Seller surplus in first price auctions

Economics Letters

Volumn 50, Issue 1, 1996, Pages 1-5

  Simmons, P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

First price auction; Risk aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 0029684954     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(95)00725-3     Document Type: Article

References (3)

1. Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1981, Allocation mechanisms and the design of auctions, Econometrica 49.
2. Maskin, E. and J. Riley, 1984, Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers, Econometrica 52.
3. Vickrey, W., 1961, Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders, Journal of Finance 16.