Tacit bargaining in international relations: A game model and a case study

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 40, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 569-596

  Langlois, Catherine C ^a   Langlois, Jean Pierre P ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030351238     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002796040004003     Document Type: Article

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