Competition between asymmetrically informed principals

Economic Theory

Volumn 10, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 227-240

  Bond, Eric W ^a   Gresik, Thomas A ^a  

^a PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031287854     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050155     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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3. 3. Bernheim, B. D., Whinston, M. D.: Menu auctions, resource allocation, and economic influence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, 1-32 (1986)
4. 4. Bond, E. W., Gresik, T. A.: Regulation of multinational firms with two active governments: A common agency approach. Journal of Public Economics 59, 33-53 (1996)
5. 5. Bond, E. W., Gresik, T. A.: Information sharing with asymetrically informed governments, mimeo (1996)
6. 6. Gal-Or, E.: A common agency with incomplete information. Rand Journal of Economics 22, 274-286 (1991)
7. 7. Gal-Or, E.: Vertical integration or separation of the sales function as implied by competitive forces, mimeo, (1994)
8. 8. Laffont, J. J., Tirole, J.: Privatization and incentives. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7, 84-105 (1991)
9. 9. Martimort, D.: Multi-principaux avec anti-selection. Annales d'Economique et de Statistiques 28, 1-38 (1992)
10. 10. Mezzetti, C.: Common agency with horizontally differentiated principals: Regulating a multinational firm to extract rent from abroad, mimeo (1993)
11. 11. Stole, L.: Mechanism design under common agency, mimeo (1992)
12. 12. Stole, L.: Nonlinear pricing and oligopoly. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 4, 529-62 (1995).