Two characterizations of the uniform rule for division problems with single-peaked preferences

Economic Theory

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 291-306

  Otten, Gert Jan ^a   Peters, Hans ^b   Volij, Oscar ^a  

^a TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030304306     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01213907     Document Type: Article

References (20)

1. Aumann, R. J., Maschler, M.: Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud. J. Econ. Theory 36, 195-213 (1985)
2. Ching, S.: A simple characterization of the uniform rule. Econ. Lett. 40, 57-60 (1992)
3. Ching, S.: An alternative characterization of the uniform rule. Soc. Choice Welfare 11, 131-136 (1994)
4. Chun, Y., Peters, H.: The lexicographic egalitarian solution. Cah. Centre Etud. Rech. Opérat. 30, 149-156 (1988)
5. Dagan, N., Volij, O.: The bankruptcy problem: a cooperative bargaining approach. Math. Soc. Sci. 26, 287-297 (1993)
6. Lensberg, T.: Stability and the Nash solution. J. Econ. Theory 45, 330-341 (1988)
7. Nash, J.: The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155-162 (1950)
8. Peleg, B.: An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments. J. Math. Econ. 14, 203-214 (1985)
9. Peleg, B.: On the reduced game property and its converse. Int. J. Game Theory 15, 187-200 (1986) A correction: Int. J. Game Theory 16, 290 (1987)
10. Peleg, B.: On the reduced game property and its converse. Int. J. Game Theory 15, 187-200 (1986) A correction: Int. J. Game Theory 16, 290 (1987)
11. Peleg, B., Tijs, S. H.: The consistency principle for games in strategic form. Discussion paper 19, Center for Rationality and Interactive Decision Theory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel (1992)
12. Sobolev, A. I.: The characterization of optimality principles in cooperative games by functional equations. In: Vorobev, N. N. (ed.) Mathematical methods in the social sciences, vol. 6, pp 94-151 (Vilnius, in Russian, 1975)
13. Sprumont, Y.: The division problem with single-peaked preferences: A characterization of the uniform rule. Econometrica 59, 509-519 (1991)
14. Thomson, W.: The consistency principle, In: Ichiishi, T., Neyman, A., Tauman, Y. (eds.) Game theory and applications, pp. 187-215. New York: Academic Press 1991
15. Thomson, W.: Population-monotonie solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked. Econ. Theory 5, 229-246 (1995)
16. Thomson, W.: Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked. J. Econ. Theory 63, 219-245 (1994a)
17. Thomson, W.: Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked. Soc Choice Welfare 11, 205-223 (1994b)
18. Thomson, W.: Manipulation and implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked. Discussion paper, University of Rochester, 1992a
19. Thomson, W.: The replacement principle in private good economies when preferences are single-peaked. Discussion paper, University of Rochester, 1992b
20. Thomson, W., Lensberg, T.: Axiomatic theory of bargaining with a variable number of agents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1989