The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games

Economic Theory

Volumn 7, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 323-335

  Manelli, Alejandro M ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030304301     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01213909     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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