Socio-economic elements in Public Choice research

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 25, Issue 5, 1996, Pages 559-569

  Morong, Cyril ^a  

^a LYON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010075926     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1053-5357(96)90017-7     Document Type: Article

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