When businesses collide: producer interest groups and the politics of regulation

Policy Studies Journal

Volumn 26, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 310-328

  Campbell, Heather E ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LEGISLATION; POLITICAL PROCESS; TELECOMMUNICATIONS;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0032415496     PISSN: 00190292     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1541-0072.1998.tb01901.x     Document Type: Article

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