International competition policy and telecommunications: Lessons from the EU and prospects for the WTO

Telecommunications Policy

Volumn 20, Issue 10, 1996, Pages 755-767

  Holmes, Peter ^a   Kempton, Jeremy ^a   McGowan, Francis ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; INTERNATIONAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; PUBLIC POLICY;

ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOUR PROBLEMS; INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY; JOINT VENTURE PROBLEMS; MARKET ACCESS PROBLEMS; MOST FAVORED NATION (MFN) RULE; TRADE FRICTIONS; WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO);

TELECOMMUNICATION CONTROL;

EID: 0030414043     PISSN: 03085961     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0308-5961(96)00057-2     Document Type: Article

References (19)

1. There are a number of other reasons for this. Antitrust traditions differ across the world and common rules and principles, beyond it is said a ban on cartels, would be hard to establish. There is also an instinctive feeling among most trade specialists that free trade itself is the one basic way to ensure open and so competitive markets. Moreover many writers in the Chicago tradition in fact view antitrust laws as devices similar to external trade protection that can be used by weaker inefficient (usually small) firms to mitigate the impact of competition from successful firms. From this perspective most of the calls for international rules on competition have undertones of demands for 'fairness' which is suspect from a Chicago perspective. See in addition Shugart, WF et al. 'Antitrust enforcement and foreign competition', pp. 179-188 in McChesney F and Shugart, WF (eds) The Causes and Consequences of Anti-trust: a Public Choice Perspective University of Chicago Press (1995).
2. See Codding, G 'Evolution of the ITU' Telecommunications Policy 1991 15 (4) 271-285. See also Renaud, J 'The role of the International Telecommunication Union: conflict, resolution and the industrialized countries' in Dyson, K and Humphreys, P (eds) The Political Economy of Communications Routledge, London (1990).
3. See Codding, G 'Evolution of the ITU' Telecommunications Policy 1991 15 (4) 271-285. See also Renaud, J 'The role of the International Telecommunication Union: conflict, resolution and the industrialized countries' in Dyson, K and Humphreys, P (eds) The Political Economy of Communications Routledge, London (1990).
4. Cowhey, P 'The international telecommunications regime: the political roots of regimes for high technology' International Organization 1990 44 (2) 169-199.
5. Cowhey, op cit. See Also Cowhey, P and Aronson, J Managing the World Economy Council on Foreign Relations (1993).
6. Cowhey, op cit. See Also Cowhey, P and Aronson, J Managing the World Economy Council on Foreign Relations (1993).
7. World telecommunications revenues in 1994 were $513 bn, Financial Times 2 May 1996.
8. Commission of the European Communities, Towards a Dynamic European Economy, Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and Equipment, COM (87) 29, Brussels.
9. Council Directive 95/62/EC, OJ L 321/95
10. Peña Castellot, M 'What are the union rules and how are they being applied?' Implementing European Telecommunications Law Conference, Brussels, November 1994
11. The Article 90(3) Directives in the telecommunications sector already implemented are: Terminals (1988), Services (1990), Satellites (1994), Cable TV Networks (1995), Mobile and Personal Communications (1996) and, most recently, Full Competition in Telecommunications Service (1996)
12. In this sense, Article 90 should be viewed as a tool used to ensure the correct implementation of European law, and, hence, similar to Articles 89 or 169, rather than as an additional means to introduce harmonizing or other legislation. Sandler, P 'Deregulation and competition: telecommunications as a case study in liberalisation', Paper presented at 1st Annual IBC Conference, Brussels, November 1994.
13. Cave, M and Crowther, P 'Determining the level of regulation in EU telecommunications: a preliminary assessment, Telecommunications Policy, in press.
14. See, for example, Petersmann, E Annex 3 in 'Competition Policy in the New Trade Order: Strengthening International Cooperation and Rules. Report of the Group of Experts' European Commission (CM 91-95-124) (1995).
15. In New Zealand recently (where recourse to a specific telecommunications regulator is not possible) there has been a long court case on whether the incumbent operator was abusing a dominant position by using the Baumol-Willig (Efficient Component Pricing) principle to determine the price it charged for access to interconnection facilities. This case illustrates the problems which will face competition authorities in trying to determine whether behaviour has been anticompetitive using only ex post competition law. See Tollemache, M 'Baumol-Willig rules, OK? Clear v telecom (part III): decision of the Privy Council' European Competition Law Review 1995 4 248-251.
16. See, for example, Tuthill, L 'Users' rights? The multilateral rules on access to telecommunications' Telecommunications Policy 20 (2) 199689-99
17. FCC, Report and Order of the Federal Communications Commission on Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-affiliated Entities, FCC 95-475, 28 November 1995
18. WTO Background Note on WTO Negotiations on Basic Telecommunications, 22 February 1996
19. Argentina, Australia, Barbados,* Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Cuba,* Cyprus,* Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,* the European Communities and their Member States (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK), Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia,* Turkey, USA and Venezuela. (An asterisk marks those countries which did not make offers but participated in the talks.)