Realism and utopianism revisited

Review of International Studies

Volumn 24, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 65-80

  Nicholson, Michael ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0032281371     PISSN: 02602105     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/s0260210598000655     Document Type: Article

References (63)

1. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations 1946 (2nd edn.) (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan (Papermac editions. 1981)), p. 42.
2. Relations between political realism in general and that in International Relations are discussed by Martin Griffiths, Realism, Idealism and International Politics: A Reinterpretation (London: Routledge, 1992).
3. A vigorous critique of realism as an appropriate framework for the analysis of International Relations on the grounds that it is empirically inadequate is by John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 1983). A set of empirical studies which are more sympathetic to realism is edited by Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, Reconstructing Realpolitik (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1994).
4. A vigorous critique of realism as an appropriate framework for the analysis of International Relations on the grounds that it is empirically inadequate is by John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique (London: Frances Pinter, 1983). A set of empirical studies which are more sympathetic to realism is edited by Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, Reconstructing Realpolitik (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1994).
5. Ken Booth 'Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice', International Affairs, 67 (1991), pp. 527-45.
6. The various modifiers of realism are numerous and not used consistently. Waltz prefers 'structural realism' for his version of realism. Buzan, Little and Jones refer to this as 'neorealism', leaving 'structural realism' for later developments. Spegele uses 'concessional realism' for Waltz's version of realism on the grounds that it makes concessions to the 'positivist-empiricist' position and in so doing marks some decline from the faith of the true believer. His version of realism he calls 'evaluative political realism', a relative of 'commonsense realism'. However, as Michael Donelan puts in a surprise appearance in Spegele's work as a 'positivist-empiricist', the whole system is rather confusing. I shall use 'realism' as a generic term, 'classical realism' for anything before Waltz, and, with apologies to Waltz for not following his terminology, 'neorealism' for Waltz and after. See Barry Buzan, Richard Little, and Charles Jones, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1993). Roger D. Spegele, Political Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. The various modifiers of realism are numerous and not used consistently. Waltz prefers 'structural realism' for his version of realism. Buzan, Little and Jones refer to this as 'neorealism', leaving 'structural realism' for later developments. Spegele uses 'concessional realism' for Waltz's version of realism on the grounds that it makes concessions to the 'positivist-empiricist' position and in so doing marks some decline from the faith of the true believer. His version of realism he calls 'evaluative political realism', a relative of 'commonsense realism'. However, as Michael Donelan puts in a surprise appearance in Spegele's work as a 'positivist-empiricist', the whole system is rather confusing. I shall use 'realism' as a generic term, 'classical realism' for anything before Waltz, and, with apologies to Waltz for not following his terminology, 'neorealism' for Waltz and after. See Barry Buzan, Richard Little, and Charles Jones, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1993). Roger D. Spegele, Political Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
8. Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory of International Relations (London and New York: Verso, 1994).
9. Barry Buzan, 'The Timeless Wisdom of Realism', in Steve Smith, Ken Booth, and Marysia Zalewski (eds.), International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 47-65.
10. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979).
11. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edn, revised by Kenneth W. Thompson (London and New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985).
12. Hedley Bull's famous attack on the social scientists interestingly made no reference to the debates in the philosophy of the social sciences. Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', in K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). See also David Singer's response to Bull in the same volume 'The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence'.
13. Hedley Bull's famous attack on the social scientists interestingly made no reference to the debates in the philosophy of the social sciences. Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach', in K. Knorr and J.N. Rosenau (eds.), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). See also David Singer's response to Bull in the same volume 'The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence'.
14. For example, Charles Reynolds, The Politics of War: A Study of the Rationality of Violence in InterState Relations (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989) and The World of States.
15. For example, Charles Reynolds, The Politics of War: A Study of the Rationality of Violence in InterState Relations (Hemel Hempstead: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989) and The World of States.
16. Tim Dunne, The English School (Oxford University Press, 1998).
17. See Barry Buzan, Richard Little, and Charles Jones, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1993). See also Roger D. Spegele, Political Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Spegele, as an American resident in Australia demonstrates the geographical weakness of the term 'English School'.
18. See Barry Buzan, Richard Little, and Charles Jones, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (New York and Chichester: Columbia University Press, 1993). See also Roger D. Spegele, Political Realism and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Spegele, as an American resident in Australia demonstrates the geographical weakness of the term 'English School'.
19. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper and Collins, 1959) and Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).
20. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (New York: Harper and Collins, 1959) and Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).
21. John J. Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', International Security, 19, 3 (winter 1994/95), pp. 5-59.
22. Imre Lakatos, 'Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes', in Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).
23. Michael Nicholson, Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study (London: Frances Pinter, 1996).
24. Bueno de Mesquita, The War Trap (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981).
25. The ingenious attempts of Grieco to defend neorealism on this difficult ground do not properly address the question of sovereignty. 'State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union' in Benjamin Frankel, Realism, pp. 261-306.
26. Alan James, 'The Realism of "Realism": the State and the Study of International Relations', Review of International Studies, 15 (1989), pp. 215-29.
27. Robert G. Gilpin, 'No One Loves a Political Realist', in Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Realism: Restatements and Renewal (London and Portland: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 3-26.
28. Joseph Grieco, 'State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories', in Benjamin Frankel, Realism, pp. 261-306.
29. Charles Jones, in Buzan, Little, and Jones, The Logic of Anarchy.
30. I use 'model' to mean a set of concepts, a calculus, or whatever, which is used to describe a simplified world. I use 'theory' to be the same, but with the intention of describing the actual world. Thus, it can therefore be tested (or refuted). The same model in formal terms can be applied to very different processes. For example, similar differential equation models can describe the movement of cannon balls, the growth of plants, and arms races. See R.B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953) and Michael Nicholson, The Scientific Analysis of Social Behaviour: A Defence of Empiricism in Social Science (London: Pinter, 1983)
31. I use 'model' to mean a set of concepts, a calculus, or whatever, which is used to describe a simplified world. I use 'theory' to be the same, but with the intention of describing the actual world. Thus, it can therefore be tested (or refuted). The same model in formal terms can be applied to very different processes. For example, similar differential equation models can describe the movement of cannon balls, the growth of plants, and arms races. See R.B. Braithwaite, Scientific Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1953) and Michael Nicholson, The Scientific Analysis of Social Behaviour: A Defence of Empiricism in Social Science (London: Pinter, 1983)
32. There are many examples, but the relative gains/absolute gains controversy is a good example. See Robert Powell, 'Absolute Gains and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', American Political Science Review, 85(4) (1991), pp. 1303-20; Duncan Snidal, 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', American Political Science Review, 85(3) (1991), pp. 701-26; Duncan Snidal, 'International Cooperation and Relative Gains Maximisers', International Studies Quarterly, 35(4) (1991), pp. 387-402. The problem is discussed in a more general rational choice context by Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and in a non-realist International Relations context by Michael Nicholson, 'Interdependent Utility Functions', in Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence (Aldershot and Brookfield Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1994). Other important developments relating to International Relations have been made by Steven Brams, for example The Theory of Moves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
33. There are many examples, but the relative gains/absolute gains controversy is a good example. See Robert Powell, 'Absolute Gains and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', American Political Science Review, 85(4) (1991), pp. 1303-20; Duncan Snidal, 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', American Political Science Review, 85(3) (1991), pp. 701-26; Duncan Snidal, 'International Cooperation and Relative Gains Maximisers', International Studies Quarterly, 35(4) (1991), pp. 387-402. The problem is discussed in a more general rational choice context by Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and in a non-realist International Relations context by Michael Nicholson, 'Interdependent Utility Functions', in Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence (Aldershot and Brookfield Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1994). Other important developments relating to International Relations have been made by Steven Brams, for example The Theory of Moves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
34. There are many examples, but the relative gains/absolute gains controversy is a good example. See Robert Powell, 'Absolute Gains and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', American Political Science Review, 85(4) (1991), pp. 1303-20; Duncan Snidal, 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', American Political Science Review, 85(3) (1991), pp. 701-26; Duncan Snidal, 'International Cooperation and Relative Gains Maximisers', International Studies Quarterly, 35(4) (1991), pp. 387-402. The problem is discussed in a more general rational choice context by Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and in a non-realist International Relations context by Michael Nicholson, 'Interdependent Utility Functions', in Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence (Aldershot and Brookfield Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1994). Other important developments relating to International Relations have been made by Steven Brams, for example The Theory of Moves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
35. There are many examples, but the relative gains/absolute gains controversy is a good example. See Robert Powell, 'Absolute Gains and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', American Political Science Review, 85(4) (1991), pp. 1303-20; Duncan Snidal, 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', American Political Science Review, 85(3) (1991), pp. 701-26; Duncan Snidal, 'International Cooperation and Relative Gains Maximisers', International Studies Quarterly, 35(4) (1991), pp. 387-402. The problem is discussed in a more general rational choice context by Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and in a non-realist International Relations context by Michael Nicholson, 'Interdependent Utility Functions', in Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence (Aldershot and Brookfield Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1994). Other important developments relating to International Relations have been made by Steven Brams, for example The Theory of Moves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
36. There are many examples, but the relative gains/absolute gains controversy is a good example. See Robert Powell, 'Absolute Gains and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', American Political Science Review, 85(4) (1991), pp. 1303-20; Duncan Snidal, 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', American Political Science Review, 85(3) (1991), pp. 701-26; Duncan Snidal, 'International Cooperation and Relative Gains Maximisers', International Studies Quarterly, 35(4) (1991), pp. 387-402. The problem is discussed in a more general rational choice context by Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and in a non-realist International Relations context by Michael Nicholson, 'Interdependent Utility Functions', in Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence (Aldershot and Brookfield Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1994). Other important developments relating to International Relations have been made by Steven Brams, for example The Theory of Moves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
37. There are many examples, but the relative gains/absolute gains controversy is a good example. See Robert Powell, 'Absolute Gains and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory', American Political Science Review, 85(4) (1991), pp. 1303-20; Duncan Snidal, 'Relative Gains and the Pattern of International Cooperation', American Political Science Review, 85(3) (1991), pp. 701-26; Duncan Snidal, 'International Cooperation and Relative Gains Maximisers', International Studies Quarterly, 35(4) (1991), pp. 387-402. The problem is discussed in a more general rational choice context by Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) and in a non-realist International Relations context by Michael Nicholson, 'Interdependent Utility Functions', in Pierre Allan and Christian Schmidt, Game Theory and International Relations: Preferences, Information and Empirical Evidence (Aldershot and Brookfield Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1994). Other important developments relating to International Relations have been made by Steven Brams, for example The Theory of Moves (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
38. See Michael Nicholson, Rationality and the Analysis of International Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
39. Kenneth Waltz, 'Reflections on Theory of International Politics, A Response to my Critics', in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 322-45.
40. Amartya Sen, 'The Theory of Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6 (1977), pp. 317-44.
41. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Book, 1984); Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Nigel Howard, The Paradoxes of Rationality (London and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971).
42. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Book, 1984); Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Nigel Howard, The Paradoxes of Rationality (London and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971).
43. Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Basic Book, 1984); Michael Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Nigel Howard, The Paradoxes of Rationality (London and Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1971).
44. L.F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (both Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press, 1960); Quincy Wright, A Study of War (2 vols.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: University Press of America, 1988) (1st edn. 1962); Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1974); Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963).
45. L.F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (both Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press, 1960); Quincy Wright, A Study of War (2 vols.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: University Press of America, 1988) (1st edn. 1962); Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1974); Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963).
46. L.F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (both Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press, 1960); Quincy Wright, A Study of War (2 vols.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: University Press of America, 1988) (1st edn. 1962); Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1974); Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963).
47. L.F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (both Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press, 1960); Quincy Wright, A Study of War (2 vols.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: University Press of America, 1988) (1st edn. 1962); Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1974); Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963).
48. L.F. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity and Statistics of Deadly Quarrels (both Pittsburgh: The Boxwood Press, 1960); Quincy Wright, A Study of War (2 vols.) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); Kenneth Boulding, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: University Press of America, 1988) (1st edn. 1962); Anatol Rapoport, Fights, Games and Debates (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1974); Karl Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1963).
49. J. David Singer, A Peace Research Odyssey (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1990).
50. Herbert A. Simon, 'The Architecture of Complexity', Proceeding of the American Philosophical Society 1960. A recent work in International Relations stressing complexity is by Lars-Erik Cederman, Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), significantly published in the series Princeton Studies in Complexity.
51. Herbert A. Simon, 'The Architecture of Complexity', Proceeding of the American Philosophical Society 1960. A recent work in International Relations stressing complexity is by Lars-Erik Cederman, Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), significantly published in the series Princeton Studies in Complexity.
52. Herbert A. Simon, 'The Architecture of Complexity', Proceeding of the American Philosophical Society 1960. A recent work in International Relations stressing complexity is by Lars-Erik Cederman, Emergent Actors in World Politics: How States and Nations Develop and Dissolve (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), significantly published in the series Princeton Studies in Complexity.
53. I consider the philosophical issues in Michael Nicholson, Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study (London and New York: Cassell 1996).
54. Hannah Arendt, The Trial of Eichman: An Essay on the Banality of Evil.
55. A classic is the Milgram experiment. See Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental Approach (London: Tavistock, 1974).
56. There is a vast and rapidly growing literature. A clear statement is by Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).
57. There is a large literature, but see Peter Temin, Causal Factors in American Economic Growth in the Nineteenth Century (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1975).
58. John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics (New York: HarperCollins, 1995).
59. Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation and Social Rigidities (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).
60. Famously, Lord Rutherford, having split the atom, denied as late as 1933 that there was any possibility of a practical use for nuclear energy. C.P. Snow, Variety of Men (London: Macmillan, 1967).
61. The mathematics behind the development of 'computable numbers' was not developed until the late 1930s. See Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: the Enigma (London: Vintage Books, 1992), 1st edn. 1983.
62. Preface to the 1981 printing. Russell Hardin uses exactly the same phrase about Bertrand Russell's book in 'Russell's Power', Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 26, 3 (September 1996), pp. 322-47.
63. A recent vigorous statement of this point of view is by Peter Singer, 'Darwin for the Left', Prospect, 31 (June 1998), pp. 26-30.