Limits to institutional reforms

Scandinavian Journal of Economics

Volumn 100, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 335-357

  Eggertsson, Thráinn ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ICELAND   (Iceland)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032376629     PISSN: 03470520     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9442.00105     Document Type: Review

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