A state-contingent production approach to principal-agent problems with an application to point-source pollution control

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 70, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 441-472

  Quiggin, John ^a   Chambers, Robert G ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

D2; D8; Moral hazard; Point source pollution; Principal agent problem; State contingent production

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032325234     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00044-9     Document Type: Article

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