Whitehall's disobedient servants? senior officials' potential resistance to ministers in British government departments

British Journal of Political Science

Volumn 27, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 223-246

  Barker, Anthony ^a   Wilson, Graham K ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031532345     PISSN: 00071234     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0007123497000124     Document Type: Article

References (37)

1. For a clear survey of these different expectations and their prevalence in Western democracies in the 1970s, see Joel D. Aberbach, Bert A. Rockman and Robert D. Putnam, Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982).
2. Aberbach et al., Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies.
3. Jeremy Richardson, ed., Policy Styles in Western Europe (Boston, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 80-110. For established approaches to this concept, see also Sir Edward Bridges, Portrait of a Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); C. H. Sisson, The Spirit of British Administration and Some European Comparisons, 2nd edn (London: Faber, 1966).
4. Jeremy Richardson, ed., Policy Styles in Western Europe (Boston, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 80-110. For established approaches to this concept, see also Sir Edward Bridges, Portrait of a Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); C. H. Sisson, The Spirit of British Administration and Some European Comparisons, 2nd edn (London: Faber, 1966).
5. Jeremy Richardson, ed., Policy Styles in Western Europe (Boston, Mass.: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 80-110. For established approaches to this concept, see also Sir Edward Bridges, Portrait of a Profession (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950); C. H. Sisson, The Spirit of British Administration and Some European Comparisons, 2nd edn (London: Faber, 1966).
6. Max Weber, The Theory of Economic and Social Organization, Volumes I and II [originally published in 1992], edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). For a valuable discussion of Weber's ideas on bureaucracy, see David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985).
7. Max Weber, The Theory of Economic and Social Organization, Volumes I and II [originally published in 1992], edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). For a valuable discussion of Weber's ideas on bureaucracy, see David Beetham, Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985).
8. Samuel N. Eisenstadt, Essays on Comparative Institutions (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 179.
9. Bo Rothstein, The Social Democratic State: The Swedish Model and the Bureaucratic Problem of Social Reforms (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995).
10. Joel D. Aberbach and Bert A. Rockman 'From Nixon's Problem to Reagan's Achievement', in Larry Berman, ed., Looking Back on the Reagan Years (New York: Basic Books, 1991).
11. Barry Weingast and Mark J. Moran, 'The Myth of the Run Away Bureaucracy: The Case of the FTC', Regulation, 6 (May/June 1982), 22-8; Barry Weingast and Mark J. Moran, 'Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission', Journal of Political Economy, 91 (1983), 765-800.
12. Barry Weingast and Mark J. Moran, 'The Myth of the Run Away Bureaucracy: The Case of the FTC', Regulation, 6 (May/June 1982), 22-8; Barry Weingast and Mark J. Moran, 'Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission', Journal of Political Economy, 91 (1983), 765-800.
13. It seemed that 'politicization' in a partisan sense had not occurred, but that Thatcher had promoted to Grades 1 and 2 officials whose style she favoured; see Royal Institute of Public Administration, Top Jobs in Whitehall: Report of a Working Party (London: RIPA, 1987). For a discussion, see Colin Campbell and Graham K. Wilson, The End of Whitehall: Death of a Paradigm? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); and Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1989).
14. It seemed that 'politicization' in a partisan sense had not occurred, but that Thatcher had promoted to Grades 1 and 2 officials whose style she favoured; see Royal Institute of Public Administration, Top Jobs in Whitehall: Report of a Working Party (London: RIPA, 1987). For a discussion, see Colin Campbell and Graham K. Wilson, The End of Whitehall: Death of a Paradigm? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); and Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1989).
15. It seemed that 'politicization' in a partisan sense had not occurred, but that Thatcher had promoted to Grades 1 and 2 officials whose style she favoured; see Royal Institute of Public Administration, Top Jobs in Whitehall: Report of a Working Party (London: RIPA, 1987). For a discussion, see Colin Campbell and Graham K. Wilson, The End of Whitehall: Death of a Paradigm? (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995); and Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1989).
16. See Richard Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1976). For Tony Benn's poor relations with his permanent secretary, see Sir Anthony Part, The Making of a Mandarin (London: Deutsch, 1990).
17. See Richard Crossman, Diaries of a Cabinet Minister (London: Hamish Hamilton and Jonathan Cape, 1976). For Tony Benn's poor relations with his permanent secretary, see Sir Anthony Part, The Making of a Mandarin (London: Deutsch, 1990).
18. Trade with Iraq and Associated Matters - Report of an Inquiry, Lord Justice Scott, HC115 (I-V) of 1995-96 (London: HMSO, 1996). This investigation was into allegations that ministers (inter alia) colluded (and officials acquiesced and supported) in misleading Parliament and the public over the actual policy towards UK rules on exports of arms-making equipment to Iraq and connived at perverted justice on associated criminal trials. On the 'undue obedience' of a senior official, Colette Bowe, to a wholly improper order to release parts of a minister's letter during the Westland helicopter affair of 1985-86 see Report from the Defence Committee of the House of Commons (HC519 of 1985-86) paras. 225-233, notably 233: 'the responsibility lies with Ministers who require or expect officials to behave in an improper way, and with officials who comply.' Also see commentary by Patrick Dunleavy, 'Reinterpreting the Westland Affair: Theories of the State and Core Executive Decision-Making', Public Administration, 68 (Spring 1990), 29-60, particularly pp. 52-4, and by Diana Woodhouse, Ministers and Parliament: Accountability in Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 106-20, notably pp. 111-12. The prime minister (Lady Thatcher) successfully enforced official secrecy on the key question of whether Colette Bowe had obeyed her minister's instruction improperly to release these extracts to the press or, rather, an instruction from her senior colleague, the prime minister's press secretary (acting on the implied authority of Lady Thatcher herself).
19. Trade with Iraq and Associated Matters - Report of an Inquiry, Lord Justice Scott, HC115 (I-V) of 1995-96 (London: HMSO, 1996). This investigation was into allegations that ministers (inter alia) colluded (and officials acquiesced and supported) in misleading Parliament and the public over the actual policy towards UK rules on exports of arms-making equipment to Iraq and connived at perverted justice on associated criminal trials. On the 'undue obedience' of a senior official, Colette Bowe, to a wholly improper order to release parts of a minister's letter during the Westland helicopter affair of 1985-86 see Report from the Defence Committee of the House of Commons (HC519 of 1985-86) paras. 225-233, notably 233: 'the responsibility lies with Ministers who require or expect officials to behave in an improper way, and with officials who comply.' Also see commentary by Patrick Dunleavy, 'Reinterpreting the Westland Affair: Theories of the State and Core Executive Decision-Making', Public Administration, 68 (Spring 1990), 29-60, particularly pp. 52-4, and by Diana Woodhouse, Ministers and Parliament: Accountability in Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 106-20, notably pp. 111-12. The prime minister (Lady Thatcher) successfully enforced official secrecy on the key question of whether Colette Bowe had obeyed her minister's instruction improperly to release these extracts to the press or, rather, an instruction from her senior colleague, the prime minister's press secretary (acting on the implied authority of Lady Thatcher herself).
20. Trade with Iraq and Associated Matters - Report of an Inquiry, Lord Justice Scott, HC115 (I-V) of 1995-96 (London: HMSO, 1996). This investigation was into allegations that ministers (inter alia) colluded (and officials acquiesced and supported) in misleading Parliament and the public over the actual policy towards UK rules on exports of arms-making equipment to Iraq and connived at perverted justice on associated criminal trials. On the 'undue obedience' of a senior official, Colette Bowe, to a wholly improper order to release parts of a minister's letter during the Westland helicopter affair of 1985-86 see Report from the Defence Committee of the House of Commons (HC519 of 1985-86) paras. 225-233, notably 233: 'the responsibility lies with Ministers who require or expect officials to behave in an improper way, and with officials who comply.' Also see commentary by Patrick Dunleavy, 'Reinterpreting the Westland Affair: Theories of the State and Core Executive Decision-Making', Public Administration, 68 (Spring 1990), 29-60, particularly pp. 52-4, and by Diana Woodhouse, Ministers and Parliament: Accountability in Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 106-20, notably pp. 111-12. The prime minister (Lady Thatcher) successfully enforced official secrecy on the key question of whether Colette Bowe had obeyed her minister's instruction improperly to release these extracts to the press or, rather, an instruction from her senior colleague, the prime minister's press secretary (acting on the implied authority of Lady Thatcher herself).
21. Trade with Iraq and Associated Matters - Report of an Inquiry, Lord Justice Scott, HC115 (I-V) of 1995-96 (London: HMSO, 1996). This investigation was into allegations that ministers (inter alia) colluded (and officials acquiesced and supported) in misleading Parliament and the public over the actual policy towards UK rules on exports of arms-making equipment to Iraq and connived at perverted justice on associated criminal trials. On the 'undue obedience' of a senior official, Colette Bowe, to a wholly improper order to release parts of a minister's letter during the Westland helicopter affair of 1985-86 see Report from the Defence Committee of the House of Commons (HC519 of 1985-86) paras. 225-233, notably 233: 'the responsibility lies with Ministers who require or expect officials to behave in an improper way, and with officials who comply.' Also see commentary by Patrick Dunleavy, 'Reinterpreting the Westland Affair: Theories of the State and Core Executive Decision-Making', Public Administration, 68 (Spring 1990), 29-60, particularly pp. 52-4, and by Diana Woodhouse, Ministers and Parliament: Accountability in Theory and Practice (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), pp. 106-20, notably pp. 111-12. The prime minister (Lady Thatcher) successfully enforced official secrecy on the key question of whether Colette Bowe had obeyed her minister's instruction improperly to release these extracts to the press or, rather, an instruction from her senior colleague, the prime minister's press secretary (acting on the implied authority of Lady Thatcher herself).
22. David Butler, Anthony Adonis and Tony Travers, Failure in British Government: The Politics of the Poll Tax (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
23. For a discussion of constitutional issues, see Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Ferdinand Mount, The British Constitution Now: Recovery or Decline (London: Heinemann, 1992); Woodhouse, Ministers and Parliament.
24. For a discussion of constitutional issues, see Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Ferdinand Mount, The British Constitution Now: Recovery or Decline (London: Heinemann, 1992); Woodhouse, Ministers and Parliament.
25. For a discussion of constitutional issues, see Geoffrey Marshall, Constitutional Conventions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984); Ferdinand Mount, The British Constitution Now: Recovery or Decline (London: Heinemann, 1992); Woodhouse, Ministers and Parliament.
26. Campbell and Wilson, The End of Whitehall.
27. James Prior, A Balance of Power (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986),p. 136. The occasion was a 'state visit' by Thatcher to the Department of Employment soon after the 1979 election where Donald Derx was deputy secretary responsible for policy on employment and trade union law. According to Prior, Derx replied to her incorrect statements on this subject with an accurate account but without telling her she was misinformed. Contemporary accounts of this exchange ran up and down Whitehall like brush-fires and included the report that Derx asked her in due course, 'Prime Minister, do you want to know the facts?' Derx retired early soon afterwards to direct an independent research institute.
28. Officials from the Department for Education and Science and the Lord Chancellor's Department participated in the first but not the second round of interviews. However, the second round covered all ministerial home civil service departments except these two.
29. For a legal analysis of the Pergau affair and Lankester's action, see Andrew Le Sueur and Maurice Sunkin, Public Law at Work (London: Longman, forthcoming 1997), ch. 31 'The Pergau Dam Affair'). The government's insistence on this loan was judicially reviewed and the ODA's deposition to the High Court recorded that Lankester accepted his principal finance officer's judgement that this loan would not have been 'prudent and economical', having noted that the Treasury's official acquiescence could be taken as vouching for its probity.
30. For these procedures, see Note of Guidance on the Duties and Responsibilities of Civil Servants in Relation to Ministers [Armstrong Memorandum] (London: Cabinet Office, 1985, revised 1987).
31. White Paper: The Civil Service: Taking Forward Continuity and Change, Cm2748, January 1995. The new Civil Service Code introduced in January 1996 reiterates the status of officials as servants of the Crown which constitutionally acts on the advice of ministers. Therefore, 'subject to the provisions of this Code, civil servants owe their loyalty to the duly constituted Government'. It also calls for 'integrity, impartiality and honesty' from officials and says that (exactly like ministers) 'they should not deceive or knowingly mislead Parliament or the public'. Foreign, defence and Northern Ireland policy are three fields where this precept is manifestly breached 'in the public interest'.
32. C. F. Bingman, Japanese Government: Leadership and Management (Basingstoke, Hants: Macmillan, 1989); and B. C. Koh, Japan's Administrative Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
33. C. F. Bingman, Japanese Government: Leadership and Management (Basingstoke, Hants: Macmillan, 1989); and B. C. Koh, Japan's Administrative Elite (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
34. On the Treasury's relationship with the rest of Whitehall, see Colin Thain and Maurice Wright, The Treasury and Whitehall: The Planning and Control of Public Expenditure, 1976-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); and, for historical contrast, Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money, 2nd revised edn (London: Macmillan, 1974).
35. On the Treasury's relationship with the rest of Whitehall, see Colin Thain and Maurice Wright, The Treasury and Whitehall: The Planning and Control of Public Expenditure, 1976-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995); and, for historical contrast, Hugh Heclo and Aaron Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money, 2nd revised edn (London: Macmillan, 1974).
36. Butler et al., Failure in British Government.
37. Patrick Dunleavy 'The Architecture of the British Central State: Part II, Empirical Findings', Public Administration, 67 (1989), pp. 319-417.