Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's 'crazy' thesis: A critique of' Hitler's Willing Executioners

New Left Review

Volumn , Issue 224, 1997, Pages 39-87

  Finkelstein, Norman G ^a  

^a NONE

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References (227)

1. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler's Witting Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust, New York 1996. The author wishes to thank David Abraham, Roane Carey, Noam Chomsky, Samira Haj, Adele Olfman, Shifra Stern, Jack Trumpbour, and Cyrus Veeser for comments on an earlier draft. This essay is dedicated to the memory of my beloved parents, both survivors of the Warsaw Ghetto and the Nazi concentration camps: only a rational apprehension of what happened can give point to their suffering.
2. New York Times, 27 March, 2 April, 3 April 1996; Time, 23 December 1996. The New York Review of Books first gave Goldhagen's book a tepid notice but then ran a glowing piece in which it was acclaimed as 'an original, indeed, brilliant contribution to the mountain of literature on the Holocaust.' (18 April 1996, 28 November 1996) Initially running a hostile review, The New Republic subsequently featured Goldhagen's nine-page 'reply to my critics' (29 April 1996, 23 December 1996). Crucial as it is to fully apprehending the Goldhagen phenomenon, the German reaction will not be considered in this monograph. Deciphering its anomalies would require a much more intimate knowledge of the German cultural landscape than this writer possesses.
3. New York Times, 27 March, 2 April, 3 April 1996; Time, 23 December 1996. The New York Review of Books first gave Goldhagen's book a tepid notice but then ran a glowing piece in which it was acclaimed as 'an original, indeed, brilliant contribution to the mountain of literature on the Holocaust.' (18 April 1996, 28 November 1996) Initially running a hostile review, The New Republic subsequently featured Goldhagen's nine-page 'reply to my critics' (29 April 1996, 23 December 1996). Crucial as it is to fully apprehending the Goldhagen phenomenon, the German reaction will not be considered in this monograph. Deciphering its anomalies would require a much more intimate knowledge of the German cultural landscape than this writer possesses.
4. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, New York 1961. My page references will be to the three-volume 'revised and definitive edition' published in 1985: vol. 3. P. 1011, vol. 1, p. 327; see also vol. 3, p. 994. See also Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, New York 1992, p. 28: 'Whether they were in command or lowly placed, in an office or outdoors, they all did their part, when the time came, with all the efficiency they could muster.' For the initial reaction to Hilberg's damning portrait of German culpability, see Raul Hilberg, The Politics of Memory, Chicago 1996, pp. 124-6. Hilberg's memoir also offers instructive insight into the politics of the 'Holocaust industry'.
5. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, New York 1961. My page references will be to the three-volume 'revised and definitive edition' published in 1985: vol. 3. P. 1011, vol. 1, p. 327; see also vol. 3, p. 994. See also Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, New York 1992, p. 28: 'Whether they were in command or lowly placed, in an office or outdoors, they all did their part, when the time came, with all the efficiency they could muster.' For the initial reaction to Hilberg's damning portrait of German culpability, see Raul Hilberg, The Politics of Memory, Chicago 1996, pp. 124-6. Hilberg's memoir also offers instructive insight into the politics of the 'Holocaust industry'.
6. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, New York 1961. My page references will be to the three-volume 'revised and definitive edition' published in 1985: vol. 3. P. 1011, vol. 1, p. 327; see also vol. 3, p. 994. See also Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, New York 1992, p. 28: 'Whether they were in command or lowly placed, in an office or outdoors, they all did their part, when the time came, with all the efficiency they could muster.' For the initial reaction to Hilberg's damning portrait of German culpability, see Raul Hilberg, The Politics of Memory, Chicago 1996, pp. 124-6. Hilberg's memoir also offers instructive insight into the politics of the 'Holocaust industry'.
7. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, New York 1961. My page references will be to the three-volume 'revised and definitive edition' published in 1985: vol. 3. P. 1011, vol. 1, p. 327; see also vol. 3, p. 994. See also Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, New York 1992, p. 28: 'Whether they were in command or lowly placed, in an office or outdoors, they all did their part, when the time came, with all the efficiency they could muster.' For the initial reaction to Hilberg's damning portrait of German culpability, see Raul Hilberg, The Politics of Memory, Chicago 1996, pp. 124-6. Hilberg's memoir also offers instructive insight into the politics of the 'Holocaust industry'.
8. Raul Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, New York 1961. My page references will be to the three-volume 'revised and definitive edition' published in 1985: vol. 3. P. 1011, vol. 1, p. 327; see also vol. 3, p. 994. See also Raul Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, New York 1992, p. 28: 'Whether they were in command or lowly placed, in an office or outdoors, they all did their part, when the time came, with all the efficiency they could muster.' For the initial reaction to Hilberg's damning portrait of German culpability, see Raul Hilberg, The Politics of Memory, Chicago 1996, pp. 124-6. Hilberg's memoir also offers instructive insight into the politics of the 'Holocaust industry'.
9. Hilberg specifically pointed to the Order Police - the subject of Goldhagens study - as perpetrators whose 'moral makeup' typified 'Germany as a whole'. The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3, p. 1011.
10. Ibid.
11. For background and critical commentary, see Eric A. Zillmer et al., The Quest for the Nazi Personality, Hillsdale, NJ 1995. Sampling a wide array of clinical data, the authors dismiss the 'simplistic' notion of a 'specific homicidal and clinically morbid' German personality (p. 13).
12. Lucy Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, New York 1975, P. 47; see also pp. 163-6.
13. Goldhagen dissents from Christopher Browning's estimates that 10-20 per cent of the German police battalions refused to kill Jews as 'stretching the evidence'. (HWE, p. 541, n. 68; see also p. 551, n. 65) It is one of Goldhagen's central contentions that the police battalions were prototypical of the murderous German mind-set (HWE, pp. 181-5, 463ff).
14. 'A Reply to My Critics', The New Republic, 23 December 1996 [hereafter Reply], p. 41.
15. HWE, p. 416, original emphasis, see also HWE, p. 582 n. 42.
16. HWE, p. 416, original emphasis, see also HWE, p. 582 n. 42.
17. Reply, p. 42; see also HWE, pp. 446-7. Not to be deterred by the hobgoblin of consitency, Goldhagen writes a couple of pages earlier: 'By the time Hitler came to power, the model of Jews that was the basis of his anti-Semitism was shared by the vast majority of Germans' (Reply, p. 40).
18. Reply, p. 42; see also HWE, pp. 446-7. Not to be deterred by the hobgoblin of consitency, Goldhagen writes a couple of pages earlier: 'By the time Hitler came to power, the model of Jews that was the basis of his anti-Semitism was shared by the vast majority of Germans' (Reply, p. 40).
19. Reply, p. 42; see also HWE, pp. 446-7. Not to be deterred by the hobgoblin of consitency, Goldhagen writes a couple of pages earlier: 'By the time Hitler came to power, the model of Jews that was the basis of his anti-Semitism was shared by the vast majority of Germans' (Reply, p. 40).
20. An unwitting ironist, Goldhagen elsewhere in the book counsels, 'Germans should not be caricatured'. (HWE, p. 382)
21. In the endnote, Golhagen cautions that his argument 'obviously does not explain people's capacity for cruelty in the first place or the gratification many derive from it.' Yet, what needs explaining is not the mechanisms of these sadistic impulses but, as noted above, why the Germans succumbed and why the Jews fell victim to them.
22. Jewish Book News 25 April 1996, p. 39. For equivalent formulations, see Reply, p. 43, and Goldhagens numerous interviews.
23. Jewish Book News 25 April 1996, p. 39. For equivalent formulations, see Reply, p. 43, and Goldhagens numerous interviews.
24. In an astonishingly disingenuous endnote, Goldhagen writes that 'it is indeed striking how little or non-existent the evidence is that... Germans' beliefs about Jews differed from the incessantly trumpeted Nazi one.' (HWE, p. 593 n. 49, original emphasis) For a sample of this 'little or non-existent evidence', see section 4) below.
25. See Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, New York 1964, pp. 30, 70, and Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the, Third Reich, Oxford 1983, p. 231. Both are basic texts. Consider Goldhagen's other theoretical breakthroughs: . . .each source of [anti-Semitism] is embedded in an extended metaphorical structure that automatically extends the domain of phenomena, situations, and linguistic usages relevant to the anti-Semitic compass in a manner paralleling the metaphorical structure itself. (HWE, p. 35) All anti-Semitisms can be divided according to one essential dissimilitude which can be usefully thought of as being dichotomous (even if, strictly speaking, this may not be the case). (HWE, p. 37)
26. See Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, New York 1964, pp. 30, 70, and Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the, Third Reich, Oxford 1983, p. 231. Both are basic texts. Consider Goldhagen's other theoretical breakthroughs: . . .each source of [anti-Semitism] is embedded in an extended metaphorical structure that automatically extends the domain of phenomena, situations, and linguistic usages relevant to the anti-Semitic compass in a manner paralleling the metaphorical structure itself. (HWE, p. 35) All anti-Semitisms can be divided according to one essential dissimilitude which can be usefully thought of as being dichotomous (even if, strictly speaking, this may not be the case). (HWE, p. 37)
27. See Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, New York 1964, pp. 30, 70, and Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the, Third Reich, Oxford 1983, p. 231. Both are basic texts. Consider Goldhagen's other theoretical breakthroughs: . . .each source of [anti-Semitism] is embedded in an extended metaphorical structure that automatically extends the domain of phenomena, situations, and linguistic usages relevant to the anti-Semitic compass in a manner paralleling the metaphorical structure itself. (HWE, p. 35) All anti-Semitisms can be divided according to one essential dissimilitude which can be usefully thought of as being dichotomous (even if, strictly speaking, this may not be the case). (HWE, p. 37)
28. See Peter Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria, New York 1964, pp. 30, 70, and Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent in the, Third Reich, Oxford 1983, p. 231. Both are basic texts. Consider Goldhagen's other theoretical breakthroughs: . . .each source of [anti-Semitism] is embedded in an extended metaphorical structure that automatically extends the domain of phenomena, situations, and linguistic usages relevant to the anti-Semitic compass in a manner paralleling the metaphorical structure itself. (HWE, p. 35) All anti-Semitisms can be divided according to one essential dissimilitude which can be usefully thought of as being dichotomous (even if, strictly speaking, this may not be the case). (HWE, p. 37)
29. Prejudice is a manifestation of people's (individual and collective) search for meaning. (HWE, p. 39, emphasis in original) Comment is superfluous.
30. HWE, p. 494 n. 92. The counterpoint to Goldhagen's homogenization of the German perpetrators is his heterogenization of the Germans' victims. Thus, Goldhagen's discriminations to prove that Jewish suffering was unique. (HWE, pp. 175, 294, 311ff, 34off, 523 n. 1)
31. HWE, p. 494 n. 92. The counterpoint to Goldhagen's homogenization of the German perpetrators is his heterogenization of the Germans' victims. Thus, Goldhagen's discriminations to prove that Jewish suffering was unique. (HWE, pp. 175, 294, 311ff, 34off, 523 n. 1)
32. HWE, pp. 141, 146, 147, 153, 421. For a variation on this argument which conflates verbal abuse with 'deportation and physical violence', see HWE, p. 125.
33. HWE, pp. 141, 146, 147, 153, 421. For a variation on this argument which conflates verbal abuse with 'deportation and physical violence', see HWE, p. 125.
34. In his rejoinder, Goldhagen downplays the import of this question: 'Even if some would conclude that I am not entirely correct about the scope and character of German anti-Semitism, it does not follow that this would invalidate my conclusion . . . about the perpetration of the Holocaust, [which] logically can stand on its own and must be confronted directly.' and again: ' My assertions about the reach of anti-Semitism in Germany before the Nazi period is [sic] supported by the works of some of the most distinguished scholars of anti-Semitism . . . Where I depart from some of them is not over the extent of anit-Semitism in Germany, but over its content and nature.' (Reply, pp. 40, 41) Yet, the 'scope and character', 'content and nature' of erman anti-Semitism are not distinct from or subsidiary to but the very essence of his thesis.
35. Pulzer, Jews and the German State, Oxford 1992.
36. Ibid., p. 71.
37. HWE, pp. 61, 491 n. 51. Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, Oxford 1983, p. 229. Indeed, Goldhagen's study is marred throughout by his penchant for double bookkeeping. Thus, in the text's body Goldhagen implied that no police battalion member initially refrained from killing infants. Turning to the back of the book, we learn that, according to one member, 'almost all the men' refused, and according to another, 'as if by tacit agreement, the shooting of infants and small children was renounced by all the people. In the endnote Goldhagen grudgingly concedes that 'undoubtedly, some of the men did shy away'. (HWE, pp. 216, 538 n. 37, n. 39)
38. HWE, pp. 61, 491 n. 51. Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, Oxford 1983, p. 229. Indeed, Goldhagen's study is marred throughout by his penchant for double bookkeeping. Thus, in the text's body Goldhagen implied that no police battalion member initially refrained from killing infants. Turning to the back of the book, we learn that, according to one member, 'almost all the men' refused, and according to another, 'as if by tacit agreement, the shooting of infants and small children was renounced by all the people. In the endnote Goldhagen grudgingly concedes that 'undoubtedly, some of the men did shy away'. (HWE, pp. 216, 538 n. 37, n. 39)
39. HWE, pp. 61, 491 n. 51. Ian Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, Oxford 1983, p. 229. Indeed, Goldhagen's study is marred throughout by his penchant for double bookkeeping. Thus, in the text's body Goldhagen implied that no police battalion member initially refrained from killing infants. Turning to the back of the book, we learn that, according to one member, 'almost all the men' refused, and according to another, 'as if by tacit agreement, the shooting of infants and small children was renounced by all the people. In the endnote Goldhagen grudgingly concedes that 'undoubtedly, some of the men did shy away'. (HWE, pp. 216, 538 n. 37, n. 39)
40. Pulzer, Jews and the German State, pp. 42, 14
41. Eva G. Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, London I950, p. 154. See Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', Princeton 1984, p. 27.
42. Eva G. Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, London I950, p. 154. See Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', Princeton 1984, p. 27.
43. Michael H. Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany: The Popular Bases', in Yad Vashem Studies, XVI, Jerusalem 1984, p. 133; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, pp. 51, 69 (working class quote), p. 70; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 325; Pulzer, Jews and the german State, pp. 261 (SPD quote), 344-5; Donna Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism, Chapel Hill 1993, p. 70.
44. Michael H. Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany: The Popular Bases', in Yad Vashem Studies, XVI, Jerusalem 1984, p. 133; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, pp. 51, 69 (working class quote), p. 70; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 325; Pulzer, Jews and the german State, pp. 261 (SPD quote), 344-5; Donna Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism, Chapel Hill 1993, p. 70.
45. Michael H. Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany: The Popular Bases', in Yad Vashem Studies, XVI, Jerusalem 1984, p. 133; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, pp. 51, 69 (working class quote), p. 70; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 325; Pulzer, Jews and the german State, pp. 261 (SPD quote), 344-5; Donna Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism, Chapel Hill 1993, p. 70.
46. Michael H. Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany: The Popular Bases', in Yad Vashem Studies, XVI, Jerusalem 1984, p. 133; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, pp. 51, 69 (working class quote), p. 70; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 325; Pulzer, Jews and the german State, pp. 261 (SPD quote), 344-5; Donna Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism, Chapel Hill 1993, p. 70.
47. Michael H. Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany: The Popular Bases', in Yad Vashem Studies, XVI, Jerusalem 1984, p. 133; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, pp. 51, 69 (working class quote), p. 70; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 325; Pulzer, Jews and the german State, pp. 261 (SPD quote), 344-5; Donna Harsch, German Social Democracy and the Rise of Nazism, Chapel Hill 1993, p. 70.
48. Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', p. 48. For a balanced presentation of German Jewry during the WEimar years, see sepecially Niewyck's The Jews in Weimar Germany.
49. Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', p. 48. For a balanced presentation of German Jewry during the WEimar years, see sepecially Niewyck's The Jews in Weimar Germany.
50. HWE, pp. 86, 142, 162, 424-5. Willia Brustein, The Logic of Power, p. 51, reports that 'relatively few people read Mein Kampf Before 1993. Albert Speer claimed never to have read it; his biographer is unsure. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 19, 122, 509; Gitta Serreny, Albert Speer, New York 1995, pp. 183, 302, 590-1. Although the notorious passage from Mein Kampf is not strictly genocidal - Hitler speculates that if 'twelve or fifteen thousand. . . Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas', Germany might have won World War I-Philippe Burrin convincingly demonstrates that these musings do shed important light on Hitler's genocidal aims. See Hitler and the Jews, London 1994. For the linguistic ambiguities of and indifferent public reception to Hitler's January 1939 'prophecy', see Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', p. 133; Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', Oxford 1987, pp. 240-2; Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, pp. 134-5 n-36.
51. HWE, pp. 86, 142, 162, 424-5. Willia Brustein, The Logic of Power, p. 51, reports that 'relatively few people read Mein Kampf Before 1993. Albert Speer claimed never to have read it; his biographer is unsure. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 19, 122, 509; Gitta Serreny, Albert Speer, New York 1995, pp. 183, 302, 590-1. Although the notorious passage from Mein Kampf is not strictly genocidal - Hitler speculates that if 'twelve or fifteen thousand. . . Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas', Germany might have won World War I-Philippe Burrin convincingly demonstrates that these musings do shed important light on Hitler's genocidal aims. See Hitler and the Jews, London 1994. For the linguistic ambiguities of and indifferent public reception to Hitler's January 1939 'prophecy', see Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', p. 133; Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', Oxford 1987, pp. 240-2; Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, pp. 134-5 n-36.
52. HWE, pp. 86, 142, 162, 424-5. Willia Brustein, The Logic of Power, p. 51, reports that 'relatively few people read Mein Kampf Before 1993. Albert Speer claimed never to have read it; his biographer is unsure. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 19, 122, 509; Gitta Serreny, Albert Speer, New York 1995, pp. 183, 302, 590-1. Although the notorious passage from Mein Kampf is not strictly genocidal - Hitler speculates that if 'twelve or fifteen thousand. . . Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas', Germany might have won World War I-Philippe Burrin convincingly demonstrates that these musings do shed important light on Hitler's genocidal aims. See Hitler and the Jews, London 1994. For the linguistic ambiguities of and indifferent public reception to Hitler's January 1939 'prophecy', see Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', p. 133; Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', Oxford 1987, pp. 240-2; Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, pp. 134-5 n-36.
53. HWE, pp. 86, 142, 162, 424-5. Willia Brustein, The Logic of Power, p. 51, reports that 'relatively few people read Mein Kampf Before 1993. Albert Speer claimed never to have read it; his biographer is unsure. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 19, 122, 509; Gitta Serreny, Albert Speer, New York 1995, pp. 183, 302, 590-1. Although the notorious passage from Mein Kampf is not strictly genocidal - Hitler speculates that if 'twelve or fifteen thousand. . . Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas', Germany might have won World War I-Philippe Burrin convincingly demonstrates that these musings do shed important light on Hitler's genocidal aims. See Hitler and the Jews, London 1994. For the linguistic ambiguities of and indifferent public reception to Hitler's January 1939 'prophecy', see Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', p. 133; Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', Oxford 1987, pp. 240-2; Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, pp. 134-5 n-36.
54. HWE, pp. 86, 142, 162, 424-5. Willia Brustein, The Logic of Power, p. 51, reports that 'relatively few people read Mein Kampf Before 1993. Albert Speer claimed never to have read it; his biographer is unsure. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 19, 122, 509; Gitta Serreny, Albert Speer, New York 1995, pp. 183, 302, 590-1. Although the notorious passage from Mein Kampf is not strictly genocidal - Hitler speculates that if 'twelve or fifteen thousand. . . Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas', Germany might have won World War I-Philippe Burrin convincingly demonstrates that these musings do shed important light on Hitler's genocidal aims. See Hitler and the Jews, London 1994. For the linguistic ambiguities of and indifferent public reception to Hitler's January 1939 'prophecy', see Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', p. 133; Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', Oxford 1987, pp. 240-2; Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, pp. 134-5 n-36.
55. HWE, pp. 86, 142, 162, 424-5. Willia Brustein, The Logic of Power, p. 51, reports that 'relatively few people read Mein Kampf Before 1993. Albert Speer claimed never to have read it; his biographer is unsure. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 19, 122, 509; Gitta Serreny, Albert Speer, New York 1995, pp. 183, 302, 590-1. Although the notorious passage from Mein Kampf is not strictly genocidal - Hitler speculates that if 'twelve or fifteen thousand. . . Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas', Germany might have won World War I-Philippe Burrin convincingly demonstrates that these musings do shed important light on Hitler's genocidal aims. See Hitler and the Jews, London 1994. For the linguistic ambiguities of and indifferent public reception to Hitler's January 1939 'prophecy', see Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', p. 133; Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', Oxford 1987, pp. 240-2; Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, pp. 134-5 n-36.
56. HWE, pp. 86, 142, 162, 424-5. Willia Brustein, The Logic of Power, p. 51, reports that 'relatively few people read Mein Kampf Before 1993. Albert Speer claimed never to have read it; his biographer is unsure. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 19, 122, 509; Gitta Serreny, Albert Speer, New York 1995, pp. 183, 302, 590-1. Although the notorious passage from Mein Kampf is not strictly genocidal - Hitler speculates that if 'twelve or fifteen thousand. . . Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas', Germany might have won World War I-Philippe Burrin convincingly demonstrates that these musings do shed important light on Hitler's genocidal aims. See Hitler and the Jews, London 1994. For the linguistic ambiguities of and indifferent public reception to Hitler's January 1939 'prophecy', see Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', p. 133; Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', Oxford 1987, pp. 240-2; Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, pp. 134-5 n-36.
57. HWE, pp. 86, 142, 162, 424-5. Willia Brustein, The Logic of Power, p. 51, reports that 'relatively few people read Mein Kampf Before 1993. Albert Speer claimed never to have read it; his biographer is unsure. Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 19, 122, 509; Gitta Serreny, Albert Speer, New York 1995, pp. 183, 302, 590-1. Although the notorious passage from Mein Kampf is not strictly genocidal - Hitler speculates that if 'twelve or fifteen thousand. . . Hebrew corrupters of the people had been held under poison gas', Germany might have won World War I-Philippe Burrin convincingly demonstrates that these musings do shed important light on Hitler's genocidal aims. See Hitler and the Jews, London 1994. For the linguistic ambiguities of and indifferent public reception to Hitler's January 1939 'prophecy', see Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', p. 133; Ian Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', Oxford 1987, pp. 240-2; Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, pp. 134-5 n-36.
58. Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, New York 1969, p. 721; Brustein, The Logic of Evil, p. 58; Max Domarus, ed., Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945, Wauconda, IL 1990, pp. 37, 40; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, New York 1997, pp. 72, 95-7, 101-4 (Friedländer puts more stress on Hitler's public anti-Semitism throughout the 19205 but concurs that in the early 19305 'the Jewish theme indeed became less frequent in his rhetoric'); Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewtsh Question', pp. 84, 129; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 230-5; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 54. For the period January 1932 to March 1933, there is no mention at all of Jews in any of Hitler's speeches collected in Domarus's standard edition. The main negative theme is anti-Bolshevism and anti-Marxism. In Baynes's earlier collection of Hitler extracts that 'practically exhausts the material on the subject of the Jews, the only item before I933 is an interview with the London Times in which Hitler, repudiating 'violent anti-Semitism', declares that he 'would have nothing to do with pogroms' (p. 726). Although 'unjust and harsh', as Domarus recalls. Hitlers forced emigration scheme was hardly unprecedented even in the modern world (p. 40).
59. Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, New York 1969, p. 721; Brustein, The Logic of Evil, p. 58; Max Domarus, ed., Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945, Wauconda, IL 1990, pp. 37, 40; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, New York 1997, pp. 72, 95-7, 101-4 (Friedländer puts more stress on Hitler's public anti-Semitism throughout the 19205 but concurs that in the early 19305 'the Jewish theme indeed became less frequent in his rhetoric'); Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewtsh Question', pp. 84, 129; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 230-5; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 54. For the period January 1932 to March 1933, there is no mention at all of Jews in any of Hitler's speeches collected in Domarus's standard edition. The main negative theme is anti-Bolshevism and anti-Marxism. In Baynes's earlier collection of Hitler extracts that 'practically exhausts the material on the subject of the Jews, the only item before I933 is an interview with the London Times in which Hitler, repudiating 'violent anti-Semitism', declares that he 'would have nothing to do with pogroms' (p. 726). Although 'unjust and harsh', as Domarus recalls. Hitlers forced emigration scheme was hardly unprecedented even in the modern world (p. 40).
60. Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, New York 1969, p. 721; Brustein, The Logic of Evil, p. 58; Max Domarus, ed., Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945, Wauconda, IL 1990, pp. 37, 40; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, New York 1997, pp. 72, 95-7, 101-4 (Friedländer puts more stress on Hitler's public anti-Semitism throughout the 19205 but concurs that in the early 19305 'the Jewish theme indeed became less frequent in his rhetoric'); Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewtsh Question', pp. 84, 129; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 230-5; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 54. For the period January 1932 to March 1933, there is no mention at all of Jews in any of Hitler's speeches collected in Domarus's standard edition. The main negative theme is anti-Bolshevism and anti-Marxism. In Baynes's earlier collection of Hitler extracts that 'practically exhausts the material on the subject of the Jews, the only item before I933 is an interview with the London Times in which Hitler, repudiating 'violent anti-Semitism', declares that he 'would have nothing to do with pogroms' (p. 726). Although 'unjust and harsh', as Domarus recalls. Hitlers forced emigration scheme was hardly unprecedented even in the modern world (p. 40).
61. Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, New York 1969, p. 721; Brustein, The Logic of Evil, p. 58; Max Domarus, ed., Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945, Wauconda, IL 1990, pp. 37, 40; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, New York 1997, pp. 72, 95-7, 101-4 (Friedländer puts more stress on Hitler's public anti-Semitism throughout the 19205 but concurs that in the early 19305 'the Jewish theme indeed became less frequent in his rhetoric'); Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewtsh Question', pp. 84, 129; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 230-5; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 54. For the period January 1932 to March 1933, there is no mention at all of Jews in any of Hitler's speeches collected in Domarus's standard edition. The main negative theme is anti-Bolshevism and anti-Marxism. In Baynes's earlier collection of Hitler extracts that 'practically exhausts the material on the subject of the Jews, the only item before I933 is an interview with the London Times in which Hitler, repudiating 'violent anti-Semitism', declares that he 'would have nothing to do with pogroms' (p. 726). Although 'unjust and harsh', as Domarus recalls. Hitlers forced emigration scheme was hardly unprecedented even in the modern world (p. 40).
62. Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, New York 1969, p. 721; Brustein, The Logic of Evil, p. 58; Max Domarus, ed., Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945, Wauconda, IL 1990, pp. 37, 40; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, New York 1997, pp. 72, 95-7, 101-4 (Friedländer puts more stress on Hitler's public anti-Semitism throughout the 19205 but concurs that in the early 19305 'the Jewish theme indeed became less frequent in his rhetoric'); Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewtsh Question', pp. 84, 129; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 230-5; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 54. For the period January 1932 to March 1933, there is no mention at all of Jews in any of Hitler's speeches collected in Domarus's standard edition. The main negative theme is anti-Bolshevism and anti-Marxism. In Baynes's earlier collection of Hitler extracts that 'practically exhausts the material on the subject of the Jews, the only item before I933 is an interview with the London Times in which Hitler, repudiating 'violent anti-Semitism', declares that he 'would have nothing to do with pogroms' (p. 726). Although 'unjust and harsh', as Domarus recalls. Hitlers forced emigration scheme was hardly unprecedented even in the modern world (p. 40).
63. Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, New York 1969, p. 721; Brustein, The Logic of Evil, p. 58; Max Domarus, ed., Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945, Wauconda, IL 1990, pp. 37, 40; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, New York 1997, pp. 72, 95-7, 101-4 (Friedländer puts more stress on Hitler's public anti-Semitism throughout the 19205 but concurs that in the early 19305 'the Jewish theme indeed became less frequent in his rhetoric'); Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewtsh Question', pp. 84, 129; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 230-5; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 54. For the period January 1932 to March 1933, there is no mention at all of Jews in any of Hitler's speeches collected in Domarus's standard edition. The main negative theme is anti-Bolshevism and anti-Marxism. In Baynes's earlier collection of Hitler extracts that 'practically exhausts the material on the subject of the Jews, the only item before I933 is an interview with the London Times in which Hitler, repudiating 'violent anti-Semitism', declares that he 'would have nothing to do with pogroms' (p. 726). Although 'unjust and harsh', as Domarus recalls. Hitlers forced emigration scheme was hardly unprecedented even in the modern world (p. 40).
64. Norman H. Baynes, ed., The Speeches of Adolf Hitler, April 1922-August 1939, New York 1969, p. 721; Brustein, The Logic of Evil, p. 58; Max Domarus, ed., Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, 1932-1945, Wauconda, IL 1990, pp. 37, 40; Saul Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, New York 1997, pp. 72, 95-7, 101-4 (Friedländer puts more stress on Hitler's public anti-Semitism throughout the 19205 but concurs that in the early 19305 'the Jewish theme indeed became less frequent in his rhetoric'); Sarah Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewtsh Question', pp. 84, 129; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 230-5; Niewyck, The Jews in Weimar Germany, p. 54. For the period January 1932 to March 1933, there is no mention at all of Jews in any of Hitler's speeches collected in Domarus's standard edition. The main negative theme is anti-Bolshevism and anti-Marxism. In Baynes's earlier collection of Hitler extracts that 'practically exhausts the material on the subject of the Jews, the only item before I933 is an interview with the London Times in which Hitler, repudiating 'violent anti-Semitism', declares that he 'would have nothing to do with pogroms' (p. 726). Although 'unjust and harsh', as Domarus recalls. Hitlers forced emigration scheme was hardly unprecedented even in the modern world (p. 40).
65. Domarus, Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, p. 37; see Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 243-4; Lothar Kettehacker, 'Hitler's Final Solution and its Rationalization, in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, p. 83; Mommsen, 'The Realizat.on of the Unthinkable', pp. 108-11.
66. Domarus, Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, p. 37; see Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 243-4; Lothar Kettehacker, 'Hitler's Final Solution and its Rationalization, in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, p. 83; Mommsen, 'The Realizat.on of the Unthinkable', pp. 108-11.
67. Domarus, Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, p. 37; see Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 243-4; Lothar Kettehacker, 'Hitler's Final Solution and its Rationalization, in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, p. 83; Mommsen, 'The Realizat.on of the Unthinkable', pp. 108-11.
68. Domarus, Hitler: Speeches and Proclamations, p. 37; see Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 243-4; Lothar Kettehacker, 'Hitler's Final Solution and its Rationalization, in Gerhard Hirschfeld, ed., The Policies of Genocide, London 1986, p. 83; Mommsen, 'The Realizat.on of the Unthinkable', pp. 108-11.
69. Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 46-7, 152, 154, 161, 230, 233, 235-8, 239 (second quote), 250 (first quote), 252; see also Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, p. 273.
70. Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 46-7, 152, 154, 161, 230, 233, 235-8, 239 (second quote), 250 (first quote), 252; see also Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, p. 273.
71. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, New York 1984, pp. 84, 218; Brustein, The Logic of Power, pp. xii, 51, 57-8, 88, 180-1; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter, Chapel Hill 1983, pp. 43, 262-8; Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish Questions', pp. 29ff, 45, 68-71, 82, 299; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton pp. 363-9, 377-8, 418, 421-2, 607, n. 46; and Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 190, 229-36. It is not at all clear even that anti-Semitism figured prominently in the motives for joining the Nazi party before, let alone after, Hitler's victory; see especially Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika, Princeton 1975, pp. 499-500. To illustrate that the crudely anti-Semitic SA was 'representative oa a significant percentage of the German people' during the Nazi years, Goldhagen recalls that its membershipd 'was approximately 10 per cent of the German civilian male population of the age cohorts on which the SA drew' (HWE, p. 95). Leaving to one side that a tip does not always prove an iceberg, Goldhagen observes elsewhere that 'many non-ideologiacl reason' induced Germans to join Nazi organizations (HWE, p. 208).
72. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, New York 1984, pp. 84, 218; Brustein, The Logic of Power, pp. xii, 51, 57-8, 88, 180-1; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter, Chapel Hill 1983, pp. 43, 262-8; Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish Questions', pp. 29ff, 45, 68-71, 82, 299; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton pp. 363-9, 377-8, 418, 421-2, 607, n. 46; and Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 190, 229-36. It is not at all clear even that anti-Semitism figured prominently in the motives for joining the Nazi party before, let alone after, Hitler's victory; see especially Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika, Princeton 1975, pp. 499-500. To illustrate that the crudely anti-Semitic SA was 'representative oa a significant percentage of the German people' during the Nazi years, Goldhagen recalls that its membershipd 'was approximately 10 per cent of the German civilian male population of the age cohorts on which the SA drew' (HWE, p. 95). Leaving to one side that a tip does not always prove an iceberg, Goldhagen observes elsewhere that 'many non-ideologiacl reason' induced Germans to join Nazi organizations (HWE, p. 208).
73. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, New York 1984, pp. 84, 218; Brustein, The Logic of Power, pp. xii, 51, 57-8, 88, 180-1; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter, Chapel Hill 1983, pp. 43, 262-8; Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish Questions', pp. 29ff, 45, 68-71, 82, 299; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton pp. 363-9, 377-8, 418, 421-2, 607, n. 46; and Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 190, 229-36. It is not at all clear even that anti-Semitism figured prominently in the motives for joining the Nazi party before, let alone after, Hitler's victory; see especially Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika, Princeton 1975, pp. 499-500. To illustrate that the crudely anti-Semitic SA was 'representative oa a significant percentage of the German people' during the Nazi years, Goldhagen recalls that its membershipd 'was approximately 10 per cent of the German civilian male population of the age cohorts on which the SA drew' (HWE, p. 95). Leaving to one side that a tip does not always prove an iceberg, Goldhagen observes elsewhere that 'many non-ideologiacl reason' induced Germans to join Nazi organizations (HWE, p. 208).
74. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, New York 1984, pp. 84, 218; Brustein, The Logic of Power, pp. xii, 51, 57-8, 88, 180-1; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter, Chapel Hill 1983, pp. 43, 262-8; Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish Questions', pp. 29ff, 45, 68-71, 82, 299; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton pp. 363-9, 377-8, 418, 421-2, 607, n. 46; and Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 190, 229-36. It is not at all clear even that anti-Semitism figured prominently in the motives for joining the Nazi party before, let alone after, Hitler's victory; see especially Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika, Princeton 1975, pp. 499-500. To illustrate that the crudely anti-Semitic SA was 'representative oa a significant percentage of the German people' during the Nazi years, Goldhagen recalls that its membershipd 'was approximately 10 per cent of the German civilian male population of the age cohorts on which the SA drew' (HWE, p. 95). Leaving to one side that a tip does not always prove an iceberg, Goldhagen observes elsewhere that 'many non-ideologiacl reason' induced Germans to join Nazi organizations (HWE, p. 208).
75. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, New York 1984, pp. 84, 218; Brustein, The Logic of Power, pp. xii, 51, 57-8, 88, 180-1; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter, Chapel Hill 1983, pp. 43, 262-8; Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish Questions', pp. 29ff, 45, 68-71, 82, 299; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton pp. 363-9, 377-8, 418, 421-2, 607, n. 46; and Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 190, 229-36. It is not at all clear even that anti-Semitism figured prominently in the motives for joining the Nazi party before, let alone after, Hitler's victory; see especially Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika, Princeton 1975, pp. 499-500. To illustrate that the crudely anti-Semitic SA was 'representative oa a significant percentage of the German people' during the Nazi years, Goldhagen recalls that its membershipd 'was approximately 10 per cent of the German civilian male population of the age cohorts on which the SA drew' (HWE, p. 95). Leaving to one side that a tip does not always prove an iceberg, Goldhagen observes elsewhere that 'many non-ideologiacl reason' induced Germans to join Nazi organizations (HWE, p. 208).
76. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, New York 1984, pp. 84, 218; Brustein, The Logic of Power, pp. xii, 51, 57-8, 88, 180-1; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter, Chapel Hill 1983, pp. 43, 262-8; Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish Questions', pp. 29ff, 45, 68-71, 82, 299; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton pp. 363-9, 377-8, 418, 421-2, 607, n. 46; and Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 190, 229-36. It is not at all clear even that anti-Semitism figured prominently in the motives for joining the Nazi party before, let alone after, Hitler's victory; see especially Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika, Princeton 1975, pp. 499-500. To illustrate that the crudely anti-Semitic SA was 'representative oa a significant percentage of the German people' during the Nazi years, Goldhagen recalls that its membershipd 'was approximately 10 per cent of the German civilian male population of the age cohorts on which the SA drew' (HWE, p. 95). Leaving to one side that a tip does not always prove an iceberg, Goldhagen observes elsewhere that 'many non-ideologiacl reason' induced Germans to join Nazi organizations (HWE, p. 208).
77. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, New York 1984, pp. 84, 218; Brustein, The Logic of Power, pp. xii, 51, 57-8, 88, 180-1; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter, Chapel Hill 1983, pp. 43, 262-8; Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish Questions', pp. 29ff, 45, 68-71, 82, 299; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton pp. 363-9, 377-8, 418, 421-2, 607, n. 46; and Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 190, 229-36. It is not at all clear even that anti-Semitism figured prominently in the motives for joining the Nazi party before, let alone after, Hitler's victory; see especially Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika, Princeton 1975, pp. 499-500. To illustrate that the crudely anti-Semitic SA was 'representative oa a significant percentage of the German people' during the Nazi years, Goldhagen recalls that its membershipd 'was approximately 10 per cent of the German civilian male population of the age cohorts on which the SA drew' (HWE, p. 95). Leaving to one side that a tip does not always prove an iceberg, Goldhagen observes elsewhere that 'many non-ideologiacl reason' induced Germans to join Nazi organizations (HWE, p. 208).
78. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, New York 1984, pp. 84, 218; Brustein, The Logic of Power, pp. xii, 51, 57-8, 88, 180-1; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter, Chapel Hill 1983, pp. 43, 262-8; Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish Questions', pp. 29ff, 45, 68-71, 82, 299; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton pp. 363-9, 377-8, 418, 421-2, 607, n. 46; and Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 190, 229-36. It is not at all clear even that anti-Semitism figured prominently in the motives for joining the Nazi party before, let alone after, Hitler's victory; see especially Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika, Princeton 1975, pp. 499-500. To illustrate that the crudely anti-Semitic SA was 'representative oa a significant percentage of the German people' during the Nazi years, Goldhagen recalls that its membershipd 'was approximately 10 per cent of the German civilian male population of the age cohorts on which the SA drew' (HWE, p. 95). Leaving to one side that a tip does not always prove an iceberg, Goldhagen observes elsewhere that 'many non-ideologiacl reason' induced Germans to join Nazi organizations (HWE, p. 208).
79. William Sheridan Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, New York 1984, pp. 84, 218; Brustein, The Logic of Power, pp. xii, 51, 57-8, 88, 180-1; Thomas Childers, The Nazi Voter, Chapel Hill 1983, pp. 43, 262-8; Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish Questions', pp. 29ff, 45, 68-71, 82, 299; Richard Hamilton, Who Voted for Hitler?, Princeton pp. 363-9, 377-8, 418, 421-2, 607, n. 46; and Eva Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 190, 229-36. It is not at all clear even that anti-Semitism figured prominently in the motives for joining the Nazi party before, let alone after, Hitler's victory; see especially Peter H. Merkl, Political Violence Under the Swastika, Princeton 1975, pp. 499-500. To illustrate that the crudely anti-Semitic SA was 'representative oa a significant percentage of the German people' during the Nazi years, Goldhagen recalls that its membershipd 'was approximately 10 per cent of the German civilian male population of the age cohorts on which the SA drew' (HWE, p. 95). Leaving to one side that a tip does not always prove an iceberg, Goldhagen observes elsewhere that 'many non-ideologiacl reason' induced Germans to join Nazi organizations (HWE, p. 208).
80. Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 231-3. Long out of print, thiS luminous work should be reissued.
81. Childers, The Nazi Voter, p. 267.
82. Reichmann, Hostages of civilaization, pp. 231, 261 n. 380.
83. HWE, p. 594 n. 56; for a sumilar argument for the war years, see pp. 251-2.
84. Goldhagen's citation of this document is doubly ironic. Not only docs it undercut his claim about the inefficacy of Nazi propaganda but also his claim about restoring the dimension of individual responsibility. Seeking to mitigate the culpability of the Einsatzgruppen commanders, the brief lent support to a plea of temporary insanity: 'The defendants. . . were obsessed with a psychological delusion based on a fallacious idea concerning the identity of the aims of Bolshevism and the political role of Jewry in Eastern Europe.' Although effectively endorsed by Goldhagen, this last defence was - fortunately for justice's sake - rejected by the Military Tribunal. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals, vol. 4, 'The Einsatzgruppen Case', Washington, DC n.d., pp. 342, 344, 350, 354, 463-4.
85. Robert Gellately, The Gestapo and German Society, Oxford 1990, pp. 111, 129, 135-6, 146-7, 160-1, 171, 172, 177, 179, 186-7, 205-7, 213, 256.
86. A brief word about sources. Research on popular opinion in Nazi Germany relies mainly on reports secretly dispatched by the SPD underground and on internal files of the Nazi police (Gestapo, SD). Goldhagen cautions that SPD reports 'should be read with circumspection' because the 'agents were obviously eager and ideologically disposed to find among the German people. . . evidence of dissent from the Nazi regime and its policies.' (HWE, p. 509 n. 162; see p. 106) Oddly, he does not enter a comparable caveat in the reverse sense for the Gestapo reports, which are repeatedly cited by him to document popular German anti-Semitism (for example, HWE, pp. 98, 121). In any event, the issue of reliability has already been thoroughly explored. The consensus is that the SPD reports are generally trustworthy - even the Gestapo attested to their veracity-and the Nazi police reports perhaps somewhat less so. See David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, Oxford 1992, pp. 7-9, 100-1; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 166-7, 209; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, p. 362; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 6-8.
87. A brief word about sources. Research on popular opinion in Nazi Germany relies mainly on reports secretly dispatched by the SPD underground and on internal files of the Nazi police (Gestapo, SD). Goldhagen cautions that SPD reports 'should be read with circumspection' because the 'agents were obviously eager and ideologically disposed to find among the German people. . . evidence of dissent from the Nazi regime and its policies.' (HWE, p. 509 n. 162; see p. 106) Oddly, he does not enter a comparable caveat in the reverse sense for the Gestapo reports, which are repeatedly cited by him to document popular German anti-Semitism (for example, HWE, pp. 98, 121). In any event, the issue of reliability has already been thoroughly explored. The consensus is that the SPD reports are generally trustworthy - even the Gestapo attested to their veracity-and the Nazi police reports perhaps somewhat less so. See David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, Oxford 1992, pp. 7-9, 100-1; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 166-7, 209; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, p. 362; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 6-8.
88. A brief word about sources. Research on popular opinion in Nazi Germany relies mainly on reports secretly dispatched by the SPD underground and on internal files of the Nazi police (Gestapo, SD). Goldhagen cautions that SPD reports 'should be read with circumspection' because the 'agents were obviously eager and ideologically disposed to find among the German people. . . evidence of dissent from the Nazi regime and its policies.' (HWE, p. 509 n. 162; see p. 106) Oddly, he does not enter a comparable caveat in the reverse sense for the Gestapo reports, which are repeatedly cited by him to document popular German anti-Semitism (for example, HWE, pp. 98, 121). In any event, the issue of reliability has already been thoroughly explored. The consensus is that the SPD reports are generally trustworthy - even the Gestapo attested to their veracity-and the Nazi police reports perhaps somewhat less so. See David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, Oxford 1992, pp. 7-9, 100-1; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 166-7, 209; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, p. 362; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 6-8.
89. A brief word about sources. Research on popular opinion in Nazi Germany relies mainly on reports secretly dispatched by the SPD underground and on internal files of the Nazi police (Gestapo, SD). Goldhagen cautions that SPD reports 'should be read with circumspection' because the 'agents were obviously eager and ideologically disposed to find among the German people. . . evidence of dissent from the Nazi regime and its policies.' (HWE, p. 509 n. 162; see p. 106) Oddly, he does not enter a comparable caveat in the reverse sense for the Gestapo reports, which are repeatedly cited by him to document popular German anti-Semitism (for example, HWE, pp. 98, 121). In any event, the issue of reliability has already been thoroughly explored. The consensus is that the SPD reports are generally trustworthy - even the Gestapo attested to their veracity-and the Nazi police reports perhaps somewhat less so. See David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, Oxford 1992, pp. 7-9, 100-1; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 166-7, 209; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, p. 362; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 6-8.
90. A brief word about sources. Research on popular opinion in Nazi Germany relies mainly on reports secretly dispatched by the SPD underground and on internal files of the Nazi police (Gestapo, SD). Goldhagen cautions that SPD reports 'should be read with circumspection' because the 'agents were obviously eager and ideologically disposed to find among the German people. . . evidence of dissent from the Nazi regime and its policies.' (HWE, p. 509 n. 162; see p. 106) Oddly, he does not enter a comparable caveat in the reverse sense for the Gestapo reports, which are repeatedly cited by him to document popular German anti-Semitism (for example, HWE, pp. 98, 121). In any event, the issue of reliability has already been thoroughly explored. The consensus is that the SPD reports are generally trustworthy - even the Gestapo attested to their veracity-and the Nazi police reports perhaps somewhat less so. See David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, Oxford 1992, pp. 7-9, 100-1; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 166-7, 209; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, p. 362; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 6-8.
91. A brief word about sources. Research on popular opinion in Nazi Germany relies mainly on reports secretly dispatched by the SPD underground and on internal files of the Nazi police (Gestapo, SD). Goldhagen cautions that SPD reports 'should be read with circumspection' because the 'agents were obviously eager and ideologically disposed to find among the German people. . . evidence of dissent from the Nazi regime and its policies.' (HWE, p. 509 n. 162; see p. 106) Oddly, he does not enter a comparable caveat in the reverse sense for the Gestapo reports, which are repeatedly cited by him to document popular German anti-Semitism (for example, HWE, pp. 98, 121). In any event, the issue of reliability has already been thoroughly explored. The consensus is that the SPD reports are generally trustworthy - even the Gestapo attested to their veracity-and the Nazi police reports perhaps somewhat less so. See David Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, Oxford 1992, pp. 7-9, 100-1; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 166-7, 209; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, p. 362; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 6-8.
92. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, Athens, 1977. PP. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi, Germany carried 'Aryan only' signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
93. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, Athens, 1977. PP. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi, Germany carried 'Aryan only' signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
94. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, Athens, 1977. PP. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi, Germany carried 'Aryan only' signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
95. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, Athens, 1977. PP. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi, Germany carried 'Aryan only' signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
96. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4;
97. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, Athens, 1977. PP. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi, Germany carried 'Aryan only' signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
98. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, Athens, 1977. PP. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi, Germany carried 'Aryan only' signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
99. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, Athens, 1977. PP. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi, Germany carried 'Aryan only' signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
100. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, Athens, 1977. PP. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi, Germany carried 'Aryan only' signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
101. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, Athens, 1977. PP. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi, Germany carried 'Aryan only' signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
102. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solutions, pp. 69-73, 81-4, 172 n. 68; Friedl̈ander, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 22, 125-30, 232-6, 259, 323-4. Gallately, The Gestapo and German Society, pp. 206-8; (quote), 106, 171; Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question, pp. 169, 171, 175, 206-8; Kater, 'Everyday Anti-Semitism in Prewar Nazi Germany, pp. 147-8, 154-6; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 232, 233, 240, 243, 244, 256, 272-4; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30; Otto Dov Kulka and Aron Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', in Yad Vashem Studies, Jerusalem 1984, p. 426; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 233-4, Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, Athens, 1977. PP. 37, 40. Benches in Nazi, Germany carried 'Aryan only' signs but of course such measures were commonplace in the South until the 1960s.
103. For the Nuremberg Laws, see Helmut Krausnick, 'The Persecution of the Jews', in Helmut Krausnick et al. , Anatomy of the SS State, New York 1965, pp. 32-3; and Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', pp. 103-5. For popular German reaction to the Nuremberg Laws, see especially Otto Dov Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', The Jerusalem Quarterly, Fall 1982, pp. 124-35. Kulka conclude that most Germans supported the laws, although a 'quite sizeable portion of the population was indifferent' (p. 135). The US Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965. The Supreme court first declared a state miscegenation law unconstitutional in 1967 (Loving v. Virginia).
104. For the Nuremberg Laws, see Helmut Krausnick, 'The Persecution of the Jews', in Helmut Krausnick et al. , Anatomy of the SS State, New York 1965, pp. 32-3; and Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', pp. 103-5. For popular German reaction to the Nuremberg Laws, see especially Otto Dov Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', The Jerusalem Quarterly, Fall 1982, pp. 124-35. Kulka conclude that most Germans supported the laws, although a 'quite sizeable portion of the population was indifferent' (p. 135). The US Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965. The Supreme court first declared a state miscegenation law unconstitutional in 1967 (Loving v. Virginia).
105. For the Nuremberg Laws, see Helmut Krausnick, 'The Persecution of the Jews', in Helmut Krausnick et al. , Anatomy of the SS State, New York 1965, pp. 32-3; and Hans Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', pp. 103-5. For popular German reaction to the Nuremberg Laws, see especially Otto Dov Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', The Jerusalem Quarterly, Fall 1982, pp. 124-35. Kulka conclude that most Germans supported the laws, although a 'quite sizeable portion of the population was indifferent' (p. 135). The US Voting Rights Act was passed in 1965. The Supreme court first declared a state miscegenation law unconstitutional in 1967 (Loving v. Virginia).
106. HWE, p. 95. Directly contradicting himself, Goldhagen writes elsewhere that 'Getmans' profound hatred of Jews. . . had in the 1930s by necessity dormant.' (HWE, p. 449, my emphasis)
107. HWE, p. 95. Directly contradicting himself, Goldhagen writes elsewhere that 'Getmans' profound hatred of Jews. . . had in the 1930s by necessity dormant.' (HWE, p. 449, my emphasis)
108. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
109. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
110. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
111. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
112. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
113. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
114. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
115. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
116. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
117. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
118. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
119. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
120. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
121. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
122. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
123. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 4; Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, pp. 271, 265; see also pp. 172, 234-5, 239, 240, 243-4, 256, 260-74. For further documentation of Bankier's conclusions, see Friedländer, Nazi Germany and the Jews, pp. 125, 163-4, 294-5; Gordon, Hitler, Germans and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 159, 173, 175-80, 206-8, 265-7; Ian Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question", 1939-1943: Some Further Reflections', in Arnold Paucker, ed., The Jews in Nazi Germany, 1933-1943, Tubingen 1986, pp. 368-9; Kershaw, The 'Hitler Myth', pp. 229-30, 235-7; Kulka, '"Public Opinion" in Nazi Germany and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 138-44; Kulka and Rodrigue, 'The German Population and the Jews in the Third Reich', p. 432; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', p. 116; Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York 1942, p. 121; Pulzer, Jews and the German State, p. 347; Pulzer, The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism, p. 71; Reichmann, Hostages of Civilization, pp. 201, 233-4, 238; Marlis Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 37, 40; Herbert A. Strauss, 'Jewish Emigration from Germany-Nazi Policies and Jewish Responses', in Leo Baeck Institute, Year Book XXV, New York 1980, p. 331. Bankier discounts, while Kershaw credits, German moral outrage to Kristallnacht. Kulka and Rodrigue reasonably conclude that 'we shall probably never know what the true proportions of both attitudes were.'
124. The scholarly consensus is that, 'Although without doubt some individual members of the white community condemned lynching, it is equally clear that a majority supported outlaw mob violence' Stewart E. Tolnay and E.M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930, Chicago 1992, p. 28; see also Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey, Chicago 1989, ch. 7, especially pp. 238ff; and Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching, New York 1969, p. 47. One may add that, for sheer brutality, Southern violence was in a class apart: the grisly torture, dismemberment and even roasting of its victims, along with the collection of bodily parts as souvenirs, were inconceivable in pre-war Nazi Germany. For an example, see Tolnay and Beck, A Festival of Violence, p. 23.
125. The scholarly consensus is that, 'Although without doubt some individual members of the white community condemned lynching, it is equally clear that a majority supported outlaw mob violence' Stewart E. Tolnay and E.M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930, Chicago 1992, p. 28; see also Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey, Chicago 1989, ch. 7, especially pp. 238ff; and Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching, New York 1969, p. 47. One may add that, for sheer brutality, Southern violence was in a class apart: the grisly torture, dismemberment and even roasting of its victims, along with the collection of bodily parts as souvenirs, were inconceivable in pre-war Nazi Germany. For an example, see Tolnay and Beck, A Festival of Violence, p. 23.
126. The scholarly consensus is that, 'Although without doubt some individual members of the white community condemned lynching, it is equally clear that a majority supported outlaw mob violence' Stewart E. Tolnay and E.M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930, Chicago 1992, p. 28; see also Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey, Chicago 1989, ch. 7, especially pp. 238ff; and Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching, New York 1969, p. 47. One may add that, for sheer brutality, Southern violence was in a class apart: the grisly torture, dismemberment and even roasting of its victims, along with the collection of bodily parts as souvenirs, were inconceivable in pre-war Nazi Germany. For an example, see Tolnay and Beck, A Festival of Violence, p. 23.
127. The scholarly consensus is that, 'Although without doubt some individual members of the white community condemned lynching, it is equally clear that a majority supported outlaw mob violence' Stewart E. Tolnay and E.M. Beck, A Festival of Violence: An Analysis of Southern Lynchings, 1882-1930, Chicago 1992, p. 28; see also Neil R. McMillen, Dark Journey, Chicago 1989, ch. 7, especially pp. 238ff; and Arthur F. Raper, The Tragedy of Lynching, New York 1969, p. 47. One may add that, for sheer brutality, Southern violence was in a class apart: the grisly torture, dismemberment and even roasting of its victims, along with the collection of bodily parts as souvenirs, were inconceivable in pre-war Nazi Germany. For an example, see Tolnay and Beck, A Festival of Violence, p. 23.
128. John W. Dower, War Without Mercy, New York 1986.
129. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, pp. 124-30.
130. Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, ch. 9; Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 136-45, 344-5.
131. Kershaw, Popular Opinion and Political Dissent, ch. 9; Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 136-45, 344-5.
132. Bankier, the Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 8, Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish QUestion', pp. 182-6; Hans Mommsen, 'What Did the Germans Know About the Genocide of the Jews?' in Walter H. Pehle, ed., November 1938, New York 1991; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', pp. 108, 128, 131 n. 12; Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 55, 140-5, 335. Probably only a small minority of Germans had specific knowledge of the death camps or gassings.
133. Bankier, the Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 8, Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish QUestion', pp. 182-6; Hans Mommsen, 'What Did the Germans Know About the Genocide of the Jews?' in Walter H. Pehle, ed., November 1938, New York 1991; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', pp. 108, 128, 131 n. 12; Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 55, 140-5, 335. Probably only a small minority of Germans had specific knowledge of the death camps or gassings.
134. Bankier, the Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 8, Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish QUestion', pp. 182-6; Hans Mommsen, 'What Did the Germans Know About the Genocide of the Jews?' in Walter H. Pehle, ed., November 1938, New York 1991; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', pp. 108, 128, 131 n. 12; Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 55, 140-5, 335. Probably only a small minority of Germans had specific knowledge of the death camps or gassings.
135. Bankier, the Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 8, Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish QUestion', pp. 182-6; Hans Mommsen, 'What Did the Germans Know About the Genocide of the Jews?' in Walter H. Pehle, ed., November 1938, New York 1991; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', pp. 108, 128, 131 n. 12; Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 55, 140-5, 335. Probably only a small minority of Germans had specific knowledge of the death camps or gassings.
136. Bankier, the Germans and the Final Solution, ch. 8, Gordon, Hitler Germans and the 'Jewish QUestion', pp. 182-6; Hans Mommsen, 'What Did the Germans Know About the Genocide of the Jews?' in Walter H. Pehle, ed., November 1938, New York 1991; Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Unthinkable', pp. 108, 128, 131 n. 12; Steinert, Hitler's War and the Germans, pp. 55, 140-5, 335. Probably only a small minority of Germans had specific knowledge of the death camps or gassings.
137. Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 366-84 (quote at pp. 383-4, original emphasis); Ian Kershaw, 'German Public Opinion During the Find Solution: Information, Comprehension, Reactions', in Asher Cohen et al., Comprehending the Holocaust, New York 1988, pp. 146-55 (quotes at pp. 146-7,155).
138. Kershaw, 'German Popular Opinion and the "Jewish Question"', pp. 366-84 (quote at pp. 383-4, original emphasis); Ian Kershaw, 'German Public Opinion During the Find Solution: Information, Comprehension, Reactions', in Asher Cohen et al., Comprehending the Holocaust, New York 1988, pp. 146-55 (quotes at pp. 146-7,155).
139. For the corrosive effects of the brutalizing combat and Nazi propaganda on ordinary German perpetrators, see especially Omer Bartov's companion studies, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, New York 1986 and Hitler's Army, Oxford I991. Goldhagen denies that the war brutalized the Germans. (HWE, p. 275) Yet he also reports, for example, that a police battalion lieutenant who originally 'refused to allow h,s men to participate in the killing of the Jews. . . was later to become a zealous killer, who performed with extrme ardor and brutality towards the victims.' (HWE, p. 535 n. 4) Goldhagen does not account for this metamorphosis. Is 'brutalization' so implausible an explanation? Goldhagen also dismisses as 'nonsense' the postwar rationale of, for example, the police battalion members that their participation in the genocide was partly in reaction to allied atrocities: 'Their killing began when Germany reigned supreme and hardly a bomb was being dropped on it.' (HWE, 537 n. 23) Police Battalion 101 - the focus of Goldhagen's study - embarked on outright genocide in July 1942. Yet Britain launched the first bomber offensive deliberately aimed at civilian German targets in May 1940. By early 1942, it was engaged in massive terror-bombing of German cites. The Allies, incidentally, inflicted far more civilian casualties on Grmany than they themselves suffered. Almost entirely restricted to Britain, German bombing of civilians caused about 51,000 deaths. The Allied air assaults, however, left about 600,000 German civilians dead. See Clive Ponting, Armageddon, New York 1995, pp. 239-40.
140. For the corrosive effects of the brutalizing combat and Nazi propaganda on ordinary German perpetrators, see especially Omer Bartov's companion studies, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, New York 1986 and Hitler's Army, Oxford I991. Goldhagen denies that the war brutalized the Germans. (HWE, p. 275) Yet he also reports, for example, that a police battalion lieutenant who originally 'refused to allow h,s men to participate in the killing of the Jews. . . was later to become a zealous killer, who performed with extrme ardor and brutality towards the victims.' (HWE, p. 535 n. 4) Goldhagen does not account for this metamorphosis. Is 'brutalization' so implausible an explanation? Goldhagen also dismisses as 'nonsense' the postwar rationale of, for example, the police battalion members that their participation in the genocide was partly in reaction to allied atrocities: 'Their killing began when Germany reigned supreme and hardly a bomb was being dropped on it.' (HWE, 537 n. 23) Police Battalion 101 - the focus of Goldhagen's study - embarked on outright genocide in July 1942. Yet Britain launched the first bomber offensive deliberately aimed at civilian German targets in May 1940. By early 1942, it was engaged in massive terror-bombing of German cites. The Allies, incidentally, inflicted far more civilian casualties on Grmany than they themselves suffered. Almost entirely restricted to Britain, German bombing of civilians caused about 51,000 deaths. The Allied air assaults, however, left about 600,000 German civilians dead. See Clive Ponting, Armageddon, New York 1995, pp. 239-40.
141. For the corrosive effects of the brutalizing combat and Nazi propaganda on ordinary German perpetrators, see especially Omer Bartov's companion studies, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, New York 1986 and Hitler's Army, Oxford I991. Goldhagen denies that the war brutalized the Germans. (HWE, p. 275) Yet he also reports, for example, that a police battalion lieutenant who originally 'refused to allow h,s men to participate in the killing of the Jews. . . was later to become a zealous killer, who performed with extrme ardor and brutality towards the victims.' (HWE, p. 535 n. 4) Goldhagen does not account for this metamorphosis. Is 'brutalization' so implausible an explanation? Goldhagen also dismisses as 'nonsense' the postwar rationale of, for example, the police battalion members that their participation in the genocide was partly in reaction to allied atrocities: 'Their killing began when Germany reigned supreme and hardly a bomb was being dropped on it.' (HWE, 537 n. 23) Police Battalion 101 - the focus of Goldhagen's study - embarked on outright genocide in July 1942. Yet Britain launched the first bomber offensive deliberately aimed at civilian German targets in May 1940. By early 1942, it was engaged in massive terror-bombing of German cites. The Allies, incidentally, inflicted far more civilian casualties on Grmany than they themselves suffered. Almost entirely restricted to Britain, German bombing of civilians caused about 51,000 deaths. The Allied air assaults, however, left about 600,000 German civilians dead. See Clive Ponting, Armageddon, New York 1995, pp. 239-40.
142. For the corrosive effects of the brutalizing combat and Nazi propaganda on ordinary German perpetrators, see especially Omer Bartov's companion studies, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, New York 1986 and Hitler's Army, Oxford I991. Goldhagen denies that the war brutalized the Germans. (HWE, p. 275) Yet he also reports, for example, that a police battalion lieutenant who originally 'refused to allow h,s men to participate in the killing of the Jews. . . was later to become a zealous killer, who performed with extrme ardor and brutality towards the victims.' (HWE, p. 535 n. 4) Goldhagen does not account for this metamorphosis. Is 'brutalization' so implausible an explanation? Goldhagen also dismisses as 'nonsense' the postwar rationale of, for example, the police battalion members that their participation in the genocide was partly in reaction to allied atrocities: 'Their killing began when Germany reigned supreme and hardly a bomb was being dropped on it.' (HWE, 537 n. 23) Police Battalion 101 - the focus of Goldhagen's study - embarked on outright genocide in July 1942. Yet Britain launched the first bomber offensive deliberately aimed at civilian German targets in May 1940. By early 1942, it was engaged in massive terror-bombing of German cites. The Allies, incidentally, inflicted far more civilian casualties on Grmany than they themselves suffered. Almost entirely restricted to Britain, German bombing of civilians caused about 51,000 deaths. The Allied air assaults, however, left about 600,000 German civilians dead. See Clive Ponting, Armageddon, New York 1995, pp. 239-40.
143. For the corrosive effects of the brutalizing combat and Nazi propaganda on ordinary German perpetrators, see especially Omer Bartov's companion studies, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, New York 1986 and Hitler's Army, Oxford I991. Goldhagen denies that the war brutalized the Germans. (HWE, p. 275) Yet he also reports, for example, that a police battalion lieutenant who originally 'refused to allow h,s men to participate in the killing of the Jews. . . was later to become a zealous killer, who performed with extrme ardor and brutality towards the victims.' (HWE, p. 535 n. 4) Goldhagen does not account for this metamorphosis. Is 'brutalization' so implausible an explanation? Goldhagen also dismisses as 'nonsense' the postwar rationale of, for example, the police battalion members that their participation in the genocide was partly in reaction to allied atrocities: 'Their killing began when Germany reigned supreme and hardly a bomb was being dropped on it.' (HWE, 537 n. 23) Police Battalion 101 - the focus of Goldhagen's study - embarked on outright genocide in July 1942. Yet Britain launched the first bomber offensive deliberately aimed at civilian German targets in May 1940. By early 1942, it was engaged in massive terror-bombing of German cites. The Allies, incidentally, inflicted far more civilian casualties on Grmany than they themselves suffered. Almost entirely restricted to Britain, German bombing of civilians caused about 51,000 deaths. The Allied air assaults, however, left about 600,000 German civilians dead. See Clive Ponting, Armageddon, New York 1995, pp. 239-40.
144. For the corrosive effects of the brutalizing combat and Nazi propaganda on ordinary German perpetrators, see especially Omer Bartov's companion studies, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, New York 1986 and Hitler's Army, Oxford I991. Goldhagen denies that the war brutalized the Germans. (HWE, p. 275) Yet he also reports, for example, that a police battalion lieutenant who originally 'refused to allow h,s men to participate in the killing of the Jews. . . was later to become a zealous killer, who performed with extrme ardor and brutality towards the victims.' (HWE, p. 535 n. 4) Goldhagen does not account for this metamorphosis. Is 'brutalization' so implausible an explanation? Goldhagen also dismisses as 'nonsense' the postwar rationale of, for example, the police battalion members that their participation in the genocide was partly in reaction to allied atrocities: 'Their killing began when Germany reigned supreme and hardly a bomb was being dropped on it.' (HWE, 537 n. 23) Police Battalion 101 - the focus of Goldhagen's study - embarked on outright genocide in July 1942. Yet Britain launched the first bomber offensive deliberately aimed at civilian German targets in May 1940. By early 1942, it was engaged in massive terror-bombing of German cites. The Allies, incidentally, inflicted far more civilian casualties on Grmany than they themselves suffered. Almost entirely restricted to Britain, German bombing of civilians caused about 51,000 deaths. The Allied air assaults, however, left about 600,000 German civilians dead. See Clive Ponting, Armageddon, New York 1995, pp. 239-40.
145. 'A perpetrator is anyone who knowingly contributed in some intimate way to the mass slaughter of Jews, generally anyone who worked in an institution of genocidal killing. This includes all people who themselves took the lives of Jews, and all those who set the scene for the final lethal act, whose help was instrumental in bringing about the deaths of Jews. So anyone who shot Jews as part of a killing squad was a perpetrator. Those who rounded up these same Jews, deported them (with knowledge of their fate) to a killing location, or cordoned off the area where their compatriots shot them were also perpetrators, even if they themselves did not do the actual killing. Perpetrators include railroad engineers and administrators who knew that they were transporting Jews to their deaths. They include any Church officials who knew that their participation in the identification of Jews as non-Christians would lead to the deaths of the Jews. They include the by now proverbial "desk-murderer" . . . who himself may not have seen the victims yet whose paperwork lubricated the wheels of deportation and destruction.' (HWE, p. 164; see also pp. 165, 523 n. 3)
146. 'A perpetrator is anyone who knowingly contributed in some intimate way to the mass slaughter of Jews, generally anyone who worked in an institution of genocidal killing. This includes all people who themselves took the lives of Jews, and all those who set the scene for the final lethal act, whose help was instrumental in bringing about the deaths of Jews. So anyone who shot Jews as part of a killing squad was a perpetrator. Those who rounded up these same Jews, deported them (with knowledge of their fate) to a killing location, or cordoned off the area where their compatriots shot them were also perpetrators, even if they themselves did not do the actual killing. Perpetrators include railroad engineers and administrators who knew that they were transporting Jews to their deaths. They include any Church officials who knew that their participation in the identification of Jews as non-Christians would lead to the deaths of the Jews. They include the by now proverbial "desk-murderer" . . . who himself may not have seen the victims yet whose paperwork lubricated the wheels of deportation and destruction.' (HWE, p. 164; see also pp. 165, 523 n. 3)
147. For Goldhagen's misrepresentation of the German archives, see Ruth Bettina Birn, 'Revising the Holocaust', The Historical Journal, vol. 40, no. 1, 1997, pp. 195-215. After submitting this manuscript for publication, I came across Birn's important review. Although our arguments occasionally overlap, her focus is Goldhagen's misuse of the archival sources, a topic I do not directly address.
148. HWE, pp. 181-5 203-22. Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, New York 1992, pp. 45-8, 61ff, 170-1. Even Nazi stalwarts organized in, for example, the Einsatzgruppen could refuse participation in the Judeocide without suffering substantive penalties. Indeed, all German perpetrators Could also exercise many options, short of outright refusal, to evade murderous orders. See Hans Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', in Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Anatomy of the ss State, New York 1965, pp. 373-5, 387; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, p. 55; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3, pp. 1024-5; Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, London 1969, p. 357; Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess, eds, 'The Good Old Days', New York 1991, pp. xx, 62, 75-86.
149. HWE, pp. 181-5 203-22. Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, New York 1992, pp. 45-8, 61ff, 170-1. Even Nazi stalwarts organized in, for example, the Einsatzgruppen could refuse participation in the Judeocide without suffering substantive penalties. Indeed, all German perpetrators Could also exercise many options, short of outright refusal, to evade murderous orders. See Hans Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', in Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Anatomy of the ss State, New York 1965, pp. 373-5, 387; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, p. 55; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3, pp. 1024-5; Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, London 1969, p. 357; Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess, eds, 'The Good Old Days', New York 1991, pp. xx, 62, 75-86.
150. HWE, pp. 181-5 203-22. Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, New York 1992, pp. 45-8, 61ff, 170-1. Even Nazi stalwarts organized in, for example, the Einsatzgruppen could refuse participation in the Judeocide without suffering substantive penalties. Indeed, all German perpetrators Could also exercise many options, short of outright refusal, to evade murderous orders. See Hans Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', in Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Anatomy of the ss State, New York 1965, pp. 373-5, 387; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, p. 55; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3, pp. 1024-5; Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, London 1969, p. 357; Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess, eds, 'The Good Old Days', New York 1991, pp. xx, 62, 75-86.
151. HWE, pp. 181-5 203-22. Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, New York 1992, pp. 45-8, 61ff, 170-1. Even Nazi stalwarts organized in, for example, the Einsatzgruppen could refuse participation in the Judeocide without suffering substantive penalties. Indeed, all German perpetrators Could also exercise many options, short of outright refusal, to evade murderous orders. See Hans Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', in Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Anatomy of the ss State, New York 1965, pp. 373-5, 387; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, p. 55; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3, pp. 1024-5; Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, London 1969, p. 357; Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess, eds, 'The Good Old Days', New York 1991, pp. xx, 62, 75-86.
152. HWE, pp. 181-5 203-22. Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, New York 1992, pp. 45-8, 61ff, 170-1. Even Nazi stalwarts organized in, for example, the Einsatzgruppen could refuse participation in the Judeocide without suffering substantive penalties. Indeed, all German perpetrators Could also exercise many options, short of outright refusal, to evade murderous orders. See Hans Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', in Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Anatomy of the ss State, New York 1965, pp. 373-5, 387; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, p. 55; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3, pp. 1024-5; Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, London 1969, p. 357; Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess, eds, 'The Good Old Days', New York 1991, pp. xx, 62, 75-86.
153. HWE, pp. 181-5 203-22. Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, New York 1992, pp. 45-8, 61ff, 170-1. Even Nazi stalwarts organized in, for example, the Einsatzgruppen could refuse participation in the Judeocide without suffering substantive penalties. Indeed, all German perpetrators Could also exercise many options, short of outright refusal, to evade murderous orders. See Hans Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', in Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Anatomy of the ss State, New York 1965, pp. 373-5, 387; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, p. 55; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3, pp. 1024-5; Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, London 1969, p. 357; Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess, eds, 'The Good Old Days', New York 1991, pp. xx, 62, 75-86.
154. HWE, pp. 181-5 203-22. Christopher Browning, Ordinary Men, New York 1992, pp. 45-8, 61ff, 170-1. Even Nazi stalwarts organized in, for example, the Einsatzgruppen could refuse participation in the Judeocide without suffering substantive penalties. Indeed, all German perpetrators Could also exercise many options, short of outright refusal, to evade murderous orders. See Hans Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', in Helmut Krausnick, Hans Buchheim, Martin Broszat, Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, Anatomy of the ss State, New York 1965, pp. 373-5, 387; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, p. 55; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 3, pp. 1024-5; Heinz Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, London 1969, p. 357; Ernst Klee, Willi Dressen, Volker Riess, eds, 'The Good Old Days', New York 1991, pp. xx, 62, 75-86.
155. Browning, Ordinary Men, pp. 73, 150ff, 184.
156. HWE, pp. 17, 188, 228, 256, 259, 386, 388-9, 396-8, 400, 457, 480 n. 40, original emphasis. Faulting 'conventional explanations' for ignoring the cruelty dimension, Goldhagen, in his inimitable style, alleges: 'They do not acknowledge the "inhumanity" of the deeds as being anything other than epiphenomenal to the underlying phenomenon to be explained.' (HWE, p. 392)
157. HWE, pp. 17, 188, 228, 256, 259, 386, 388-9, 396-8, 400, 457, 480 n. 40, original emphasis. Faulting 'conventional explanations' for ignoring the cruelty dimension, Goldhagen, in his inimitable style, alleges: 'They do not acknowledge the "inhumanity" of the deeds as being anything other than epiphenomenal to the underlying phenomenon to be explained.' (HWE, p. 392)
158. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, Ner York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote), 372; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 115 (quote), 118 (quote), 121 (quote); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 326 (quote), 332-3 (quote), vol. 3, pp. 904, 1009-10; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, London 1974, pp. 70, 142-3, 150, 171-3, 201-3; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 307, 325 (quote), 328 (quote), 364-6, 382 (quote), 383, 386ff; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 195ff (quote); Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Uthinkable', p. 99.
159. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, Ner York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote), 372; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 115 (quote), 118 (quote), 121 (quote); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 326 (quote), 332-3 (quote), vol. 3, pp. 904, 1009-10; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, London 1974, pp. 70, 142-3, 150, 171-3, 201-3; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 307, 325 (quote), 328 (quote), 364-6, 382 (quote), 383, 386ff; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 195ff (quote); Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Uthinkable', p. 99.
160. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, Ner York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote), 372; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 115 (quote), 118 (quote), 121 (quote); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 326 (quote), 332-3 (quote), vol. 3, pp. 904, 1009-10; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, London 1974, pp. 70, 142-3, 150, 171-3, 201-3; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 307, 325 (quote), 328 (quote), 364-6, 382 (quote), 383, 386ff; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 195ff (quote); Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Uthinkable', p. 99.
161. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, Ner York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote), 372; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 115 (quote), 118 (quote), 121 (quote); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 326 (quote), 332-3 (quote), vol. 3, pp. 904, 1009-10; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, London 1974, pp. 70, 142-3, 150, 171-3, 201-3; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 307, 325 (quote), 328 (quote), 364-6, 382 (quote), 383, 386ff; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 195ff (quote); Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Uthinkable', p. 99.
162. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, Ner York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote),
163. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, Ner York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote), 372; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 115 (quote), 118 (quote), 121 (quote); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 326 (quote), 332-3 (quote), vol. 3, pp. 904, 1009-10; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, London 1974, pp. 70, 142-3, 150, 171-3, 201-3; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 307, 325 (quote), 328 (quote), 364-6, 382 (quote), 383, 386ff; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 195ff (quote); Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Uthinkable', p. 99.
164. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, Ner York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote), 372; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 115 (quote), 118 (quote), 121 (quote); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 326 (quote), 332-3 (quote), vol. 3, pp. 904, 1009-10; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, London 1974, pp. 70, 142-3, 150, 171-3, 201-3; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 307, 325 (quote), 328 (quote), 364-6, 382 (quote), 383, 386ff; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 195ff (quote); Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Uthinkable', p. 99.
165. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, Ner York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote), 372; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 115 (quote), 118 (quote), 121 (quote); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 326 (quote), 332-3 (quote), vol. 3, pp. 904, 1009-10; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, London 1974, pp. 70, 142-3, 150, 171-3, 201-3; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 307, 325 (quote), 328 (quote), 364-6, 382 (quote), 383, 386ff; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 195ff (quote); Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Uthinkable', p. 99.
166. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, Ner York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote), 372; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 115 (quote), 118 (quote), 121 (quote); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 326 (quote), 332-3 (quote), vol. 3, pp. 904, 1009-10; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, London 1974, pp. 70, 142-3, 150, 171-3, 201-3; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 307, 325 (quote), 328 (quote), 364-6, 382 (quote), 383, 386ff; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 195ff (quote); Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Uthinkable', p. 99.
167. On these and related points, see Omer Bartov, The Eastern Front, 1941-45, p. 115; Richard Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, Ner York 1991, p. 250; Buchheim, 'Command and Compliance', pp. 338 (quote), 351, 361-2, 363 (quote), 372; Joachim Fest, The Face of the Third Reich, New York 1970, pp. 115 (quote), 118 (quote), 121 (quote); Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 326 (quote), 332-3 (quote), vol. 3, pp. 904, 1009-10; Rudolf Hoess, Commandant of Auschwitz, London 1974, pp. 70, 142-3, 150, 171-3, 201-3; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 307, 325 (quote), 328 (quote), 364-6, 382 (quote), 383, 386ff; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 195ff (quote); Mommsen, 'The Realization of the Uthinkable', p. 99.
168. Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, New York 1984, p. 18, see also p. 93; Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror, Princeton, 1997, pp. 137-49.
169. Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, New York 1984, p. 18, see also p. 93; Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror, Princeton, 1997, pp. 137-49.
170. Viktor E. Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, New York 1984, p. 18, see also p. 93; Wolfgang Sofsky, The Order of Terror, Princeton, 1997, pp. 137-49.
171. Dower, War Without Mercy, p. 65.
172. HWE, pp. 268, 585 n. 73. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, p. 325; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', p. 195ff. For the German photographs, see also Bartov, Hitler's Army, pp. 104-5.
173. HWE, pp. 268, 585 n. 73. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, p. 325; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', p. 195ff. For the German photographs, see also Bartov, Hitler's Army, pp. 104-5.
174. HWE, pp. 268, 585 n. 73. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, p. 325; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', p. 195ff. For the German photographs, see also Bartov, Hitler's Army, pp. 104-5.
175. HWE, pp. 268, 585 n. 73. Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, p. 325; Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', p. 195ff. For the German photographs, see also Bartov, Hitler's Army, pp. 104-5.
176. Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, p. 363; Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 92; Ella Lingens-Reiner, Prisoners of Fear, London 1948, pp. 129, 41 (see also ch. 8); Bernd Naumann, Auschwitz, New York 1966, p. 91; Tzvetan Toodorov, Facing the Extreme, New York, 1996, p. 122; Sofsky, The Order of Terror, ch. 20. Ironically, Goldhagen chastises other historians for ignoring survivor testimony (see Goldhagen's review of Browning in The New Republic, 13-20 July 1992, yet on this - the crucial - point of his thesis, Goldhagen himself ignores what the classic survivor accounts report. For a clinical study that reaches the same conclusions as the survivors, see Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, especially pp. 117, 119, 180-1. Regarding earlier versions of the Goldhagen thesis, Lingens-Reiner cautioned: When one report after the other focused the glare of its searchlight on the final horrors and the most outrageous atrocities, I began to feel . . . that something was missing, something therefore was wrong. Not that the most terrifying descriptions of inhuman cruelties and inhuman misery were not true! Yet, when the spotlight picked them out, it seemed to me that the background which made them possible, the day-to-day happenings and 'normal' aspects of concentration camp life, became almost invisible and unintelligible. And if only the sensational horrors were registered, there was a danger that the for deeper, but less blatant, horror of the whole system would not be fully understood. (p. ix)
177. Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, p. 363; Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 92; Ella Lingens-Reiner, Prisoners of Fear, London 1948, pp. 129, 41 (see also ch. 8); Bernd Naumann, Auschwitz, New York 1966, p. 91; Tzvetan Toodorov, Facing the Extreme, New York, 1996, p. 122; Sofsky, The Order of Terror, ch. 20. Ironically, Goldhagen chastises other historians for ignoring survivor testimony (see Goldhagen's review of Browning in The New Republic, 13-20 July 1992, yet on this - the crucial - point of his thesis, Goldhagen himself ignores what the classic survivor accounts report. For a clinical study that reaches the same conclusions as the survivors, see Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, especially pp. 117, 119, 180-1. Regarding earlier versions of the Goldhagen thesis, Lingens-Reiner cautioned: When one report after the other focused the glare of its searchlight on the final horrors and the most outrageous atrocities, I began to feel . . . that something was missing, something therefore was wrong. Not that the most terrifying descriptions of inhuman cruelties and inhuman misery were not true! Yet, when the spotlight picked them out, it seemed to me that the background which made them possible, the day-to-day happenings and 'normal' aspects of concentration camp life, became almost invisible and unintelligible. And if only the sensational horrors were registered, there was a danger that the for deeper, but less blatant, horror of the whole system would not be fully understood. (p. ix)
178. Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, p. 363; Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 92; Ella Lingens-Reiner, Prisoners of Fear, London 1948, pp. 129, 41 (see also ch. 8); Bernd Naumann, Auschwitz, New York 1966, p. 91; Tzvetan Toodorov, Facing the Extreme, New York, 1996, p. 122; Sofsky, The Order of Terror, ch. 20. Ironically, Goldhagen chastises other historians for ignoring survivor testimony (see Goldhagen's review of Browning in The New Republic, 13-20 July 1992, yet on this - the crucial - point of his thesis, Goldhagen himself ignores what the classic survivor accounts report. For a clinical study that reaches the same conclusions as the survivors, see Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, especially pp. 117, 119, 180-1. Regarding earlier versions of the Goldhagen thesis, Lingens-Reiner cautioned: When one report after the other focused the glare of its searchlight on the final horrors and the most outrageous atrocities, I began to feel . . . that something was missing, something therefore was wrong. Not that the most terrifying descriptions of inhuman cruelties and inhuman misery were not true! Yet, when the spotlight picked them out, it seemed to me that the background which made them possible, the day-to-day happenings and 'normal' aspects of concentration camp life, became almost invisible and unintelligible. And if only the sensational horrors were registered, there was a danger that the for deeper, but less blatant, horror of the whole system would not be fully understood. (p. ix)
179. Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, p. 363; Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 92; Ella Lingens-Reiner, Prisoners of Fear, London 1948, pp. 129, 41 (see also ch. 8); Bernd Naumann, Auschwitz, New York 1966, p. 91; Tzvetan Toodorov, Facing the Extreme, New York, 1996, p. 122; Sofsky, The Order of Terror, ch. 20. Ironically, Goldhagen chastises other historians for ignoring survivor testimony (see Goldhagen's review of Browning in The New Republic, 13-20 July 1992, yet on this - the crucial - point of his thesis, Goldhagen himself ignores what the classic survivor accounts report. For a clinical study that reaches the same conclusions as the survivors, see Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, especially pp. 117, 119, 180-1. Regarding earlier versions of the Goldhagen thesis, Lingens-Reiner cautioned: When one report after the other focused the glare of its searchlight on the final horrors and the most outrageous atrocities, I began to feel . . . that something was missing, something therefore was wrong. Not that the most terrifying descriptions of inhuman cruelties and inhuman misery were not true! Yet, when the spotlight picked them out, it seemed to me that the background which made them possible, the day-to-day happenings and 'normal' aspects of concentration camp life, became almost invisible and unintelligible. And if only the sensational horrors were registered, there was a danger that the for deeper, but less blatant, horror of the whole system would not be fully understood. (p. ix)
180. Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, p. 363; Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 92; Ella Lingens-Reiner, Prisoners of Fear, London 1948, pp. 129, 41 (see also ch. 8); Bernd Naumann, Auschwitz, New York 1966, p. 91; Tzvetan Toodorov, Facing the Extreme, New York, 1996, p. 122; Sofsky, The Order of Terror, ch. 20. Ironically, Goldhagen chastises other historians for ignoring survivor testimony (see Goldhagen's review of Browning in The New Republic, 13-20 July 1992, yet on this - the crucial - point of his thesis, Goldhagen himself ignores what the classic survivor accounts report. For a clinical study that reaches the same conclusions as the survivors, see Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, especially pp. 117, 119, 180-1. Regarding earlier versions of the Goldhagen thesis, Lingens-Reiner cautioned: When one report after the other focused the glare of its searchlight on the final horrors and the most outrageous atrocities, I began to feel . . . that something was missing, something therefore was wrong. Not that the most terrifying descriptions of inhuman cruelties and inhuman misery were not true! Yet, when the spotlight picked them out, it seemed to me that the background which made them possible, the day-to-day happenings and 'normal' aspects of concentration camp life, became almost invisible and unintelligible. And if only the sensational horrors were registered, there was a danger that the for deeper, but less blatant, horror of the whole system would not be fully understood. (p. ix)
181. Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, p. 363; Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 92; Ella Lingens-Reiner, Prisoners of Fear, London 1948, pp. 129, 41 (see also ch. 8); Bernd Naumann, Auschwitz, New York 1966, p. 91; Tzvetan Toodorov, Facing the Extreme, New York, 1996, p. 122; Sofsky, The Order of Terror, ch. 20. Ironically, Goldhagen chastises other historians for ignoring survivor testimony (see Goldhagen's review of Browning in The New Republic, 13-20 July 1992, yet on this - the crucial - point of his thesis, Goldhagen himself ignores what the classic survivor accounts report. For a clinical study that reaches the same conclusions as the survivors, see Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, especially pp. 117, 119, 180-1. Regarding earlier versions of the Goldhagen thesis, Lingens-Reiner cautioned: When one report after the other focused the glare of its searchlight on the final horrors and the most outrageous atrocities, I began to feel . . . that something was missing, something therefore was wrong. Not that the most terrifying descriptions of inhuman cruelties and inhuman misery were not true! Yet, when the spotlight picked them out, it seemed to me that the background which made them possible, the day-to-day happenings and 'normal' aspects of concentration camp life, became almost invisible and unintelligible. And if only the sensational horrors were registered, there was a danger that the for deeper, but less blatant, horror of the whole system would not be fully understood. (p. ix)
182. Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, p. 363; Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 92; Ella Lingens-Reiner, Prisoners of Fear, London 1948, pp. 129, 41 (see also ch. 8); Bernd Naumann, Auschwitz, New York 1966, p. 91; Tzvetan Toodorov, Facing the Extreme, New York, 1996, p. 122; Sofsky, The Order of Terror, ch. 20. Ironically, Goldhagen chastises other historians for ignoring survivor testimony (see Goldhagen's review of Browning in The New Republic, 13-20 July 1992, yet on this - the crucial - point of his thesis, Goldhagen himself ignores what the classic survivor accounts report. For a clinical study that reaches the same conclusions as the survivors, see Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, especially pp. 117, 119, 180-1. Regarding earlier versions of the Goldhagen thesis, Lingens-Reiner cautioned: When one report after the other focused the glare of its searchlight on the final horrors and the most outrageous atrocities, I began to feel . . . that something was missing, something therefore was wrong. Not that the most terrifying descriptions of inhuman cruelties and inhuman misery were not true! Yet, when the spotlight picked them out, it seemed to me that the background which made them possible, the day-to-day happenings and 'normal' aspects of concentration camp life, became almost invisible and unintelligible. And if only the sensational horrors were registered, there was a danger that the for deeper, but less blatant, horror of the whole system would not be fully understood. (p. ix)
183. Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, p. 363; Frankl, Man's Search for Meaning, p. 92; Ella Lingens-Reiner, Prisoners of Fear, London 1948, pp. 129, 41 (see also ch. 8); Bernd Naumann, Auschwitz, New York 1966, p. 91; Tzvetan Toodorov, Facing the Extreme, New York, 1996, p. 122; Sofsky, The Order of Terror, ch. 20. Ironically, Goldhagen chastises other historians for ignoring survivor testimony (see Goldhagen's review of Browning in The New Republic, 13-20 July 1992, yet on this - the crucial - point of his thesis, Goldhagen himself ignores what the classic survivor accounts report. For a clinical study that reaches the same conclusions as the survivors, see Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, especially pp. 117, 119, 180-1. Regarding earlier versions of the Goldhagen thesis, Lingens-Reiner cautioned: When one report after the other focused the glare of its searchlight on the final horrors and the most outrageous atrocities, I began to feel . . . that something was missing, something therefore was wrong. Not that the most terrifying descriptions of inhuman cruelties and inhuman misery were not true! Yet, when the spotlight picked them out, it seemed to me that the background which made them possible, the day-to-day happenings and 'normal' aspects of concentration camp life, became almost invisible and unintelligible. And if only the sensational horrors were registered, there was a danger that the for deeper, but less blatant, horror of the whole system would not be fully understood. (p. ix)
184. Note that, according to Browning, 'there was a pronounced reluctance of the witnesses to criticize their former comrades' and that 'such denunciations by the policemen, even of unpopular superiors, much less of their comrades, were extremely rare.' Ordinary Men, pp. 108, 151-2.
185. For other example, see HWE, pp. 198, 228, 252, 540 n. 58.
186. For the Einsatzgruppen, see especially Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV (cited phrase on p. 490).
187. See Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 196-7, 204; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, pp. 21, 55, 95; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 327-8, 332-3, vol. 3, pp. 1008-10; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 357, 363 (quote), 366-7; Ernst Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 5, 60, 68, 81-3, 129; Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, pp. 183, 206, 245, 311.
188. See Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 196-7, 204; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, pp. 21, 55, 95; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 327-8, 332-3, vol. 3, pp. 1008-10; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 357, 363 (quote), 366-7; Ernst Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 5, 60, 68, 81-3, 129; Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, pp. 183, 206, 245, 311.
189. See Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 196-7, 204; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, pp. 21, 55, 95; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 327-8, 332-3, vol. 3, pp. 1008-10; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 357, 363 (quote), 366-7; Ernst Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 5, 60, 68, 81-3, 129; Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, pp. 183, 206, 245, 311.
190. See Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 196-7, 204; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, pp. 21, 55, 95; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 327-8, 332-3, vol. 3, pp. 1008-10; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 357, 363 (quote), 366-7; Ernst Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 5, 60, 68, 81-3, 129; Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, pp. 183, 206, 245, 311.
191. See Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 196-7, 204; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, pp. 21, 55, 95; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 327-8, 332-3, vol. 3, pp. 1008-10; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 357, 363 (quote), 366-7; Ernst Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 5, 60, 68, 81-3, 129; Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, pp. 183, 206, 245, 311.
192. See Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 196-7, 204; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, pp. 21, 55, 95; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 327-8, 332-3, vol. 3, pp. 1008-10; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 357, 363 (quote), 366-7; Ernst Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 5, 60, 68, 81-3, 129; Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, pp. 183, 206, 245, 311.
193. See Breitman, The Architect of Genocide, pp. 196-7, 204; Hilberg, Perpetrators, Victims, Bystanders, pp. 21, 55, 95; Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews, vol. 1, pp. 327-8, 332-3, vol. 3, pp. 1008-10; Höhne, The Order of the Death's Head, pp. 357, 363 (quote), 366-7; Ernst Klee et al., 'The Good Old Days', pp. 5, 60, 68, 81-3, 129; Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, pp. 183, 206, 245, 311.
194. Bankier, The Germans and the Final Solution, p. 150.
195. Goldhagen's treatment of German anti-Semitism at the end of the war is typically disingenuous. From the multitude of immediate postwar surveys with their wildly contradictory findings, he culls only the most damning statistic. Thus he reports that 'a survey done by American occupation authorities at the end of 1946 revealed that fully 61 per cent of Germans were willing to express views that classified them as racists or anti-Semites.' (HWE, p. 593 n. 53) But turning to the cited study, we also learn that, according to a survey a year earlier, fully 61 per cent agreed that 'the actions against the Jews were in no way justified.' Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge, Oxford 1992, pp. 117-18. For a sensitive appraisal of the postwar surveys, see Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 197-209. Juxtaposing one finding that nearly 80 per cent of Germans totally opposed Hitlers anti-Semitism against another - albeit in response to a 'badly phrased question' - that nearly 40 per cent approved the extermination, Gordon concludes that no definitive conclusion is possible from these surveys. Adolf Hitler, My New Order, New York 1941, p. 777; Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, New York 1979, pp. 522-4, 531-40, 548-9 (quote at 534). The phrase 'concentration camps' was borrowed from the notorius reconcentrado camps set up by the Spanish to deal with the Cuban guerrillas.
196. Goldhagen's treatment of German anti-Semitism at the end of the war is typically disingenuous. From the multitude of immediate postwar surveys with their wildly contradictory findings, he culls only the most damning statistic. Thus he reports that 'a survey done by American occupation authorities at the end of 1946 revealed that fully 61 per cent of Germans were willing to express views that classified them as racists or anti-Semites.' (HWE, p. 593 n. 53) But turning to the cited study, we also learn that, according to a survey a year earlier, fully 61 per cent agreed that 'the actions against the Jews were in no way justified.' Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge, Oxford 1992, pp. 117-18. For a sensitive appraisal of the postwar surveys, see Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 197-209. Juxtaposing one finding that nearly 80 per cent of Germans totally opposed Hitlers anti-Semitism against another - albeit in response to a 'badly phrased question' - that nearly 40 per cent approved the extermination, Gordon concludes that no definitive conclusion is possible from these surveys. Adolf Hitler, My New Order, New York 1941, p. 777; Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, New York 1979, pp. 522-4, 531-40, 548-9 (quote at 534). The phrase 'concentration camps' was borrowed from the notorius reconcentrado camps set up by the Spanish to deal with the Cuban guerrillas.
197. Goldhagen's treatment of German anti-Semitism at the end of the war is typically disingenuous. From the multitude of immediate postwar surveys with their wildly contradictory findings, he culls only the most damning statistic. Thus he reports that 'a survey done by American occupation authorities at the end of 1946 revealed that fully 61 per cent of Germans were willing to express views that classified them as racists or anti-Semites.' (HWE, p. 593 n. 53) But turning to the cited study, we also learn that, according to a survey a year earlier, fully 61 per cent agreed that 'the actions against the Jews were in no way justified.' Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge, Oxford 1992, pp. 117-18. For a sensitive appraisal of the postwar surveys, see Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 197-209. Juxtaposing one finding that nearly 80 per cent of Germans totally opposed Hitlers anti-Semitism against another - albeit in response to a 'badly phrased question' - that nearly 40 per cent approved the extermination, Gordon concludes that no definitive conclusion is possible from these surveys. Adolf Hitler, My New Order, New York 1941, p. 777; Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, New York 1979, pp. 522-4, 531-40, 548-9 (quote at 534). The phrase 'concentration camps' was borrowed from the notorius reconcentrado camps set up by the Spanish to deal with the Cuban guerrillas.
198. Goldhagen's treatment of German anti-Semitism at the end of the war is typically disingenuous. From the multitude of immediate postwar surveys with their wildly contradictory findings, he culls only the most damning statistic. Thus he reports that 'a survey done by American occupation authorities at the end of 1946 revealed that fully 61 per cent of Germans were willing to express views that classified them as racists or anti-Semites.' (HWE, p. 593 n. 53) But turning to the cited study, we also learn that, according to a survey a year earlier, fully 61 per cent agreed that 'the actions against the Jews were in no way justified.' Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge, Oxford 1992, pp. 117-18. For a sensitive appraisal of the postwar surveys, see Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 197-209. Juxtaposing one finding that nearly 80 per cent of Germans totally opposed Hitlers anti-Semitism against another - albeit in response to a 'badly phrased question' - that nearly 40 per cent approved the extermination, Gordon concludes that no definitive conclusion is possible from these surveys. Adolf Hitler, My New Order, New York 1941, p. 777; Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, New York 1979, pp. 522-4, 531-40, 548-9 (quote at 534). The phrase 'concentration camps' was borrowed from the notorius reconcentrado camps set up by the Spanish to deal with the Cuban guerrillas.
199. Goldhagen's treatment of German anti-Semitism at the end of the war is typically disingenuous. From the multitude of immediate postwar surveys with their wildly contradictory findings, he culls only the most damning statistic. Thus he reports that 'a survey done by American occupation authorities at the end of 1946 revealed that fully 61 per cent of Germans were willing to express views that classified them as racists or anti-Semites.' (HWE, p. 593 n. 53) But turning to the cited study, we also learn that, according to a survey a year earlier, fully 61 per cent agreed that 'the actions against the Jews were in no way justified.' Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge, Oxford 1992, pp. 117-18. For a sensitive appraisal of the postwar surveys, see Gordon, Hitler, Germans, and the 'Jewish Question', pp. 197-209. Juxtaposing one finding that nearly 80 per cent of Germans totally opposed Hitlers anti-Semitism against another - albeit in response to a 'badly phrased question' - that nearly 40 per cent approved the extermination, Gordon concludes that no definitive conclusion is possible from these surveys. Adolf Hitler, My New Order, New York 1941, p. 777; Thomas Pakenham, The Boer War, New York 1979, pp. 522-4, 531-40, 548-9 (quote at 534). The phrase 'concentration camps' was borrowed from the notorius reconcentrado camps set up by the Spanish to deal with the Cuban guerrillas.
200. Dower, War Without Mercy, pp. 36, 40-1, 53-55.
201. Theodore Roosevelt, Winning of the West, New York 1889, vol. 1, p. 119, vol. 4, pp. 54-6; Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Cambridge 1951, vol. 2, pp. 1176-77, vol. 8, p. 946. Denouncing the Nazis' racist Weltanschauung, the Nuremberg Tribunal repeatedly cited these words from a Hitler speech: But long ago man has proceeded in the same way with his fellowman. The higher race - at first higher in the sense of possessing a greater gift for organization - subjects to itself a lower race and thus constitutes a relationship which now embraces races of unequal value. Thus there results the subjection of a number of people under the will often of only a few persons, a subjection based simply on the right of the stronger, a right as we see it in nature can be regarded as the sole conceivable right because founded on reason. Although plainly racist, Hitler's argument was but an anemic version of Roosevelt's. In the Tribunal's final judgement, of the two individuals specifically lauded for lightening humanity's dark history, the first was 'President Theodore Roosevelt'. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, vol. IV, pp. 33, 279, 497.
202. Theodore Roosevelt, Winning of the West, New York 1889, vol. 1, p. 119, vol. 4, pp. 54-6; Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Cambridge 1951, vol. 2, pp. 1176-77, vol. 8, p. 946. Denouncing the Nazis' racist Weltanschauung, the Nuremberg Tribunal repeatedly cited these words from a Hitler speech: But long ago man has proceeded in the same way with his fellowman. The higher race - at first higher in the sense of possessing a greater gift for organization - subjects to itself a lower race and thus constitutes a relationship which now embraces races of unequal value. Thus there results the subjection of a number of people under the will often of only a few persons, a subjection based simply on the right of the stronger, a right as we see it in nature can be regarded as the sole conceivable right because founded on reason. Although plainly racist, Hitler's argument was but an anemic version of Roosevelt's. In the Tribunal's final judgement, of the two individuals specifically lauded for lightening humanity's dark history, the first was 'President Theodore Roosevelt'. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, vol. IV, pp. 33, 279, 497.
203. Theodore Roosevelt, Winning of the West, New York 1889, vol. 1, p. 119, vol. 4, pp. 54-6; Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Cambridge 1951, vol. 2, pp. 1176-77, vol. 8, p. 946. Denouncing the Nazis' racist Weltanschauung, the Nuremberg Tribunal repeatedly cited these words from a Hitler speech: But long ago man has proceeded in the same way with his fellowman. The higher race - at first higher in the sense of possessing a greater gift for organization - subjects to itself a lower race and thus constitutes a relationship which now embraces races of unequal value. Thus there results the subjection of a number of people under the will often of only a few persons, a subjection based simply on the right of the stronger, a right as we see it in nature can be regarded as the sole conceivable right because founded on reason. Although plainly racist, Hitler's argument was but an anemic version of Roosevelt's. In the Tribunal's final judgement, of the two individuals specifically lauded for lightening humanity's dark history, the first was 'President Theodore Roosevelt'. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, vol. IV, pp. 33, 279, 497.
204. Theodore Roosevelt, Winning of the West, New York 1889, vol. 1, p. 119, vol. 4, pp. 54-6; Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Cambridge 1951, vol. 2, pp. 1176-77, vol. 8, p. 946. Denouncing the Nazis' racist Weltanschauung, the Nuremberg Tribunal repeatedly cited these words from a Hitler speech: But long ago man has proceeded in the same way with his fellowman. The higher race - at first higher in the sense of possessing a greater gift for organization - subjects to itself a lower race and thus constitutes a relationship which now embraces races of unequal value. Thus there results the subjection of a number of people under the will often of only a few persons, a subjection based simply on the right of the stronger, a right as we see it in nature can be regarded as the sole conceivable right because founded on reason. Although plainly racist, Hitler's argument was but an anemic version of Roosevelt's. In the Tribunal's final judgement, of the two individuals specifically lauded for lightening humanity's dark history, the first was 'President Theodore Roosevelt'. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, vol. IV, pp. 33, 279, 497.
205. Theodore Roosevelt, Winning of the West, New York 1889, vol. 1, p. 119, vol. 4, pp. 54-6; Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, Cambridge 1951, vol. 2, pp. 1176-77, vol. 8, p. 946. Denouncing the Nazis' racist Weltanschauung, the Nuremberg Tribunal repeatedly cited these words from a Hitler speech: But long ago man has proceeded in the same way with his fellowman. The higher race - at first higher in the sense of possessing a greater gift for organization - subjects to itself a lower race and thus constitutes a relationship which now embraces races of unequal value. Thus there results the subjection of a number of people under the will often of only a few persons, a subjection based simply on the right of the stronger, a right as we see it in nature can be regarded as the sole conceivable right because founded on reason. Although plainly racist, Hitler's argument was but an anemic version of Roosevelt's. In the Tribunal's final judgement, of the two individuals specifically lauded for lightening humanity's dark history, the first was 'President Theodore Roosevelt'. Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals, vol. IV, pp. 33, 279, 497.
206. Compare, for example, Raul Hilberg's scathing assessments of Lucy Dawidowicz, the doyenne of Holocaust studies in the US, and Israel Gutman, director of the Research Centre of Yad Vashem in Israel. See Hilberg, The Politics of Memory.
207. To be sure, the sins varied. Hilberg was blackballed for allegedly minimizing Jewish resistance. Yet the ideological phantom of Jewish resistance only obscures the non-instrumental character of the Nazi genocide. Indeed, the claim of 'Jewish partisan activity' was the Einsatzgruppen's main pretext for the slaughter. For illuminating commentary on the ideological recasting of the Holocaust to incorporate Jewish resistance, see Tom Segev, The Seventh Million, New York 1993, pp. 109-10, 179-80, 183-4 and especially ch. 24. The banishment of Hannah Arendt from the Holocaust fold for pointing up the crucial role of Jewish cooperation in the Final Solution is well known. Recent revelations concerning Arendt's relationship with Martin Heidegger have fueled new speculation. Thus Richard Wolin suggests that this affair was behind Arendt's 'calumnies about the Jews'. The New Republic, 9 October 1995. Yet Arendt's indictment of Jewish collaboration pales beside that of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising leader Yitzak Zuckerman: 'We didn't figure that the Germans would put in the Jewish element, that Jews would lead Jews to death . . . There isn't another chapter in Jewish history in which the murderers themselves were basically Jews.' A Surplus of Memory, New York 1993, pp. 210, 212; see also pp. 192, 208-9. Arno Mayer's main blasphemy was emphasizing the salience of anti-Bolshevism alongside anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology. The hatchet man in his case was then-Harvard graduate student Daniel Goldhagen. See The New Republic, 17 April 1989.
208. To be sure, the sins varied. Hilberg was blackballed for allegedly minimizing Jewish resistance. Yet the ideological phantom of Jewish resistance only obscures the non-instrumental character of the Nazi genocide. Indeed, the claim of 'Jewish partisan activity' was the Einsatzgruppen's main pretext for the slaughter. For illuminating commentary on the ideological recasting of the Holocaust to incorporate Jewish resistance, see Tom Segev, The Seventh Million, New York 1993, pp. 109-10, 179-80, 183-4 and especially ch. 24. The banishment of Hannah Arendt from the Holocaust fold for pointing up the crucial role of Jewish cooperation in the Final Solution is well known. Recent revelations concerning Arendt's relationship with Martin Heidegger have fueled new speculation. Thus Richard Wolin suggests that this affair was behind Arendt's 'calumnies about the Jews'. The New Republic, 9 October 1995. Yet Arendt's indictment of Jewish collaboration pales beside that of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising leader Yitzak Zuckerman: 'We didn't figure that the Germans would put in the Jewish element, that Jews would lead Jews to death . . . There isn't another chapter in Jewish history in which the murderers themselves were basically Jews.' A Surplus of Memory, New York 1993, pp. 210, 212; see also pp. 192, 208-9. Arno Mayer's main blasphemy was emphasizing the salience of anti-Bolshevism alongside anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology. The hatchet man in his case was then-Harvard graduate student Daniel Goldhagen. See The New Republic, 17 April 1989.
209. To be sure, the sins varied. Hilberg was blackballed for allegedly minimizing Jewish resistance. Yet the ideological phantom of Jewish resistance only obscures the non-instrumental character of the Nazi genocide. Indeed, the claim of 'Jewish partisan activity' was the Einsatzgruppen's main pretext for the slaughter. For illuminating commentary on the ideological recasting of the Holocaust to incorporate Jewish resistance, see Tom Segev, The Seventh Million, New York 1993, pp. 109-10, 179-80, 183-4 and especially ch. 24. The banishment of Hannah Arendt from the Holocaust fold for pointing up the crucial role of Jewish cooperation in the Final Solution is well known. Recent revelations concerning Arendt's relationship with Martin Heidegger have fueled new speculation. Thus Richard Wolin suggests that this affair was behind Arendt's 'calumnies about the Jews'. The New Republic, 9 October 1995. Yet Arendt's indictment of Jewish collaboration pales beside that of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising leader Yitzak Zuckerman: 'We didn't figure that the Germans would put in the Jewish element, that Jews would lead Jews to death . . . There isn't another chapter in Jewish history in which the murderers themselves were basically Jews.' A Surplus of Memory, New York 1993, pp. 210, 212; see also pp. 192, 208-9. Arno Mayer's main blasphemy was emphasizing the salience of anti-Bolshevism alongside anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology. The hatchet man in his case was then-Harvard graduate student Daniel Goldhagen. See The New Republic, 17 April 1989.
210. To be sure, the sins varied. Hilberg was blackballed for allegedly minimizing Jewish resistance. Yet the ideological phantom of Jewish resistance only obscures the non-instrumental character of the Nazi genocide. Indeed, the claim of 'Jewish partisan activity' was the Einsatzgruppen's main pretext for the slaughter. For illuminating commentary on the ideological recasting of the Holocaust to incorporate Jewish resistance, see Tom Segev, The Seventh Million, New York 1993, pp. 109-10, 179-80, 183-4 and especially ch. 24. The banishment of Hannah Arendt from the Holocaust fold for pointing up the crucial role of Jewish cooperation in the Final Solution is well known. Recent revelations concerning Arendt's relationship with Martin Heidegger have fueled new speculation. Thus Richard Wolin suggests that this affair was behind Arendt's 'calumnies about the Jews'. The New Republic, 9 October 1995. Yet Arendt's indictment of Jewish collaboration pales beside that of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising leader Yitzak Zuckerman: 'We didn't figure that the Germans would put in the Jewish element, that Jews would lead Jews to death . . . There isn't another chapter in Jewish history in which the murderers themselves were basically Jews.' A Surplus of Memory, New York 1993, pp. 210, 212; see also pp. 192, 208-9. Arno Mayer's main blasphemy was emphasizing the salience of anti-Bolshevism alongside anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology. The hatchet man in his case was then-Harvard graduate student Daniel Goldhagen. See The New Republic, 17 April 1989.
211. To be sure, the sins varied. Hilberg was blackballed for allegedly minimizing Jewish resistance. Yet the ideological phantom of Jewish resistance only obscures the non-instrumental character of the Nazi genocide. Indeed, the claim of 'Jewish partisan activity' was the Einsatzgruppen's main pretext for the slaughter. For illuminating commentary on the ideological recasting of the Holocaust to incorporate Jewish resistance, see Tom Segev, The Seventh Million, New York 1993, pp. 109-10, 179-80, 183-4 and especially ch. 24. The banishment of Hannah Arendt from the Holocaust fold for pointing up the crucial role of Jewish cooperation in the Final Solution is well known. Recent revelations concerning Arendt's relationship with Martin Heidegger have fueled new speculation. Thus Richard Wolin suggests that this affair was behind Arendt's 'calumnies about the Jews'. The New Republic, 9 October 1995. Yet Arendt's indictment of Jewish collaboration pales beside that of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising leader Yitzak Zuckerman: 'We didn't figure that the Germans would put in the Jewish element, that Jews would lead Jews to death . . . There isn't another chapter in Jewish history in which the murderers themselves were basically Jews.' A Surplus of Memory, New York 1993, pp. 210, 212; see also pp. 192, 208-9. Arno Mayer's main blasphemy was emphasizing the salience of anti-Bolshevism alongside anti-Semitism in Nazi ideology. The hatchet man in his case was then-Harvard graduate student Daniel Goldhagen. See The New Republic, 17 April 1989.
212. Alongside Holocaust studies, a veritable Holocaust industry has sprung up. The recent publication of a Holocaust cookbook - to rave notices, no less - points up the marketing possibilities of Holocaust kitsch. Cara DeSilva, ed., In Memory's Kitchen, New York 1996.
213. Revealingly, Holocaust studies has been exempted from the current mainstream assault on what is disparagingly dubbed 'victim studies' - for example, women's and gay and lesbian studies. The explanation for this discrepancy is plainly not comparative scholarly worth. One may also note that the field of Judaic studies has enjoyed comparable immunity from current mainstream attacks on ethnic studies.
214. Indeed, Goldhagen is to Holocaust scholarship what Elie Wiesel is to Holocaust memory. In a highly-praised new memoir, All River Run to the Sea, New York 1995, Wiesel documents his credibility as a witness. Recently liberated from Buchenwald and only eighteen years old, he reports, 'I read The Critique of Pure Reason - don't laugh! - in Yiddish.' (pp. 139, 163-4) Leaving aside Wiesel's acknowledgement that at the time 'I was wholly ignorant of Yiddish grammar' (pp. 139, 163-4), The Critique of Pure Reason was never translated into Yiddish. This is only one of a number of extraordinary episodes in the book (for others, see pp. 121-30, 202). He who 'refuse to believe me', Wiesel protests, 'is lending credence to those who deny the Holocaust.' (p. 336)
215. In Alexander Bloom's Prodigal Sons, New York 1986, a richly detailed portrait of the New York Jewish intellectual scene through the late 1960s, there is scarcely a mention of either Zionism or Israel. The memoirs of prominent American Jewish intellectuals across the political spectrum confirm that 'none of us were Zionists' (Sidney Hook, Out of Step, New York 1987, p. 5), that 'the Six-Day War probably formed a turning point' (Irving Howe, A Margin of Hope, New York 1982, p. 277), and that Israel after the June war was 'now the religion of the American Jews' (Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, New York 1979, p. 335). To cite one illustrative example, Dissent magazine devoted only two or three articles to Israel from its founding in 1954 through the 1967 war. Yet in subsequent years, Dissent editors Irving Howe and Michael Walzer were seen both here and in Israel as intellectual mainstays of the Jewish state. One may further note that the only allusions in Dissent before the June war to the Nazi Holocaust were two critical reviews of Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem and an article commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.
216. In Alexander Bloom's Prodigal Sons, New York 1986, a richly detailed portrait of the New York Jewish intellectual scene through the late 1960s, there is scarcely a mention of either Zionism or Israel. The memoirs of prominent American Jewish intellectuals across the political spectrum confirm that 'none of us were Zionists' (Sidney Hook, Out of Step, New York 1987, p. 5), that 'the Six-Day War probably formed a turning point' (Irving Howe, A Margin of Hope, New York 1982, p. 277), and that Israel after the June war was 'now the religion of the American Jews' (Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, New York 1979, p. 335). To cite one illustrative example, Dissent magazine devoted only two or three articles to Israel from its founding in 1954 through the 1967 war. Yet in subsequent years, Dissent editors Irving Howe and Michael Walzer were seen both here and in Israel as intellectual mainstays of the Jewish state. One may further note that the only allusions in Dissent before the June war to the Nazi Holocaust were two critical reviews of Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem and an article commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.
217. In Alexander Bloom's Prodigal Sons, New York 1986, a richly detailed portrait of the New York Jewish intellectual scene through the late 1960s, there is scarcely a mention of either Zionism or Israel. The memoirs of prominent American Jewish intellectuals across the political spectrum confirm that 'none of us were Zionists' (Sidney Hook, Out of Step, New York 1987, p. 5), that 'the Six-Day War probably formed a turning point' (Irving Howe, A Margin of Hope, New York 1982, p. 277), and that Israel after the June war was 'now the religion of the American Jews' (Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, New York 1979, p. 335). To cite one illustrative example, Dissent magazine devoted only two or three articles to Israel from its founding in 1954 through the 1967 war. Yet in subsequent years, Dissent editors Irving Howe and Michael Walzer were seen both here and in Israel as intellectual mainstays of the Jewish state. One may further note that the only allusions in Dissent before the June war to the Nazi Holocaust were two critical reviews of Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem and an article commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.
218. In Alexander Bloom's Prodigal Sons, New York 1986, a richly detailed portrait of the New York Jewish intellectual scene through the late 1960s, there is scarcely a mention of either Zionism or Israel. The memoirs of prominent American Jewish intellectuals across the political spectrum confirm that 'none of us were Zionists' (Sidney Hook, Out of Step, New York 1987, p. 5), that 'the Six-Day War probably formed a turning point' (Irving Howe, A Margin of Hope, New York 1982, p. 277), and that Israel after the June war was 'now the religion of the American Jews' (Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, New York 1979, p. 335). To cite one illustrative example, Dissent magazine devoted only two or three articles to Israel from its founding in 1954 through the 1967 war. Yet in subsequent years, Dissent editors Irving Howe and Michael Walzer were seen both here and in Israel as intellectual mainstays of the Jewish state. One may further note that the only allusions in Dissent before the June war to the Nazi Holocaust were two critical reviews of Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem and an article commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.
219. In Alexander Bloom's Prodigal Sons, New York 1986, a richly detailed portrait of the New York Jewish intellectual scene through the late 1960s, there is scarcely a mention of either Zionism or Israel. The memoirs of prominent American Jewish intellectuals across the political spectrum confirm that 'none of us were Zionists' (Sidney Hook, Out of Step, New York 1987, p. 5), that 'the Six-Day War probably formed a turning point' (Irving Howe, A Margin of Hope, New York 1982, p. 277), and that Israel after the June war was 'now the religion of the American Jews' (Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, New York 1979, p. 335). To cite one illustrative example, Dissent magazine devoted only two or three articles to Israel from its founding in 1954 through the 1967 war. Yet in subsequent years, Dissent editors Irving Howe and Michael Walzer were seen both here and in Israel as intellectual mainstays of the Jewish state. One may further note that the only allusions in Dissent before the June war to the Nazi Holocaust were two critical reviews of Hannah Arendt's Eichmann in Jerusalem and an article commemorating the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising.
220. Goldhagen locates 'eliminationist anti-Semitism' - the tendency towards extermination - in Germany. Yet, in his formulation, it must be a general tendency. At any rate, Goldhagen never specifies why it was peculiar to Germany. To adduce the Nazi holocaust as evidence is plainly a post hoc, ergo propter hoc argument.
221. A full discussion of the origins of Holocaust culture would also have to include domestic sources. Aligned with black people against the Jim Crow system in the South, many Jews broke with the Civil Rights alliance in the late 1960s when the struggle for equality no longer turned on caste discrimination - from which they themselves had suffered -but rather economic privilege. Articulating the class outlook of an ethnic group that had largely 'made it' in the US, Jewish neoconservatives figured prominently in the assault on the poor. Playing the Holocaust card to deflect criticism, they wrapped themselves in the cloak of virginal innocence and bandied about the claim of 'black anti-Semitism'. In addition, former Jewish leftists joining the political mainstream exploited the Holocaust as they tarred the New Left with charges of anti-Semitism.
222. For the Joan Peters hoax, see Edward Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds, Blaming the Victims, New York 1988, ch. 1;
223. and Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, ch. 2. For the record, an abridged version of this manuscript was submitted to Harper's, The Nation, The New Republic and The New York Review of Books. No editor disputed the findings; none, however, expressed interest in publishing them.
224. Naumann, Auschwitz, p. 91;
225. Primo Levi, The Reawakening, New York 1965, p. 214;
226. Zillmer, The Quest for the Nazi Personality, pp. 79, 48;
227. Trials of War Criminals, vol. IV, p. 500.