Do managers work harder in competitive industries?

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 34, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 489-498

  Graziano, Clara ^a   Parigi, Bruno M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF UDINE   (Italy)

^b CA' FOSCARI UNIVERSITY OF VENICE   (Italy)

Author keywords

D43; Executive pay; L13; Oligopoly; Relative performance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032013987     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00085-1     Document Type: Article

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