Multiprincipal agency relationships as implied by product market competition

Journal of Economics and Management Strategy

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 235-256

  Gal Or, Esther ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031486847     PISSN: 10586407     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/105864097567093     Document Type: Review

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