Genes, embryos, and future people

Bioethics

Volumn 12, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 187-211

  Glannon, Walter ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; ANALYTICAL APPROACH; ARTICLE; BEGINNING OF HUMAN LIFE; BENEFICENCE; CHILD; CRYOPRESERVATION; DISABLED PERSON; EMBRYO; EMBRYO DISPOSITION; ETHICS; FETUS; FETUS DISEASE; GENE THERAPY; GENETIC DISORDER; GENETIC ENGINEERING; GENETIC ENHANCEMENT; GENETIC SCREENING; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; GERM CELL; HUMAN; INDIVIDUALITY; INFERTILITY THERAPY; INJURY; LIFE; MEDICAL GENETICS; MENTAL PATIENT; MENTAL STRESS; MORALITY; ONSET AGE; PAIN; PARENT; PERSONHOOD; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH; POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION; PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS; QUALITY OF LIFE; REPRODUCTION; RISK; RISK ASSESSMENT; SELF CONCEPT; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL JUSTICE; SOCIOECONOMICS; TIME; WRONGFUL LIFE;

ANALYTICAL APPROACH; GENETICS AND REPRODUCTION; PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH;

AGE OF ONSET; ALTRUISM; BEGINNING OF HUMAN LIFE; BENEFICENCE; CHILD; CRYOPRESERVATION; DISABLED PERSONS; EMBRYO; EMBRYO DISPOSITION; ETHICS; EUGENICS; FETAL DISEASES; FETUS; GENE THERAPY; GENETIC DISEASES, INBORN; GENETIC ENGINEERING; GENETIC ENHANCEMENT; GENETIC SCREENING; GERM CELLS; HUMANS; INDIVIDUALITY; LIFE; MENTALLY DISABLED PERSONS; MORAL OBLIGATIONS; PAIN; PARENTS; PERSONHOOD; POSTHUMOUS CONCEPTION; PREIMPLANTATION DIAGNOSIS; QUALITY OF LIFE; REPRODUCTION; REPRODUCTIVE TECHNIQUES, ASSISTED; RISK; RISK ASSESSMENT; SELF CONCEPT; SOCIAL JUSTICE; SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY; STRESS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; TIME FACTORS; VALUE OF LIFE; WOUNDS AND INJURIES; WRONGFUL LIFE;

EID: 0032106983     PISSN: 02699702     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-8519.00108     Document Type: Article

References (86)

1. This thesis derives from Jan Narveson's claim that we do not have a moral duty to make happy people, but only to make people happy. He argues that the benefit of an act is the good it brings to already existing people and does not include the good of people who come into existence as a result of the act. See 'Utilitarianism and New Generations', Mind 76 (1967), pp. 62-72, and 'Moral Problems of Population', Monist 57 (1973), pp. 62-86. John Broome and Adam Morton discuss different aspects of the moral asymmetry thesis in 'The Value of A Person', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 68 (1994), pp. 167-98.
2. This thesis derives from Jan Narveson's claim that we do not have a moral duty to make happy people, but only to make people happy. He argues that the benefit of an act is the good it brings to already existing people and does not include the good of people who come into existence as a result of the act. See 'Utilitarianism and New Generations', Mind 76 (1967), pp. 62-72, and 'Moral Problems of Population', Monist 57 (1973), pp. 62-86. John Broome and Adam Morton discuss different aspects of the moral asymmetry thesis in 'The Value of A Person', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 68 (1994), pp. 167-98.
3. This thesis derives from Jan Narveson's claim that we do not have a moral duty to make happy people, but only to make people happy. He argues that the benefit of an act is the good it brings to already existing people and does not include the good of people who come into existence as a result of the act. See 'Utilitarianism and New Generations', Mind 76 (1967), pp. 62-72, and 'Moral Problems of Population', Monist 57 (1973), pp. 62-86. John Broome and Adam Morton discuss different aspects of the moral asymmetry thesis in 'The Value of A Person', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 68 (1994), pp. 167-98.
4. Here I follow the definition of harm given by Joel Feinberg in Harm to Others (New York, Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 102-4, and Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock in Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 162-9. Broome, ibid., Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), Part IV, and John Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 89, define personal harm in comparative terms. That is, a person is harmed when she is made worse off than she would have been otherwise. I avoid using the comparative sense of harm in considering whether being caused to exist with disabilities harms people, because these people would not exist without the disabilities they have, and a coherent comparison can be made only between two states of existence. The comparative sense of harm can be invoked only insofar as people exist and have interests. Otherwise, we should use an impersonal sense of harm, comparing two distinct potential lives of two distinct potential people.
5. Here I follow the definition of harm given by Joel Feinberg in Harm to Others (New York, Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 102-4, and Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock in Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 162-9. Broome, ibid., Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), Part IV, and John Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 89, define personal harm in comparative terms. That is, a person is harmed when she is made worse off than she would have been otherwise. I avoid using the comparative sense of harm in considering whether being caused to exist with disabilities harms people, because these people would not exist without the disabilities they have, and a coherent comparison can be made only between two states of existence. The comparative sense of harm can be invoked only insofar as people exist and have interests. Otherwise, we should use an impersonal sense of harm, comparing two distinct potential lives of two distinct potential people.
6. Here I follow the definition of harm given by Joel Feinberg in Harm to Others (New York, Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 102-4, and Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock in Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 162-9. Broome, ibid., Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), Part IV, and John Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 89, define personal harm in comparative terms. That is, a person is harmed when she is made worse off than she would have been otherwise. I avoid using the comparative sense of harm in considering whether being caused to exist with disabilities harms people, because these people would not exist without the disabilities they have, and a coherent comparison can be made only between two states of existence. The comparative sense of harm can be invoked only insofar as people exist and have interests. Otherwise, we should use an impersonal sense of harm, comparing two distinct potential lives of two distinct potential people.
7. Here I follow the definition of harm given by Joel Feinberg in Harm to Others (New York, Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 102-4, and Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock in Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 162-9. Broome, ibid., Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), Part IV, and John Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 89, define personal harm in comparative terms. That is, a person is harmed when she is made worse off than she would have been otherwise. I avoid using the comparative sense of harm in considering whether being caused to exist with disabilities harms people, because these people would not exist without the disabilities they have, and a coherent comparison can be made only between two states of existence. The comparative sense of harm can be invoked only insofar as people exist and have interests. Otherwise, we should use an impersonal sense of harm, comparing two distinct potential lives of two distinct potential people.
8. Here I follow the definition of harm given by Joel Feinberg in Harm to Others (New York, Oxford University Press, 1984), pp. 102-4, and Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock in Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 162-9. Broome, ibid., Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), Part IV, and John Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman: The Ethics of Human Biotechnology (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 89, define personal harm in comparative terms. That is, a person is harmed when she is made worse off than she would have been otherwise. I avoid using the comparative sense of harm in considering whether being caused to exist with disabilities harms people, because these people would not exist without the disabilities they have, and a coherent comparison can be made only between two states of existence. The comparative sense of harm can be invoked only insofar as people exist and have interests. Otherwise, we should use an impersonal sense of harm, comparing two distinct potential lives of two distinct potential people.
9. Parfit defends this principle in Reasons and Persons, Ch. 18, and 'Comments', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 858 ff., as does Jonathan Glover, 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', in Peter Laslett and James Fishkin, eds. Justice Between Age Groups and Generations (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 127-43.
10. Parfit defends this principle in Reasons and Persons, Ch. 18, and 'Comments', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 858 ff., as does Jonathan Glover, 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', in Peter Laslett and James Fishkin, eds. Justice Between Age Groups and Generations (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 127-43.
11. Parfit defends this principle in Reasons and Persons, Ch. 18, and 'Comments', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 858 ff., as does Jonathan Glover, 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', in Peter Laslett and James Fishkin, eds. Justice Between Age Groups and Generations (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 127-43.
12. This idea is discussed by Parfit, Reasons and Persons, and Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman, p. 90.
13. This idea is discussed by Parfit, Reasons and Persons, and Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman, p. 90.
14. See Michael Lockwood, 'When Does A Life Begin?', in Lockwood, ed., Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 9-31, Norman M. Ford, When Did I Begin? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 97 ff., Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson, and Peter Singer, 'The Syngamy Debate: When Precisely Does A Human Life Begin?', in Singer et al., eds., Embryo Experimentation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ch. 19, Harris, pp. 61-5, and Jeff McMahan, 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 91-126.
15. See Michael Lockwood, 'When Does A Life Begin?', in Lockwood, ed., Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 9-31, Norman M. Ford, When Did I Begin? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 97 ff., Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson, and Peter Singer, 'The Syngamy Debate: When Precisely Does A Human Life Begin?', in Singer et al., eds., Embryo Experimentation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ch. 19, Harris, pp. 61-5, and Jeff McMahan, 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 91-126.
16. See Michael Lockwood, 'When Does A Life Begin?', in Lockwood, ed., Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 9-31, Norman M. Ford, When Did I Begin? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 97 ff., Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson, and Peter Singer, 'The Syngamy Debate: When Precisely Does A Human Life Begin?', in Singer et al., eds., Embryo Experimentation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ch. 19, Harris, pp. 61-5, and Jeff McMahan, 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 91-126.
17. See Michael Lockwood, 'When Does A Life Begin?', in Lockwood, ed., Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 9-31, Norman M. Ford, When Did I Begin? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 97 ff., Stephen Buckle, Karen Dawson, and Peter Singer, 'The Syngamy Debate: When Precisely Does A Human Life Begin?', in Singer et al., eds., Embryo Experimentation (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990), Ch. 19, Harris, pp. 61-5, and Jeff McMahan, 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 91-126.
18. McMahan draws a similar distinction between persons and human organisms in 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', as does Robert Elliot in 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy', Bioethics 7 (1993), pp. 27-40, and 'Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity', Bioethics 11 (1997), pp. 151-60. Compare these accounts with that of Ingmar Persson, who draws a three-fold distinction between a conceptus, a human being, and a person in 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 16-31. For a defense of the view that we are essentially human animals, see Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), and 'Was I Ever A Fetus?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), pp. 43-59.
19. McMahan draws a similar distinction between persons and human organisms in 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', as does Robert Elliot in 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy', Bioethics 7 (1993), pp. 27-40, and 'Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity', Bioethics 11 (1997), pp. 151-60. Compare these accounts with that of Ingmar Persson, who draws a three-fold distinction between a conceptus, a human being, and a person in 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 16-31. For a defense of the view that we are essentially human animals, see Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), and 'Was I Ever A Fetus?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), pp. 43-59.
20. McMahan draws a similar distinction between persons and human organisms in 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', as does Robert Elliot in 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy', Bioethics 7 (1993), pp. 27-40, and 'Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity', Bioethics 11 (1997), pp. 151-60. Compare these accounts with that of Ingmar Persson, who draws a three-fold distinction between a conceptus, a human being, and a person in 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 16-31. For a defense of the view that we are essentially human animals, see Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), and 'Was I Ever A Fetus?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), pp. 43-59.
21. McMahan draws a similar distinction between persons and human organisms in 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', as does Robert Elliot in 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy', Bioethics 7 (1993), pp. 27-40, and 'Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity', Bioethics 11 (1997), pp. 151-60. Compare these accounts with that of Ingmar Persson, who draws a three-fold distinction between a conceptus, a human being, and a person in 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 16-31. For a defense of the view that we are essentially human animals, see Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), and 'Was I Ever A Fetus?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), pp. 43-59.
22. McMahan draws a similar distinction between persons and human organisms in 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', as does Robert Elliot in 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy', Bioethics 7 (1993), pp. 27-40, and 'Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity', Bioethics 11 (1997), pp. 151-60. Compare these accounts with that of Ingmar Persson, who draws a three-fold distinction between a conceptus, a human being, and a person in 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 16-31. For a defense of the view that we are essentially human animals, see Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), and 'Was I Ever A Fetus?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), pp. 43-59.
23. McMahan draws a similar distinction between persons and human organisms in 'The Metaphysics of Brain Death', as does Robert Elliot in 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene Therapy', Bioethics 7 (1993), pp. 27-40, and 'Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity', Bioethics 11 (1997), pp. 151-60. Compare these accounts with that of Ingmar Persson, who draws a three-fold distinction between a conceptus, a human being, and a person in 'Genetic Therapy, Identity and the Person-Regarding Reasons', Bioethics 9 (1995), pp. 16-31. For a defense of the view that we are essentially human animals, see Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996), and 'Was I Ever A Fetus?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997), pp. 43-59.
24. In Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977), Glover says that a fetus is a potential person (p. 122), and Harris holds that embryos are potential persons, or 'pre-persons' (p. 58). Buckle subtly discusses the difference between the potential to become and the potential to produce in 'Arguing from Potential', Bioethics 2 (1988), pp. 227 ff. Reprinted in Singer et al., Ch. 9.
25. In Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977), Glover says that a fetus is a potential person (p. 122), and Harris holds that embryos are potential persons, or 'pre-persons' (p. 58). Buckle subtly discusses the difference between the potential to become and the potential to produce in 'Arguing from Potential', Bioethics 2 (1988), pp. 227 ff. Reprinted in Singer et al., Ch. 9.
26. In Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977), Glover says that a fetus is a potential person (p. 122), and Harris holds that embryos are potential persons, or 'pre-persons' (p. 58). Buckle subtly discusses the difference between the potential to become and the potential to produce in 'Arguing from Potential', Bioethics 2 (1988), pp. 227 ff. Reprinted in Singer et al., Ch. 9.
27. In Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977), Glover says that a fetus is a potential person (p. 122), and Harris holds that embryos are potential persons, or 'pre-persons' (p. 58). Buckle subtly discusses the difference between the potential to become and the potential to produce in 'Arguing from Potential', Bioethics 2 (1988), pp. 227 ff. Reprinted in Singer et al., Ch. 9.
28. In Causing Death and Saving Lives (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977), Glover says that a fetus is a potential person (p. 122), and Harris holds that embryos are potential persons, or 'pre-persons' (p. 58). Buckle subtly discusses the difference between the potential to become and the potential to produce in 'Arguing from Potential', Bioethics 2 (1988), pp. 227 ff. Reprinted in Singer et al., Ch. 9.
29. Elliot, 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene therapy', and 'Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity'. McMahan explores the implications of the differences between genetic techniques that are identity-determining and those that are identity-preserving in 'Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice', Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996), pp. 3- 35.
30. Elliot, 'Identity and the Ethics of Gene therapy', and 'Genetic Therapy, Person-Regarding Reasons and the Determination of Identity'. McMahan explores the implications of the differences between genetic techniques that are identity-determining and those that are identity-preserving in 'Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice', Philosophy & Public Affairs 25 (1996), pp. 3-35.
31. Tom Regan first argued for this position in 'Feinberg on What Sorts of Beings Can Have Rights', Southern Journal of Philosophy 14 (1976), pp. 485-98.
32. Reasons and Persons, pp. 488-9.
33. In 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', Philosophy & Public Affairs 11 (1982), pp. 93-112, Gregory Kavka defines a restricted life as 'one that is significantly deficient in one or more of the major respects that generally make human lives valuable and worth living' (p. 105). Yet Kavka says further that 'restricted lives typically will be worth living, on the whole, for those who live them' (p. 105). When 1 say that life is or is not worth living for a person, I mean it in the subjective rather than objective sense, or, what it is like for the person who lives it. McMahan offers insightful discussions of this and related issues in 'Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice', and 'Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist', in Jules Coleman and Christopher Morris, eds., Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
34. In 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', Philosophy & Public Affairs 11 (1982), pp. 93-112, Gregory Kavka defines a restricted life as 'one that is significantly deficient in one or more of the major respects that generally make human lives valuable and worth living' (p. 105). Yet Kavka says further that 'restricted lives typically will be worth living, on the whole, for those who live them' (p. 105). When 1 say that life is or is not worth living for a person, I mean it in the subjective rather than objective sense, or, what it is like for the person who lives it. McMahan offers insightful discussions of this and related issues in 'Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice', and 'Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist', in Jules Coleman and Christopher Morris, eds., Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
35. In 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', Philosophy & Public Affairs 11 (1982), pp. 93-112, Gregory Kavka defines a restricted life as 'one that is significantly deficient in one or more of the major respects that generally make human lives valuable and worth living' (p. 105). Yet Kavka says further that 'restricted lives typically will be worth living, on the whole, for those who live them' (p. 105). When 1 say that life is or is not worth living for a person, I mean it in the subjective rather than objective sense, or, what it is like for the person who lives it. McMahan offers insightful discussions of this and related issues in 'Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice', and 'Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist', in Jules Coleman and Christopher Morris, eds., Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
36. In 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', Philosophy & Public Affairs 11 (1982), pp. 93-112, Gregory Kavka defines a restricted life as 'one that is significantly deficient in one or more of the major respects that generally make human lives valuable and worth living' (p. 105). Yet Kavka says further that 'restricted lives typically will be worth living, on the whole, for those who live them' (p. 105). When 1 say that life is or is not worth living for a person, I mean it in the subjective rather than objective sense, or, what it is like for the person who lives it. McMahan offers insightful discussions of this and related issues in 'Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice', and 'Wrongful Life: Paradoxes in the Morality of Causing People to Exist', in Jules Coleman and Christopher Morris, eds., Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).
37. Reasons and Persons, Ch. 16, and 'Comments', pp. 854-62. Others who address this problem include McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life', Kavka, 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', James Woodward, 'The Non-Identity Problem', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 804-31, Matthew Hanser, 'Harming Future People', Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (Winter 1990), pp. 47-70, and David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), Chs. 4, 6. Robert Adams first articulated the Non-Identity Problem in 'Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil', Nous 13, (1979), pp. 65-76.
38. Reasons and Persons, Ch. 16, and 'Comments', pp. 854-62. Others who address this problem include McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life', Kavka, 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', James Woodward, 'The Non-Identity Problem', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 804-31, Matthew Hanser, 'Harming Future People', Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (Winter 1990), pp. 47-70, and David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), Chs. 4, 6. Robert Adams first articulated the Non-Identity Problem in 'Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil', Nous 13, (1979), pp. 65-76.
39. Reasons and Persons, Ch. 16, and 'Comments', pp. 854-62. Others who address this problem include McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life', Kavka, 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', James Woodward, 'The Non-Identity Problem', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 804-31, Matthew Hanser, 'Harming Future People', Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (Winter 1990), pp. 47-70, and David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), Chs. 4, 6. Robert Adams first articulated the Non-Identity Problem in 'Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil', Nous 13, (1979), pp. 65-76.
40. Reasons and Persons, Ch. 16, and 'Comments', pp. 854-62. Others who address this problem include McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life', Kavka, 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', James Woodward, 'The Non-Identity Problem', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 804-31, Matthew Hanser, 'Harming Future People', Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (Winter 1990), pp. 47-70, and David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), Chs. 4, 6. Robert Adams first articulated the Non-Identity Problem in 'Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil', Nous 13, (1979), pp. 65-76.
41. Reasons and Persons, Ch. 16, and 'Comments', pp. 854-62. Others who address this problem include McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life', Kavka, 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', James Woodward, 'The Non-Identity Problem', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 804-31, Matthew Hanser, 'Harming Future People', Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (Winter 1990), pp. 47-70, and David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), Chs. 4, 6. Robert Adams first articulated the Non-Identity Problem in 'Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil', Nous 13, (1979), pp. 65-76.
42. Reasons and Persons, Ch. 16, and 'Comments', pp. 854-62. Others who address this problem include McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life', Kavka, 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', James Woodward, 'The Non-Identity Problem', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 804-31, Matthew Hanser, 'Harming Future People', Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (Winter 1990), pp. 47-70, and David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), Chs. 4, 6. Robert Adams first articulated the Non-Identity Problem in 'Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil', Nous 13, (1979), pp. 65-76.
43. Reasons and Persons, Ch. 16, and 'Comments', pp. 854-62. Others who address this problem include McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life', Kavka, 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', James Woodward, 'The Non-Identity Problem', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 804-31, Matthew Hanser, 'Harming Future People', Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (Winter 1990), pp. 47-70, and David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), Chs. 4, 6. Robert Adams first articulated the Non-Identity Problem in 'Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil', Nous 13, (1979), pp. 65-76.
44. Reasons and Persons, Ch. 16, and 'Comments', pp. 854-62. Others who address this problem include McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life', Kavka, 'The Paradox of Future Individuals', James Woodward, 'The Non-Identity Problem', Ethics 96 (1986), pp. 804-31, Matthew Hanser, 'Harming Future People', Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (Winter 1990), pp. 47-70, and David Heyd, Genethics: Moral Issues in the Creation of People (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1992), Chs. 4, 6. Robert Adams first articulated the Non-Identity Problem in 'Existence, Self-interest, and the Problem of Evil', Nous 13, (1979), pp. 65-76.
45. 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', p. 141.
46. Ibid., p. 142.
47. I assume that the same number of people will exist in the different outcomes. This avoids complications involving different numbers of people and having to determine which group is better or worse off than others. See Parfit's discussion of 'Same People Choices', 'Same Number Choices', and 'Different Number Choices' in Reasons and Persons, pp. 356 ff. See also Hanser, 'Harming Future People', and Heyd, Genethics.
48. I assume that the same number of people will exist in the different outcomes. This avoids complications involving different numbers of people and having to determine which group is better or worse off than others. See Parfit's discussion of 'Same People Choices', 'Same Number Choices', and 'Different Number Choices' in Reasons and Persons, pp. 356 ff. See also Hanser, 'Harming Future People', and Heyd, Genethics.
49. I assume that the same number of people will exist in the different outcomes. This avoids complications involving different numbers of people and having to determine which group is better or worse off than others. See Parfit's discussion of 'Same People Choices', 'Same Number Choices', and 'Different Number Choices' in Reasons and Persons, pp. 356 ff. See also Hanser, 'Harming Future People', and Heyd, Genethics.
50. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer claim that 'we can, of course, damage the embryo in such a way as to cause harm to the sentient being it will become, if it lives, but if it never becomes a sentient being, the embryo has not been harmed'. See 'Individuals, Humans, and Persons: The Issue of Moral Status', in Embryo Experimentation, p. 82. Furthermore, Harris maintains that 'harm done at the pre- person (embryo) stage will be harm done to the actual person she becomes. It is a form of delayed-action wrongdoing'. Wonderwoman and Superman, p. 153. I believe that persons can be harmed or wronged by what we do or fail to do to embryos even if embryos do not strictly speaking become persons.
51. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer claim that 'we can, of course, damage the embryo in such a way as to cause harm to the sentient being it will become, if it lives, but if it never becomes a sentient being, the embryo has not been harmed'. See 'Individuals, Humans, and Persons: The Issue of Moral Status', in Embryo Experimentation, p. 82. Furthermore, Harris maintains that 'harm done at the pre-person (embryo) stage will be harm done to the actual person she becomes. It is a form of delayed-action wrongdoing'. Wonderwoman and Superman, p. 153. I believe that persons can be harmed or wronged by what we do or fail to do to embryos even if embryos do not strictly speaking become persons.
52. Patricia Baird provides an excellent overview of these issues in 'Altering Human Genes: Social, Ethical, and Legal Implications', Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 37 (1994), pp. 566-75. See also Leroy Walters and Julie Gage Palmer, The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy (New York, Oxford University Press, 1997).
53. Patricia Baird provides an excellent overview of these issues in 'Altering Human Genes: Social, Ethical, and Legal Implications', Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 37 (1994), pp. 566-75. See also Leroy Walters and Julie Gage Palmer, The Ethics of Human Gene Therapy (New York, Oxford University Press, 1997).
54. Elliot and Persson fail to recognize this in their respective uses of 'gene therapy'.
55. The diseases I discuss involve genetic defects in the nuclei of cells. Genes in the mitochondria of cells can mutate in the same way that the more familiar nuclear genes do. And like nuclear genes, mutations in mitochondrial genes may lead to disease. There are indications that familial Alzheimer disease may be caused by a faulty mitochondrial gene, though the research has not yet yielded any definitive conclusions. Moreover, my concern is with genetic testing rather than genetic screening. 'Genetic testing denotes the use of specific assays to determine the genetic status of individuals already suspected to be at high risk for a particular inherited condition because of family history of clinical symptoms; genetic screening involves the use of various genetic tests to evaluate populations or groups of individuals independent of a family history of a disorder.' Arno Motulsky et al., Assessing Genetic Risks: Implications for Health and Social Policy (Washington, D. C., National Academy Press, 1994), p. 4.
56. But see R. M. Blaese et al., 'Treatment of Severe Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID) Due to Adenosine Deaminase Deficiency with CD34+ Selected Autologous Blood Cells Transduced with a Human ADA Gene', Human Gene Therapy 4 (1993), pp. 521-7, M. Grossman et al., 'Successful Ex Vivo Gene Therapy
57. But see R. M. Blaese et al., 'Treatment of Severe Combined Immunodeficiency (SCID) Due to Adenosine Deaminase Deficiency with CD34+ Selected Autologous Blood Cells Transduced with a Human ADA Gene', Human Gene Therapy 4 (1993), pp. 521-7, M. Grossman et al., 'Successful Ex Vivo Gene Therapy
58. Canavan's is a degenerative disease that strikes infants, leading to the decay of the nervous system and early death. Hurler syndrome involves disruption of cognitive development in early childhood and usually death by age 10. Lesch-Nyhan syndrome causes both mental retardation and compulsive self-mutilation in boys. Philip Kitcher offers an insightful discussion of the genetic causes of these and other diseases in The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human Possibilities (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996).
59. See Glover, 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability', and Allen Buchanan, 'Equal Opportunity and Genetic Intervention', Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995), pp. 105-35, and 'Choosing Who Will Be Disabled: Genetic Intervention and the Morality of Inclusion', Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996), pp. 18-46.
60. See Glover, 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability', and Allen Buchanan, 'Equal Opportunity and Genetic Intervention', Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995), pp. 105-35, and 'Choosing Who Will Be Disabled: Genetic Intervention and the Morality of Inclusion', Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996), pp. 18-46.
61. See Glover, 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability', and Allen Buchanan, 'Equal Opportunity and Genetic Intervention', Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995), pp. 105-35, and 'Choosing Who Will Be Disabled: Genetic Intervention and the Morality of Inclusion', Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996), pp. 18-46.
62. See Glover, 'Future People, Disability, and Screening', McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability', and Allen Buchanan, 'Equal Opportunity and Genetic Intervention', Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1995), pp. 105-35, and 'Choosing Who Will Be Disabled: Genetic Intervention and the Morality of Inclusion', Social Philosophy and Policy 13 (1996), pp. 18-46.
63. R. G. Edwards and J. Purdy, Human Conception In Vitro (London, Academic Press, 1981), p. 373.
64. See Feinberg, 'Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming', in Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 3-36, Heyd, Genethics, Ch. 1, Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman, Ch. 4, and McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life'.
65. See Feinberg, 'Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming', in Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 3-36, Heyd, Genethics, Ch. 1, Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman, Ch. 4, and McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life'.
66. See Feinberg, 'Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming', in Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 3-36, Heyd, Genethics, Ch. 1, Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman, Ch. 4, and McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life'.
67. See Feinberg, 'Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming', in Freedom and Fulfillment (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1992), pp. 3-36, Heyd, Genethics, Ch. 1, Harris, Wonderwoman and Superman, Ch. 4, and McMahan, 'Cognitive Disability' and 'Wrongful Life'.
68. Thomas Hurka presents a model that measures quality of life in terms of averaging achievements in earlier and later stages of life in Perfectionism (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 70 ff. See also Brock, 'Quality of Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics', in Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 268-324.
69. Thomas Hurka presents a model that measures quality of life in terms of averaging achievements in earlier and later stages of life in Perfectionism (New York, Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 70 ff. See also Brock, 'Quality of Life Measures in Health Care and Medical Ethics', in Life and Death: Philosophical Essays in Biomedical Ethics (New York, Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 268-324.
70. I thank a referee for Bioethics for raising this issue.
71. 'Choosing Who Will Be Disabled', p. 32. Emphasis added.
72. Ibid., p. 33.
73. See, for example, Daniel Kevles, In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), an examination of the history of eugenics in the United States.
74. The Lives to Come, p. 202. See also Glover, What Sort of People Should There Be? (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984), John A. Wagner, 'Gene Therapy Is not Eugenics', Nature Genetics 15 (1997), p. 234, and Buchanan, Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler, In the Shadow of Eugenics: the Human Genome Project and the Limits of Ethical Theory (forthcoming).
75. The Lives to Come, p. 202. See also Glover, What Sort of People Should There Be? (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984), John A. Wagner, 'Gene Therapy Is not Eugenics', Nature Genetics 15 (1997), p. 234, and Buchanan, Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler, In the Shadow of Eugenics: the Human Genome Project and the Limits of Ethical Theory (forthcoming).
76. The Lives to Come, p. 202. See also Glover, What Sort of People Should There Be? (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984), John A. Wagner, 'Gene Therapy Is not Eugenics', Nature Genetics 15 (1997), p. 234, and Buchanan, Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler, In the Shadow of Eugenics: the Human Genome Project and the Limits of Ethical Theory (forthcoming).
77. The Lives to Come, p. 202. See also Glover, What Sort of People Should There Be? (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1984), John A. Wagner, 'Gene Therapy Is not Eugenics', Nature Genetics 15 (1997), p. 234, and Buchanan, Brock, Norman Daniels and Daniel Wikler, In the Shadow of Eugenics: the Human Genome Project and the Limits of Ethical Theory (forthcoming).
78. Eight years ago, in 'Contemporary and Future Possibilities for Human Embryonic Manipulation', Mark Ferguson wrote 'it is unclear how well the ageing human female reproductive system would cope with such good embryos'. In Anthony Dyson and John Harris, eds., Experiments on Embryos (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990), p. 10. Yet recently a woman of 63 in Los Angeles gave birth to a healthy baby girl. See Gina Kolata, 'A Record and Big Questions as Woman Gives Birth at 63'. New York Times, April 24, 1997.
79. Eight years ago, in 'Contemporary and Future Possibilities for Human Embryonic Manipulation', Mark Ferguson wrote 'it is unclear how well the ageing human female reproductive system would cope with such good embryos'. In Anthony Dyson and John Harris, eds., Experiments on Embryos (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990), p. 10. Yet recently a woman of 63 in Los Angeles gave birth to a healthy baby girl. See Gina Kolata, 'A Record and Big Questions as Woman Gives Birth at 63'. New York Times, April 24, 1997.
80. Eight years ago, in 'Contemporary and Future Possibilities for Human Embryonic Manipulation', Mark Ferguson wrote 'it is unclear how well the ageing human female reproductive system would cope with such good embryos'. In Anthony Dyson and John Harris, eds., Experiments on Embryos (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990), p. 10. Yet recently a woman of 63 in Los Angeles gave birth to a healthy baby girl. See Gina Kolata, 'A Record and Big Questions as Woman Gives Birth at 63'. New York Times, April 24, 1997.
81. Davis v. Davis 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn Cir 1984) rev'd 842 S. W. 2D 588, 597 (Tenn 1992).
82. 'Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos', Hastings Center Report 19 (November-December 1989), p. 11. More recently, Robertson examines this and related issues in Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996).
83. 'Resolving Disputes over Frozen Embryos', Hastings Center Report 19 (November-December 1989), p. 11. More recently, Robertson examines this and related issues in Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996).
84. Life Before Birth: The Moral and Legal Status of Embryos and Fetuses (New York, Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 5-41.
85. I thank Bonnic Steinbock for pointing this out.
86. I am grateful to Michael Burgess, David Donaldson, Chris McDonald, Bonnie Steinbeck, and an anonymous referee for Bioethics for very helpful comments on an ancestor of this paper. Work on the paper was supported by a Killam Postdoctoral Fellowship at the Centre for Applied Ethics, University of British Columbia, which also is gratefully acknowledged.