ACTIVE EUTHANASIA;
ANALYTICAL APPROACH;
ASSISTED SUICIDE;
ATTITUDE TO HEALTH;
BEHAVIOR;
DEATH AND EUTHANASIA;
ETHICS;
HOMICIDE;
HUMAN;
MEDICAL ETHICS;
MENTAL STRESS;
METHODOLOGY;
MORALITY;
MOTIVATION;
PASSIVE EUTHANASIA;
PERSONAL AUTONOMY;
PHILOSOPHY;
POLITICAL SYSTEM;
PUBLIC OPINION;
REVIEW;
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY;
TERMINAL CARE;
TREATMENT WITHDRAWAL;
VOLUNTARY EUTHANASIA;
ANALYTICAL APPROACH;
DEATH AND EUTHANASIA;
ATTITUDE TO HEALTH;
ETHICAL ANALYSIS;
ETHICS, MEDICAL;
EUTHANASIA, ACTIVE;
EUTHANASIA, ACTIVE, VOLUNTARY;
EUTHANASIA, PASSIVE;
HOMICIDE;
HUMANS;
INTENTION;
MORAL OBLIGATIONS;
MOTIVATION;
NATIONAL SOCIALISM;
PERSONAL AUTONOMY;
PHILOSOPHY, MEDICAL;
PUBLIC OPINION;
SOCIAL VALUES;
STRESS, PSYCHOLOGICAL;
SUICIDE, ASSISTED;
TERMINAL CARE;
WITHHOLDING TREATMENT;
An analysis of arguments for and against euthanasia and assisted suicide: Part one
Thomasma DC. An analysis of arguments for and against euthanasia and assisted suicide: part one. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 1996;5(1):62-76.
When physicians choose to participate in the death of their patients: Ethics and physician-assisted suicide
Thomasma DC. When physicians choose to participate in the death of their patients: ethics and physician-assisted suicide. Law, Medicine & Ethics 1996;24(3):183-97.
Withdrawal of treatment versus killing of patients
Beauchamp T, ed. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall
See, for example, Brody B. Withdrawal of treatment versus killing of patients. In Beauchamp T, ed. Intending Death. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1996:90-103.
This argument is different from the more theoretical analysis provided by Frances Kamm. Her position, like mine, is that there is a moral distinction between killing and letting die; yet she argues further that there can be permissible harms, such that some killing may be morally justified. Here I would distinguish between intending the death of another that can be a good, and directly killing that person. See Kamm FM. Morality, Mortality, vol. II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Also see Baruch Brody's hesitations about her argument in his review: Brody B. When killing is justified. Hastings Center Report 1998;28(1):40-1.
This argument is different from the more theoretical analysis provided by Frances Kamm. Her position, like mine, is that there is a moral distinction between killing and letting die; yet she argues further that there can be permissible harms, such that some killing may be morally justified. Here I would distinguish between intending the death of another that can be a good, and directly killing that person. See Kamm FM. Morality, Mortality, vol. II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Also see Baruch Brody's hesitations about her argument in his review: Brody B. When killing is justified. Hastings Center Report 1998;28(1):40-1.
Dubious premises-evil conclusions: Moral reasoning at the Nuremberg trials
forthcoming
For a summary of dangers of analogous reasoning comparing the Nazis to other societies, see Pellegrino ED, Thomasma DC. Dubious premises-evil conclusions: moral reasoning at the Nuremberg trials. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics, forthcoming.
Nazi doctors, racial medicine, and human experimentation
Annas GJ, Grodin MA, eds. New York: Oxford University Press
Proctor R. Nazi doctors, racial medicine, and human experimentation. In Annas GJ, Grodin MA, eds. The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992:17-31.