne Krueger, 'Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development' American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol.83, No.2 (1993), pp.351-5.
3. See Robert Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1981); also see Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1987) and Anne Krueger, 'Virtuous and Vicious Circles in Economic Development' American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, Vol.83, No.2 (1993), pp.351-5.
4. See Merilee Grindle, 'Positive Economics and Negative Politics', in Gerald Meier (ed.), Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries (San Francisco, CA: International Center for Economic Growth, 1991).
5. See Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); also see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in East Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, 'Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy', in Haggard and Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Adjustment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
6. See Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); also see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in East Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, 'Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy', in Haggard and Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Adjustment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
7. See Richard Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa's Economic Recovery (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993); also see Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in East Europe and Latin America (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991) and Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, 'Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy', in Haggard and Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Adjustment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992).
8. African states are widely perceived as 'weak' both in their connection to society and their administrative capacity.
9. Thomas Callaghy, 'Political Passions and Economic Interests: Economic Reform and Political Structure in Africa', in Thomas Callaghy and John Ravenhill (eds.), Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p.479.
10. Though the specific content of structural adjustment varies by country over time, such programmes (in following the dictates of the orthodox principle of export-led growth) include trade reforms such as exchange rate devaluations and tariff reductions, and financial sector reforms, such as the divestiture of state-owned enterprises and the termination of price and wage controls. In sum, these programmes are aimed at ending the long-standing predation of agricultural markets, which still represent many African nations' comparative advantage, and attempt to reassert the primacy of economic criteria in development planning. As a result, these reforms often diminish the scope of 'rent-seeking' created by the arbitrary nature of old inward-oriented policies.
11. As is evident from the argument here, successful economic reform constitutes the central independent variable. Though the comparative success of an economic reform programme is difficult to evaluate precisely, the success of reforms in the cases studies here is measured both by the constancy of reforms and by their results - such as the rate of GNP growth, inflation rates, rates of privatization, stabilization of the economy and promotion of new productive activities. In doing so, the cases can be ranked in the following, descending order (of success): (1) Ghana; (2) Tanzania; (3) Senegal; (4) Zambia; (5) Kenya. The criteria used to compile these rankings are described more thoroughly in Table 1 of the Appendix and are also discussed in the individual case studies.
12. For a description of how KANU elites managed to manipulate the money supply in their favour while seemingly reducing the budget deficit, see Barbara Grosh and Stephen Orvis, 'Democracy, Confusion, or Chaos: Political Conditionality in Kenya', unpublished manuscript.
13. By democratization, I mean both formal changes in the political system, such as the legalization of opposition parties, the initiation of ('free and fair') multi-party elections, and increased transparency and accountability in policy-making; as well as more informal changes, such as an increase in the freedom of the press, increased political participation by previously marginalized groups, and a decrease in government-sponsored violence. Though popular clamour for democratization did rise significantly in the early 1990s throughout Africa, practical moves toward democracy were actually initiated, or 'supplied', by incumbent elites, often under pressure from international sources. The political changes in the five cases are tracked in Table 2 of the Appendix. Most strikingly, it shows that Kenya is the only country which has become less liberal since the advent of structural adjustment according to both the analysis here and the widely used Freedom House Gastil index of political freedom. See Freedom House's Freedom in the World, 1986-1987 and freedom in the World, 1996-1997.
14. For an influential analysis of the determinants of the East Asian 'miracle', see Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); see also Gary Gereffi and Donald Wyman (eds.), Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). For a more orthodox interpretation of East Asia's economic success, see The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
15. For an influential analysis of the determinants of the East Asian 'miracle', see Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); see also Gary Gereffi and Donald Wyman (eds.), Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). For a more orthodox interpretation of East Asia's economic success, see The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
16. For an influential analysis of the determinants of the East Asian 'miracle', see Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); see also Gary Gereffi and Donald Wyman (eds.), Manufacturing Miracles: Paths of Industrialization in Latin America and East Asia (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). For a more orthodox interpretation of East Asia's economic success, see The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
17. See Gustav Ranis, 'Another Look at the East Asian Miracle', The World Bank Economic Review, Vol.9, No.3 (1995), pp.509-34.
18. Such analysts point to several similarities between Southeast Asia and Africa, including similar physical and human resource endowments as well as comparable weaknesses in administrative capacities. In addition, Southeast Asia's reform programs have taken place much more recently and, in many cases, are still on-going. See Peter Lewis, 'Economic Reform and Political Transitions in Africa: The Quest for a Politics of Development', World Politics , Vol.49, No.1 (1996), pp.92-129. Also see Peter Harold, Malathi Jayawickrama, and Deepak Bhattasali, Practical Lessons for Africa from East Asia in Industrial and Trade Policies (World Bank Discussion Papers Series, Paper No.310, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996).
19. Such analysts point to several similarities between Southeast Asia and Africa, including similar physical and human resource endowments as well as comparable weaknesses in administrative capacities. In addition, Southeast Asia's reform programs have taken place much more recently and, in many cases, are still on-going. See Peter Lewis, 'Economic Reform and Political Transitions in Africa: The Quest for a Politics of Development', World Politics , Vol.49, No.1 (1996), pp.92-129. Also see Peter Harold, Malathi Jayawickrama, and Deepak Bhattasali, Practical Lessons for Africa from East Asia in Industrial and Trade Policies (World Bank Discussion Papers Series, Paper No.310, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1996).
20. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); also see Richard Sandbrook, 'Taming the African Leviathan', World Policy Journal (Fall 1990), pp.673-701 ; D. Rothchild and N. Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State & Society in Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), and Peter Evans, 'The State as Problem and Solution', in Haggard and Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Adjustment.
21. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); also see Richard Sandbrook, 'Taming the African Leviathan', World Policy Journal (Fall 1990), pp.673-701 ; D. Rothchild and N. Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State & Society in Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), and Peter Evans, 'The State as Problem and Solution', in Haggard and Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Adjustment.
22. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); also see Richard Sandbrook, 'Taming the African Leviathan', World Policy Journal (Fall 1990), pp.673-701 ; D. Rothchild and N. Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State & Society in Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), and Peter Evans, 'The State as Problem and Solution', in Haggard and Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Adjustment.
23. See Robert H. Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); also see Richard Sandbrook, 'Taming the African Leviathan', World Policy Journal (Fall 1990), pp.673-701 ; D. Rothchild and N. Chazan (eds.), The Precarious Balance: State & Society in Africa (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), and Peter Evans, 'The State as Problem and Solution', in Haggard and Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Adjustment.
24. Deepak Lal, 'The Political Economy of Economic Liberalization', The World Bank Economic Review , Vol.1, No.2 (1987), pp.273-99.
25. The World Bank, Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth (Washington, DC: World Bank, Nov. 1989), p.186.
26. Lawrence Summers and Vinod Thomas, 'Recent Lessons of Development', The World Bank Research Observer , Vol.8, No.2 (1993), p.249.
27. Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982-1991 (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993), p.160.
28. The World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p.162.
29. Ironically, such marketing boards were first established during colonial times to defend rural interests, by pooling resources for loans to farmers during times of need. See Robert Bates, 'Governments and Agricultural Markets in Africa', in Robert. Bates (ed.), Toward a Political Economy of Development (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1988), pp.331-58.
30. While pursuing state-led growth, many African governments intervened to lower the price of politically strategic inputs. Over time, however, these interventions produced devastating distortions in domestic economies. African governments, for instance, over-valued national currencies to artificially lower the price of imports from abroad. Unfortunately, this practice also increased the price of exports (often making them uncompetitive) and diminished foreign exchange earnings. When foreign exchange reserves dwindled, the government rationed these reserves through import licenses rather than devaluing the currency (in order to continue to protect the low price of strategic imports, including cheap capital inputs for state-centered industry, low-cost luxury items for state elites, and cheap food grains for urban workers). By allocating these licenses to political clients below their real value, the government thereby created another 'rent' to secure political support. Yet, with the lack of productive activity and the increasing number of rent-seekers under this statist system, foreign exchange reserves eventually became virtually non-existent.
31. Indeed, many scholars have argued that state-led industrialization (based on economic criteria) has produced spectacular results in other developing areas. For an example of this argument, see Wade, Governing the Market; also see Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Recent economic instability in East Asia, however, has led to renewed criticism of such state intervention in industrial development, even in relatively favourable settings such as Japan and South Korea. In particular, critics question the ability of the bureaucratic structures guiding such development to remain insulated from political interference. See 'Asia's Economic Crisis: How Far is Down?', The Economist (15-21 Nov. 1997), pp.19-21.
32. Indeed, many scholars have argued that state-led industrialization (based on economic criteria) has produced spectacular results in other developing areas. For an example of this argument, see Wade, Governing the Market; also see Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Recent economic instability in East Asia, however, has led to renewed criticism of such state intervention in industrial development, even in relatively favourable settings such as Japan and South Korea. In particular, critics question the ability of the bureaucratic structures guiding such development to remain insulated from political interference. See 'Asia's Economic Crisis: How Far is Down?', The Economist (15-21 Nov. 1997), pp.19-21.
33. Indeed, many scholars have argued that state-led industrialization (based on economic criteria) has produced spectacular results in other developing areas. For an example of this argument, see Wade, Governing the Market; also see Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). Recent economic instability in East Asia, however, has led to renewed criticism of such state intervention in industrial development, even in relatively favourable settings such as Japan and South Korea. In particular, critics question the ability of the bureaucratic structures guiding such development to remain insulated from political interference. See 'Asia's Economic Crisis: How Far is Down?', The Economist (15-21 Nov. 1997), pp.19-21.
34. This bias against agriculture was also ideological as many post-independence leaders, along with several prominent development economists, considered this sector to be indicative of Africa's economic backwardness. Unlike their liberal counterparts, such development economists were highly 'trade pessimistic'. Sceptical of market mechanisms, they argued that exports of primary products, which were subject to frequent and drastic price fluctuations, provided an insufficient base for national growth. ISI's rapid, state-led industrialization, on the other hand, was hailed as allowing developing areas such as Africa to break free from their inferior position in the international market. For an example of the trade pessimism which provided the intellectual and ideological basis for ISI, see Hollis Chenery, 'Comparative Development Policy', in Hollis Chenery and Moshe Syrquin (eds.), Advantage and Patterns of Development, 1950-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975). Also see Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (New York: United Nations, 1950).
35. This bias against agriculture was also ideological as many post-independence leaders, along with several prominent development economists, considered this sector to be indicative of Africa's economic backwardness. Unlike their liberal counterparts, such development economists were highly 'trade pessimistic'. Sceptical of market mechanisms, they argued that exports of primary products, which were subject to frequent and drastic price fluctuations, provided an insufficient base for national growth. ISI's rapid, state-led industrialization, on the other hand, was hailed as allowing developing areas such as Africa to break free from their inferior position in the international market. For an example of the trade pessimism which provided the intellectual and ideological basis for ISI, see Hollis Chenery, 'Comparative Development Policy', in Hollis Chenery and Moshe Syrquin (eds.), Advantage and Patterns of Development, 1950-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975). Also see Raul Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems (New York: United Nations, 1950).
36. The implementation of ISI in Latin America, on the other hand, did not require such coercion on the part of government since many sectors, including large agribusiness, benefited from those economic policies. See Michael Barzelay, The Politicized Market Economy: Alcohol in Brazil's Energy Strategy (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1986); also see David Mares, Penetrating the International Market: Theoretical Considerations and a Mexican Case Study (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
37. The implementation of ISI in Latin America, on the other hand, did not require such coercion on the part of government since many sectors, including large agribusiness, benefited from those economic policies. See Michael Barzelay, The Politicized Market Economy: Alcohol in Brazil's Energy Strategy (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1986); also see David Mares, Penetrating the International Market: Theoretical Considerations and a Mexican Case Study (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
38. For an excellent critique of more simplistic interpretations of urban bias, see Merilee Grindle, 'Positive Economics and Negative Politics', in Gerald Meier (ed.), Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries (San Francisco, CA: International Center for Economic Growth, 1991 ). Grindle argues that the influence of societal interests in the policy outcomes of many developing - particularly those without effective legislatures, such as most African nations - is often exaggerated. Unlike the situation in developed nations, the developing governments are not a relatively neutral arena for competitive lobbies. Moreover, political elites (centered in the executive branch) are often quite autonomous in policy initiation (if not policy reform). For a similar argument focused upon Africa, see Michael Lofchie, 'The New Political Economy of Africa', in David Apter and Carl Rosberg (eds.), Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Charlottesville, VA : The University of Virginia Press, 1994).
39. For an excellent critique of more simplistic interpretations of urban bias, see Merilee Grindle, 'Positive Economics and Negative Politics', in Gerald Meier (ed.), Politics and Policy Making in Developing Countries (San Francisco, CA: International Center for Economic Growth, 1991 ). Grindle argues that the influence of societal interests in the policy outcomes of many developing - particularly those without effective legislatures, such as most African nations - is often exaggerated. Unlike the situation in developed nations, the developing governments are not a relatively neutral arena for competitive lobbies. Moreover, political elites (centered in the executive branch) are often quite autonomous in policy initiation (if not policy reform). For a similar argument focused upon Africa, see Michael Lofchie, 'The New Political Economy of Africa', in David Apter and Carl Rosberg (eds.), Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Charlottesville, VA : The University of Virginia Press, 1994).
40. For a discussion of such discordant facts in relation to his own urban bias argument in Markets and States in Tropical Africa, see Robert Bates, 'Agricultural Policy and the Study of Politics in Post-Independence Africa', in Douglas Rimmer (ed.), Africa 30 Years On (Portsmouth, NH: Heinenmann, 1991).
41. See Ruth Collier, Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945-1975 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); also see Robert H. Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982).
42. See Ruth Collier, Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945-1975 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982); also see Robert H. Jackson and Carl Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982).
43. See Haggard and Kaufman, 'Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy'; also see J. Nelson, 'The Political Economy of Stabilization'.
44. See Haggard and Kaufman, 'Economic Adjustment and the Prospects for Democracy'; also see J. Nelson, 'The Political Economy of Stabilization'.
45. See Robert Bates and Anne Krueger, 'Generalizations from the Country Studies', in Robert Bates and Anne Krueger (eds.), Political and Economic Interaction in Economic Policy Reform (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993); also see Deepak Lal, 'India and China: Contrasts in Economic Liberalization?', World Development, Vol.23, No.9 (1995), pp.1475-94.
46. See Robert Bates and Anne Krueger, 'Generalizations from the Country Studies', in Robert Bates and Anne Krueger (eds.), Political and Economic Interaction in Economic Policy Reform (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1993); also see Deepak Lal, 'India and China: Contrasts in Economic Liberalization?', World Development, Vol.23, No.9 (1995), pp.1475-94.
47. For a well-grounded discussion of the crisis hypothesis, see Mariano Tommasi and Andres Veasco, 'Where Are We in the Political Economy of Reform?' paper prepared for the Columbia University Conference on 'Economic Reform in Developing and Transitional Economies', New York City, 12 May 1995; also see John Williamson, 'In Search of a Manual for Technopols', in J. Williamson (ed.), The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington, DC: Institutute for International Economics, 1994), pp.9-44.
48. For a well-grounded discussion of the crisis hypothesis, see Mariano Tommasi and Andres Veasco, 'Where Are We in the Political Economy of Reform?' paper prepared for the Columbia University Conference on 'Economic Reform in Developing and Transitional Economies', New York City, 12 May 1995; also see John Williamson, 'In Search of a Manual for Technopols', in J. Williamson (ed.), The Political Economy of Policy Reform (Washington, DC: Institutute for International Economics, 1994), pp.9-44.
49. J. Clark Leith and Michael F. Lofchie, 'The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment in Ghana', in Bates and Krueger (eds.), Political and Economic Interactions, pp.225-93.
50. Once distorted ISI policies are dismantled, two main groups of winners emerge at first. On the one hand, business, especially its export-oriented (often informal and more small-scale) sectors, benefits from various reforms, including more realistic exchange rates, increased foreign exchange reserves, and more stable property rights. In addition, since agriculture remains Africa's comparative advantage, neo-liberal economic restructuring also benefits rural areas. Indeed, following early agricultural reforms such as the end of unfair taxation, farmers increased their output in Ghana, Tanzania, Senegal and even drought-stricken Zambia. The same proved true of other commodity workers, such as small-scale gold-miners in Ghana. As food prices tend to rise less than cash crops after reform, rural food producers, especially female-headed households, may not make similar gains. Yet the relative position of food producers remains difficult to trace, as food production per capita, though mixed, remains above pre-reform levels. See The World Bank, African Development Indicators 1996 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1996).
51. For a description of such reluctance on the part of Ghanaian farmers during early reforms, see Herbst, The Politics of Reform.
52. See John Waterbury, 'The Political Management of Economic Adjustment and Reform', in Joan Nelson (ed.), Fragile Coalitions: The Politics of Economic Adjustment (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions Books, 1989).
53. See David E. Sahn, Paul Dorosh, and Stephen Younger, 'Exchange Rate, Fiscal and Agricultural Policies in Africa: Does Adjustment Hurt the Poor?' World Development, Vol.24, No.4 (1996), pp.719-47. Also see Lionel Demery and Lyn Squire, 'Macroeconomic Adjustment and Poverty in Africa: An Emerging Picture', The World Bank Research Observer , Vol.11, No.1 (1996), pp.39-59.
54. See David E. Sahn, Paul Dorosh, and Stephen Younger, 'Exchange Rate, Fiscal and Agricultural Policies in Africa: Does Adjustment Hurt the Poor?' World Development, Vol.24, No.4 (1996), pp.719-47. Also see Lionel Demery and Lyn Squire, 'Macroeconomic Adjustment and Poverty in Africa: An Emerging Picture', The World Bank Research Observer , Vol.11, No.1 (1996), pp.39-59.
55. Though, in theory formal sector labourers should also benefit from export-led growth over the long-term, they are often especially hard hit by many of the central reforms (and, ironically, they had begun to suffer as much as, if not more than, rural inhabitants before reform initiation). Examples are currency devaluation, which cut into the buying power of wages, and the end of protection for state-owned enterprises, which provided employment.
56. See Barbara Geddes, 'Challenging the Conventional Wisdom', Journal of Democracy, Vol.5, No.4 (1994), pp.104-18.
57. For a persuasive argument supporting this view, see Leith and Lofchie, 'The Political Economy of Structural Adjustment in Ghana'.
58. As Robert Bates and Paul Collier argue in 'The Politics and Economic of Policy Reform in Zambia', in Bates and Krueger (eds.), Political and Economic Interactions, by the mid-1980s, subsidies on maize meal had actually become regressive, as maize coupons did not keep up with constant price increases and did not protect informal sector workers.
59. Though often labelled a democracy, Senegal clearly did not enjoy a democratic political system at the time of economic reform in the early 1980s.
60. Though, most ironically, liberal reform programs often advocate the curtailment of the state. For further discussion of the orthodox paradox of reform, see Miles Kalher, 'Orthodoxy and its Alternatives: Explaining Approaches to Stabilization and Adjustment', in Joan Nelson (ed.), Economic Crisis and Policy Choice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990).
61. See Robert Bates and Anne Krueger, 'Generalizations from the Country Studies', in Bates and Krueger (eds.), Political and Economic Interactions.
62. Greater political participation may also serve economic policy-making by guarding against rigid economic policy-making. In Chile, in particular, the authoritarian nature of its early reformist government was widely blamed for the 'over-kill' of its initial economic reforms. Recently, the economic ministries of Newly Industrializing Countries have also become more constrained in their policy-making. As Haggard and Moon argue, for instance, Korea's past government assistance to the chaebol, the large manufacturing conglomerates created as part of the nation's heavy-industry policies, rendered subsequent policy change difficult. See Barbara Stallings and Phillip Brock, 'Economic Adjustment in Chile, 1973-90', in Bates and Kruger (eds.), Political and Economic Interactions, pp.78-122 and Stephan Haggard and Chung-ln Moon, 'Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study', World Politics, Vol.42, No.2 (1990), pp.210-37.
63. Greater political participation may also serve economic policy-making by guarding against rigid economic policy-making. In Chile, in particular, the authoritarian nature of its early reformist government was widely blamed for the 'over-kill' of its initial economic reforms. Recently, the economic ministries of Newly Industrializing Countries have also become more constrained in their policy-making. As Haggard and Moon argue, for instance, Korea's past government assistance to the chaebol, the large manufacturing conglomerates created as part of the nation's heavy-industry policies, rendered subsequent policy change difficult. See Barbara Stallings and Phillip Brock, 'Economic Adjustment in Chile, 1973-90', in Bates and Kruger (eds.), Political and Economic Interactions, pp.78-122 and Stephan Haggard and Chung-In Moon, 'Institutions and Economic Policy: Theory and a Korean Case Study', World Politics, Vol.42, No.2 (1990), pp.210-37.
64. Data from the Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Profiles and Quarterly Reports, Africa Confidential, Africa Contemporary Record, Ishrat Husain and Rashid Faruquee (eds.), Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Country Case Studies (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1994) and other sources. At present, most African election data remains somewhat suspect, though important (and relatively reliable) multi-party data has recently been recorded.
65. Although for many years TUC represented over 700,000 members, its numbers declined considerably during the early 1990s; with the official membership standing at roughly 550,000 in 1993. This decline is due in large part to government retrenchment and the slow rate of formal sector (primarily SOE-centred) job creation. As is the case in most nations undergoing neo-liberal reform, most of the dynamism in Ghana's business community is concentrated in the export-oriented sector and in smaller, more informal enterprises.
66. The most powerful figure in each district assembly remains the presidential appointee ratified by district members. But local autonomy is growing. A fund for district governments has been established independent of the Ministry of Finance, for instance. A new civil service law also transferred authority over local civil servants from the central government to the districts.
67. Indeed, the NDC's main support now comes from rural areas. See the Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report : Ghana, 2nd Quarter 1995.
68. Opposition parties boycotted the 1992 legislative elections due, in part, to their conflict with the NDC over out-dated voter registration lists (which contained duplicate or 'ghost' voters) and the lack of voter identification cards. In April 1994, a breakthrough occurred on these issues. With financial aid from the United States and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems, the NDC and the five main opposition parties drafted a plan to over-haul the registration system and issue identification cards for most Ghanaians in time for the 1996 elections.
69. See Tony Waters, 'Beyond Structural Adjustment: State and Market in a Rural Tanzanian Village', African Studies Review, Vol.40, No.2 (1997), pp.59-89.
70. See Africa Confidential (21 July 1995).
71. These business interests, represented by the Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI) are viewed suspiciously by most small-scale African entrepreneurs, both for racial reasons and due to their relative disadvantage in gaining government support.
72. As Samba Ka and Nicolas van de Walle cogently argue in 'Senegal: Stalled Reform in a Dominant Party System', in S. Haggard and S. Webb (eds.), Voting for Reform : Democracy, Political Liberalization, and Economic Adjustment (New York: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 1994), pp.290-359, Senegalese reforms stalled not due to fear of electoral defeat but because reformers failed to court new allies among farmers or business while maintaining ties with old political clients.
73. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Senegal, 2nd Quarter 1996. 53.
74. As Nicolas van de Walle argues in 'The Decline of the Franc Zone: Monetary Politics in Francophone Africa', African Affairs, Vol.90, No.360 (1991), pp.383-405, the policy mechanisms of the CFA franc zone including the zone's control over monetary and fiscal policy, its open trading arrangements and French financial support (used to pay off deficits accumulated by zone members), buffered Francophone Africa from the full-scale economic decline of its neighbours. In particular, the convertibility of the CFA franc encouraged business confidence and curtailed inflation. Indeed, as the CFA franc followed the French franc's fluctuations, the zone became a highly profitable market for illegal border trade. This situation changed markedly as the French franc appreciated in the mid-1980s, causing zone exports to lose their competitive edge while encouraging capital flight. Zone leaders, however, continued to support zone membership. For over-valuation benefited core members of their urban coalitions (though at the expense of farmers), while zone mechanisms and French financial support provided them with useful political tools. Therefore, the absence of devaluation (until 1994), as well as the relative reduction of French support, significantly undermined the neo-liberal reforms efforts of zone members such as Senegal. Yet, as indicated above, continuation of zone-wide restrictions resulted from the support of local, state-based elites, not from France (which had began to reassess its ties to the Zone). In this way, state-based elites imposed this, albeit onerous, restriction upon economic reforms themselves.
75. During 1965 to 1973, Kenya's GNP grew at 7.9 per cent in stark contrast to the rest of Africa which attained a GNP growth rate of only 3.7 per cent. Up to 1984, Kenya continued to enjoy a GNP growth rate of 4.4 per cent, while Africa's over-all rate dropped (considerably below population growth rates) to 2.0 per cent. The contrast is even more dramatic with regard to the agricultural sector, where Kenya's growth rates up to 1984 were more than twice that of its African neighbours. For a cogent analysis of Kenya's earlier export-oriented policies, see Robert Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
76. Up to the mid-1980s, the technical competence and coherence of Kenya's civil service was particularly high by African standards. These skilled technocrats exerted considerable influence in the formulation and implementation of policy during Kenyatta's rule. By 1986, however, Moi centralized most decision-making under the office of the president. For a further discussion of the decline of the technical capacity of the Kenyan government, see Merilee Grindle, Challenging the State: Crisis and Innovation in Latin America and Africa (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
77. Correspondence with Barbara Grosh, 12 Oct. 1995.
78. See Gurushi Swamy, 'Kenya: patch, intermittent commitment', in I. Husain and R. Faruquee (eds.), Adjustment in Africa, pp.193-237.
79. In addition, foreign exchange has been completely deregulated, restrictions on the marketing and importing of food crops lifted, and some progress on SOE privatization and civil service reform has begun.
80. For a description of how KANU elites managed to manipulate the money supply in their favor while seemingly reducing the budget deficit, see Barbara Grosh and Stephen Orvis, 'Democracy, Confusion, or Chaos: Political Conditionality in Kenya', unpublished manuscript.
81. For instance the crisis in the sugar industry and fundamental problems in the coffee and tea marketing systems remain unresolved. Meanwhile, the government's fondness for prestige projects continues to increase budget deficits.
82. Some private businessmen did successfully run for the national parliament during the mid-1970s, but this legislature had no policy-making influence whatsoever. Though politically marginalized, both business and labour (centred in the Copperbelt) openly criticized the government and backed at least one attempted coup against Kaunda in 1980.
83. The Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), dominated by the Mineworkers Union of Zambia (MUZ), has long enjoyed greater organizational strength than its counterparts in other African countries, due to the fundamental role of copper production in the Zambian economy as well as Zambia's unusually large urban population (roughly 50 per cent of the national total).
84. For a detailed analysis of labor's role in contemporary Zambian politics, see Neo Simutanyi, 'The Politics of Structural Adjustment in Zambia', Third World Quarterly Vol.17 No 4 (1996), pp.825-39.
85. As Michael Bratton points out in 'Economic Crisis and Political Realignment in Zambia', in Jennifer Widner (ed.), Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore, MD: The John Hopkins Press, 1994), UNIP leaders attempted to derail debate on economic issues altogether by asserting that MMD's economic platform was identical to UNIP's own.
86. United National Independence Party, Manifesto 1996, pp.17-19.
87. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Zambia, 1st Quarter 1997.