Gas, oil and the linkages between domestic and foreign policies: The case of Ukraine

Europe - Asia Studies

Volumn 50, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 257-286

  Balmaceda, Margarita Mercedes ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENERGY RESOURCES; FOREIGN POLICY; GEOPOLITICS; INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS;

UKRAINE;

EID: 0031828577     PISSN: 09668136     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09668139808412535     Document Type: Article

References (157)

1. Oles M. Smolansky, 'Ukraine's Quest for Independence: The Fuel Factor', Europe-Asia Studies, 47, 1, January 1995, p. 85.
2. Oleksandr Yurchuk, 'Pipelines and Politics: Monopoly in the Gas Sector?', Eastern Economist, 13 January 1997, p. 23.
3. See Smolansky 'Ukraine's Quest ...'.
4. See Gregory V. Krasnov & Josef C. Brada, 'Implicit Subsidies in Russian-Ukrainian Energy Trade', Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 5, July 1997, p. 840.
5. Leslie Dienes, Istvan Dobozi et al., Energy and Economic Reform in the Former Soviet Union (New York, St Martin's Press, 1994), p. 205.
6. 'The Black Sea shelf has estimated gas reserves of 70 billion cubic metres; ... the Crimean peninsular area is also estimated to have reserves of 1.3 billion barrels of oil equivalent'. Only 3% of the Black Sea has even been explored. See Russian Petroleum Investor, November 1996, p. 56.
7. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Oil, Natural Gas, Coal, Electricity Profile, 1996; see also IntelNews Weekly Digest, 3 March 1997, p. 4.
8. US Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, Oil, Natural Gas, Coal, Electricity Profile, 1996; see also IntelNews Weekly Digest, 3 March 1997, p. 4.
9. In 1997 Ukraine hoped to receive no more than 10 million tons of crude oil from Russia. It also hoped to get up to 3 million tons of Azeri crude oil through the recently established ferry link between the Ukrainian Black Sea port of Illichevsk and the Georgian port of Poti. Eastern Economist, 13 January 1997, p. 14.
10. Turkmenistan has stopped gas deliveries on several occasions (most recently in March 1997), citing unpaid Ukrainian debts. Until recently, Turkmen natural gas was supplied by ITERA under a contract with Turkmenrosgaz, a Turkmen-Gazprom joint venture. In April 1997 the Turkmen and Ukrainian governments reached an agreement on direct supplies of Turkmen gas without Russian mediation.
11. See Op-Ed, New York Times, 9 April 1997. Foreign investment is especially important in this area because Ukraine lacks the equipment to work in deep areas, where the most promising deposits are located. Russian Petroleum Investor, November 1996, p. 56.
12. See Op-Ed, New York Times, 9 April 1997. Foreign investment is especially important in this area because Ukraine lacks the equipment to work in deep areas, where the most promising deposits are located. Russian Petroleum Investor, November 1996, p. 56.
13. Including Russian excise taxes of US$ 28.00.
14. Oles Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem: Recent Developments', The Ukrainian Quarterly, LII, 2-3, Summer-Fall 1996, p. 144; Bagdan Babyi, head of the Ukrainian State Committee for Oil and Gas Industry, in Uryadovyi Kurer (Kiev), 4 February 1997 (in FBIS-SOV-97-030).
15. Oles Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem: Recent Developments', The Ukrainian Quarterly, LII, 2-3, Summer-Fall 1996, p. 144; Bagdan Babyi, head of the Ukrainian State Committee for Oil and Gas Industry, in Uryadovyi Kurer (Kiev), 4 February 1997 (in FBIS-SOV-97-030).
16. Dienes & Dobozi.
17. In addition, oil supplies from Turkmenistan also pass through Ukrainian pipelines on their way to Europe. Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy (Westport, Praeger, 1995), p. 47.
18. Findings of the Rada Commission on the Formation of the Domestic Fuel Market, as reported in Intel News Weekly Digest, 10 March 1997. The data for export earnings are estimated on the basis of the first five months of 1997. See the Report of the Department of National Economic Development of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 'The Economy of Ukraine in January-June 1997', Uryadovyi Kurer, 29 July 1997, pp. 5-6.
19. Findings of the Rada Commission on the Formation of the Domestic Fuel Market, as reported in Intel News Weekly Digest, 10 March 1997. The data for export earnings are estimated on the basis of the first five months of 1997. See the Report of the Department of National Economic Development of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 'The Economy of Ukraine in January-June 1997', Uryadovyi Kurer, 29 July 1997, pp. 5-6.
20. Bogdan Klyuk, 'U nas gaz potreblyayut, slovno nazlo vragam', Zerkalo nedeli (Kiev), 16 August 1997, p. 9.
21. Francis Gutmann, 'Russie, hydrocarbures et politique', Geopolitique, No. 54, Summer 1996, p. 72. Translation mine.
22. Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem ...', p. 144. See also Konstantin Levin, Komersant-Daily, 26 July 1995 in FBIS/SOV, 27 July 1995; and 'State Committee ...', in FBIS-SOV, 10 October 1995 (Supplement). The CIS customs union is composed of Russia, Belarus, Kazhakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which have unified customs and trading regulations largely dictated by Russia.
23. Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem ...', p. 144. See also Konstantin Levin, Komersant-Daily, 26 July 1995 in FBIS/SOV, 27 July 1995; and 'State Committee ...', in FBIS-SOV, 10 October 1995 (Supplement). The CIS customs union is composed of Russia, Belarus, Kazhakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which have unified customs and trading regulations largely dictated by Russia.
24. Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem ...', p. 144. See also Konstantin Levin, Komersant-Daily, 26 July 1995 in FBIS/SOV, 27 July 1995; and 'State Committee ...', in FBIS-SOV, 10 October 1995 (Supplement). The CIS customs union is composed of Russia, Belarus, Kazhakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which have unified customs and trading regulations largely dictated by Russia.
25. Business Intelligence Report World of Information, Ukraine, October 1996.
26. IntelNews Weekly Digest, 10 March 1997.
27. Zerkalo nedeli, 15 February 1997, p. 7. Estimates vary.
28. Dmitrii Voloshin, 'Strategii natsional'noi bezopasnosti Ukrainy i Rossii v ocherednoi raz raskhodyatsya', Finansovaya Ukraina, 8 April 1997, p. 5.
29. Moscow Radio, 18 November 1993, quoted in Smolansky, 'Ukraine's Quest ...', p. 82.
30. Moscow Radio, 18 November 1993, quoted in Smolansky, 'Ukraine's Quest ...', p. 82.
31. Rustan Narzikulov, Segodnya, 11 March 1994.
32. Kommersant Daily, quoted by the International Gas Report, 31 March 1995 (via Lexis-Nexus).
33. Kommersant Daily, quoted by the International Gas Report, 31 March 1995 (via Lexis-Nexus).
34. 'Business News Weekly', (UKRINFORM), 13 January 1995, in FBIS-SOV-95-0150A.
35. International Gas Report, 31 March 1995 (via Lexis-Nexus).
36. Krasnov & Brada, pp. 839-840.
37. See Smolansky, 'Ukraine's Quest ...', p. 59.
38. According to the agreement, from 1995 to 1997 Ukraine would only be charged interest on the outstanding debt, meaning a temporary forgiveness of US$ 1.4 billion of the gas debt. Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem ...', p. 155. Krasnov & Brada estimate the implicit subsidy due to low interest rates (LIBOR + 1.5%) as falling within the range of $0.7 to $8.5 billion over the 1996-2008 period. Krasnov & Brada, pp. 835-836.
39. According to the agreement, from 1995 to 1997 Ukraine would only be charged interest on the outstanding debt, meaning a temporary forgiveness of US$ 1.4 billion of the gas debt. Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem ...', p. 155. Krasnov & Brada estimate the implicit subsidy due to low interest rates (LIBOR + 1.5%) as falling within the range of $0.7 to $8.5 billion over the 1996-2008 period. Krasnov & Brada, pp. 835-836.
40. Finansovaya Ukraina, 1 April 1997, p. 2
41. Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem ...', p. 169.
42. Interview with Oleg Ishchenko (member of the Rada commission on the formation of the domestic energy market), Zerkalo nedeli, 14 June 1997, p. 8.
43. IntelNews Weekly Report, 9 June 1997. For a full discussion of the Lisichansk refinery, see Oleh Dudkin, 'Black Gold or Black Hole?', IntelNews Weekly Report, 9 June 1997.
44. IntelNews Weekly Report, 9 June 1997. For a full discussion of the Lisichansk refinery, see Oleh Dudkin, 'Black Gold or Black Hole?', IntelNews Weekly Report, 9 June 1997.
45. Ganna Lyuta, 'Nu i LiNOS s nim', Zerkalo nedeli, 23 August 1997, p. 9.
46. IntelNews Weekly Report, 12 May 1997.
47. Business Intelligence Report World of Information, Ukraine, October 1996.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
50. Deputy Hennadyi Uharov, in IntelNews, 22 June 1997, in FBIS-SOV-97-173.
51. Business Intelligence Report World of Information, Ukraine, October 1996.
52. I. Binko & V. Shtemko (National Institute of Strategic Research), 'How to Provide for "Blood Circulation" in the Ukrainian Economy. Slow Progress with reforms of Energy Supply and Financial System is Dangerous', Vseukrainskie vedomosti (Kiev), 5 August 1997, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV-97, 28 August 1997.
53. Intel News Weekly Digest, 11 November 1996, p. 4.
54. Kiev, 30 May 1997.
55. Ihor Stadnychenko & Olha Ansimova, 'Finally! Kuchma and Yeltsin Seal Historic Pact; Did Ukraine Get a Fair Deal?', IntelNews weekly Digest, 9 June 1997.
56. The oil and gas complex is composed of the natural gas monopoly Gazprom (a joint-stock company with 40% state participation) and 'several major oil groups associated with Imperial, Yugorsky, and other large banks' (Igor Khiripunov & Mary M. Matthews, 'Russia's Oil and Gas Interest Group and its Foreign Policy Agenda', Problems of Post-Communism, 43, 3, May - June 1996, p. 39). Some of the largest of these 'vertically integrated' groups are LUKoil and Sidanko. LUKoil is the world's largest private oil firm in terms of its proven oil reserves (OMRI Daily Digest, 26 February 1997).
57. The oil and gas complex is composed of the natural gas monopoly Gazprom (a joint-stock company with 40% state participation) and 'several major oil groups associated with Imperial, Yugorsky, and other large banks' (Igor Khiripunov & Mary M. Matthews, 'Russia's Oil and Gas Interest Group and its Foreign Policy Agenda', Problems of Post-Communism, 43, 3, May - June 1996, p. 39). Some of the largest of these 'vertically integrated' groups are LUKoil and Sidanko. LUKoil is the world's largest private oil firm in terms of its proven oil reserves (OMRI Daily Digest, 26 February 1997).
58. Khiripunov & Matthews, p. 38. On Gazprom's contributions to the Russian budget, see Nikolai Evgenev, 'Gazprom na evropeiskom rynke gaza: ekspansiya kak sposob vyzhyvaniya', Zerkalo nedeli, 4-11 January 1997, p. 9.
59. Khiripunov & Matthews, p. 46.
60. Analytical report by Constitutional Centre, 19 March 1997, quoted by Moscow Interfax, in FBIS-SOV-97-078.
61. After the abolition of tax exemptions for joint ventures, the Supreme Rada agreed to draw up a list of companies involved in productive activities, which would still be eligible for exemptions.
62. Analytical report by Constitutional Centre, 19 March 1997, quoted by Moscow Interfax, in FBIS-SOV-97-078.
63. IntelNews, 22 June 1997, in FBIS-SOV-97-173.
64. See Khiripunov & Matthews, p. 43.
65. Russian Petroleum Investor, September 1996, p. 40.
66. Khiripunov & Matthews.
67. Although beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting the significant role played by the oil and gas complex in Russia's restructuring of relations with former USSR-friendly countries in the Third World, such as Iraq, Libya, Cuba and Iran, as well as other Latin American countries. See Khiripunov & Matthews, p. 42.
68. Such as a petroleum import-export terminal in the port of Butinga.
69. 'Lithuania Looks to Foreign Investors for Help in Attaining Economic Independence from Russia', Russian Petroleum Investor, September 1996, p. 61.
70. Ibid.
71. Binko & Shtemko.
72. There are five basic options open to Russia: (1) the pipeline to the Latvian port of Ventspils; (2) the Druzhba pipeline's Northern Route through Belarus; (3) the Druzhba pipeline's Southern Route to Uzhgorod in Ukraine; (4) the Baltic Pipeline System to the port of Porvoo in Finland and (5) pipeline system to Murmansk. However, the continued use and upgrading of the Yaroslav-Belarus-Ventspils pipeline also seems to depend on political factors: the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly has insisted that Russia should not ship more through the 'unfriendly' Baltic States ('The Baltic or Bust', Russian Petroleum Investor, November 1996, p. 67). Russia would prefer to build its own export terminal on the Baltic Sea.
73. On Gazprom's strategy, see the interview with Rem Vyakhirev, Chairman of Gazprom, in Igor Shevelev: 'Gazprom Warns: You Yourselves Will Come and Give In', Obshchaya gazeta (Moscow), 14 August 1997, p. 7, in FBIS-SOV-97-233, 21 August 1997.
74. In the Balkan region alone, gas consumption is set to rise from 36 billion cubic metres/year in 1995 to 79 bcm in 2010 (Den' (Kiev), 11 February 1997, p. 4).
75. Polish sources estimate that gas as a percentage of total energy consumption in Poland will rise from 8% to 20% by 2010. See Grzegorz Lys, 'Pipeline Under Pressure', Gazeta Bankowa (Warsaw), 19 November 1994, p. 25, in FBIS-EE-94-245, 21 December 1994.
76. Vitalii Knyazhansky, 'Evropu zagrozhaet gazovyi golod', Den (Kiev), 11 February 1997, p. 1. In May 1997 Gazprom repeated accusations that Ukraine was illegally exporting (Russian) gas to third countries, such as Slovakia.
77. See Sergey Kiselev, 'Druzhba Oil Pipeline - There is a Problem: the Contact Bouts of Russian and Ukrainian Amateurs', Nezavisimost' (Kiev), 13 November 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-237.
78. The increase was from US$ 4.53 to US$ 5.20 per tonne of oil pumped thorough the 722-km Ukrainian section of the Druzhba pipeline, a rate significantly lower than that paid by Germany to Poland, for example.
79. Alla Eremenko, 'Ukraina zaruchilas' Rossiiskoi gazovoi kvotom na 1997 god', Zerkalo nedeli, 7-13 December 1996, p. 1.
80. On 17 April 1997 Gazprom won a $2.5 billion credit line from German banks to finance the construction of the Belarus-Poland-Germany section of the Yamal pipeline: a further $1 billion credit for the purchase of pipes is also expected.
81. Russia has other transport alternatives available, for example liquefying the gas to make it easier to transport.
82. 'Pipeline Fantasies', Russian Petroleum Investor, May 1996, p. 66. On the conflict over transit fees, see above.
83. By 70 billion cubic metres per year over 20 years.
84. 'Pipeline Fantasies', p. 66.
85. See Voloshin.
86. In this sense, the recent letter of Yuliya Timoshenko (head of United Energy Systems) to President Clinton on the eve of the March 1997 Helsinki summit is quite telling. In the letter, Timoshenko reportedly asked Clinton to raise the question of Gazprom's dominance of the world energy market in his negotiations with El'tsin. Indeed, because Gazprom has no competitors in Russia, it can set monopoly prices for gas exported to Ukraine, a question of concern both for the Ukrainian government in general and for the specific companies involved. The very existence of this letter may speak of a low point in Ukraine's negotiations with Gazprom, or may also be regarded as 'a hidden request of Ukraine to involve a third party in negotiations with Gazprom'. IntelNews Weekly Report, 14 April 1997, p. 4. On the Timoshenko letter, see Den', 8 and 10 April 1997.
87. In this sense, the recent letter of Yuliya Timoshenko (head of United Energy Systems) to President Clinton on the eve of the March 1997 Helsinki summit is quite telling. In the letter, Timoshenko reportedly asked Clinton to raise the question of Gazprom's dominance of the world energy market in his negotiations with El'tsin. Indeed, because Gazprom has no competitors in Russia, it can set monopoly prices for gas exported to Ukraine, a question of concern both for the Ukrainian government in general and for the specific companies involved. The very existence of this letter may speak of a low point in Ukraine's negotiations with Gazprom, or may also be regarded as 'a hidden request of Ukraine to involve a third party in negotiations with Gazprom'. IntelNews Weekly Report, 14 April 1997, p. 4. On the Timoshenko letter, see Den', 8 and 10 April 1997.
88. Business Report World of Information, Ukraine, October 1996.
89. Zerkalo nedeli 8 February 1997, p. 7. Other estimates are even more pessimistic. The official Ukrainian figure is 7.5 times more. IntelNews Weekly Digest, 19 May 1997.
90. Zerkalo nedeli 8 February 1997, p. 7. Other estimates are even more pessimistic. The official Ukrainian figure is 7.5 times more. IntelNews Weekly Digest, 19 May 1997.
91. Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem ...', p. 149.
92. IntelNews Weekly Digest, 19 May 1997.
93. Ganna Lyuta, 'Vozvrashchayutsya vse, krome tekh, kto nuzhnei', Zerkalo nedeli, 30 August 1997, p. 2.
94. Klyuk, p. 9.
95. Evgenii Kolesnik, 'Kak Pavel Ivanovich pomirilsya s Remom Ivanovichem', Zerkalo nedeli, 28 December 1996, p. 8, and IntelNews Weekly Digest, 20 January 1997.
96. Evgenii Kolesnik, 'Kak Pavel Ivanovich pomirilsya s Remom Ivanovichem', Zerkalo nedeli, 28 December 1996, p. 8, and IntelNews Weekly Digest, 20 January 1997.
97. 'Bogdan Babyi: "My s Gazpromom torguemsya, no eto ne glavnaya problema" ', Zerkalo nedeli, 16 November 1996, p. 9. Bogdan Babyi was Chairman of Ukraine's Gas and Oil Committee until April 1997.
98. Zerkalo nedeli, 7 September 1996, p. 1.
99. On this meeting, see Serhiy Litvin, 'Edini'tainshi nepovtomi stvoryayuyut' ne bezpechnu situatsiyu', Ukraina-Business (Kiev), No. 14 (314), 10 April 1997, p. 12.
100. Mykola Dudchenko, Chairman of the Commission on the Formation of the Domestic Fuel Market, as reported in IntelNews Weekly Digest, 10 March 1997.
101. Matthew Kaminsky, 'Ukraine held hostage by the clash of its clans', Financial Times, 7 August 1996. Indeed, the scandal reached the parliament, but the procurator-general's office found only minor infractions, and none involving Lazarenko. Not surprisingly, Ukraine's procurator-gen-eral, Hryhorii Vorsinov, also comes from Dnepropetrovsk.
102. See Arkadii Moshes, 'Krizis na Ukraine i politika Rossii', Moskovskie novosti, 4-11 August 1996, p. 5.
103. Raymond Bonner, 'Ukraine Staggers in the Path to the Free Market', The New York Times, 9 April 1997.
104. Yurchuk.
105. IntelNews Weekly Digest, 11 November 1996, p. 9.
106. Sergei Tolstov, participant in the conference on 'Poland and Ukraine for the Stability and Development of Central and Eastern Europe', organised by the Institut Spraw Publicznych, Warsaw, 25 November 1996. According to other Ukrainian sources, the government tried to prevent Itera from exporting grain as barter for gas. See Kolesnik, p. 2.
107. Eastern Economist, 11 November 1996, p. 21.
108. On the results of this investigation, see Alia Eremenko, 'Esli ne mozhesh' pobedit' kartel', obmini ego', Zerkalo nedeli, 15 March 1997, pp. 1, 9.
109. Statement of the all-Ukrainian association Hromada, Moscow Interfax, 22 August 1997, in FBIS-SOV-97-234.
110. 'Lazarenko as Lazarus: Comeback of the Year', The Rukh Insider (electronic newsletter), 3, 8, 4 September 1997. See also Serhiy Rudenko, 'A Bright Future? Lazarenko steps back into the picture', Eastern Economist, 8 September 1997, p. 5.
111. 'Lazarenko as Lazarus: Comeback of the Year', The Rukh Insider (electronic newsletter), 3, 8, 4 September 1997. See also Serhiy Rudenko, 'A Bright Future? Lazarenko steps back into the picture', Eastern Economist, 8 September 1997, p. 5.
112. Not having received Russian gas in the last weeks, UES was replaced by six other companies in the provision of gas to the population and state organisations. See Ganna Lyuta, 'Vozvrashchayutsya vse, krome tekh, kto nuzhnei', Zerkalo nedeli, 30 August 1997, p. 2.
113. See Ganna Lyuta & Evgenii Kolesnik, 'Dlya beshennoi sobaki 100 Kilometrov- ne kryuk', Zerkalo nedeli, 16 August 1997, p. 9.
114. Alla Eremenko, 'Vyakhireva boyatsya - v gazovyi rynok ne khodit ...', Zerkalo nedeli, 26 July 1997, p. 9.
115. Ibid.
116. Novaya gazeta Analytical Group, 'The Language of Ultimatums Has Led to Kiev', Novaya gazeta, 28 July 1997, p. 3, in FBIS-SOV-97-216. Emphasis mine.
117. See Ivan Gonta, 'Ukrainskii "gazovyi desant": optom i v roznitsy', Zerkalo nedeli, 19 July 1997, p. 2.
118. Smolansky, 'Ukraine's Quest ...', p. 85. For example, fearing Russian displeasure, some Ukrainian foreign policy bureaucrats have been irresolute in pursuing relations with Georgia and other strategically important Caucasian states. See Rotislav Khotin, 'Soobrazheniya dvoikh na troikh', Zerkalo nedeli, 15 February 1997, p. 2.
119. Smolansky, 'Ukraine's Quest ...', p. 85. For example, fearing Russian displeasure, some Ukrainian foreign policy bureaucrats have been irresolute in pursuing relations with Georgia and other strategically important Caucasian states. See Rotislav Khotin, 'Soobrazheniya dvoikh na troikh', Zerkalo nedeli, 15 February 1997, p. 2.
120. The so-called Samsun-Dzezhan oil pipeline across Turkey.
121. Sanobar Shermatova & Akakii Mikadze, 'Politicheskie marshruty kaspiiskoi nefti', Moskovskie novosti, 9-16 March 1997, p. 15.
122. IntelNews Business Journal 7 April 1997, p. 7. It is not clear over what period of time these savings would accrue, nor their significance compared to the investment needed.
123. Indeed, Ukraine recently signalled its intention to join quadripartite agreements between Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkmenistan on the regulation of transit carriage and railway transport cooperation.
124. See 'Russian-Ukrainian Energy Relations', Ukraine Business Review, 3, 5, February 1995, p. 9; and 'The Odessa Oil Terminal', Ukraine Business Review, 3, 6, March 1995. Construction of the Odessa oil terminal seems to have been delayed indefinitely owing to lack of funds.
125. See 'Russian-Ukrainian Energy Relations', Ukraine Business Review, 3, 5, February 1995, p. 9; and 'The Odessa Oil Terminal', Ukraine Business Review, 3, 6, March 1995. Construction of the Odessa oil terminal seems to have been delayed indefinitely owing to lack of funds.
126. 'The High Price of Friendship', Russian Petroleum Investor, December 1996/January 1997, p. 54.
127. Shermatova & Mikadze.
128. See Voloshin, p. 5.
129. Kiev's view of the CIS as divided into two blocs, one led by Russia (composed of Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Kazhakhstan) and another which Ukraine sees itself as potentially leading (composed of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and perhaps Moldova) supports this view of Ukraine's desire to play a 'balancing' role within the CIS. See I. Fedorovska, 'Vneshnyaya politika Ukrainy mezhdu Zapadom i Vostokom', Ekonomika i Politika Rossii i Cosudarstva Blizhnego Zarubezha (Moscow), July 1995, p. 21. On the theory aspects of Ukraine's balancing behaviour, see Margarita M. Balmaceda, 'Institutions, Alliances, and Stability: Thinking Theoretically about International Relations in Central-East Europe', European Security, 5, 3, Fall 1997.
130. Kiev's view of the CIS as divided into two blocs, one led by Russia (composed of Belarus, Georgia, Armenia and Kazhakhstan) and another which Ukraine sees itself as potentially leading (composed of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and perhaps Moldova) supports this view of Ukraine's desire to play a 'balancing' role within the CIS. See I. Fedorovska, 'Vneshnyaya politika Ukrainy mezhdu Zapadom i Vostokom', Ekonomika i Politika Rossii i Cosudarstva Blizhnego Zarubezha (Moscow), July 1995, p. 21. On the theory aspects of Ukraine's balancing behaviour, see Margarita M. Balmaceda, 'Institutions, Alliances, and Stability: Thinking Theoretically about International Relations in Central-East Europe', European Security, 5, 3, Fall 1997.
131. Vitalii Portnikov, 'The CIS: the Commonwealth of Independent Gas Pipelines', Obshchaya gazeta, 10-16 April 1997, p. 4.
132. See Voloshin.
133. Aleksandr Makarov, 'Piknik na okolitse', Zerkalo nedeli, 7-13 December 1996, p. 5.
134. 'The High Price of Friendship', Russian Petroleum Investor, December 1996/January 1997, p. 57.
135. Personal communication, 10 April 1997.
136. Khotin, p. 2. Translation mine.
137. F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Ukraine's Balancing Act', Survival, 38, 2, Summer 1996; see also Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem ...', p. 161.
138. F. Stephen Larrabee, 'Ukraine's Balancing Act', Survival, 38, 2, Summer 1996; see also Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem ...', p. 161.
139. Ibid.
140. Hungary receives 22 000 tonnes of Russian oil per day through the Druzhba pipeline, and Slovakia and the Czech Republic a combined 28 000 tonnes. Business Intelligence Report World of Information, Ukraine, October 1996 (via Lexus-Nexus). Disputes over transit fees between Ukraine and Russia led to the interruption of energy supplies to Central Europe on at least three occasions: oil deliveries to Slovakia and Hungary (March 1996), oil deliveries to Hungary and Czechoslovakia (1992) and gas supplies to Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey (1994). See Krasnov & Brada, p. 839.
141. The Czech Republic has already taken steps to establish alternative oil supply routes through Germany.
142. See S. Morkowitz, 'Czech Oil Supplies', The Prague Post, 10-16 January 1996, p. 2.
143. Smolansky, 'Ukraine and the Fuel Problem ...', pp. 171-172.
144. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 28 December 1995.
145. Alexandr Duleba, The Blind Pragmatism of Slovak Eastern Policy: The Actual Agenda of Slovak-Russian Relations (Bratislava, Research Centre of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association Series, 1996).
146. 'Poles still want diverse gas supplies despite Yamal deal', East European Energy Report, October 1993.
147. See J. Sier (pseudonym), 'The Gas Deal of the Century', Trybuna (Warsaw), 26 September 1996, p. 2, in FBIS-EEU-96-189.
148. The importance of the more geo-economic aspects of security has not escaped Polish analysts and intellectuals, and found a place in the widely-circulated 'Poland-NATO Report' signed by some of the country's most influential political actors: 'Poland is interested in the commencement of a basic debate on the security and reliability of supplies of strategic materials on the continent as an integral part of the security and stability of Europe'. For an English translation of the report, see 'Poland-NATO Report', European Security, 5, 1, Spring 1996, pp. 141-166.
149. See Lys.
150. Chechnya was renowned as a high-class centre of pipeline construction technology, and a recent agreement between the Association of Polish Pipeline Builders and the Chechen Republic provides for the participation of Chechen technicians in a Polish pipeline project in Sudan. Jacek Pawlicki, 'Will We Buy Oil From Chechnya?', Gazeta Wyborcza (Warsaw), 22 December 1996, in FBIS-EEU-97-007.
151. In mid-February 1997 the new Chechen government invited 20 leading Ukrainian politicians (including L. Kravchuk, E. Marchuk and Vyacheslav Chornobil) to visit the country. The visit coincided with the celebration of Aslan Maskhadov's inauguration as President. See Alena Pritula, 'Aslan Maskhadov: 'Chechenskaya nezavisimost' ne budet zhdat' opredelennykh v Khasav'yurte pyati let', Zerkalo nedeli, 15 February 1997, p. 4. See also Edmund L. Andrews, 'Russian-Chechen Agreement on Rebuilding a Major Oil Pipeline is Beginning to Unravel', The New York Times, 13 September 1997, p. 6.
152. In mid-February 1997 the new Chechen government invited 20 leading Ukrainian politicians (including L. Kravchuk, E. Marchuk and Vyacheslav Chornobil) to visit the country. The visit coincided with the celebration of Aslan Maskhadov's inauguration as President. See Alena Pritula, 'Aslan Maskhadov: 'Chechenskaya nezavisimost' ne budet zhdat' opredelennykh v Khasav'yurte pyati let', Zerkalo nedeli, 15 February 1997, p. 4. See also Edmund L. Andrews, 'Russian-Chechen Agreement on Rebuilding a Major Oil Pipeline is Beginning to Unravel', The New York Times, 13 September 1997, p. 6.
153. On this topic, see also Larrabee, p. 153. During one of the latest disputes with Ukraine over transit fees, Russia stopped using the Druzhba pipeline for shipments, albeit only for a few days. Russian Petroleum Investor, February 1996, p. 52, and April 1996.
154. Two examples of this endeavour are Russia's new Yamal pipeline - already in the building stage - across Poland and Belarus, and the proposal to build a possibly 'extraterritorial' road linking Russia and Kaliningrad via Belarus and Poland. See Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine's Security Dilemmas', Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1996, pp. 11-13, and Gazeta Wyborcza, 15 March 1996, p. 3.
155. Two examples of this endeavour are Russia's new Yamal pipeline - already in the building stage - across Poland and Belarus, and the proposal to build a possibly 'extraterritorial' road linking Russia and Kaliningrad via Belarus and Poland. See Taras Kuzio, 'Ukraine's Security Dilemmas', Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1996, pp. 11-13, and Gazeta Wyborcza, 15 March 1996, p. 3.
156. Ustina Markus, 'Belarus, Ukraine Take opposite Views', Transition, 15 November 1996, pp. 20-22
157. Rzeczpozpolita (Warsaw), 27 November 1996, p. 3.