Legal indeterminacy and the origins of Nazi legal thought: The case of Carl Schmitt

History of Political Thought

Volumn 17, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 571-590

  Scheuerman, William E ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0030327309     PISSN: 0143781X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
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References (82)

1. Of special interest for my discussion here: Carl Schmitt, 'Das gute Recht der deutschen Revolution', Westdeutscher Beobachter, Vol. 12 (May 12, 1933). But Schmitt's numerous apologetic essays from this period predate even this one. For a reliable discussion of Schmitt's activities and polemical writings during this period: Bernd Rüthers, Carl Schmitt im Dritten Reich (Munich, 1990), esp. pp. 55-75.
2. Of special interest for my discussion here: Carl Schmitt, 'Das gute Recht der deutschen Revolution', Westdeutscher Beobachter, Vol. 12 (May 12, 1933). But Schmitt's numerous apologetic essays from this period predate even this one. For a reliable discussion of Schmitt's activities and polemical writings during this period: Bernd Rüthers, Carl Schmitt im Dritten Reich (Munich, 1990), esp. pp. 55-75.
3. There is a massive German-language literature documenting Schmitt's important contributions to Nazi jurisprudence. For a fine survey of the German debate: Bernd Rüthers, Entartetes Recht. Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich (Munich, 1988). Also: Peter Caldwell, 'National Socialism and Constitutional Law: Carl Schmitt, Otto Koellreutter, and the Debate Over the Nature of the Nazi State, 1933-1937', Cardozo Law Review (1995). For a discussion of the differences between Anglo-American and German conceptions of the rule of law: Franz L. Neumann, The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society (Leamington Spa, 1986).
4. There is a massive German-language literature documenting Schmitt's important contributions to Nazi jurisprudence. For a fine survey of the German debate: Bernd Rüthers, Entartetes Recht. Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich (Munich, 1988). Also: Peter Caldwell, 'National Socialism and Constitutional Law: Carl Schmitt, Otto Koellreutter, and the Debate Over the Nature of the Nazi State, 1933-1937', Cardozo Law Review (1995). For a discussion of the differences between Anglo-American and German conceptions of the rule of law: Franz L. Neumann, The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society (Leamington Spa, 1986).
5. There is a massive German-language literature documenting Schmitt's important contributions to Nazi jurisprudence. For a fine survey of the German debate: Bernd Rüthers, Entartetes Recht. Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich (Munich, 1988). Also: Peter Caldwell, 'National Socialism and Constitutional Law: Carl Schmitt, Otto Koellreutter, and the Debate Over the Nature of the Nazi State, 1933-1937', Cardozo Law Review (1995). For a discussion of the differences between Anglo-American and German conceptions of the rule of law: Franz L. Neumann, The Rule of Law: Political Theory and the Legal System in Modern Society (Leamington Spa, 1986).
6. Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk (Hamburg, 1933), esp. pp. 42-6. Also: Carl Schmitt, Fünf Leitsätze für die Rechtspraxis (Berlin, 1933), as well as the somewhat later Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens (Hamburg, 1934). All translations are my own unless an existing English translation has been cited.
7. Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk (Hamburg, 1933), esp. pp. 42-6. Also: Carl Schmitt, Fünf Leitsätze für die Rechtspraxis (Berlin, 1933), as well as the somewhat later Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens (Hamburg, 1934). All translations are my own unless an existing English translation has been cited.
8. Carl Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk (Hamburg, 1933), esp. pp. 42-6. Also: Carl Schmitt, Fünf Leitsätze für die Rechtspraxis (Berlin, 1933), as well as the somewhat later Über die drei Arten des rechtswissenschaftlichen Denkens (Hamburg, 1934). All translations are my own unless an existing English translation has been cited.
9. Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, p. 43. have discussed this facet of Schmitt's argument in detail in: W.E. Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 68-80, where I attempt to reformulate the social democratic political theorist Franz L. Neumann's critique of Carl Schmitt: Neumann, 'The Democratic and Authoritarian State', in: The Rule of Law Under Siege: Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, ed. William E. Scheuerman (Berkeley and London, 1996).
10. Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, p. 43. have discussed this facet of Schmitt's argument in detail in: W.E. Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 68-80, where I attempt to reformulate the social democratic political theorist Franz L. Neumann's critique of Carl Schmitt: Neumann, 'The Democratic and Authoritarian State', in: The Rule of Law Under Siege: Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, ed. William E. Scheuerman (Berkeley and London, 1996).
11. Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, p. 43. have discussed this facet of Schmitt's argument in detail in: W.E. Scheuerman, Between the Norm and the Exception: The Frankfurt School and the Rule of Law (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 68-80, where I attempt to reformulate the social democratic political theorist Franz L. Neumann's critique of Carl Schmitt: Neumann, 'The Democratic and Authoritarian State', in: The Rule of Law Under Siege: Selected Essays of Franz L. Neumann and Otto Kirchheimer, ed. William E. Scheuerman (Berkeley and London, 1996).
12. Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, pp. 43-4.
13. But it should be noted that some recent commentators have argued that the extent of such tendencies has been grossly exaggerated. Ingo Müller, Hitler's Justice: The Courts of the Third Reich (Cambridge, 1991).
14. Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, p. 45.
15. George Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Ideas of Carl Schmitt (New York, 1989); Joseph Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton, 1983).
16. George Schwab, The Challenge of the Exception: An Introduction to the Ideas of Carl Schmitt (New York, 1989); Joseph Bendersky, Carl Schmitt: Theorist for the Reich (Princeton, 1983).
17. For a brief introductory account: Paul Bookbinder, 'Roots of Totalitarian Law: The Early Works of Carl Schmitt', Social Science, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 1981). have also found the voluminous German literature on Schmitt helpful here. Hasso Hofmann, Legitimität gegen Legalität. Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts (Berlin, 1992), esp. pp. 7-84; Matthias Kaufmann, Recht ohne Regel. Die philosophischen Prinzipien in Carl Schmitts Staats und Rechtslehre (Freiburg, 1988); Ingeborg Maus, Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus. Zur sozialen Funktion der Theorie Carl Schmitts (Munich, 1976); Peter Schneider, Ausnahmezustand und Norm. Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre Carl Schmitts (Stuttgart, 1957), pp. 259-78; Lorenz Kiefer, 'Begründung, Dezision und Politische Theologie. Zu den frühen Schriften von Carl Schmitt', Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, Vol 76 (1990).
18. For a brief introductory account: Paul Bookbinder, 'Roots of Totalitarian Law: The Early Works of Carl Schmitt', Social Science, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 1981). have also found the voluminous German literature on Schmitt helpful here. Hasso Hofmann, Legitimität gegen Legalität. Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts (Berlin, 1992), esp. pp. 7-84; Matthias Kaufmann, Recht ohne Regel. Die philosophischen Prinzipien in Carl Schmitts Staats und Rechtslehre (Freiburg, 1988); Ingeborg Maus, Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus. Zur sozialen Funktion der Theorie Carl Schmitts (Munich, 1976); Peter Schneider, Ausnahmezustand und Norm. Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre Carl Schmitts (Stuttgart, 1957), pp. 259-78; Lorenz Kiefer, 'Begründung, Dezision und Politische Theologie. Zu den frühen Schriften von Carl Schmitt', Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, Vol 76 (1990).
19. For a brief introductory account: Paul Bookbinder, 'Roots of Totalitarian Law: The Early Works of Carl Schmitt', Social Science, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 1981). have also found the voluminous German literature on Schmitt helpful here. Hasso Hofmann, Legitimität gegen Legalität. Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts (Berlin, 1992), esp. pp. 7-84; Matthias Kaufmann, Recht ohne Regel. Die philosophischen Prinzipien in Carl Schmitts Staats und Rechtslehre (Freiburg, 1988); Ingeborg Maus, Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus. Zur sozialen Funktion der Theorie Carl Schmitts (Munich, 1976); Peter Schneider, Ausnahmezustand und Norm. Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre Carl Schmitts (Stuttgart, 1957), pp. 259-78; Lorenz Kiefer, 'Begründung, Dezision und Politische Theologie. Zu den frühen Schriften von Carl Schmitt', Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, Vol 76 (1990).
20. For a brief introductory account: Paul Bookbinder, 'Roots of Totalitarian Law: The Early Works of Carl Schmitt', Social Science, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 1981). have also found the voluminous German literature on Schmitt helpful here. Hasso Hofmann, Legitimität gegen Legalität. Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts (Berlin, 1992), esp. pp. 7-84; Matthias Kaufmann, Recht ohne Regel. Die philosophischen Prinzipien in Carl Schmitts Staats und Rechtslehre (Freiburg, 1988); Ingeborg Maus, Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus. Zur sozialen Funktion der Theorie Carl Schmitts (Munich, 1976); Peter Schneider, Ausnahmezustand und Norm. Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre Carl Schmitts (Stuttgart, 1957), pp. 259-78; Lorenz Kiefer, 'Begründung, Dezision und Politische Theologie. Zu den frühen Schriften von Carl Schmitt', Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, Vol 76 (1990).
21. For a brief introductory account: Paul Bookbinder, 'Roots of Totalitarian Law: The Early Works of Carl Schmitt', Social Science, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 1981). have also found the voluminous German literature on Schmitt helpful here. Hasso Hofmann, Legitimität gegen Legalität. Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts (Berlin, 1992), esp. pp. 7-84; Matthias Kaufmann, Recht ohne Regel. Die philosophischen Prinzipien in Carl Schmitts Staats und Rechtslehre (Freiburg, 1988); Ingeborg Maus, Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus. Zur sozialen Funktion der Theorie Carl Schmitts (Munich, 1976); Peter Schneider, Ausnahmezustand und Norm. Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre Carl Schmitts (Stuttgart, 1957), pp. 259-78; Lorenz Kiefer, 'Begründung, Dezision und Politische Theologie. Zu den frühen Schriften von Carl Schmitt', Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, Vol 76 (1990).
22. For a brief introductory account: Paul Bookbinder, 'Roots of Totalitarian Law: The Early Works of Carl Schmitt', Social Science, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Summer 1981). have also found the voluminous German literature on Schmitt helpful here. Hasso Hofmann, Legitimität gegen Legalität. Der Weg der politischen Philosophie Carl Schmitts (Berlin, 1992), esp. pp. 7-84; Matthias Kaufmann, Recht ohne Regel. Die philosophischen Prinzipien in Carl Schmitts Staats und Rechtslehre (Freiburg, 1988); Ingeborg Maus, Bürgerliche Rechtstheorie und Faschismus. Zur sozialen Funktion der Theorie Carl Schmitts (Munich, 1976); Peter Schneider, Ausnahmezustand und Norm. Eine Studie zur Rechtslehre Carl Schmitts (Stuttgart, 1957), pp. 259-78; Lorenz Kiefer, 'Begründung, Dezision und Politische Theologie. Zu den frühen Schriften von Carl Schmitt', Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, Vol 76 (1990).
23. In light of a growing body of scholarship that, like the jurisprudence of Schmitt, attributes a profound and unavoidable indeterminacy to all legal experience, Schmitt's legal ideas again take on fresh significance. In particular, Stanley Fish's recent post-structuralist-inspired attempt to defend a view of law which sees an arbitrary act of wilful power as constitutive of its very core comes strikingly close to Schmitt's analysis. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing Too (New York, 1994), esp. pp. 141-79. Unfortunately, such theorists have yet to show why their more recent 'deconstructions' of the concept of legal determinacy can avoid all the ills exhibited by Schmitt's assault on legal determinacy. Few such authors even seem aware of the fact that Nazi legal thought rests on a radical critique of liberal law's quest for determinacy. For an excellent critical discussion of the debate about legal indeterminacy within contemporary radical North American jurisprudence: Lawrence Solum, 'On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiqueing Critical Dogma', University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 1987).
24. In light of a growing body of scholarship that, like the jurisprudence of Schmitt, attributes a profound and unavoidable indeterminacy to all legal experience, Schmitt's legal ideas again take on fresh significance. In particular, Stanley Fish's recent post-structuralist-inspired attempt to defend a view of law which sees an arbitrary act of wilful power as constitutive of its very core comes strikingly close to Schmitt's analysis. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing Too (New York, 1994), esp. pp. 141-79. Unfortunately, such theorists have yet to show why their more recent 'deconstructions' of the concept of legal determinacy can avoid all the ills exhibited by Schmitt's assault on legal determinacy. Few such authors even seem aware of the fact that Nazi legal thought rests on a radical critique of liberal law's quest for determinacy. For an excellent critical discussion of the debate about legal indeterminacy within contemporary radical North American jurisprudence: Lawrence Solum, 'On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiqueing Critical Dogma', University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 2 (Spring 1987).
25. The phrase here is Max Weber's. In contrast to Schmitt, however, Weber hopes that a more modest version of this ideal can be salvaged. Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, 1979), p. 979. For an account of Weber's contributions to jurisprudence: Anthony Kronman, Max Weber (Stanford, 1983).
26. The phrase here is Max Weber's. In contrast to Schmitt, however, Weber hopes that a more modest version of this ideal can be salvaged. Max Weber, Economy and Society (Berkeley, 1979), p. 979. For an account of Weber's contributions to jurisprudence: Anthony Kronman, Max Weber (Stanford, 1983).
27. Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, pp. 44-5. Schmitt refers on many occasions to this famous passage in Montesquieu. Yet Montesquieu's view of judicial action is more subtle than Schmitt concedes. Although Schmitt conveniently ignores this, Montesquieu notes that it is only in republics where 'the very nature of the constitution requires the judge to follow the letter of the law'. In a monarchy judges only need 'investigate their spirit' if laws are not explicit. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York, 1949), p. 75. In fairness to Schmitt, he does seem to provide a more sympathetic reading of Montesquieu at least at one juncture: Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur (Munich and Leipzig, 1928), p. 109. But his overall interpretation remains too one-sided.
28. Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, pp. 44-5. Schmitt refers on many occasions to this famous passage in Montesquieu. Yet Montesquieu's view of judicial action is more subtle than Schmitt concedes. Although Schmitt conveniently ignores this, Montesquieu notes that it is only in republics where 'the very nature of the constitution requires the judge to follow the letter of the law'. In a monarchy judges only need 'investigate their spirit' if laws are not explicit. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York, 1949), p. 75. In fairness to Schmitt, he does seem to provide a more sympathetic reading of Montesquieu at least at one juncture: Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur (Munich and Leipzig, 1928), p. 109. But his overall interpretation remains too one-sided.
29. Schmitt, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, pp. 44-5. Schmitt refers on many occasions to this famous passage in Montesquieu. Yet Montesquieu's view of judicial action is more subtle than Schmitt concedes. Although Schmitt conveniently ignores this, Montesquieu notes that it is only in republics where 'the very nature of the constitution requires the judge to follow the letter of the law'. In a monarchy judges only need 'investigate their spirit' if laws are not explicit. Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Thomas Nugent (New York, 1949), p. 75. In fairness to Schmitt, he does seem to provide a more sympathetic reading of Montesquieu at least at one juncture: Carl Schmitt, Die Diktatur (Munich and Leipzig, 1928), p. 109. But his overall interpretation remains too one-sided.
30. Although the historical story here is complicated, one could argue against Schmitt that the underlying insight of liberal conceptions of judicial action takes a more modest - and defensible - form. In this view, the idea of legal determinacy consists of claiming that a legal norm 'cannot bind in every direction the act by which it is applied. There must always be more or less room for discretion, so that the . . . [legal norm] . . . can only have the character of a frame to be filled by this act.' In this more persuasive reading of the liberal idea of legal determinacy, '[t]he interpretation of a statute . . . need not necessarily lead to a single decision as the only correct one, but possibly to several which are all of an equal value'. Legal determinacy is never perfect. In every case a set of possible answers are defensible. Nonetheless, this set of possible answers remains relatively limited and predictable. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 349, 351.
31. Carl Schmitt, Gesetz und Urteil. Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Rechtspraxis (Munich, 1968). The characteristic reference to Montesquieu is found on p. 7. As one recent historian of legal theory noted, Begriffsjurisprudenz, or the 'jurisprudence of concepts ', 'imagined [that] it had constructed a seamless network of rules which answered all problems scientifically, and excluded all extraneous values'. Begriffsjurisprudenz was criticized widely for its 'excessively literal, and therefore often absurd and unjust adherence to the letter of the law'. J.M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford, 1992), pp. 359-60.
32. Carl Schmitt, Gesetz und Urteil. Eine Untersuchung zum Problem der Rechtspraxis (Munich, 1968). The characteristic reference to Montesquieu is found on p. 7. As one recent historian of legal theory noted, Begriffsjurisprudenz, or the 'jurisprudence of concepts ', 'imagined [that] it had constructed a seamless network of rules which answered all problems scientifically, and excluded all extraneous values'. Begriffsjurisprudenz was criticized widely for its 'excessively literal, and therefore often absurd and unjust adherence to the letter of the law'. J.M. Kelly, A Short History of Western Legal Theory (Oxford, 1992), pp. 359-60.
33. Schmitt, Gesetz und Urteil, p. 15.
34. Ibid., p. 27.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., p. 32.
37. Political theorists are most likely to be familiar with the Free School of Law from Max Weber's polemic against it in Economy and Society, where Weber associates the Free School with 'anti-formal trends' in the law and the ongoing decline of the rule of law. Schmitt and Weber agree that the Free Law Movement initiates a series of theoretical innovations incompatible with liberal concepts of norm-based legal decision making. Unlike Weber, however, Schmitt sides with the Free Law School in its battle against traditional liberal jurisprudence: Schmitt believes that the Free Law movement is inadequately radical in its assault on traditional liberal jurisprudence. Max Weber, Economy and Society, esp. pp. 882-95. For an accessible general discussion of the Free Law School: Kelly, Short History of Western Legal Theory, pp. 359-64.
38. Political theorists are most likely to be familiar with the Free School of Law from Max Weber's polemic against it in Economy and Society, where Weber associates the Free School with 'anti-formal trends' in the law and the ongoing decline of the rule of law. Schmitt and Weber agree that the Free Law Movement initiates a series of theoretical innovations incompatible with liberal concepts of norm-based legal decision making. Unlike Weber, however, Schmitt sides with the Free Law School in its battle against traditional liberal jurisprudence: Schmitt believes that the Free Law movement is inadequately radical in its assault on traditional liberal jurisprudence. Max Weber, Economy and Society, esp. pp. 882-95. For an accessible general discussion of the Free Law School: Kelly, Short History of Western Legal Theory, pp. 359-64.
39. Political theorists are most likely to be familiar with the Free School of Law from Max Weber's polemic against it in Economy and Society, where Weber associates the Free School with 'anti-formal trends' in the law and the ongoing decline of the rule of law. Schmitt and Weber agree that the Free Law Movement initiates a series of theoretical innovations incompatible with liberal concepts of norm-based legal decision making. Unlike Weber, however, Schmitt sides with the Free Law School in its battle against traditional liberal jurisprudence: Schmitt believes that the Free Law movement is inadequately radical in its assault on traditional liberal jurisprudence. Max Weber, Economy and Society, esp. pp. 882-95. For an accessible general discussion of the Free Law School: Kelly, Short History of Western Legal Theory, pp. 359-64.
40. Schmitt, Gesetz und Urteil, pp. 20-1, 40-1.
41. Ibid., p. 67.
42. Ibid., pp. 48-50. Schmitt tries to enlist Hegel as an ally here by recalling the argument in The Philosophy of Right that '[d]etermination . . . imposes only a general limit within which variations are also possible . . . It is impossible to determine by reason, or to decide by applying a determination derived from the concept, whether the just penalty for an offence is corporal punishment of forty lashes or thirty-nine, a fine of five dollars as distinct from four dollars and twenty-three groschen or less . . . It is reason itself which recognizes that contingency, contradiction, and semblance have their sphere and right'. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood (Cambridge, 1991), para. 214. But at least two key differences separate Schmitt and Hegel on this point. First, for Hegel such 'indeterminacy' is a genuinely peripheral aspect of legal experience, in part because Hegel takes liberal ideas of legal determinacy quite seriously. Second, this moment of 'indeterminacy' is never associated, as it will be in Schmitt's later writings, with a moment of irrational, normatively unregulated power or arbitrary wilfulness.
43. Ibid., pp. 48-50. Schmitt tries to enlist Hegel as an ally here by recalling the argument in The Philosophy of Right that '[d]etermination . . . imposes only a general limit within which variations are also possible . . . It is impossible to determine by reason, or to decide by applying a determination derived from the concept, whether the just penalty for an offence is corporal punishment of forty lashes or thirty-nine, a fine of five dollars as distinct from four dollars and twenty-three groschen or less . . . It is reason itself which recognizes that contingency, contradiction, and semblance have their sphere and right'. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood (Cambridge, 1991), para. 214. But at least two key differences separate Schmitt and Hegel on this point. First, for Hegel such 'indeterminacy' is a genuinely peripheral aspect of legal experience, in part because Hegel takes liberal ideas of legal determinacy quite seriously. Second, this moment of 'indeterminacy' is never associated, as it will be in Schmitt's later writings, with a moment of irrational, normatively unregulated power or arbitrary wilfulness.
44. Ibid., pp. 48-50. Schmitt tries to enlist Hegel as an ally here by recalling the argument in The Philosophy of Right that '[d]etermination . . . imposes only a general limit within which variations are also possible . . . It is impossible to determine by reason, or to decide by applying a determination derived from the concept, whether the just penalty for an offence is corporal punishment of forty lashes or thirty-nine, a fine of five dollars as distinct from four dollars and twenty-three groschen or less . . . It is reason itself which recognizes that contingency, contradiction, and semblance have their sphere and right'. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen Wood (Cambridge, 1991), para. 214. But at least two key differences separate Schmitt and Hegel on this point. First, for Hegel such 'indeterminacy' is a genuinely peripheral aspect of legal experience, in part because Hegel takes liberal ideas of legal determinacy quite seriously. Second, this moment of 'indeterminacy' is never associated, as it will be in Schmitt's later writings, with a moment of irrational, normatively unregulated power or arbitrary wilfulness.
45. Schmitt, Gesetz und Urteil, p. 71.
46. Ibid., pp. 71, 78-9.
47. Ibid., p. 86.
48. Ibid., p. 88. Fred Whelan has suggested to me that this vision may be akin to the traditional English idea of a community of judges whose special training in the intricacies of the common law allegedly can provide for a measure of legal predictability. But we might do well to recall that a crucial element of this experience, as Max Weber argued, was that English common lawyers long constituted 'a strong organized guild which, by corporate and economic interests, through a monopoly of the bench and a central position at the seat of the central courts' gained 'a measure of power which neither King nor parliament' could ignore. Max Weber, Economy and Society, p. 794. If this comparison is a fair one, how then does Schmitt hope to guarantee a similar corporate spirit among modern expert jurists?
49. Ibid., p. 88. Fred Whelan has suggested to me that this vision may be akin to the traditional English idea of a community of judges whose special training in the intricacies of the common law allegedly can provide for a measure of legal predictability. But we might do well to recall that a crucial element of this experience, as Max Weber argued, was that English common lawyers long constituted 'a strong organized guild which, by corporate and economic interests, through a monopoly of the bench and a central position at the seat of the central courts' gained 'a measure of power which neither King nor parliament' could ignore. Max Weber, Economy and Society, p. 794. If this comparison is a fair one, how then does Schmitt hope to guarantee a similar corporate spirit among modern expert jurists?
50. It is revealing that the application of Schmitt's theory would surely have resulted in increased authority for the judiciary vis-à-vis the (norm-generating) legislature -precisely at that historical juncture when Social Democracy had made substantial electoral gains. (In 1912 the SPD gained a substantial 34.8% of all votes cast in parliamentary elections. Just twenty-five years earlier, in 1887, the SPD had received a mere 10.1%.)
51. Carl Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen (Tübingen, 1914), p. 22. Schmitt seems to have a number of different legal theories in mind, including socialist-oriented views that conceive of law as an instrument of the dominant social class. Some of Schmitt's observations about the limits of power-realist views of law resemble the underlying argumentation of Alexander Passerin d'Entreves' classic The Notion of the State (Oxford, 1967).
52. Carl Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen (Tübingen, 1914), p. 22. Schmitt seems to have a number of different legal theories in mind, including socialist-oriented views that conceive of law as an instrument of the dominant social class. Some of Schmitt's observations about the limits of power-realist views of law resemble the underlying argumentation of Alexander Passerin d'Entreves' classic The Notion of the State (Oxford, 1967).
53. Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen, p. 29.
54. Notwithstanding Schmitt's subsequent hostility to Kelsen, Schmitt praises Kelsen in his early works, and even begins with a set of assumptions similar to Kelsen's. Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen, pp. 30-1, 77. Kelsen analogously argues that legal analysis should be clearly delineated from a sociology of empirical power relations. Kelsen posits a 'pure theory of law' from which an empirical analysis of the concrete dynamics of state power has been excluded; Schmitt then responds with a theory of law in which 'pure power' plays a pivotal role and the place of (normative) legal restraints is demoted. As Hermann Heller argued in the 1920s, Schmitt's 'decisionism' thus ultimately reproduces the ills of Kelsen's positivism. Kelsen offers us a theory of the 'will-less norm' and Schmitt then responds with a theory of the 'norm-less will'. Hermann Heller, Gesammelte Schriften, Vols. I-III (Leiden, 1971). David Dyzenhaus's forthcoming Truth's Revenge: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford) offers an excellent discussion of the Weimar debates from the vantage point of Heller's analysis of the complementary features of the theories of Schmitt and Kelsen.
55. Notwithstanding Schmitt's subsequent hostility to Kelsen, Schmitt praises Kelsen in his early works, and even begins with a set of assumptions similar to Kelsen's. Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen, pp. 30-1, 77. Kelsen analogously argues that legal analysis should be clearly delineated from a sociology of empirical power relations. Kelsen posits a 'pure theory of law' from which an empirical analysis of the concrete dynamics of state power has been excluded; Schmitt then responds with a theory of law in which 'pure power' plays a pivotal role and the place of (normative) legal restraints is demoted. As Hermann Heller argued in the 1920s, Schmitt's 'decisionism' thus ultimately reproduces the ills of Kelsen's positivism. Kelsen offers us a theory of the 'will-less norm' and Schmitt then responds with a theory of the 'norm-less will'. Hermann Heller, Gesammelte Schriften, Vols. I-III (Leiden, 1971). David Dyzenhaus's forthcoming Truth's Revenge: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford) offers an excellent discussion of the Weimar debates from the vantage point of Heller's analysis of the complementary features of the theories of Schmitt and Kelsen.
56. Notwithstanding Schmitt's subsequent hostility to Kelsen, Schmitt praises Kelsen in his early works, and even begins with a set of assumptions similar to Kelsen's. Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen, pp. 30-1, 77. Kelsen analogously argues that legal analysis should be clearly delineated from a sociology of empirical power relations. Kelsen posits a 'pure theory of law' from which an empirical analysis of the concrete dynamics of state power has been excluded; Schmitt then responds with a theory of law in which 'pure power' plays a pivotal role and the place of (normative) legal restraints is demoted. As Hermann Heller argued in the 1920s, Schmitt's 'decisionism' thus ultimately reproduces the ills of Kelsen's positivism. Kelsen offers us a theory of the 'will-less norm' and Schmitt then responds with a theory of the 'norm-less will'. Hermann Heller, Gesammelte Schriften, Vols. I-III (Leiden, 1971). David Dyzenhaus's forthcoming Truth's Revenge: Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Hermann Heller in Weimar (Oxford) offers an excellent discussion of the Weimar debates from the vantage point of Heller's analysis of the complementary features of the theories of Schmitt and Kelsen.
57. Schmitt, Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen, p. 30.
58. Ibid., p. 79.
59. Schmitt, Die Diktatur, p. viii.
60. Ibid., p. ix.
61. Ibid., p. viii.
62. Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Ellen Kennedy (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 33-50.
63. Carl Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität (Munich, 1932), esp. p. 87. For an interpretation of the arguments of this crucial text: W.E. Scheuerman, 'The Rule of Law Under Siege: Carl Schmitt and the Death of the Weimar Republic', History of Political Thought, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1993). As we have seen, Schmitt's Nazi-era writings then make legal indeterminacy the starting point for justifying a legal order for the Nazi dictatorship.
64. Carl Schmitt, Legalität und Legitimität (Munich, 1932), esp. p. 87. For an interpretation of the arguments of this crucial text: W.E. Scheuerman, 'The Rule of Law Under Siege: Carl Schmitt and the Death of the Weimar Republic', History of Political Thought, Vol. 14, No. 2 (1993). As we have seen, Schmitt's Nazi-era writings then make legal indeterminacy the starting point for justifying a legal order for the Nazi dictatorship.
65. The conception of the 'concrete exception' is intimately related to the idea of 'indifference in reference to the content' of the law. For Schmitt, '[t]he exception is that which cannot be subsumed; it defies general codification, but it simultaneously reveals a specifically juristic element - the decision in absolute purity. The exception appears in its absolute form when a situation in which legal prescriptions can be valid must first be brought about.' Carl Schmitt, Political Theology, trans. George Schwab (Cambridge, 1985), p. 13.
66. Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 5.
67. Ibid., p. 13. Again, legal indeterminacy here is considered to be of significance to more than a narrowly-defined category of legal decision makers, the judiciary: it is now seen as pointing to the fact that a rich diversity of political and legal actors inevitably subordinate 'normativistic' law to exercises of pure power or wilfulness.
68. Ibid., p. 12.
69. Ibid., p. 66. On the structure of Schmitt's 'decisionism': Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Entscheidung. Eine Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger (Stuttgart, 1965).
70. Ibid., p. 66. On the structure of Schmitt's 'decisionism': Christian Graf von Krockow, Die Entscheidung. Eine Untersuchung über Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, Martin Heidegger (Stuttgart, 1965).
71. Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 17. This claim is crucial for making sense of Schmitt's legal thought in the middle and late 1920s. Commentators have struggled with the fact that Schmitt seems to revert to a more traditional liberal vision of the rule of law during this period. That is, Schmitt suddenly seems to downplay his earlier radical arguments about legal indeterminacy in favour of relying on a strikingly traditional definition of the liberal rule of law in order to argue against defenders of Weimar's emerging democratic welfare state, which Schmitt believes that he can disparage by emphasizing its purported incompatibility with the liberal rule of law. But a careful examination of Schmitt's argumentation explains why there is less of a contradiction here than first seems to be the case: Schmitt's definition of the rule of law in many of the texts in question turns out to be exceedingly open-ended, even 'infinitely pliable'. In the 1928 Constitutional Theory, where Schmitt offers his most detailed definition of the modern ideal of the rule of law, he argues that it is incompatible with 'legal dispensations and privileges, regardless of what form they take'. (Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Munich, 1928), pp. 154-5). In other words: the rule of law is incompatible with any differentiated or specialized form of legislation whatsoever (focused on specific objects or categories of people). In an earlier 1926 text, the rule of law is generally seen as being incompatible only with 'individual' laws, that is, acts of legislation that single out an individual object or person. (Carl Schmitt, Unabhängigkeit der Richter, Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz und Gewährleisting des Privateigentums nach der Weimarer Verfassung (Berlin, 1926). In other words, Schmitt guarantees that a crucial element of 'indeterminacy' inheres within the very core of the liberal rule of law - at least as he sees fit to define it.
72. Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 17. This claim is crucial for making sense of Schmitt's legal thought in the middle and late 1920s. Commentators have struggled with the fact that Schmitt seems to revert to a more traditional liberal vision of the rule of law during this period. That is, Schmitt suddenly seems to downplay his earlier radical arguments about legal indeterminacy in favour of relying on a strikingly traditional definition of the liberal rule of law in order to argue against defenders of Weimar's emerging democratic welfare state, which Schmitt believes that he can disparage by emphasizing its purported incompatibility with the liberal rule of law. But a careful examination of Schmitt's argumentation explains why there is less of a contradiction here than first seems to be the case: Schmitt's definition of the rule of law in many of the texts in question turns out to be exceedingly open-ended, even 'infinitely pliable'. In the 1928 Constitutional Theory, where Schmitt offers his most detailed definition of the modern ideal of the rule of law, he argues that it is incompatible with 'legal dispensations and privileges, regardless of what form they take'. (Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Munich, 1928), pp. 154-5). In other words: the rule of law is incompatible with any differentiated or specialized form of legislation whatsoever (focused on specific objects or categories of people). In an earlier 1926 text, the rule of law is generally seen as being incompatible only with 'individual' laws, that is, acts of legislation that single out an individual object or person. (Carl Schmitt, Unabhängigkeit der Richter, Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz und Gewährleisting des Privateigentums nach der Weimarer Verfassung (Berlin, 1926). In other words, Schmitt guarantees that a crucial element of 'indeterminacy' inheres within the very core of the liberal rule of law - at least as he sees fit to define it.
73. Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 17. This claim is crucial for making sense of Schmitt's legal thought in the middle and late 1920s. Commentators have struggled with the fact that Schmitt seems to revert to a more traditional liberal vision of the rule of law during this period. That is, Schmitt suddenly seems to downplay his earlier radical arguments about legal indeterminacy in favour of relying on a strikingly traditional definition of the liberal rule of law in order to argue against defenders of Weimar's emerging democratic welfare state, which Schmitt believes that he can disparage by emphasizing its purported incompatibility with the liberal rule of law. But a careful examination of Schmitt's argumentation explains why there is less of a contradiction here than first seems to be the case: Schmitt's definition of the rule of law in many of the texts in question turns out to be exceedingly open-ended, even 'infinitely pliable'. In the 1928 Constitutional Theory, where Schmitt offers his most detailed definition of the modern ideal of the rule of law, he argues that it is incompatible with 'legal dispensations and privileges, regardless of what form they take'. (Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Munich, 1928), pp. 154-5). In other words: the rule of law is incompatible with any differentiated or specialized form of legislation whatsoever (focused on specific objects or categories of people). In an earlier 1926 text, the rule of law is generally seen as being incompatible only with 'individual' laws, that is, acts of legislation that single out an individual object or person. (Carl Schmitt, Unabhängigkeit der Richter, Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz und Gewährleisting des Privateigentums nach der Weimarer Verfassung (Berlin, 1926). In other words, Schmitt guarantees that a crucial element of 'indeterminacy' inheres within the very core of the liberal rule of law - at least as he sees fit to define it.
74. Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 17. This claim is crucial for making sense of Schmitt's legal thought in the middle and late 1920s. Commentators have struggled with the fact that Schmitt seems to revert to a more traditional liberal vision of the rule of law during this period. That is, Schmitt suddenly seems to downplay his earlier radical arguments about legal indeterminacy in favour of relying on a strikingly traditional definition of the liberal rule of law in order to argue against defenders of Weimar's emerging democratic welfare state, which Schmitt believes that he can disparage by emphasizing its purported incompatibility with the liberal rule of law. But a careful examination of Schmitt's argumentation explains why there is less of a contradiction here than first seems to be the case: Schmitt's definition of the rule of law in many of the texts in question turns out to be exceedingly open-ended, even 'infinitely pliable'. In the 1928 Constitutional Theory, where Schmitt offers his most detailed definition of the modern ideal of the rule of law, he argues that it is incompatible with 'legal dispensations and privileges, regardless of what form they take'. (Carl Schmitt, Verfassungslehre (Munich, 1928), pp. 154-5). In other words: the rule of law is incompatible with any differentiated or specialized form of legislation whatsoever (focused on specific objects or categories of people). In an earlier 1926 text, the rule of law is generally seen as being incompatible only with 'individual' laws, that is, acts of legislation that single out an individual object or person. (Carl Schmitt, Unabhängigkeit der Richter, Gleichheit vor dem Gesetz und Gewährleisting des Privateigentums nach der Weimarer Verfassung (Berlin, 1926). In other words, Schmitt guarantees that a crucial element of 'indeterminacy' inheres within the very core of the liberal rule of law - at least as he sees fit to define it.
75. Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 31.
76. Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (New Brunswick, 1976), p. 67.
77. John McCormick, 'The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional Emergency Powers', Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (forthcoming, 1997).
78. Ibid.
79. On Nazi law: Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State (New York, 1991); Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944 (New York, 1944).
80. On Nazi law: Ernst Fraenkel, The Dual State (New York, 1991); Franz L. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism, 1933-1944 (New York, 1944).
81. In fairness to Schmitt, his pre-1933 writings lack the anti-semitic and ethnicist currents so obvious in State, Movement, Folk and other Nazi-era writings. But recall Schmitt's claim in Political Theology that the 'core of the political idea' is the 'pure decision not based on reason and discussion and not justifying itself . . . an absolute decision created out of nothingness'. What arguments can a 'decisionism' of this sort possibly offer against radical nationalism and anti-semitism? The basic arguments of Schmitt's pre-1933 writings did not necessarily predestine Schmitt for anti-semitism, but they provide no real protection for him against it either. For a more detailed account of this important issue see W.E. Scheuerman, 'The Fascism of Carl Schmitt: A Response to George Schwab', German Politics & Society, No. 29 (Summer 1993).
82. Schmitt, Gesetz und Urteil, p. v.