Mentalese not spoken here: Computation, cognition and causation

Philosophical Psychology

Volumn 10, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 413-435

  Garfield, Jay L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TASMANIA   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031283643     PISSN: 09515089     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09515089708573231     Document Type: Article

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