The relevance of class to the evolution of Zimbabwe's development strategy, 1980-1991

Journal of Southern African Studies

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 27-48

  Dashwood, Hevina S ^a  

^a BROCK UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CLASS ANALYSIS; CLASS ROLE; DEVELOPING COUNTRY; DEVELOPMENT PLANNING; DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY; ECONOMIC POLICY;

ZIMBABWE;

EID: 0030458710     PISSN: 03057070     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03057079608708477     Document Type: Article

References (103)

1. Although a central part of the explanation of the major policy changes in Zimbabwe in the early 1990s lies in the factors that led the government to adopt market-based reforms, the argument presented here accepts that public policy should strive for sustainable and equitable development, recognising it as a long-term process, of which structural adjustment is only a part.
2. The 'ruling élite' refers to senior bureaucrats and politicians holding positions in the Zimbabwean state. The terms 'agrarian élite' and 'entrepreneurial élite' refer to specific forms of capitalist economic organisation. The agrarian élite is made up of the large-scale commercial farmers. The entrepreneurial élite refer to those who own industrial, commercial and service enterprises. While this study agrees (as has been generally accepted) with the need to include senior managers who directly serve the interests of capital owners in this definition, the discussion refers primarily to the owners of capital. The term 'élite' is understood in a neutral sense, and not as implying any value (ideological or otherwise).
3. There is no space here to cover in detail the impact of South African military, economic and political destabilisation in the 1980s on Zimbabwe. For an excellent analysis of this issue, see Eliphas Munkonoweshuro, Zimbabwe: Ten Years of Destabilisation: A Balance Sheet (Bethany Books, Stockholm, 1992).
4. See Lionel Cliffe, 'Were They Pushed or Did They Jump? Zimbabwe and the World Bank', Southern Africa Report (March 1991), pp. 25-28. Cliffe, in arguing for the home-grown side, sees the explanation partly as a result of a 'failure of nerve' regarding radical economic nationalism in the light of the collapse of socialism around the world, and partly as a result of a 'rightward drift' in Zimbabwean politics, including the ideological isolation of Mugabe in Cabinet. Surprisingly, he does not account for the role of the shifting alignment of class forces. Government officials, in particular, tend to push the 'home-grown' argument. For example, Bernard Chidzero in an interview with Ibbo Mandaza, (ed.). Southern African Political and Economic Monthly, (December-January 1991/92), pp. 11-16.
5. See Lionel Cliffe, 'Were They Pushed or Did They Jump? Zimbabwe and the World Bank', Southern Africa Report (March 1991), pp. 25-28. Cliffe, in arguing for the home-grown side, sees the explanation partly as a result of a 'failure of nerve' regarding radical economic nationalism in the light of the collapse of socialism around the world, and partly as a result of a 'rightward drift' in Zimbabwean politics, including the ideological isolation of Mugabe in Cabinet. Surprisingly, he does not account for the role of the shifting alignment of class forces. Government officials, in particular, tend to push the 'home-grown' argument. For example, Bernard Chidzero in an interview with Ibbo Mandaza, (ed.). Southern African Political and Economic Monthly, (December-January 1991/92), pp. 11-16.
6. Government of Zimbabwe, Economic Policy Statement: Macroeconomic Adjustment and Trade Liberalisation (Harare, 26 July 1990).
7. See Roben Davies, David Sanders and Timothy Shaw, 'Liberalisation for Development: Zimbabwe's Adjustment without the Fund', paper prepared for UNICEF, Innocenti Occasional Paper No. 16 (May 1991), pp. 17-19.
8. By and large, the alteration consisted of establishing firmer targets for the proposed reforms, especially in the area of reduction of the budget deficit. The document, Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform, 1991-1995 (January 1991), was the product of consultations with the World Bank, and was presented to the Paris Club of donors for consideration.
9. Bernard Chidzero identifies the period 1986/87 as the time when the government began to rethink its policy direction. See Bernard Chidzero, Interview with Ibbo Mandaza, in Southern African Political and Economic Monthly (December-January 1991/92), p. 12. Others have identified the shift as beginning even earlier, from 1985/86, as confirmed in numerous interviews with officials in the public and private sectors.
10. World Bank, Industrial Sector Memorandum, (1987); Zimbabwe - A Strategy for Sustained Growth (November 1987); Zimbabwe: Private Investment and Government Policy (30 May, 1989); Zimbabwe: The Capital Goods Sector: Investment and Industrial Issues (22 January, 1990); see also: African Development Bank, Zimbabwe Industrial Stimulation and Export Promotion Study (October 1989).
11. World Bank, Industrial Sector Memorandum, (1987); Zimbabwe - A Strategy for Sustained Growth (November 1987); Zimbabwe: Private Investment and Government Policy (30 May, 1989); Zimbabwe: The Capital Goods Sector: Investment and Industrial Issues (22 January, 1990); see also: African Development Bank, Zimbabwe Industrial Stimulation and Export Promotion Study (October 1989).
12. World Bank, Industrial Sector Memorandum, (1987); Zimbabwe - A Strategy for Sustained Growth (November 1987); Zimbabwe: Private Investment and Government Policy (30 May, 1989); Zimbabwe: The Capital Goods Sector: Investment and Industrial Issues (22 January, 1990); see also: African Development Bank, Zimbabwe Industrial Stimulation and Export Promotion Study (October 1989).
13. World Bank, Industrial Sector Memorandum, (1987); Zimbabwe - A Strategy for Sustained Growth (November 1987); Zimbabwe: Private Investment and Government Policy (30 May, 1989); Zimbabwe: The Capital Goods Sector: Investment and Industrial Issues (22 January, 1990); see also: African Development Bank, Zimbabwe Industrial Stimulation and Export Promotion Study (October 1989).
14. World Bank, Industrial Sector Memorandum, (1987); Zimbabwe - A Strategy for Sustained Growth (November 1987); Zimbabwe: Private Investment and Government Policy (30 May, 1989); Zimbabwe: The Capital Goods Sector: Investment and Industrial Issues (22 January, 1990); see also: African Development Bank, Zimbabwe Industrial Stimulation and Export Promotion Study (October 1989).
15. Gerald Helleiner and Giovanni Andrea Cornia (eds) From Adjustment to Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Conflict. Controversy, Convergence, Consensus? An Overview (Macmillan Press, London, 1994), pp. 14-15.
16. See Government of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe: A Framework For Economic Reform, pp. 6-8.
17. World Bank, Adjustment Lending: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Experience (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 1988). This report recognised the need to tailor adjustment programmes to specific country contexts, the need to protect the poor from the impact of adjustment and the need to account for political as well as economic impediments, such as low levels of development, weak markets and limited state capabilities. See also, World Bank, Sub-Suharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study (Washington, DC, 1989). The new thinking was also reflected in subsequent World Development Reports and more recently, in World Bank, Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress, Payoffs and Challenges (Washington, DC, 1993). The debate is now beginning to turn to the need to move beyond structural adjustment. While the World Bank is not prepared to abandon its commitment to SAPs, it is showing some sensitivity to the need to link short-term adjustment measures with longer-term sustainable development. See, World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms. Results and the Road Ahead (Washington, DC, 1994).
18. World Bank, Adjustment Lending: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Experience (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 1988). This report recognised the need to tailor adjustment programmes to specific country contexts, the need to protect the poor from the impact of adjustment and the need to account for political as well as economic impediments, such as low levels of development, weak markets and limited state capabilities. See also, World Bank, Sub-Suharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study (Washington, DC, 1989). The new thinking was also reflected in subsequent World Development Reports and more recently, in World Bank, Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress, Payoffs and Challenges (Washington, DC, 1993). The debate is now beginning to turn to the need to move beyond structural adjustment. While the World Bank is not prepared to abandon its commitment to SAPs, it is showing some sensitivity to the need to link short-term adjustment measures with longer-term sustainable development. See, World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms. Results and the Road Ahead (Washington, DC, 1994).
19. World Bank, Adjustment Lending: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Experience (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 1988). This report recognised the need to tailor adjustment programmes to specific country contexts, the need to protect the poor from the impact of adjustment and the need to account for political as well as economic impediments, such as low levels of development, weak markets and limited state capabilities. See also, World Bank, Sub-Suharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study (Washington, DC, 1989). The new thinking was also reflected in subsequent World Development Reports and more recently, in World Bank, Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress, Payoffs and Challenges (Washington, DC, 1993). The debate is now beginning to turn to the need to move beyond structural adjustment. While the World Bank is not prepared to abandon its commitment to SAPs, it is showing some sensitivity to the need to link short-term adjustment measures with longer-term sustainable development. See, World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms. Results and the Road Ahead (Washington, DC, 1994).
20. World Bank, Adjustment Lending: An Evaluation of Ten Years of Experience (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 1988). This report recognised the need to tailor adjustment programmes to specific country contexts, the need to protect the poor from the impact of adjustment and the need to account for political as well as economic impediments, such as low levels of development, weak markets and limited state capabilities. See also, World Bank, Sub-Suharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: A Long-Term Perspective Study (Washington, DC, 1989). The new thinking was also reflected in subsequent World Development Reports and more recently, in World Bank, Adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa: Progress, Payoffs and Challenges (Washington, DC, 1993). The debate is now beginning to turn to the need to move beyond structural adjustment. While the World Bank is not prepared to abandon its commitment to SAPs, it is showing some sensitivity to the need to link short-term adjustment measures with longer-term sustainable development. See, World Bank, Adjustment in Africa: Reforms. Results and the Road Ahead (Washington, DC, 1994).
21. See, Government of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform, pp. 20-23.
22. Colin Stoneman, 'Home-Grown Trade Liberalisation?', Africa Recovery (October-December, 1990), p. 1.
23. Many students of African political economy, though not often employing the term dominant class, have for long emphasised the central importance of both the ruling petty bourgeoisie and the emerging national bourgeoisie. See, for example, Paul Lubeck (ed.), The African Bourgeoisie: Capitalist Development in Nigeria, Kenya and the Ivory Coast (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1987) and Paul Kennedy, African Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988). For an application of this theoretical approach to the Canadian political economy, see Cranford Pratt, 'Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus', International Journal, 39, 1 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 99-117 and Cranford Pratt 'Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: A Basis for an Explanation', Studies in Political Economy, 13 (1984), pp. 27-57. Cranford Pratt spent several decades working primarily as an Africanist before turning his attention to Canadian foreign policy issues, and his subsequent writings have clearly been influenced by the African political economy literature.
24. Many students of African political economy, though not often employing the term dominant class, have for long emphasised the central importance of both the ruling petty bourgeoisie and the emerging national bourgeoisie. See, for example, Paul Lubeck (ed.), The African Bourgeoisie: Capitalist Development in Nigeria, Kenya and the Ivory Coast (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1987) and Paul Kennedy, African Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988). For an application of this theoretical approach to the Canadian political economy, see Cranford Pratt, 'Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus', International Journal, 39, 1 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 99-117 and Cranford Pratt 'Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: A Basis for an Explanation', Studies in Political Economy, 13 (1984), pp. 27-57. Cranford Pratt spent several decades working primarily as an Africanist before turning his attention to Canadian foreign policy issues, and his subsequent writings have clearly been influenced by the African political economy literature.
25. Many students of African political economy, though not often employing the term dominant class, have for long emphasised the central importance of both the ruling petty bourgeoisie and the emerging national bourgeoisie. See, for example, Paul Lubeck (ed.), The African Bourgeoisie: Capitalist Development in Nigeria, Kenya and the Ivory Coast (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1987) and Paul Kennedy, African Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988). For an application of this theoretical approach to the Canadian political economy, see Cranford Pratt, 'Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus', International Journal, 39, 1 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 99-117 and Cranford Pratt 'Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: A Basis for an Explanation', Studies in Political Economy, 13 (1984), pp. 27-57. Cranford Pratt spent several decades working primarily as an Africanist before turning his attention to Canadian foreign policy issues, and his subsequent writings have clearly been influenced by the African political economy literature.
26. Many students of African political economy, though not often employing the term dominant class, have for long emphasised the central importance of both the ruling petty bourgeoisie and the emerging national bourgeoisie. See, for example, Paul Lubeck (ed.), The African Bourgeoisie: Capitalist Development in Nigeria, Kenya and the Ivory Coast (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1987) and Paul Kennedy, African Capitalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988). For an application of this theoretical approach to the Canadian political economy, see Cranford Pratt, 'Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus', International Journal, 39, 1 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 99-117 and Cranford Pratt 'Canadian Policy Towards the Third World: A Basis for an Explanation', Studies in Political Economy, 13 (1984), pp. 27-57. Cranford Pratt spent several decades working primarily as an Africanist before turning his attention to Canadian foreign policy issues, and his subsequent writings have clearly been influenced by the African political economy literature.
27. Larry Diamond, 'Class Formation in the Swollen African State', Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 4 (1987), p. 570. For a classic treatment of the dominant class approach, see Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (Quartet Books, London, 1973).
28. Larry Diamond, 'Class Formation in the Swollen African State', Journal of Modern African Studies, 25, 4 (1987), p. 570. For a classic treatment of the dominant class approach, see Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (Quartet Books, London, 1973).
29. Lee Cokorinos, in Michael Schatzberg (ed.), The Political Economy of Zimbabwe (Praeger, New York, 1984), pp. 32-33. For an excellent analysis of the ideological contradictions within the leadership and their varying fortunes during the liberation struggle, see David Moore, 'The Ideological Formation of the Zimbabwean Ruling Class', Journal of Southern African Studies (September 1991), pp. 8-31. André Astrow also highlights the petty-bourgeois nature of the nationalist leadership. See, André Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost its Way? (Zed Press, London, 1983).
30. Lee Cokorinos, in Michael Schatzberg (ed.), The Political Economy of Zimbabwe (Praeger, New York, 1984), pp. 32-33. For an excellent analysis of the ideological contradictions within the leadership and their varying fortunes during the liberation struggle, see David Moore, 'The Ideological Formation of the Zimbabwean Ruling Class', Journal of Southern African Studies (September 1991), pp. 8-31. André Astrow also highlights the petty-bourgeois nature of the nationalist leadership. See, André Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost its Way? (Zed Press, London, 1983).
31. Lee Cokorinos, in Michael Schatzberg (ed.), The Political Economy of Zimbabwe (Praeger, New York, 1984), pp. 32-33. For an excellent analysis of the ideological contradictions within the leadership and their varying fortunes during the liberation struggle, see David Moore, 'The Ideological Formation of the Zimbabwean Ruling Class', Journal of Southern African Studies (September 1991), pp. 8-31. André Astrow also highlights the petty-bourgeois nature of the nationalist leadership. See, André Astrow, Zimbabwe: A Revolution That Lost its Way? (Zed Press, London, 1983).
32. See, for example, such local papers and magazines as The Herald, Bulawayo Chronicle, The Financial Gazette, Parade and Moto, as well as Ruth Weiss, Zimbabwe and the New Elite (British Academic Press, London, 1994). For scholarly works, see, in particular, Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (Printer Publishers, London, 1989); Lloyd Sachikonye, 'State and Social Forces in Zimbabwe', in David Moore and Gerald J. Schmitz (eds), Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives (Macmillan Press, London, 1995), and Christine Sylvester, Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development (Westview Press, Boulder, 1991). Even Masipule Sithole, who tends to stress the racial and ethnic divisions within Zimbabwean society, has referred to the 'embourgeoisement' of the ruling élite. See, Masipule Sithole, 'Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy', in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, Vol. 2 (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1988), p. 244.
33. See, for example, such local papers and magazines as The Herald, Bulawayo Chronicle, The Financial Gazette, Parade and Moto, as well as Ruth Weiss, Zimbabwe and the New Elite (British Academic Press, London, 1994). For scholarly works, see, in particular, Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (Printer Publishers, London, 1989); Lloyd Sachikonye, 'State and Social Forces in Zimbabwe', in David Moore and Gerald J. Schmitz (eds), Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives (Macmillan Press, London, 1995), and Christine Sylvester, Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development (Westview Press, Boulder, 1991). Even Masipule Sithole, who tends to stress the racial and ethnic divisions within Zimbabwean society, has referred to the 'embourgeoisement' of the ruling élite. See, Masipule Sithole, 'Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy', in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, Vol. 2 (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1988), p. 244.
34. See, for example, such local papers and magazines as The Herald, Bulawayo Chronicle, The Financial Gazette, Parade and Moto, as well as Ruth Weiss, Zimbabwe and the New Elite (British Academic Press, London, 1994). For scholarly works, see, in particular, Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (Printer Publishers, London, 1989); Lloyd Sachikonye, 'State and Social Forces in Zimbabwe', in David Moore and Gerald J. Schmitz (eds), Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives (Macmillan Press, London, 1995), and Christine Sylvester, Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development (Westview Press, Boulder, 1991). Even Masipule Sithole, who tends to stress the racial and ethnic divisions within Zimbabwean society, has referred to the 'embourgeoisement' of the ruling élite. See, Masipule Sithole, 'Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy', in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, Vol. 2 (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1988), p. 244.
35. See, for example, such local papers and magazines as The Herald, Bulawayo Chronicle, The Financial Gazette, Parade and Moto, as well as Ruth Weiss, Zimbabwe and the New Elite (British Academic Press, London, 1994). For scholarly works, see, in particular, Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (Printer Publishers, London, 1989); Lloyd Sachikonye, 'State and Social Forces in Zimbabwe', in David Moore and Gerald J. Schmitz (eds), Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives (Macmillan Press, London, 1995), and Christine Sylvester, Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development (Westview Press, Boulder, 1991). Even Masipule Sithole, who tends to stress the racial and ethnic divisions within Zimbabwean society, has referred to the 'embourgeoisement' of the ruling élite. See, Masipule Sithole, 'Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy', in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, Vol. 2 (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1988), p. 244.
36. See, for example, such local papers and magazines as The Herald, Bulawayo Chronicle, The Financial Gazette, Parade and Moto, as well as Ruth Weiss, Zimbabwe and the New Elite (British Academic Press, London, 1994). For scholarly works, see, in particular, Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (Printer Publishers, London, 1989); Lloyd Sachikonye, 'State and Social Forces in Zimbabwe', in David Moore and Gerald J. Schmitz (eds), Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives (Macmillan Press, London, 1995), and Christine Sylvester, Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development (Westview Press, Boulder, 1991). Even Masipule Sithole, who tends to stress the racial and ethnic divisions within Zimbabwean society, has referred to the 'embourgeoisement' of the ruling élite. See, Masipule Sithole, 'Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy', in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, Vol. 2 (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1988), p. 244.
37. See, for example, such local papers and magazines as The Herald, Bulawayo Chronicle, The Financial Gazette, Parade and Moto, as well as Ruth Weiss, Zimbabwe and the New Elite (British Academic Press, London, 1994). For scholarly works, see, in particular, Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society (Printer Publishers, London, 1989); Lloyd Sachikonye, 'State and Social Forces in Zimbabwe', in David Moore and Gerald J. Schmitz (eds), Debating Development Discourse: Institutional and Popular Perspectives (Macmillan Press, London, 1995), and Christine Sylvester, Zimbabwe: The Terrain of Contradictory Development (Westview Press, Boulder, 1991). Even Masipule Sithole, who tends to stress the racial and ethnic divisions within Zimbabwean society, has referred to the 'embourgeoisement' of the ruling élite. See, Masipule Sithole, 'Zimbabwe: In Search of a Stable Democracy', in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (eds), Democracy in Developing Countries: Africa, Vol. 2 (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1988), p. 244.
38. Colin Stoneman and Lionel Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society, p. 61.
39. See Lloyd Sachikonye, 'State and Social Forces in Zimbabwe', in David B. Moore and Gerald J. Schmitz (eds) Debating Development Discourse, p. 215.
40. Stoneman and Cliffe, Zimbabwe: Politics, Economics and Society, p. 61. They also note that, because it is officially frowned upon, it is very hard to determine the exact extent of the acquisition process. Nevertheless, they argue that there is no doubt that it has occurred, noting, for example, that the Commercial Farmers Union has not hesitated to speak of the 'political weight of their new members'. Ibid., p. 57.
41. Lloyd Sachikonye, 'The Context of the Democracy Debate', in Ibbo Mandaza and Lloyd Sachikonye (eds), The One Party State and Democracy: The Zimbabwe Debate (Southern African Political and Economic Series Trust, Harare, 1991), pp. 48-49. The felt need for a leadership code reveals that the process of accumulation began very early, probably even before independence. The embourgeoisement of the ruling élite has therefore been a gradual process, which did not begin to have a direct impact on decision-making until the late 1980s.
42. ZANU-PF, 'Leadership Code', Approved at the Second Party Congress (August 1984), p. 4. See also, 'Tekere Speaks Out on Corruption', Moto (July 1984), pp. 3-5.
43. Reported in Economist Intelligence Unit, Zimbabwe Country Report, 1st quarter 1995 (Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 1995), p. 7.
44. See, for example, 'A Lesson From Zimbabwe', The Southern African Economist (April/May, 1989), pp. 29-30 and Andrew Meldrum, 'The Corruption Controversy', Africa Report (January-February, 1989), p. 37.
45. See, for example, 'A Lesson From Zimbabwe', The Southern African Economist (April/May, 1989), pp. 29-30 and Andrew Meldrum, 'The Corruption Controversy', Africa Report (January-February, 1989), p. 37.
46. John Nkomo, Minister, Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, Interview, January 1993.
47. See, for example, Colin Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe's Inheritance (Macmillan, London, 1981) and Ibbo Mandaza (ed.) Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition: 1980-1986 (CODESRIA Book Series, Dakar, 1986).
48. See, for example, Colin Stoneman (ed.), Zimbabwe's Inheritance (Macmillan, London, 1981) and Ibbo Mandaza (ed.) Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition: 1980-1986 (CODESRIA Book Series, Dakar, 1986).
49. Although the government was vague on what it meant by 'socialism', its statements indicate that it envisaged socialism to entail the eradication of private ownership of the means of production. However, for some of the élite, 'socialism' could have entailed the promotion of an egalitarian society within the existing capitalist structure. In this paper, this latter meaning is equated with the term 'social-welfarism'.
50. Government of Zimbabwe, Growth with Equity (Harare, 1981); Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85 (Harare, November 1982).
51. Government of Zimbabwe, Growth with Equity (Harare, 1981); Transitional National Development Plan, 1982/83-1984/85 (Harare, November 1982).
52. Government of Zimbabwe, First Five-Year National Development Plan (1986-1990) (FFYNDP) (Harare, April 1986).
53. FFYNDP, p. 1.
54. Ibid., p. 3.
55. Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1991), p. 174. Herbst notes that the distribution of rural health centres is quite evenly spread across the provinces.
56. Clever Mumbengegwi, 'Continuity and Change in Agricultural Policy', in Ibbo Mandaza, Zimbabwe: The Political Economy of Transition (1986), p. 215.
57. This paragraph is drawn from Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, pp. 89-92, 96-98.
58. Sam Moyo, 'The Land Question', in Mandaza, The Political Economy of Transition, p. 186.
59. Roger Riddell, Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Incomes, Prices and Conditions of Service (1981), p. 148. This report, better known as the Riddell Commission Report, was very influential in the early years after independence.
60. This point is made in Jeffrey Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe, p. 40. While Herbst correctly observes that commercial farmers do not have unlimited political influence, his attempt to argue that the government 'autonomously' arrived at the decision that land redistribution would not solve the problem of land hunger, ignores the hegemony of the agrarian élite over information on the land question.
61. Government of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform (1991-95) (Harare, 18 January 1991).
62. Government of Zimbabwe, Second Five-Year National Development Plan (1991-1995) (SFYNDP) (Harare, December 1991).
63. Bernard Chidzero, Economic Policy Statement (July, 1990), p. 6.
64. Ibid., p. 7.
65. The ERS was introduced in 1990, and allowed exporters to retain a fixed percentage of their export earnings.
66. See, for example, Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform, p. 4.
67. SFYNDP, p. i.
68. See International Labour Office, 'Structural Change and Adjustment In Zimbabwe', unpublished Occasional Paper No. 16 (ILO, Geneva, November 1993), p. 5 and Sam Moyo, 'Zimbabwe's Land Reform Under the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)', mimeo, Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies (April 1992), p. 14. Peter Robinson of Zimconsult, who led the advisory team on the phasing in of the OGIL, also strongly argued for the need to incorporate land redistribution into the strategy for economic reform. See Peter Robinson, 'How Zimbabwe Reached its Present State and Where it Goes Now', Paper presented to the Third National Management Convention (Harare: 5 May, 1991), p. 12.
69. See International Labour Office, 'Structural Change and Adjustment In Zimbabwe', unpublished Occasional Paper No. 16 (ILO, Geneva, November 1993), p. 5 and Sam Moyo, 'Zimbabwe's Land Reform Under the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)', mimeo, Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies (April 1992), p. 14. Peter Robinson of Zimconsult, who led the advisory team on the phasing in of the OGIL, also strongly argued for the need to incorporate land redistribution into the strategy for economic reform. See Peter Robinson, 'How Zimbabwe Reached its Present State and Where it Goes Now', Paper presented to the Third National Management Convention (Harare: 5 May, 1991), p. 12.
70. See International Labour Office, 'Structural Change and Adjustment In Zimbabwe', unpublished Occasional Paper No. 16 (ILO, Geneva, November 1993), p. 5 and Sam Moyo, 'Zimbabwe's Land Reform Under the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP)', mimeo, Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies (April 1992), p. 14. Peter Robinson of Zimconsult, who led the advisory team on the phasing in of the OGIL, also strongly argued for the need to incorporate land redistribution into the strategy for economic reform. See Peter Robinson, 'How Zimbabwe Reached its Present State and Where it Goes Now', Paper presented to the Third National Management Convention (Harare: 5 May, 1991), p. 12.
71. This point was confirmed in numerous interviews. For example, Sam Moyo, senior research fellow, Zimbabwe Institute of Development Studies, Interview, May 1993; senior official, National Planning Commission, Interview, December 1992; senior official, Zimbabwe Investment Centre, Interview, January 1993. This is further confirmed by the government's commissioning of outside studies, as well as internal studies, looking into the possibility of reform.
72. Bernard Chidzero, Budget Statement, 1987, p. 38.
73. The high calibre of Reserve Bank employees has much to do with the fact that it is not affiliated to the Public Service Commission. The salaries offered employees are higher than is the case with government ministries, and are competitive with salaries offered in the private sector.
74. Sandy Cuthbertson and Ross Wilson, Trade Liberalisation Study, unpublished (December 1988).
75. Bernard Chidzero, in an interview with Ibbo Mandaza, Southern African Economic and Political Monthly (1991/92), p. 13. The level of corruption in the administration of the foreign exchange allocation system was certainly a strong factor behind the World Bank's support for its abolition. Colin Stoneman acknowledged that the existing system was operating less and less efficiently; 'Policy Reform or Industrialisation? The Choice in Zimbabwe', in R. Adhikari, C. Kirkpatrick and J. Weiss, eds., Industrial and Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992), p. 107. Roger Riddell, while acknowledging the problems, argued that under the interventionist system, the performance of the industrial sector had been among the best in sub-Saharan Africa. Riddell, 'Zimbabwe', in Manufacturing Africa, p. 390.
76. Bernard Chidzero, in an interview with Ibbo Mandaza, Southern African Economic and Political Monthly (1991/92), p. 13. The level of corruption in the administration of the foreign exchange allocation system was certainly a strong factor behind the World Bank's support for its abolition. Colin Stoneman acknowledged that the existing system was operating less and less efficiently; 'Policy Reform or Industrialisation? The Choice in Zimbabwe', in R. Adhikari, C. Kirkpatrick and J. Weiss, eds., Industrial and Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992), p. 107. Roger Riddell, while acknowledging the problems, argued that under the interventionist system, the performance of the industrial sector had been among the best in sub-Saharan Africa. Riddell, 'Zimbabwe', in Manufacturing Africa, p. 390.
77. Bernard Chidzero, in an interview with Ibbo Mandaza, Southern African Economic and Political Monthly (1991/92), p. 13. The level of corruption in the administration of the foreign exchange allocation system was certainly a strong factor behind the World Bank's support for its abolition. Colin Stoneman acknowledged that the existing system was operating less and less efficiently; 'Policy Reform or Industrialisation? The Choice in Zimbabwe', in R. Adhikari, C. Kirkpatrick and J. Weiss, eds., Industrial and Trade Policy Reform in Developing Countries (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1992), p. 107. Roger Riddell, while acknowledging the problems, argued that under the interventionist system, the performance of the industrial sector had been among the best in sub-Saharan Africa. Riddell, 'Zimbabwe', in Manufacturing Africa, p. 390.
78. Ministry of Labour, Manpower Planning and Social Welfare, Fourth Report of the Inter-Ministerial Task Force on Employment Creation (confidential) (27 October 1989).
79. Ministry of Finance (7 September, 1989). As this document is highly confidential, I will discuss it only in general terms.
80. For an excellent analysis of this phenomenon, see Carolyn Jenkins, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford. 'Economic Policy and Rural Welfare in Zimbabwe, 1980-90', Paper presented at the 20th Anniversary Conference of the Journal of Southern African Studies (7 September, 1994).
81. Cabinet Committee on Financial and Economic Affairs, Confidential Paper (December 1989).
82. Trade Liberalisation Sludy, p. 63.
83. Ibid., p. 112.
84. Ibid., p. 113.
85. Sam Geza, 'Trade Liberalisation and Economic Structural Adjustment', Paper presented at the Symposium on Trade Liberalisation and Structural Adjustment, Zimbabwe University Economic Society (Harare, 30 July 1988), p. 3.
86. For further elaboration of the new criteria, see Marit Stiles, 'Zimbabwe Land Reform: What's Going On?', Southern Africa Report (July 1994), pp. 48-51 and Liz Enochs, 'Landless Lose Out in Land Reforms', Horizon (May 1992), p. 13.
87. For further elaboration of the new criteria, see Marit Stiles, 'Zimbabwe Land Reform: What's Going On?', Southern Africa Report (July 1994), pp. 48-51 and Liz Enochs, 'Landless Lose Out in Land Reforms', Horizon (May 1992), p. 13.
88. Government of Zimbabwe, Social Dimensions of Adjustment (SDA): A Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (November 1991).
89. The ILO notes that the system of 'exclusive' targeting, whereby, in ensuring that those outside the target group are not reached, also means that not all those deserving help within the target group are reached. See, ILO, 'Structural Change and Adjustment in Zimbabwe', (Geneva, 1993), p. 12.
90. Ibid., p. 15. René Loewenson refers to the SDA as a 'shift away from social equity towards affordable forms of social charity'. See René Loewenson, 'The Social Dimensions of Adjustment', paper presented at a workshop on ESAP in Zimbabwe, (Kadoma, 18-22 November 1991), p. 10.
91. Government of Zimbabwe, 'Letter of Development Policy', confidential document prepared for the World Bank (1992).
92. Jonathan Moyo, Voting For Democracy: Electoral Politics in Zimbabwe (University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 1992), pp. 18-22.
93. Senior official, Commercial Farmers Union, Interview, January 1993.
94. Commercial Farmers Union, 'Green Paper', unpublished document (1986).
95. In a letter written by the CFU to the Director of the National Planning Agency dated 10 April 1992, one of the key constraints to agriculture was cited to be the chronic shortages of agricultural inputs.
96. D. P. Fulks, 'Drop Controlled Prices Say Commercial Farmers Union', The Herald (18 November 1991).
97. Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI), Economics Department, 'Employment Creation - Is Investment the Solution?', Industrial Review (August 1988), pp. 39-41.
98. CZI Economics Department, 'Employment Creation - Is Investment the Solution?', Industrial Review (August 1988), p. 50.
99. Ibid., pp. 49-50.
100. Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries, Confidential submission to the government for the 1988/89 Budget.
101. Chris Molam, 'An Economic Blueprint For Zimbabwe', Industrial Review (August 1989), p. 107.
102. Ibid., pp. 105-107; John Singer, 'Basis For Investment and Employment', Industrial Review (August 1989), p. 43.
103. Interview with private consultant, November 1992, and a senior official in the Ministry of Finance, November 1992.