The politics of economic policy-making in Zimbabwe

Journal of Modern African Studies

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 575-602

  Jenkins, Carolyn ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC POLICY; LOCAL PARTICIPATION; POLICY MAKING; STATE INTERVENTION;

ZIMBABWE;

EID: 0031462910     PISSN: 0022278X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0022278X97002589     Document Type: Article

References (68)

1. Zimbabwe's independence dates formally from 18 April 1980. The unilateral declaration of independence in 1965 was never recognised by the international community although, in effect, Britain had never interfered in the affairs of the colony, which from its establishment had controlled its own army and police force.
2. See, for example, R. Matthews, 'The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth', in Economic Journal (London), 96, 1986, pp. 903-18; Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1991); and John Harriss, Janet Hunter, and Colin Lewis, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development (London, 1995).
3. See, for example, R. Matthews, 'The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth', in Economic Journal (London), 96, 1986, pp. 903-18; Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1991); and John Harriss, Janet Hunter, and Colin Lewis, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development (London, 1995).
4. See, for example, R. Matthews, 'The Economics of Institutions and the Sources of Growth', in Economic Journal (London), 96, 1986, pp. 903-18; Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, 1991); and John Harriss, Janet Hunter, and Colin Lewis, The New Institutional Economics and Third World Development (London, 1995).
5. Thomas M. Callaghy, 'Toward State Capability and Embedded Liberalism in the Third World: lessons for adjustment', in Joan Nelson (ed.), Fragile Coalitions (Washington, DC, 1989); Joan Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice (Princeton, 1990); Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton, 1992) ; Robert H. Bates and Anne Krueger (eds.), Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform (Princeton, 1993). Bates and Krueger do not use the term 'state autonomy', but stress the importance of the delegation to technocrats of power to decide economic policy.
6. Thomas M. Callaghy, 'Toward State Capability and Embedded Liberalism in the Third World: lessons for adjustment', in Joan Nelson (ed.), Fragile Coalitions (Washington, DC, 1989); Joan Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice (Princeton, 1990); Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton, 1992) ; Robert H. Bates and Anne Krueger (eds.), Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform (Princeton, 1993). Bates and Krueger do not use the term 'state autonomy', but stress the importance of the delegation to technocrats of power to decide economic policy.
7. Thomas M. Callaghy, 'Toward State Capability and Embedded Liberalism in the Third World: lessons for adjustment', in Joan Nelson (ed.), Fragile Coalitions (Washington, DC, 1989); Joan Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice (Princeton, 1990); Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton, 1992) ; Robert H. Bates and Anne Krueger (eds.), Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform (Princeton, 1993). Bates and Krueger do not use the term 'state autonomy', but stress the importance of the delegation to technocrats of power to decide economic policy.
8. Thomas M. Callaghy, 'Toward State Capability and Embedded Liberalism in the Third World: lessons for adjustment', in Joan Nelson (ed.), Fragile Coalitions (Washington, DC, 1989); Joan Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice (Princeton, 1990); Stephen Haggard and Robert Kaufman (eds.), The Politics of Economic Adjustment (Princeton, 1992) ; Robert H. Bates and Anne Krueger (eds.), Political and Economic Interactions in Economic Policy Reform (Princeton, 1993). Bates and Krueger do not use the term 'state autonomy', but stress the importance of the delegation to technocrats of power to decide economic policy.
9. John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions (Cambridge, 1993), argues that state-led industrialisation and protectionism in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey was not the result of interest-group pressures, but of ideology, state-building, and geopolitics. Similarly, Alice H. Amsden, 'The State and Taiwan's Economic Development', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 78-106, finds no evidence of successful societal pressures behind East Asia's interventionist economic policies.
10. John Waterbury, Exposed to Innumerable Delusions (Cambridge, 1993), argues that state-led industrialisation and protectionism in Egypt, India, Mexico, and Turkey was not the result of interest-group pressures, but of ideology, state-building, and geopolitics. Similarly, Alice H. Amsden, 'The State and Taiwan's Economic Development', in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 78-106, finds no evidence of successful societal pressures behind East Asia's interventionist economic policies.
11. For example, Alberto Alesina, 'Macroeconomics and Polities', in NBER, Macroeconomics Annual, 1988 (Cambridge, MA, 1988). This literature is reviewed in Robert Kaufman and Stephen Haggard, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions Princeton, 1995), pp. 19-23.
12. For example, Alberto Alesina, 'Macroeconomics and Polities', in NBER, Macroeconomics Annual, 1988 (Cambridge, MA, 1988). This literature is reviewed in Robert Kaufman and Stephen Haggard, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions Princeton, 1995), pp. 19-23.
13. Robert H. Bates, 'Social Dilemmas and Rational Individuals: an assessment of the new institutionalism', in Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis (eds.), op. cit. p. 46.
14. Rudiger Dornbusch and S. Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago, 1991).
15. The greatest difficulty is faced by weak authoritarian governments because of a 'vicious cycle ' of political and economic reform : if they liberalise because the costs of repression are too high, the new freedoms may be used to protest against further economic adjustment. See Kaufman and Haggard, op. cit. 1995, p. 23.
16. Potentially strong lobby groups, like trade unions, are dealt with in the same way: their leaderships are suppressed or co-opted, which weakens the ability of labour to assert its own interests. See John Healey and Mark Robinson, Democracy, Governance and Economic Policy (London, 1992), p. 90.
17. See, for example, Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, 1990), and Tor Skålnes, The Politics of Economic Reform in Zimbabwe: continuity and change in development (Basingstoke and New York, 1995). Also, Colin Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe's Inheritance (Basingstoke and London, 1981).
18. See, for example, Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, 1990), and Tor Skålnes, The Politics of Economic Reform in Zimbabwe: continuity and change in development (Basingstoke and New York, 1995). Also, Colin Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe's Inheritance (Basingstoke and London, 1981).
19. See, for example, Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and Oxford, 1990), and Tor Skålnes, The Politics of Economic Reform in Zimbabwe: continuity and change in development (Basingstoke and New York, 1995). Also, Colin Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe's Inheritance (Basingstoke and London, 1981).
20. This persisted in spite of cosmetic unity in the formation in 1976 of the Patriotic Front (PF) by the two parties, which simply gave rise to Zanu (PF) and PF-Zapu.
21. See, for example, Raul Prebisch, 'Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries', in American Economic Review (Nashville, TN), 49, May 1959, pp. 251-73. For a review and critical analysis of the 'elasticity pessimism' literature, see Marian Radetzki, A Guide to Primary Commodities in the World Economy (Oxford, 1990).
22. See, for example, Raul Prebisch, 'Commercial Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries', in American Economic Review (Nashville, TN), 49, May 1959, pp. 251-73. For a review and critical analysis of the 'elasticity pessimism' literature, see Marian Radetzki, A Guide to Primary Commodities in the World Economy (Oxford, 1990).
23. A new set of arguments (different from earlier views of John Stuart Mill, Friedrich List, and others) was propounded by, for example, Tibor Scitovsky, 'Two Concepts of External Economies', in Journal of Political Economy (Chicago), 62, 2, 1954, pp. 143-51,' Gunnar Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor (New York, 1957), pp. 96-7; and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, 'Notes on the Theory of the "Big Push"', in T. Morgan et al. (eds.), Readings in Economic Development (San Francisco, 1963).
24. A new set of arguments (different from earlier views of John Stuart Mill, Friedrich List, and others) was propounded by, for example, Tibor Scitovsky, 'Two Concepts of External Economies', in Journal of Political Economy (Chicago), 62, 2, 1954, pp. 143-51,' Gunnar Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor (New York, 1957), pp. 96-7; and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, 'Notes on the Theory of the "Big Push"', in T. Morgan et al. (eds.), Readings in Economic Development (San Francisco, 1963).
25. A new set of arguments (different from earlier views of John Stuart Mill, Friedrich List, and others) was propounded by, for example, Tibor Scitovsky, 'Two Concepts of External Economies', in Journal of Political Economy (Chicago), 62, 2, 1954, pp. 143-51,' Gunnar Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor (New York, 1957), pp. 96-7; and Paul Rosenstein-Rodan, 'Notes on the Theory of the "Big Push"', in T. Morgan et al. (eds.), Readings in Economic Development (San Francisco, 1963).
26. For example, Amsden, loc. cit.
27. The evolution of the 'neo-orthodox' approach that has dominated reactions to poorer countries by the Bretton Woods institutions, and by the Governments of the United States, Germany, and Japan, is traced by M. Kahler, Orthodoxy and its Alternatives: explaining approaches to stabilization and adjustment', in Nelson (ed.), op. cit. pp. 33-61. The view that macro-economic imbalances have causes deeper than excess demand, requiring market-oriented structural reforms, also coincided with growing opposition to 'big government' in the US and Britain.
28. Republic of Zimbabwe, Growth with Equity. An Economic Policy Statement (Harare, 1981), p. 3, and Transitional National Development Plan, Vol. I (Harare, 1982), p. i.
29. Republic of Zimbabwe, Growth with Equity. An Economic Policy Statement (Harare, 1981), p. 3, and Transitional National Development Plan, Vol. I (Harare, 1982), p. i.
30. It has been argued that Marxist-Leninist rhetoric was always a thin mask for a lack of agreement within Zanu (PF) on substantive issues, rather than defining party 'strategy'. See Skålnes, op. cit. p. 75.
31. Financial Times (London), 20 May 1980.
32. Ruth Weiss, Zimbabwe and the New Elite (London, 1994), p. xiv.
33. Financial Times, 3 April 1981.
34. Skålnes, op. cit. pp. 76, 93, and 100-1.
35. Arguments surfaced early after independence in Parliament concerning the inefficiency of farming outside of the large-scale commercial sector versus the inequity of preserving the existing distribution of land. See Parliamentary Debates (Harare), Vol. 1, 1980, pp. 399-423, and Vol. 4, 1981, pp. 596, and 621-2.
36. Arguments surfaced early after independence in Parliament concerning the inefficiency of farming outside of the large-scale commercial sector versus the inequity of preserving the existing distribution of land. See Parliamentary Debates (Harare), Vol. 1, 1980, pp. 399-423, and Vol. 4, 1981, pp. 596, and 621-2.
37. On this and related concerns, black and white rural area MPs supported one another in Parliament, as may be seen from ibid. Vol. 1, 1980, pp. 1042-72, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 966-80 and 1130-1, Vol. 3, 1982, pp. 755-71, etc. They were assisted by the Minister of Agriculture, the former president of the CFU, who continued to be sympathetic to the difficulties of farmers operating in a risky environment.
38. On this and related concerns, black and white rural area MPs supported one another in Parliament, as may be seen from ibid. Vol. 1, 1980, pp. 1042-72, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 966-80 and 1130-1, Vol. 3, 1982, pp. 755-71, etc. They were assisted by the Minister of Agriculture, the former president of the CFU, who continued to be sympathetic to the difficulties of farmers operating in a risky environment.
39. On this and related concerns, black and white rural area MPs supported one another in Parliament, as may be seen from ibid. Vol. 1, 1980, pp. 1042-72, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 966-80 and 1130-1, Vol. 3, 1982, pp. 755-71, etc. They were assisted by the Minister of Agriculture, the former president of the CFU, who continued to be sympathetic to the difficulties of farmers operating in a risky environment.
40. There was some increase in state ownership, although no programme of nationalisation, and the redistribution of land after independence was much less than promised.
41. Accommodation went further than permissive economic policy. The Government's attitude towards private schools, for example, was far more sympathetic than towards private medical services-indeed, the former received grants per capita that were 164 per cent of those made to government schools. The debate on the 1981 Education Bill involved explicit threats by whites in terms of emigration and adverse donor community reaction, and was far more acrimonious and racist than that over the 1981 Medical Services Repeal Bill, although it ended with the white opposition pronouncing the Minister of Education 'very competent, very reasonable, very pleasant'. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 2, 1981, p. 488. As government officials joined the ranks of the élite, incentives for greater equality in education diminished further. According to Weiss, op. cit. p. 114, new private schools mushroomed from 12 in 1980 to 40 in 1991.
42. Accommodation went further than permissive economic policy. The Government's attitude towards private schools, for example, was far more sympathetic than towards private medical services-indeed, the former received grants per capita that were 164 per cent of those made to government schools. The debate on the 1981 Education Bill involved explicit threats by whites in terms of emigration and adverse donor community reaction, and was far more acrimonious and racist than that over the 1981 Medical Services Repeal Bill, although it ended with the white opposition pronouncing the Minister of Education 'very competent, very reasonable, very pleasant'. Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 2, 1981, p. 488. As government officials joined the ranks of the élite, incentives for greater equality in education diminished further. According to Weiss, op. cit. p. 114, new private schools mushroomed from 12 in 1980 to 40 in 1991.
43. One of the most persuasive arguments was that the existing development strategy was not delivering jobs. The general concern about unemployment was certainly an important factor in helping Bernard Chidzero to persuade sufficient of his colleagues in the Cabinet to back the programme so as to gain approval. See Hevina Dashwood, 'The Relevance of Class to the Evolution of Zimbabwe's Development Strategy, 1980-1991', in Journal of Southern African Studies (Abingdon, Oxfordshire), 22, 1, 1996, p. 40.
44. For example, Jonathan N. Moyo, 'The Dialectics of National Unity and Democracy in Zimbabwe', in Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye (eds.), The One-Party State and Democracy: the Zimbabwe debate (Harare, 1991), p. 87, and Christine Sylvester, Zimbabwe: the terrain of contradictory development (Boulder, Oxford, and Harare, 1991), p. 161.
45. For example, Jonathan N. Moyo, 'The Dialectics of National Unity and Democracy in Zimbabwe', in Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye (eds.), The One-Party State and Democracy: the Zimbabwe debate (Harare, 1991), p. 87, and Christine Sylvester, Zimbabwe: the terrain of contradictory development (Boulder, Oxford, and Harare, 1991), p. 161.
46. The electorate had become increasingly less compliant with respect to one-party rule. This had been favoured in 1985 by 60 per cent but opposed by 60 per cent in 1990 (significant at the 95 per cent confidence level), according to a survey of voters that year. See Jonathan N. Moyo, Voting for Democracy: electoral politics in Zimbabwe (Harare, 1992), p. 144. Student demonstrations against corruption in 1990 included opposition to single-party rule, on the grounds that it would exacerbate the problem of corruption.
47. Brian Raftopoulos, Beyond the House of Hunger: the struggle for democratic development in Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, Harare, 1991), pp. 2 and 26. The small-scale peasant farmers living on land held by communal tenure were excluded from the benefits of agricultural policy measures by the previous régime.
48. Slowness to resettle emerged very early. The issue resurfaced prior to elections, particularly towards the end of the 19805, and appeared repeatedly in the Parliamentary Debates of 1981, with the Government providing a variety of reasons for non-performance, including (i) the Lancaster House Agreement, and (ii) non-co-operation by commercial farmers (Vol. 3, p. 1537), (iii) squatters taking over farmland earmarked for resettlement (Vol. 4, pp. 78 and 576), (iv) non-preparedness of the 'land development team' (Vol. 4, p. 565), (v) non-availability of suitable land, and (vi) peasant conservatism and unwillingness to move (Vol. 4, pp. 618-19). Also, (vii) the slowness of aid flows to pay for the purchase of farms (Financial Times, 10 October 1983), and (viii) drought (ibid. 15 April 1983).
49. Slowness to resettle emerged very early. The issue resurfaced prior to elections, particularly towards the end of the 19805, and appeared repeatedly in the Parliamentary Debates of 1981, with the Government providing a variety of reasons for non-performance, including (i) the Lancaster House Agreement, and (ii) non-co-operation by commercial farmers (Vol. 3, p. 1537), (iii) squatters taking over farmland earmarked for resettlement (Vol. 4, pp. 78 and 576), (iv) non-preparedness of the 'land development team' (Vol. 4, p. 565), (v) non-availability of suitable land, and (vi) peasant conservatism and unwillingness to move (Vol. 4, pp. 618-19). Also, (vii) the slowness of aid flows to pay for the purchase of farms (Financial Times, 10 October 1983), and (viii) drought (ibid. 15 April 1983).
50. Nick Amin, 'State and Peasantry in Zimbabwe since Independence', in European Journal of Development Research (London), 4, 1, 1992, p. 147.
51. However, whereas 54 per cent of registered voters appeared at the polls in 1990-see J. Makumbe, 'The 1990 Zimbabwe Elections: implications for democracy', in Mandaza and Sachikonye (eds.), op. cit. p. 185 - in 1995 the proportion was less than one-fifth.
52. For example, Herbst, op. cit. p. 174, notes that the distribution of rural health centres is quite evenly spread across all provinces.
53. Since 1986, almost every quarterly report on Zimbabwe by The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), London, has contained one or more new fraud or bribery cases, and one recorded the uncovering of 114 cases in three months. There is scarcely a Ministry which has not been publicly implicated; most parastatals are involved and the police services are riddled with misconduct. When the best known (Willowvale) case - of Ministers acquiring cars with scarce foreign exchange at controlled prices, and reselling them for up to five times the amount paid - was made public, only Chidzero was exempted by name from accusation. EIU, 1989 (i).
54. It was estimated in 1993 that civil servants, Cabinet Ministers, MPs, and Zanu (PF) party officials owned some 8 per cent of commercial farmland. Weiss, op. cit. p. 187.
55. For example, it was reported in 1988 that, since 1980, 177 civil servants had been convicted of corruption in Harare alone, and that 758 cases were pending, a third of which were police officers. However, in 1989 there were student demonstrations against corruption, and one of the demands was that 12 unpunished cases be brought to justice. EIU, 1988 (2) and 1989 (1).
56. For example, soon after independence, a murder charge was brought against Edward Tekere, a popular radical figure and a close associate of Mugabe. The President allowed the prosecution to proceed in 1980, and Tekere was found guilty. He was acquitted under the 1975 Indemnity Act, but dropped from the Cabinet. Also, pardons were granted to Ministers found guilty of corruption during the Willowvale scandal. EIU, 1980 (3), 1981 (1), and 1989 (4).
57. Some politicians were reported as having said openly that they would leave politics if the Leadership Code was enforced. EIU, 1989 (1).
58. One attempt is that of Robert Davies, David Sanders, and Timothy Shaw, Liberation for Development: Zimbabwe's adjustment without the Fund (Florence, Unicef, 1991), Innocenti Occasional Papers No. 16. They argue that both absolute poverty and income distribution have worsened in the rural areas since 1983.
59. See, for example, Sylvester, op. cit. p. 108, and Weiss, op. cit. p. 157. These sentiments also emerged in interviews conducted by the author in 1994 and 1995.
60. See, for example, Sylvester, op. cit. p. 108, and Weiss, op. cit. p. 157. These sentiments also emerged in interviews conducted by the author in 1994 and 1995.
61. Lloyd M. Sachikonye, 'Structural Adjustment, State and Organised Labour in Zimbabwe', in Peter Gibbon (ed.), Social Change and Economic Reform in Africa (Uppsala, 1993), p. 254. This is not to suggest that liberalisation is less suitable for economic development; the point is that there was a shift in emphasis at the political level.
62. EIU, 1983 (1) and (2).
63. The World Bank continued to fund projects in Zimbabwe, including the successful export-promotion programme, even after the agreement with the IMF broke down.
64. Dashwood, loc. cit. p. 34, argues that the peasants, the working class, and the pettybourgeoisie were excluded from the decision-making process, and inadequately informed of the debate, although this was 'well-publicised' from the point of view of those with access to newspapers, television, and business seminars.
65. EIU, 1983 (3).
66. During an interview in early 1996, lamenting the difficulties caused by tariff reductions under ESAP, a senior CZI official said: 'I know we pushed for tariff reform; we never thought that they [the Government] would go this far!'
67. Reuters, 22 March 1996.
68. This does not imply that the economy is under-taxed. According to the World Development Report (Washington, DC, 1995), Zimbabwe's ratio of tax revenue to GDP at 30 per cent in 1993 was higher than in other African economies which reported this statistic, except small mineral economies, like Namibia and Botswana. Most of the others were below 20 per cent.