Russell's Power

Philosophy of the Social Sciences

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1996, Pages 322-347

  Hardin, Russell ^a,b  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039110089     PISSN: 00483931     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/004839319602600302     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. References in parentheses in the text are to Bertrand Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London: Unwin Books, 1962). The book was first published in 1938 with different pagination.
2. This psychological twist may be a peculiar projection of Russell's own psychology. He seems often to have been concerned with his own urges to power. For example, in his journal entry of 14 January 1905, he wrote, "I am in danger of getting a love of power - the power of the father confessor" (Bertrand Russell, Collected Papers, vol. 12 [London: Allen and Unwin, 1985], 27).
3. McGill holds that, in Russell's account, the power drive is "an unnecessary and supernumerary assumption" (V. J. McGill, "Russell's Political and Economic Philosophy," in Paul Arthur Schilpp, The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, 3rd ed. [New York: Harper, [1944] 1963, 581-617, at 587).
4. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper, [1942] 1950); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957). Downs works out the implications of Russell's insight at book length. The implications are many and diverse. The insight pervades the works of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, and James Burnham. Pareto dismissed the "fiction" of popular representation with the guttural remark that "poppycock grinds no flour" ( Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, vol. 4 [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935 {translated by Andrew Bongiomo and Arthur Livingston}], 1569, §2244). Russell took credit for some of Burnham's views (Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2 [Boston: Atlantic/Little, Brown, {1951} 1968], 302).
5. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper, [1942] 1950); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957). Downs works out the implications of Russell's insight at book length. The implications are many and diverse. The insight pervades the works of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, and James Burnham. Pareto dismissed the "fiction" of popular representation with the guttural remark that "poppycock grinds no flour" ( Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, vol. 4 [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935 {translated by Andrew Bongiomo and Arthur Livingston}], 1569, §2244). Russell took credit for some of Burnham's views (Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2 [Boston: Atlantic/Little, Brown, {1951} 1968], 302).
6. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper, [1942] 1950); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957). Downs works out the implications of Russell's insight at book length. The implications are many and diverse. The insight pervades the works of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, and James Burnham. Pareto dismissed the "fiction" of popular representation with the guttural remark that "poppycock grinds no flour" ( Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, vol. 4 [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935 {translated by Andrew Bongiomo and Arthur Livingston}], 1569, §2244). Russell took credit for some of Burnham's views (Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2 [Boston: Atlantic/Little, Brown, {1951} 1968], 302).
7. Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper, [1942] 1950); Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957). Downs works out the implications of Russell's insight at book length. The implications are many and diverse. The insight pervades the works of Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, Robert Michels, and James Burnham. Pareto dismissed the "fiction" of popular representation with the guttural remark that "poppycock grinds no flour" ( Vilfredo Pareto, The Mind and Society, vol. 4 [New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935 {translated by Andrew Bongiomo and Arthur Livingston}], 1569, §2244). Russell took credit for some of Burnham's views (Bertrand Russell, The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell, vol. 2 [Boston: Atlantic/Little, Brown, {1951} 1968], 302).
8. Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
9. Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965); Russell Hardin, Collective Action (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982).
10. Russell, Autobiography, 302. In his analysis of the problem of the equality of political power, Christiano generally seems to agree with Russell that equality of power is a more compelling concern of social justice than is equality of wealth and income ( Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory [Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996]).
11. Russell, Autobiography, 302. In his analysis of the problem of the equality of political power, Christiano generally seems to agree with Russell that equality of power is a more compelling concern of social justice than is equality of wealth and income ( Thomas Christiano, The Rule of the Many: Fundamental Issues in Democratic Theory [Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996]).
12. Bertrand Russell, Freedom and Organization (London: Allen and Unwin, 1934) (published as Freedom from Organization [New York: Norton], 144). This comment is in keeping with his view of Hitler before the writing of Power that Hitler was just another politician. See further discussion in the concluding section.
13. Bertrand Russell, Freedom and Organization (London: Allen and Unwin, 1934) (published as Freedom from Organization [New York: Norton], 144). This comment is in keeping with his view of Hitler before the writing of Power that Hitler was just another politician. See further discussion in the concluding section.
14. Russell, Autobiography, vol. 2, 302.
15. Hermann Heller, "Power, Political," in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, vol. 12, edited by Edwin R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson (New York: Macmillan, 1933), 300-5.
16. See, further, Russell Hardin, One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 28-37.
17. Frank Harvey, Air War - Vietnam (New York: Bantam, 1967).
18. Ryan remarks, "Like many writers of the 1930s, Russell was more than a little obsessed with the figure of the aviator" (Alan Ryan, Bertrand Russell: A Political Life [New York: Hill & Wang, 1988], 151).
19. Amitav Ghosh, "The Ghosts of Mrs. Gandhi," The New Yorker (17 July 1995): 35-41.
20. See, further, Russell Hardin, "Hobbesian Political Order," Political Theory 19 (May 1991): 156-80, esp. 170-71.
21. Russell Hardin, "Sanction and Obligation," The Monist 68 (July 1985): 403-18.
22. Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Political Power," in Political Power: A Reader in Theory and Research, edited by Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison Wagner (New York: Free Press, 1969 [essay originally published 1963]), 251-84, at 255-62.
23. Russell, Autobiography, vol. 2, 302.
24. Bertrand Russell, Why Men Fight: A Method of Abolishing the International Duel (New York: Century, 1916 [published in England as Principles of Social Reconstruction with different pagination]), 72-73.
25. Bertrand Russell, Why Men Fight: A Method of Abolishing the International Duel (New York: Century, 1916 [published in England as Principles of Social Reconstruction with different pagination]), 72-73.
26. The value of money can similarly be increased by our activities, but the quantity of it can only be increased by credible institutions, such as banks and governments.
27. Bertrand Russell, "Reply to Criticisms," in Schilpp, Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, 681-741, at 730.
28. McGill, "Russell's Political and Economic Philosophy," 589. The final clause in this quote presumably was meant as a rebuke of Russell for his hostility to Soviet socialism.
29. Bertrand Russell, "A Free Man's Worship," in Bertrand Russell, Mysticism and Logic (New York: Doubleday, [1917] n.d.), 44-54, at 46-48.
30. See several contributions to Bell et al., Political Power.
31. L. S. Shapley and Martin Shubik, "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review 48 (1954): 787-92.
32. The term "strategy" does not appear in the indexes of Alan Donagan, Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); or Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). Nor is there any term that is an apparent relative of strategic interaction. Davidson does discuss Mill's account of cause and problems in decision theory, including that of the ur-game theorists John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, but he does not address the problem of strategic interaction (Davidson, Essays, 149-62). Bratman discusses what one might call strategic interactions between one's present and one's future selves as the ground for making plans to constrain future actions ( Michael Bratman, "Davidson's Theory of Intention," in LePore and McLaughlin, Actions and Events, 14-28). Elster explicitly discusses strategic interaction but does not relate it to action theory ( Jon Elster, "The Nature and Scope of Rational Choice Explanation," in ibid., 60-72). I may do the injustice of oversight to one or more of these books. In any case, it need be seen as no criticism of them that they do not address social action in strategic contexts. Even the simplest of categories of action is hard to analyze.
33. The term "strategy" does not appear in the indexes of Alan Donagan, Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); or Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). Nor is there any term that is an apparent relative of strategic interaction. Davidson does discuss Mill's account of cause and problems in decision theory, including that of the ur-game theorists John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, but he does not address the problem of strategic interaction (Davidson, Essays, 149-62). Bratman discusses what one might call strategic interactions between one's present and one's future selves as the ground for making plans to constrain future actions ( Michael Bratman, "Davidson's Theory of Intention," in LePore and McLaughlin, Actions and Events, 14-28). Elster explicitly discusses strategic interaction but does not relate it to action theory ( Jon Elster, "The Nature and Scope of Rational Choice Explanation," in ibid., 60-72). I may do the injustice of oversight to one or more of these books. In any case, it need be seen as no criticism of them that they do not address social action in strategic contexts. Even the simplest of categories of action is hard to analyze.
34. The term "strategy" does not appear in the indexes of Alan Donagan, Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); or Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). Nor is there any term that is an apparent relative of strategic interaction. Davidson does discuss Mill's account of cause and problems in decision theory, including that of the ur-game theorists John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, but he does not address the problem of strategic interaction (Davidson, Essays, 149-62). Bratman discusses what one might call strategic interactions between one's present and one's future selves as the ground for making plans to constrain future actions ( Michael Bratman, "Davidson's Theory of Intention," in LePore and McLaughlin, Actions and Events, 14-28). Elster explicitly discusses strategic interaction but does not relate it to action theory ( Jon Elster, "The Nature and Scope of Rational Choice Explanation," in ibid., 60-72). I may do the injustice of oversight to one or more of these books. In any case, it need be seen as no criticism of them that they do not address social action in strategic contexts. Even the simplest of categories of action is hard to analyze.
35. The term "strategy" does not appear in the indexes of Alan Donagan, Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); or Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). Nor is there any term that is an apparent relative of strategic interaction. Davidson does discuss Mill's account of cause and problems in decision theory, including that of the ur-game theorists John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, but he does not address the problem of strategic interaction (Davidson, Essays, 149-62). Bratman discusses what one might call strategic interactions between one's present and one's future selves as the ground for making plans to constrain future actions ( Michael Bratman, "Davidson's Theory of Intention," in LePore and McLaughlin, Actions and Events, 14-28). Elster explicitly discusses strategic interaction but does not relate it to action theory ( Jon Elster, "The Nature and Scope of Rational Choice Explanation," in ibid., 60-72). I may do the injustice of oversight to one or more of these books. In any case, it need be seen as no criticism of them that they do not address social action in strategic contexts. Even the simplest of categories of action is hard to analyze.
36. The term "strategy" does not appear in the indexes of Alan Donagan, Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); or Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). Nor is there any term that is an apparent relative of strategic interaction. Davidson does discuss Mill's account of cause and problems in decision theory, including that of the ur-game theorists John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, but he does not address the problem of strategic interaction (Davidson, Essays, 149-62). Bratman discusses what one might call strategic interactions between one's present and one's future selves as the ground for making plans to constrain future actions ( Michael Bratman, "Davidson's Theory of Intention," in LePore and McLaughlin, Actions and Events, 14-28). Elster explicitly discusses strategic interaction but does not relate it to action theory ( Jon Elster, "The Nature and Scope of Rational Choice Explanation," in ibid., 60-72). I may do the injustice of oversight to one or more of these books. In any case, it need be seen as no criticism of them that they do not address social action in strategic contexts. Even the simplest of categories of action is hard to analyze.
37. The term "strategy" does not appear in the indexes of Alan Donagan, Choice: The Essential Element in Human Action (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987); Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); or Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985). Nor is there any term that is an apparent relative of strategic interaction. Davidson does discuss Mill's account of cause and problems in decision theory, including that of the ur-game theorists John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, but he does not address the problem of strategic interaction (Davidson, Essays, 149-62). Bratman discusses what one might call strategic interactions between one's present and one's future selves as the ground for making plans to constrain future actions ( Michael Bratman, "Davidson's Theory of Intention," in LePore and McLaughlin, Actions and Events, 14-28). Elster explicitly discusses strategic interaction but does not relate it to action theory ( Jon Elster, "The Nature and Scope of Rational Choice Explanation," in ibid., 60-72). I may do the injustice of oversight to one or more of these books. In any case, it need be seen as no criticism of them that they do not address social action in strategic contexts. Even the simplest of categories of action is hard to analyze.
38. Frank H. Knight, "Bertrand Russell on Power," Ethics 49 (1939): 253-85, at 262.
39. Olson, Logic of Collective Action; Russell Hardin, "Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoner's Dilemma," Behavioral Science 16 (September 1971): 472-81.
40. Olson, Logic of Collective Action; Russell Hardin, "Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoner's Dilemma," Behavioral Science 16 (September 1971): 472-81.
41. Michael Taylor, Anarchy and Cooperation (London: Wiley, 1976), 134-40.
42. Bertrand Russell, Marriage and Morals (New York: Liveright, [1929] 1970), 298.
43. Russell, "Reply to Criticisms," 727.
44. He presumably would have approved the omission of his social criticism from the volume on his philosophy for the series, "The Arguments of the Philosophers" (R. M. Sainsbury, Russell [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979]).
45. Bertrand Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin, 1919), 71.
46. Bertrand Russell, The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism (London: Allen and Unwin, 1920).
47. Stuart Hampshire, "Engaged Philosopher," New York Review of Books (2 February 1989): 7-9, at 9.