Organizing knowledge

California Management Review

Volumn , Issue 3, 1998, Pages 90-111

  Brown, John Seely ^a   Duguid, Paul ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0032368071     PISSN: 00081256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/41165945     Document Type: Article

References (81)

1. The classic statement on transaction costs is R.H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica (1937), pp. 386-405. For more recent explorations, see, for example, Oliver Williamson and Sidney G. Winter, eds., The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993). For relations between technology and transaction costs, see, for example, Thomas W. Malone, JoAnne Yates, and Robert Benjamin, "Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies," Communications of the ACM (1987), pp. 484-497 or Claudio U. Ciborra, Teams, Markets, and Systems: Business Innovation and Information Technology (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For variants of arguments about "the fading boundaries of the firm," see vol. 152 of Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (1966). It is interesting to note that Williamson has retreated a little from the totalizing view of transaction costs reflected in many of these works and acknowledged the "complementary perspectives" that an understanding of "embeddedness" contributes. See Oliver Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed," Business and Public Policy Working Paper, BPP 67, University of California, Institute of Management, Innovation, and Organization, Berkeley, CA, October 1997.
2. The classic statement on transaction costs is R.H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica (1937), pp. 386-405. For more recent explorations, see, for example, Oliver Williamson and Sidney G. Winter, eds., The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993). For relations between technology and transaction costs, see, for example, Thomas W. Malone, JoAnne Yates, and Robert Benjamin, "Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies," Communications of the ACM (1987), pp. 484-497 or Claudio U. Ciborra, Teams, Markets, and Systems: Business Innovation and Information Technology (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For variants of arguments about "the fading boundaries of the firm," see vol. 152 of Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (1966). It is interesting to note that Williamson has retreated a little from the totalizing view of transaction costs reflected in many of these works and acknowledged the "complementary perspectives" that an understanding of "embeddedness" contributes. See Oliver Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed," Business and Public Policy Working Paper, BPP 67, University of California, Institute of Management, Innovation, and Organization, Berkeley, CA, October 1997.
3. The classic statement on transaction costs is R.H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica (1937), pp. 386-405. For more recent explorations, see, for example, Oliver Williamson and Sidney G. Winter, eds., The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993). For relations between technology and transaction costs, see, for example, Thomas W. Malone, JoAnne Yates, and Robert Benjamin, "Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies," Communications of the ACM (1987), pp. 484-497 or Claudio U. Ciborra, Teams, Markets, and Systems: Business Innovation and Information Technology (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For variants of arguments about "the fading boundaries of the firm," see vol. 152 of Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (1966). It is interesting to note that Williamson has retreated a little from the totalizing view of transaction costs reflected in many of these works and acknowledged the "complementary perspectives" that an understanding of "embeddedness" contributes. See Oliver Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed," Business and Public Policy Working Paper, BPP 67, University of California, Institute of Management, Innovation, and Organization, Berkeley, CA, October 1997.
4. The classic statement on transaction costs is R.H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica (1937), pp. 386-405. For more recent explorations, see, for example, Oliver Williamson and Sidney G. Winter, eds., The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993). For relations between technology and transaction costs, see, for example, Thomas W. Malone, JoAnne Yates, and Robert Benjamin, "Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies," Communications of the ACM (1987), pp. 484-497 or Claudio U. Ciborra, Teams, Markets, and Systems: Business Innovation and Information Technology (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For variants of arguments about "the fading boundaries of the firm," see vol. 152 of Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (1966). It is interesting to note that Williamson has retreated a little from the totalizing view of transaction costs reflected in many of these works and acknowledged the "complementary perspectives" that an understanding of "embeddedness" contributes. See Oliver Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed," Business and Public Policy Working Paper, BPP 67, University of California, Institute of Management, Innovation, and Organization, Berkeley, CA, October 1997.
5. The classic statement on transaction costs is R.H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica (1937), pp. 386-405. For more recent explorations, see, for example, Oliver Williamson and Sidney G. Winter, eds., The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993). For relations between technology and transaction costs, see, for example, Thomas W. Malone, JoAnne Yates, and Robert Benjamin, "Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies," Communications of the ACM (1987), pp. 484-497 or Claudio U. Ciborra, Teams, Markets, and Systems: Business Innovation and Information Technology (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For variants of arguments about "the fading boundaries of the firm," see vol. 152 of Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (1966). It is interesting to note that Williamson has retreated a little from the totalizing view of transaction costs reflected in many of these works and acknowledged the "complementary perspectives" that an understanding of "embeddedness" contributes. See Oliver Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed," Business and Public Policy Working Paper, BPP 67, University of California, Institute of Management, Innovation, and Organization, Berkeley, CA, October 1997.
6. The classic statement on transaction costs is R.H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm," Economica (1937), pp. 386-405. For more recent explorations, see, for example, Oliver Williamson and Sidney G. Winter, eds., The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993). For relations between technology and transaction costs, see, for example, Thomas W. Malone, JoAnne Yates, and Robert Benjamin, "Electronic Markets and Electronic Hierarchies," Communications of the ACM (1987), pp. 484-497 or Claudio U. Ciborra, Teams, Markets, and Systems: Business Innovation and Information Technology (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993). For variants of arguments about "the fading boundaries of the firm," see vol. 152 of Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (1966). It is interesting to note that Williamson has retreated a little from the totalizing view of transaction costs reflected in many of these works and acknowledged the "complementary perspectives" that an understanding of "embeddedness" contributes. See Oliver Williamson, "Transaction Cost Economics: How It Works; Where It is Headed," Business and Public Policy Working Paper, BPP 67, University of California, Institute of Management, Innovation, and Organization, Berkeley, CA, October 1997.
7. See, for example, Ikujiro Nonaka and Hiotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995); Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander, "What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Learning," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 502-518; R. M. Grant, "Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1996): 109-122; J.-C. Spender, "Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1966): 45-62; Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Sources of Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1995). For a dissenting voice, see Nicolai J. Foss, "Knowledge-Based Approaches to the Theory of the Firm: Some Critical Comments," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 470-476. It might be argued that knowledge production simply imposes another transaction cost, so the knowledge-based view is merely part of the transaction cost argument. We argue, however, that some important knowledge is only produced through social, nonmarket relations. Thus the transaction cost for individuals in market relations would be infinite. To embrace infinite transaction costs as part of the transaction cost argument trivializes the very important contribution of transaction cost analysis to understanding organizations.
8. See, for example, Ikujiro Nonaka and Hiotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995); Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander, "What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Learning," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 502-518; R. M. Grant, "Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1996): 109-122; J.-C. Spender, "Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1966): 45-62; Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Sources of Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1995). For a dissenting voice, see Nicolai J. Foss, "Knowledge-Based Approaches to the Theory of the Firm: Some Critical Comments," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 470-476. It might be argued that knowledge production simply imposes another transaction cost, so the knowledge-based view is merely part of the transaction cost argument. We argue, however, that some important knowledge is only produced through social, nonmarket relations. Thus the transaction cost for individuals in market relations would be infinite. To embrace infinite transaction costs as part of the transaction cost argument trivializes the very important contribution of transaction cost analysis to understanding organizations.
9. See, for example, Ikujiro Nonaka and Hiotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995); Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander, "What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Learning," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 502-518; R. M. Grant, "Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1996): 109-122; J.-C. Spender, "Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1966): 45-62; Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Sources of Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1995). For a dissenting voice, see Nicolai J. Foss, "Knowledge-Based Approaches to the Theory of the Firm: Some Critical Comments," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 470-476. It might be argued that knowledge production simply imposes another transaction cost, so the knowledge-based view is merely part of the transaction cost argument. We argue, however, that some important knowledge is only produced through social, nonmarket relations. Thus the transaction cost for individuals in market relations would be infinite. To embrace infinite transaction costs as part of the transaction cost argument trivializes the very important contribution of transaction cost analysis to understanding organizations.
10. See, for example, Ikujiro Nonaka and Hiotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995); Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander, "What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Learning," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 502-518; R. M. Grant, "Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1996): 109-122; J.-C. Spender, "Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1966): 45-62; Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Sources of Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1995). For a dissenting voice, see Nicolai J. Foss, "Knowledge-Based Approaches to the Theory of the Firm: Some Critical Comments," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 470-476. It might be argued that knowledge production simply imposes another transaction cost, so the knowledge-based view is merely part of the transaction cost argument. We argue, however, that some important knowledge is only produced through social, nonmarket relations. Thus the transaction cost for individuals in market relations would be infinite. To embrace infinite transaction costs as part of the transaction cost argument trivializes the very important contribution of transaction cost analysis to understanding organizations.
11. See, for example, Ikujiro Nonaka and Hiotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995); Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander, "What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Learning," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 502-518; R. M. Grant, "Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1996): 109-122; J.-C. Spender, "Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1966): 45-62; Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Sources of Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1995). For a dissenting voice, see Nicolai J. Foss, "Knowledge-Based Approaches to the Theory of the Firm: Some Critical Comments," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 470-476. It might be argued that knowledge production simply imposes another transaction cost, so the knowledge-based view is merely part of the transaction cost argument. We argue, however, that some important knowledge is only produced through social, nonmarket relations. Thus the transaction cost for individuals in market relations would be infinite. To embrace infinite transaction costs as part of the transaction cost argument trivializes the very important contribution of transaction cost analysis to understanding organizations.
12. See, for example, Ikujiro Nonaka and Hiotaka Takeuchi, The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995); Bruce Kogut and Udo Zander, "What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, and Learning," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 502-518; R. M. Grant, "Toward a Knowledge-Based Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1996): 109-122; J.-C. Spender, "Making Knowledge the Basis of a Dynamic Theory of the Firm," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1966): 45-62; Dorothy Leonard-Barton, Wellsprings of Knowledge: Building and Sustaining the Sources of Innovation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1995). For a dissenting voice, see Nicolai J. Foss, "Knowledge-Based Approaches to the Theory of the Firm: Some Critical Comments," Organization Science, 7/5 (1996): 470-476. It might be argued that knowledge production simply imposes another transaction cost, so the knowledge-based view is merely part of the transaction cost argument. We argue, however, that some important knowledge is only produced through social, nonmarket relations. Thus the transaction cost for individuals in market relations would be infinite. To embrace infinite transaction costs as part of the transaction cost argument trivializes the very important contribution of transaction cost analysis to understanding organizations.
13. For "communities of practice" see Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993); John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, "Organizational Learning and Communities of Practice: Towards a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation," Organization Science, 2 (1991): 40-57.
14. For "communities of practice" see Jean Lave and Etienne Wenger, Situated Learning: Legitimate Peripheral Participation (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1993); John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, "Organizational Learning and Communities of Practice: Towards a Unified View of Working, Learning, and Innovation," Organization Science, 2 (1991): 40-57.
15. It might be possible to reach such a conclusion from Mark Casson, Information and Organization: A New Perspective on the Theory of the Firm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).
16. It is important, however, not to elide information, Casson's main topic, and knowledge, though we do not expand on this problem here. See John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, "The Knowledge Continuum," in preparation.
17. See for example, Leonard-Barton's portrayal of the "learning organization and her example of Chaparral Steel. Leonard-Barton, op. cit.
18. The distinction between know-what and know-how and the notion of "dispositional knowledge" comes from Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson 1954). Know-how may appear to be little more than so-called "physical" skills, such as catching a ball or riding a bicycle. It is much more, however. For any student to "know" Newton's second law in any meaningful way requires having the skill to deploy the law in an analysis of colliding objects This sort of knowledge, a disposition as well as a possession, emerges when called upon. It is evident, for instance, in such complex skills as talking, writing, and thinking or in negotiating with clients, overseeing employees, controlling production processes, developing strategy, conducting scientific experiments, fixing complex machines, cooking a meal, or writing computer programs. For the importance of dispositional knowledge, see S. Noam Cook and John Seely Brown, "Bridging Epistemologies: The Generative Dance between Organizational Knowledge and Organizational Knowing," Organization Science (forthcoming).
19. The distinction between know-what and know-how and the notion of "dispositional knowledge" comes from Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind (London: Hutchinson 1954). Know-how may appear to be little more than so-called "physical" skills, such as catching a ball or riding a bicycle. It is much more, however. For any student to "know" Newton's second law in any meaningful way requires having the skill to deploy the law in an analysis of colliding objects This sort of knowledge, a disposition as well as a possession, emerges when called upon. It is evident, for instance, in such complex skills as talking, writing, and thinking or in negotiating with clients, overseeing employees, controlling production processes, developing strategy, conducting scientific experiments, fixing complex machines, cooking a meal, or writing computer programs. For the importance of dispositional knowledge, see S. Noam Cook and John Seely Brown, "Bridging Epistemologies: The Generative Dance between Organizational Knowledge and Organizational Knowing," Organization Science (forthcoming).
20. As the CEO of Chaparral Steel told Leonard-Barton, "He can tour competitors through the plant, show them almost 'everything and we will be giving away nothing because they can't take it home with them.'" Leonard-Barton, op. cit.,
21. See, for example, George Gilder, Life After Television (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1994) for disintermediation; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York, NY: Morrow, 1980) for demassification; Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996) for disaggregation.
22. See, for example, George Gilder, Life After Television (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1994) for disintermediation; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York, NY: Morrow, 1980) for demassification; Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996) for disaggregation.
23. See, for example, George Gilder, Life After Television (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1994) for disintermediation; Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave (New York, NY: Morrow, 1980) for demassification; Nicholas Negroponte, Being Digital (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996) for disaggregation.
24. Friedrich Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988). See, also, Friedrich Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review, 35 (September 1945): 519-30); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1974).
25. Friedrich Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988). See, also, Friedrich Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review, 35 (September 1945): 519-30); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1974).
26. Friedrich Hayek, The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1988). See, also, Friedrich Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," American Economic Review, 35 (September 1945): 519-30); Kenneth J. Arrow, The Limits of Organization (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1974).
27. See, for example, Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and the Economic World (New York, NY: Addison-Wesley, 1994) for bees; Andy Clark Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997) for termites; Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1986) and Sherry Turkle, Life On the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996) for artificial life.
28. See, for example, Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and the Economic World (New York, NY: Addison-Wesley, 1994) for bees; Andy Clark Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997) for termites; Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1986) and Sherry Turkle, Life On the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996) for artificial life.
29. See, for example, Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and the Economic World (New York, NY: Addison-Wesley, 1994) for bees; Andy Clark Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997) for termites; Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1986) and Sherry Turkle, Life On the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996) for artificial life.
30. See, for example, Kevin Kelly, Out of Control: The New Biology of Machines, Social Systems, and the Economic World (New York, NY: Addison-Wesley, 1994) for bees; Andy Clark Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1997) for termites; Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1986) and Sherry Turkle, Life On the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet (New York, NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996) for artificial life.
31. See Douglass C. North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 1981).
32. Raymond Williams, The Long Revolution (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1961).
33. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York NY: Cambridge University Press, 1990);
34. Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977).
35. Though for a qualified view of this argument, see Daniel E. Sichel, The Computer Revolution: An Economic Perspective (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions Press, 1997).
36. Francis Fukuyama, "Social Networks and Digital Networks," in preparation. For an analysis of the complex relationship between communications technology and institutions see the classic study Harold Innis, The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951).
37. Francis Fukuyama, "Social Networks and Digital Networks," in preparation. For an analysis of the complex relationship between communications technology and institutions see the classic study Harold Innis, The Bias of Communication (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1951).
38. See Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985): 481-510; Gordon Walker, Bruce Kogut, and Weijian Shan, "Social Capital, Structural Holes and the Formation of an Industry Network," Organization Science, 8 (1997): 109-112; Martin Kenney and Urs von Burg, "Bringing Technology Back In: Explaining the Divergence between Silicon Valley and Route 128," in preparation; AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Gernot Grabher, The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks (London: Routledge, 1993).
39. See Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985): 481-510; Gordon Walker, Bruce Kogut, and Weijian Shan, "Social Capital, Structural Holes and the Formation of an Industry Network," Organization Science, 8 (1997): 109-112; Martin Kenney and Urs von Burg, "Bringing Technology Back In: Explaining the Divergence between Silicon Valley and Route 128," in preparation; AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Gernot Grabher, The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks (London: Routledge, 1993).
40. See Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985): 481-510; Gordon Walker, Bruce Kogut, and Weijian Shan, "Social Capital, Structural Holes and the Formation of an Industry Network," Organization Science, 8 (1997): 109-112; Martin Kenney and Urs von Burg, "Bringing Technology Back In: Explaining the Divergence between Silicon Valley and Route 128," in preparation; AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Gernot Grabher, The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks (London: Routledge, 1993).
41. See Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985): 481-510; Gordon Walker, Bruce Kogut, and Weijian Shan, "Social Capital, Structural Holes and the Formation of an Industry Network," Organization Science, 8 (1997): 109-112; Martin Kenney and Urs von Burg, "Bringing Technology Back In: Explaining the Divergence between Silicon Valley and Route 128," in preparation; AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Gernot Grabher, The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks (London: Routledge, 1993).
42. See Mark Granovetter, "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness," American Journal of Sociology, 91 (1985): 481-510; Gordon Walker, Bruce Kogut, and Weijian Shan, "Social Capital, Structural Holes and the Formation of an Industry Network," Organization Science, 8 (1997): 109-112; Martin Kenney and Urs von Burg, "Bringing Technology Back In: Explaining the Divergence between Silicon Valley and Route 128," in preparation; AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996); Gernot Grabher, The Embedded Firm: On the Socioeconomics of Industrial Networks (London: Routledge, 1993).
43. Julian E. Orr, Talking About Machines: An Ethnography of a Modern Job (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 1996).
44. Nonaka and Takeuchi, op. cit., p. 72; Ikujiro Nonaka and Noboru Konno, "The Concept of 'Ba': Building a Foundation for Knowledge Creation," California Management Review, 40/3 (Spring 1998).
45. Nonaka and Takeuchi, op. cit., p. 72; Ikujiro Nonaka and Noboru Konno, "The Concept of 'Ba': Building a Foundation for Knowledge Creation," California Management Review, 40/3 (Spring 1998).
46. For views of personal knowledge, see M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension: The Terry Lectures, (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1966); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1953); David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983); Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1997).
47. For views of personal knowledge, see M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension: The Terry Lectures, (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1966); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1953); David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983); Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1997).
48. For views of personal knowledge, see M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension: The Terry Lectures, (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1966); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1953); David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983); Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1997).
49. For views of personal knowledge, see M. Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension: The Terry Lectures, (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1966); Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe, trans. (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1953); David Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1983); Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (New York, NY: New York University Press, 1997).
50. For a discussion of collective sensemaking, see Karl Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Books, 1995); Karl Weick and K. Roberts, "Collective Mind in Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, 38/3 (September 1993): 357-381.
51. For a discussion of collective sensemaking, see Karl Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Books, 1995); Karl Weick and K. Roberts, "Collective Mind in Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, 38/3 (September 1993): 357-381.
52. Leonard-Barton, op. cit., especially chapter 2.
53. Raghu Garud and Michael A. Rappa, "A Socio-Cognitive Model of Technology Evolution: The Case of Cochlear Implants," Organization Science, 5 (1994): 344-362.
54. Garud and Rappa argue that in such cases, markets are actually quite inefficient means to challenge the interdependence of belief and evaluation - in part because markets, too, rely on evaluations provided by the blinkered technologies. Garud and Rappa, op. cit., p. 358.
55. Larry Hirschhorn, Reworking Authority: Leading and Following in the Post-Modern Organization (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Leonard-Barton attributes "creative abrasion" to Gerald Hirshberg of Nissan Design International. Leonard-Barton, op. cit., p. 63. See also Karl Jaspers, The Idea of the University, H. Reiche and T. Vanderschmidt, trans. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1959) for the notion of "creative tension."
56. Larry Hirschhorn, Reworking Authority: Leading and Following in the Post-Modern Organization (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Leonard-Barton attributes "creative abrasion" to Gerald Hirshberg of Nissan Design International. Leonard-Barton, op. cit., p. 63. See also Karl Jaspers, The Idea of the University, H. Reiche and T. Vanderschmidt, trans. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1959) for the notion of "creative tension."
57. Larry Hirschhorn, Reworking Authority: Leading and Following in the Post-Modern Organization (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); Leonard-Barton attributes "creative abrasion" to Gerald Hirshberg of Nissan Design International. Leonard-Barton, op. cit., p. 63. See also Karl Jaspers, The Idea of the University, H. Reiche and T. Vanderschmidt, trans. (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1959) for the notion of "creative tension."
58. Eric Von Hippel, "'Sticky Information' and the Locus of Problem Solving: Implications for Innovation," Management Science, 40 (1994): 429-439.
59. Stephen R. Barley, "Technicians in the Workplace: Ethnographic Evidence for Bringing Work into Organization Studies," Administrative Science Quarterly, 41 (1966): 401-444; Henry W. Chesbrough and David J. Teece, "When is Virtual Virtuous? Organizing for Innovation," Harvard Business Review, 74/1 (1996): 65-73.
60. Stephen R. Barley, "Technicians in the Workplace: Ethnographic Evidence for Bringing Work into Organization Studies," Administrative Science Quarterly, 41 (1966): 401-444; Henry W. Chesbrough and David J. Teece, "When is Virtual Virtuous? Organizing for Innovation," Harvard Business Review, 74/1 (1996): 65-73.
61. Robert Cole, The Quest for Quality Improvement: How American Business Met the Challenge (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
62. Polanyi, op. cit.
63. David Teece, Richard Rumelt, Giovanni Dosi and Sidney Winter, "Understanding Corporate Coherence: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 23/1 (1994): 1-30.
64. For the notion of leakiness, see R.M. Grant and J.-C. Spender, "Knowledge and the Firm: Overview," Strategic Management Journal, 17 (1996): 5-9.
65. Walter W. Powell, "Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152 (1996): 197-215; Kristen Kreiner and Majken Schultz, "Informal Collaboration in R&D: The Formation of Networks across Organizations," Organization Science, 14 (1993): 189-209.
66. Walter W. Powell, "Inter-Organizational Collaboration in the Biotechnology Industry," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 152 (1996): 197-215; Kristen Kreiner and Majken Schultz, "Informal Collaboration in R&D: The Formation of Networks across Organizations," Organization Science, 14 (1993): 189-209.
67. To some degree, such fields resemble "social worlds." See Anselm Strauss, "A Social World Perspective," Studies in Symbolic Interaction, 1 (1978): 119-128.
68. See John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, "The Knowledge Continuum," in preparation.
69. Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, "Institutional Ecology, 'Translations' and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39," Social Studies of Science, 19 (1989): 387-420.
70. Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties," American Journal of Sociology (1976), pp. 1360-1380; Granovetter's argument presupposes that for knowledge to spread, groups cannot simply be related as isolated individuals connected by market; they (and, indeed, markets) must be embedded in complex social systems. This argument appears more forcefully in his critique of transaction costs cited above.
71. Chris Argyris and Donald Schön, Organizational Learning (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1978).
72. Ikujiro Nonaka, "The Knowledge Creating Company," Harvard Business Review, 69/6 (November/December 1991): 96-104.
73. For the notion of "loosely coupled" systems, see Karl E. Weick, "Organizational Culture as a Source of High Reliability," California Management Review, 29/2 (Winter 1987): 112-127; J. Douglas Orton and Karl E. Weick," Loosely Coupled Systems: A Reconceptualization," Academy of Management Review, 15/2 (April 1990): 203-223.
74. For the notion of "loosely coupled" systems, see Karl E. Weick, "Organizational Culture as a Source of High Reliability," California Management Review, 29/2 (Winter 1987): 112-127; J. Douglas Orton and Karl E. Weick," Loosely Coupled Systems: A Reconceptualization," Academy of Management Review, 15/2 (April 1990): 203-223.
75. Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, "Knowledge and Infrastructure in International Information Management: Problems of Classification and Coding," in Lisa Bud-Frierman, ed., Information Acumen: The Understanding and Use of Knowledge in Modern Business (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 187-213; Paul Adler and Bryan Borys, "Two Types of Bureaucracy: Enabling and Coercive," Administrative Science Quarterly, 41 (1996): 61-89.
76. Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, "Knowledge and Infrastructure in International Information Management: Problems of Classification and Coding," in Lisa Bud-Frierman, ed., Information Acumen: The Understanding and Use of Knowledge in Modern Business (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 187-213; Paul Adler and Bryan Borys, "Two Types of Bureaucracy: Enabling and Coercive," Administrative Science Quarterly, 41 (1996): 61-89.
77. For an insightful view of the interplay between the formal and the informal in the creation of trust, see Sim B. Sitkin, "On the Positive Effect of Legalization on Trust," Research on Negotiation in Organizations (1995), pp. 185-217.
78. Tim Berners Lee, "The World Wide Web: Past, Present, and Future, [available online]: http://www.w3.org/People/Berners-Lee/1996/ppf.html
79. See John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, "The University in the Digital Age," Change, 28 (1996): 10-15; John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, "The Social Life of Documents," Release 1.0 (October 1995), pp. 1-12.
80. See John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, "The University in the Digital Age," Change, 28 (1996): 10-15; John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, "The Social Life of Documents," Release 1.0 (October 1995), pp. 1-12.
81. Lave and Wenger, op. cit.