Preserving the identity crisis: Autonomy, system and sovereignty in European law

Law and Philosophy

Volumn 16, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 377-420

  Richmond, Catherine ^a  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

EC law; Kelsen; Legal system; Legal theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031522948     PISSN: 01675249     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3504982     Document Type: Article

References (182)

1. I concentrate solely upon the 'European Community', used as an umbrella term for the three Communities upon which the European Union is based: the European Community (ex European Economic Community); the ECSC; Euratom.
2. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961), Preface, p. xvi.
3. To 'know' and 'describe' law are given by Kelsen to be the exclusive purpose of his theory of law: Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 1. From hereinafter Kelsen's works referred to most often are abbreviated: The Pure Theory of Law as PTL; Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) , tr. B. and S. Paulson, as IPLT; General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961) as GTLS; Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., revised and edited by Robert W. Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), as PIL.
4. To 'know' and 'describe' law are given by Kelsen to be the exclusive purpose of his theory of law: Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 1. From hereinafter Kelsen's works referred to most often are abbreviated: The Pure Theory of Law as PTL; Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) , tr. B. and S. Paulson, as IPLT; General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961) as GTLS; Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., revised and edited by Robert W. Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), as PIL.
5. To 'know' and 'describe' law are given by Kelsen to be the exclusive purpose of his theory of law: Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 1. From hereinafter Kelsen's works referred to most often are abbreviated: The Pure Theory of Law as PTL; Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) , tr. B. and S. Paulson, as IPLT; General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961) as GTLS; Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., revised and edited by Robert W. Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), as PIL.
6. To 'know' and 'describe' law are given by Kelsen to be the exclusive purpose of his theory of law: Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967), p. 1. From hereinafter Kelsen's works referred to most often are abbreviated: The Pure Theory of Law as PTL; Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) , tr. B. and S. Paulson, as IPLT; General Theory of Law and State (New York: Russell and Russell, 1961) as GTLS; Principles of International Law, 2nd ed., revised and edited by Robert W. Tucker (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), as PIL.
7. Roger Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence (London and Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1989), p. 86. Cotterrell terms this approach 'conceptualism', but 'constructivism' has been preferred here.
8. Case 26/62, (1963) ECR 1, at 12.
9. Kelsen, PTL, p. 72.
10. To say that theory 'creates' its object is not to say that it creates law in the way that law is created by a legal authority. This 'creation' has a purely epistemological character. See Kelsen, PTL, p. 72.
11. Cotterrell, op. cit., p. 85.
12. See Neil MacCormick, 'Beyond the Sovereign State', Modern Law Review 56 (1993): 1-18; Jones, 'The Legal Nature of the European Community: A Jurisprudential Model Using H.L.A. Hart's Model of Law and Legal System', Cornell International Law Journal 17 (1984): 1-59.
13. See Neil MacCormick, 'Beyond the Sovereign State', Modern Law Review 56 (1993): 1-18; Jones, 'The Legal Nature of the European Community: A Jurisprudential Model Using H.L.A. Hart's Model of Law and Legal System', Cornell International Law Journal 17 (1984): 1-59.
14. Joxerramon Bengoetxea, 'Institutions, Legal Theory and EC Law', Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 2 (1991): 195-213.
15. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos, (1963) ECR 1.
16. Bengoetxea, op. cit., p. 203.
17. PIL, p. 251.
18. PIL, p. 262.
19. PIL, pp. 262-263.
20. PIL, p. 260.
21. PIL, p. 262. A legal community may, for example, be validated but not constituted by international law. Section III, infra, discusses the possibility that a State legal order is validated by international law. However, such an order is not constituted by international law, since it has a prima facie claim to autonomy and validity that renders it independent from the international legal order.
22. PIL, p. 264, footnote 89.
23. PIL, p. 265, footnote 89.
24. Case 26/62, (1963) ECR 1.
25. Arguments and observations of the Commission, at p. 7.
26. At p. 12.
27. See, e.g., Re the Draft Treaty on a European Economic Area, Opinion 1/91 (First EEA Case), (1991) ECR 6079, para. 21 of the judgment.
28. Henry Schermers, 'Commentary on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92', Common Market Law Review 29 (1992): 991-1009, p. 1004.
29. PIL, p. 265, footnote 89.
30. PTL, pp. 30-31.
31. Ian Ward, 'Making Sense of Integration: A Philosophy of Law for the European Community', Journal of European Integration 17 (1993): 101-136, at p. 132.
32. Dowrick, 'A Model of the European Communities' Legal System', Yearbook of European Law 3 (1983): 169-237.
33. Coppel and O'Neill, 'The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?', Legal Studies 12 (1992): 227-245; Ward, 'Making Sense of Integration: A Philosophy of Law for the European Community', Journal of European Integration 17 (1993): 101-136.
34. Coppel and O'Neill, 'The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?', Legal Studies 12 (1992): 227-245; Ward, 'Making Sense of Integration: A Philosophy of Law for the European Community', Journal of European Integration 17 (1993): 101-136.
35. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Butterworths, 1977), p. 101, quoted in Neil MacCormick, 'Jurisprudence and the Constitution', Current Legal Problems 36 (1983): 13-30, p. 23.
36. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Butterworths, 1977), p. 101, quoted in Neil MacCormick, 'Jurisprudence and the Constitution', Current Legal Problems 36 (1983): 13-30, p. 23.
37. If, as Dworkin's theory requires, we must refer to a set of institutions in order to "filter out of background morality a set of principles which 'fit' the said institutions . . . , then it follows that some procedure must exist for identifying the institutions independently of either background morality or a fortiori institutional morality"; see Neil MacCormick, op. cit. ('Jurisprudence . . . '), p. 24.
38. The statement "something ought to be" describes a norm while the statement "something is" describes an existent fact (PTL, pp. 5-6).
39. Only in this way can the command of a gangster be distinguished from the command of a tax-man.
40. The term 'chain of validity' is not used by Kelsen but I have adopted it from Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). It is also used by Paulson in his translation of the first edition of Reine Rechtslehre, IPLT.
41. The term 'chain of validity' is not used by Kelsen but I have adopted it from Joseph Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980). It is also used by Paulson in his translation of the first edition of Reine Rechtslehre, IPLT.
42. PTL, p. 8.
43. See, for example, T.C. Hartley, The Foundations of European Community Law, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), Ch. 4.
44. The constitutive Treaties of the Community: the European Community [EC] Treaty (renaming the European Economic Community founded by the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EEC]); the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community [ECSC]; the Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community [Euratom]; the Single European Act [SEA]; the Treaty on European Union [TEU].
45. Kelsen draws a distinction between a dynamic and a static legal order. In the latter, validity is dependent on content, in the former, on creation. See PTL, pp. 195-198.
46. Variola v Amministrazione italiana delle Finanze, Case 34/73 (1973) ECR 981, paragraph 8 of the judgment.
47. Draft amendment to the EEC Treaty, proposed by the European Parliament, 18 April 1991, OJ C129, 20.5.91, p. 136, at p. 138.
48. Draft amendment to the EEC Treaty, proposed by the Commission, EC Supplement 2/91 p. 117, at p. 121.
49. Raz, op. cit. (The Concept of a Legal System), p. 71.
50. PTL, p. 221.
51. GTLS, p. 124.
52. Lasok and Bridge, Law and Institutions of the European Communities, 5th ed. (London: Butterworths, 1991).
53. Gerd Winter (ed.), Sources and Categories of European Union Law: A Comparative and Reform Perspective (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996).
54. These grounds of review are set out also in Articles 33 ECSC and 146 Euratom.
55. Kieran Bradley, 'The European Court and the Legal Basis of Community Legislation', European Law Review 13 (1988): 379-402, p. 379.
56. PTL, pp. 199-201.
57. See (IV/M53) OJ 1991 L334/42.
58. Regulation 4064/89/EEC (Merger Control Regulation, OJ 1989 L395), under Article 2.
59. Article 189 EC.
60. GTLS, p. 124.
61. PTL, p. 222.
62. PTL, p. 222.
63. For example, the Decision to Replace Financial Contributions from Member States by the Communities' Own Resources, 21 April 1970, and the Decision on Direct Elections to the European Parliament, 20 September 1976, which, Dowrick (op. cit., p. 181) notes, rank with general provisions of the basic Treaties as major constitutional provisions.
64. Kelsen's term 'Grundnorm' is translated 'basic norm' in the English versions of his texts.
65. PTL, p. 218.
66. IPLT, p. 58; PTL, p. 202, p. 218.
67. IPLT, p. 58; PTL, p. 202, p. 218.
68. The basic norm in the case of a national legal order may be formulated as follows: "Coercive acts sought to be performed under the conditions and in the manner which the historically first constitution, and the norms created according to it, prescribe. (In short: One ought to behave as the constitution prescribes.)" (PTL, p. 201).
69. PTL, p. 202
70. PTL, p. 205.
71. PTL, p. 205.
72. PTL, p. 199.
73. PTL, p. 209.
74. PTL, p. 209.
75. PTL, p. 223.
76. GTLS, p. 126; PTL, pp. 221-224.
77. GTLS, p. 126; PTL, pp. 221-224.
78. Case 6/64, (1964) ECR 585.
79. At p. 593.
80. At p. 594.
81. Neil MacCormick, 'Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Post-Sovereign State', in Bellamy, R., and Castiglione, D. (eds.), Constitutionalism in Transformation: European and Theoretical Perspectives (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 141-155.
82. Schilling, 'The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order - An Analysis of Possible Foundations', Harvard International Law Journal 37 (1996): 389-409, p. 407.
83. Weiler and Haltern, 'The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order -Through the Looking Glass', Harvard International Law Journal 37 (1996): 411-448, p. 433.
84. See, for example, the Brunner decision: Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, BverfG, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Brunner v Treaty on European Union); English translation CMLR 1 (1994): 57-108.
85. Schilling, op. cit., p. 403.
86. E.g. Van Gend, Case 26/62, (1963) ECR 1; Costa v ENEL, Case 6/64, (1964) ECR 585.
87. See, e.g., Polydor, Case 270/80, (1982) ECR 329.
88. Easson, 'Legal Approaches to European Integration: The Role of the Court and Legislator in the Completion of the European Common Market', Revue d'integration européenne 12 (1989): 101-119, p. 103.
89. Schilling, op. cit., p. 397, referring to Brunner.
90. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v EVGF, decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 29 May 1974, CMLR2 (1974) at 549, para. 19 of the judgment.
91. Schilling, op. cit., p. 398.
92. Bengoetxea, op. cit., p. 207.
93. Schilling, op. cit., pp. 390-395.
94. E.g. Pescatore notes two occasions on which the Treaties were amended through international law as opposed to the procedures prescribed within them: Pierre Pescatore, L'ordre juridique des Communautés europeénnes (Liège: Presses universitaires de Liège, 1975), pp. 62-63.
95. Jacqué, 'Cours générale de droit communautaire', Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law I.1 (1990): 237-359, p. 256: "Il n'est pas indifférent de savoir si l'on doit qualifier le Traité de traité international ou de constitution."
96. PTL, p. 198.
97. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations (London: Stevens, 1950), p. 330.
98. Jacqué, op. cit., p. 267.
99. Van Gend, Case 26/62, (1963) ECR 1.
100. Opinion 1/91, 14 December 1991, (1991) ECR1-6079, paragraph 21 of the judgment.
101. Les Verts-Parti Ecologiste v European Parliament, Case 294/83, (1986) ECR 1339, para. 23 of the judgment.
102. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v EVGF, decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, 29 May 1974, CMLR 2 (1974) at 549, para. 19 of the judgment.
103. Jean Paul Jacqué, op. cit., p. 269: "Le caractère constitutionnel des traités se manifeste essentiellement dans l'exclusion du jeu des règles de droit international en ce qui concerne la révision des traités".
104. Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signed on 23 May 1968.
105. The procedure laid down by the Treaties regarding their revision is to be found in Article N(1) of the Treaty on European Union, which basically repeats the content of the old Articles 236 EEC, 204 Euratom and 96 ECSC, which were repealed by the TEU.
106. Pierre Pescatore, op. cit., pp. 62-63.
107. Defrenne v Sabena, Case 43/75 (1976) ECR 455, at para. 58 of the judgment.
108. Reply of the Council to written question 398/77, OJ C 270, 10 November 1977, 18.
109. Kelsen, GTLS, p. 62, PTL, p. 116.
110. Kelsen, GTLS, p. 62, PTL, p. 116.
111. José Luís da Cruz Vilaça and Nuno Piçarra, 'Y a-t-il des limites matérielles à la révision des traités instituant les communautés européennes?', Cahiers de droit européen 1-2 (1993): 3-37, p. 16.
112. Jacqué, op. cit., p. 272.
113. Cruz Vilaça and Piçarra, op. cit., p. 37.
114. Harris, 'When and Why Does the Grundnorm Change?' Cambridge Law Journal 29 (1971): 103-133, p. 122.
115. This is so in the absence of a written constitutional norm validating custom as a source of law: see infra p. 19.
116. Kelsen's suggested Grundnorm of international law is: "Coercion of State against State ought to be exercised under the conditions and in the manner, that conforms with the custom constituted by the actual behaviour of the States" (Kelsen, PTL, p. 216). In PTL Kelsen also suggests that custom is created by an act of will "individual or collective" (pp. 225-226), which Harris interprets as authorising the population at large "to fashion the ultimate norms of the constitution in any way which meets with general approval":
117. Harris, op. cit. ('When and why . . . '), p. 111. Harris thus formulates the Grundnorm of the United Kingdom (which has no written constitution) as: "Coercive acts ought to be applied only under the conditions and in the ways customarily recognised as constitutional from time to time by the population at large" (p. 111). Harris' interpretation has been followed here.
118. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 97.
119. Hart, op. cit., p. 107.
120. Harris, Law and Legal Science (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 74.
121. Harris, op. cit. ('When and why . . . '), p. 117, footnote 57a.
122. See Graham Hughes, 'Validity and the Basic Norm', California Law Review 59 (1971): 695-714, particularly pp. 699-701, for an opposing view.
123. Kelsen, 'The Function of a Constitution', tr. Ian Stewart, in Tur and Twining (eds.), Essays on Kelsen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 109-119, p. 117.
124. Kelsen, 'On the Pure Theory of Law', 1 Israel Law Review 1 (1966): 1-7, p. 6.
125. Kelsen, op. cit. ('The Function of a Constitution'), p. 117.
126. Harris, op. cit. (Law and Legal Science), p. 79, referring to H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As If' (1924), pp. 85-90.
127. Harris, op. cit. (Law and Legal Science), p. 79, referring to H. Vaihinger, The Philosophy of 'As If' (1924), pp. 85-90.
128. Dowrick, op. cit., p. 185.
129. PTL, p. 328.
130. MacCormick, op. cit. ('Beyond the Sovereign State'), p. 9
131. Harris, op. cit. (Law and Legal Science), p. 13: "The expression 'developed legal system' is commonly used to refer to the typical panoply of such institutions to be found in a contemporary industrialized society".
132. This objection to the monist theory is made by MacCormick in 'Beyond the Sovereign State', but he then retracts in 'Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Post-Sovereign State' (p. 8.), saying that Kelsen does take the internal point of view into account. If this is so, it is no longer clear why he prefers the Hartian over the Kelsenian model.
133. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 138. Ronald Dworkin puts this idea in a slightly different way: "When Kelsen says that if international and municipal law conflicted, we could not speak of them both as valid at the same time, he means that someone who had to decide what he ought to do - a judge for instance - could not treat them both as valid in the conclusory sense, could not, in Kelsen's phrase, serve two masters": 'Comments on the Unity of Law Doctrine', in Kiefer and Munitz (eds.), Ethics and Social Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968), p. 200, at p. 201). For criticism of Kelsen, see Hart, 'Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law', in the same volume (p. 171).
134. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 138. Ronald Dworkin puts this idea in a slightly different way: "When Kelsen says that if international and municipal law conflicted, we could not speak of them both as valid at the same time, he means that someone who had to decide what he ought to do - a judge for instance - could not treat them both as valid in the conclusory sense, could not, in Kelsen's phrase, serve two masters": 'Comments on the Unity of Law Doctrine', in Kiefer and Munitz (eds.), Ethics and Social Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968), p. 200, at p. 201). For criticism of Kelsen, see Hart, 'Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law', in the same volume (p. 171).
135. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 138. Ronald Dworkin puts this idea in a slightly different way: "When Kelsen says that if international and municipal law conflicted, we could not speak of them both as valid at the same time, he means that someone who had to decide what he ought to do - a judge for instance - could not treat them both as valid in the conclusory sense, could not, in Kelsen's phrase, serve two masters": 'Comments on the Unity of Law Doctrine', in Kiefer and Munitz (eds.), Ethics and Social Justice (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1968), p. 200, at p. 201). For criticism of Kelsen, see Hart, 'Kelsen's Doctrine of the Unity of Law', in the same volume (p. 171).
136. Kelsen, What is Justice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960), p. 284.
137. PTL, p. 218, note 82.
138. Raz, op. cit. (The Authority of Law), p. 140. In his discussion of the point of view of legal science, Raz comments that the legal scientist does not only describe a point of view but actually adopts one, although it is adopted in a "special professional and uncommitted sense" (p. 143).
139. IPLT, p. 120.
140. PTL, pp. 333-339.
141. Compare Neil MacCormick, op. cit. ('Liberalism . . . '), where he suggests that the monist theory can offer three models of the relationship between national, international and Community law. He assumes that the Grundnorm will be pre-supposed in relation only to the international legal order, and so discusses models equivalent to the first, second and seventh proposed here.
142. PTL, p. 337.
143. PTL, p. 333.
144. PTL, p. 337: "Since international law regulates the behavior of states, it must determine what is a 'state' in the sense of international law - it must determine . . . under what conditions their acts are to be regarded as acts of state, that is, legal acts in the meaning of international law". The European Community regulates the behaviour of its members, and so must determine, in this model, under what conditions their acts are to be regarded as acts in the meaning of Community law.
145. At time of writing the UK, Ireland and Denmark (1972), Greece (1981), Spain and Portugal (1986), Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995).
146. Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
147. The legal order in the narrower sense "comprises the norms of the constitution and the norms created - in accordance with the constitution - by the acts of legislation, jurisdiction, and administration. The national legal order in the wider sense includes the recognized international law. Figuratively speaking we may say: the state which recognizes international law thereby submits to international law". However, the ultimate reason for the national legal order's validity is not international law's principle of efficacy but the Grundnorm presupposed in relation to it.
148. PTL, p. 332.
149. Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL (1964) ECR 585.
150. Brunner, Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, BverfG, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Brunner v Treaty on European Union); English translation (1994) 1 Common Market Law Reports 57. This case involved a challenge to the validity of Germany's accession to the Maastricht Treaty: see Neil MacCormick's article 'The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now', European Law Journal 1 (1995): 259-266.
151. Brunner, Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, BverfG, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Brunner v Treaty on European Union); English translation (1994) 1 Common Market Law Reports 57. This case involved a challenge to the validity of Germany's accession to the Maastricht Treaty: see Neil MacCormick's article 'The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now', European Law Journal 1 (1995): 259-266.
152. Brunner, Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, BverfG, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Brunner v Treaty on European Union); English translation (1994) 1 Common Market Law Reports 57. This case involved a challenge to the validity of Germany's accession to the Maastricht Treaty: see Neil MacCormick's article 'The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now', European Law Journal 1 (1995): 259-266.
153. Brunner, Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, BverfG, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Brunner v Treaty on European Union); English translation (1994) 1 Common Market Law Reports 57. This case involved a challenge to the validity of Germany's accession to the Maastricht Treaty: see Neil MacCormick's article 'The Maastricht-Urteil: Sovereignty Now', European Law Journal 1 (1995): 259-266.
154. Neil MacCormick evaluates each model on its plausibility in relation to actual Community practice, but Kelsen's conceptual approach rejects such empirical testing of his theory.
155. PTL, p. 346.
156. PTL, p. 346.
157. PTL, p. 346. Looking back tO Kelsen's earlier preference for the primacy of international law in the light of this later work, it is possible to identify the 'non-scientific, political' considerations upon which he bases his choice: he "values the idea of a legal organization of the world" and so rejects the concept of sovereignty and opposes the primacy of the nation state model on the grounds that it has the consequence of 'denaturing' international law's function of co-ordinating all states (IPLT, p. 117).
158. PTL, p. 346. Looking back tO Kelsen's earlier preference for the primacy of international law in the light of this later work, it is possible to identify the 'non- scientific, political' considerations upon which he bases his choice: he "values the idea of a legal organization of the world" and so rejects the concept of sovereignty and opposes the primacy of the nation state model on the grounds that it has the consequence of 'denaturing' international law's function of co-ordinating all states (IPLT, p. 117).
159. IPLT, pp. 115-116.
160. Ian Ward, 'The European Constitution and the Nation State', Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 16 (1996): 161-174, p. 165.
161. Ian Ward, (1995), 'Identity and Difference: The European Union and Post-modernism', in Shaw, J., and More, G. (eds.), New Legal Dynamics of European Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 15-28, p. 24.
162. Ward, op. cit. ('Identity and Difference . . . '), p. 24.
163. Ward, op. cit. ('The European Constitution . . . '), p. 164.
164. Ward, op. cit. ('The European Constitution . . . '), p. 164, referring to Lord Mackenzie Stuart, 'Subsidiarity - A Busted Flush?', in D. Curtin and D. O'Keeffe (eds.), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community Law and National Law (Dublin: Butterworths, 1992), pp. 12-24.
165. Ward, op. cit. ('The European Constitution . . . '), p. 164, referring to Lord Mackenzie Stuart, 'Subsidiarity - A Busted Flush?', in D. Curtin and D. O'Keeffe (eds.), Constitutional Adjudication in European Community Law and National Law (Dublin: Butterworths, 1992), pp. 12-24.
166. Ian Ward, '(Pre)conceptions in European Law', Journal of Law and Society 23 (1996): 198-212, p. 203.
167. Ward, op. cit. ('The European Constitution . . . '), p. 165.
168. Kelsen, 'Les rapports de système entre le droit interne et le droit international public', Recueil des Cours, Académie de droit international IV 14 (1927): 231-326.
169. GTLS, pp. 408-409; PTL, pp. 18-19, 25, 205-208, 328.
170. GTLS, pp. 408-409; PTL, pp. 18-19, 25, 205-208, 328.
171. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, BverfG, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Brunner v Treaty on European Union); English translation (1994) 1 Common Market Law Reports 57, at para. 49 of the judgment.
172. Judgment of Oct. 12, 1993, BverfG, 89 BVerfGE 155 (Brunner v Treaty on European Union); English translation (1994) 1 Common Market Law Reports 57, at para. 49 of the judgment.
173. Brunner, particularly paras. 54-55 of the judgment.
174. Weiler and Haltern, op. cit., p. 455.
175. Weiler and Haltern, op. cit., p. 445.
176. The Court claims that it would have the last word on the validity of Community legislation that conflicts with German constitutional provisions: Brunner, para. 49 and 99 of the judgment.
177. Neil MacCormick, op. cit. ('The Maastricht-Urteil . . . ), p. 259.
178. Neil MacCormick, op. cit. ('Liberalism . . . '), p. 149.
179. As Schilling notes, the weakness of the Hartian approach "lies in its appeal to a reasonable interpretation" of conflicting laws (op. cit., p. 399).
180. Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, (1942), pp. 54-55, quoted in David Kennedy, 'A Case Study of Legal Architecture: The Hans Kelsen of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: Public International Law Pragmatist', Current Legal Theory XIII 1 (1995): 33-60, p. 49.
181. Hans Kelsen, Law and Peace in International Relations: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, (1942), pp. 54-55, quoted in David Kennedy, 'A Case Study of Legal Architecture: The Hans Kelsen of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: Public International Law Pragmatist', Current Legal Theory XIII 1 (1995): 33-60, p. 49.
182. GTLS, preface, p. xvii.