-
1
-
-
85037520241
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-
JIS 194/M, Aug. 2, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereafter JCS Records), Record Group (RG) 218, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland
-
Joint Intelligence Staff (hereafter, JIS; Service Members), "Enemy Reaction to An Assault Against Northern Honshu," JIS 194/M, Aug. 2, 1945, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44), Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereafter JCS Records), Record Group (RG) 218, National Archives II, College Park, Maryland. All cited National Archives records, whether used initially in the Washington building or the College Park building, and sometimes used in each building, are now located in the College Park building.
-
(1945)
Enemy Reaction to an Assault Against Northern Honshu
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-
-
2
-
-
0042337917
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The decision to use the bomb: A historiographical update
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Michael Hogan, ed., New York
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J. Samuel Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update," in Michael Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory (New York, 1996), 11-37;
-
(1996)
Hiroshima in History and Memory
, pp. 11-37
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-
-
3
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-
0039347641
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The struggle over history: Defining the hiroshima narrative
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Philip Nobile, ed., New York
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J. Samuel Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update," in Michael Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory (New York, 1996), 11-37; Barton J. Bernstein, "The Struggle Over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative," in Philip Nobile, ed., Judgment at the Smithsonian (New York, 1995), 127-256.
-
(1995)
Judgment at the Smithsonian
, pp. 127-256
-
-
Bernstein, B.J.1
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4
-
-
0033416239
-
-
East Lansing, Mich.
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Among those who argue that the bomb definitely saved American lives are Robert P. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult (East Lansing, Mich., 1995), 185-197; Robert J. Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later (Columbia, Mo., 1995), 137-164; and Donald Kagan, "Why America Dropped the Bomb," Commentary, 100 (Sept. 1995), 17-23. For critical analysis of some very high-casualty claims, see Bernstein, "Reconsidering Truman's Claim of 'Half A Million American Lives' Saved: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth," Journal of Strategic Studies, 22 (1999), 54-95.
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(1995)
Truman and the Hiroshima Cult
, pp. 185-197
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-
Newman, R.P.1
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5
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0033416239
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-
Columbia, Mo.
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Among those who argue that the bomb definitely saved American lives are Robert P. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult (East Lansing, Mich., 1995), 185-197; Robert J. Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later (Columbia, Mo., 1995), 137-164; and Donald Kagan, "Why America Dropped the Bomb," Commentary, 100 (Sept. 1995), 17-23. For critical analysis of some very high-casualty claims, see Bernstein, "Reconsidering Truman's Claim of 'Half A Million American Lives' Saved: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth," Journal of Strategic Studies, 22 (1999), 54-95.
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(1995)
Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later
, pp. 137-164
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-
Maddox, R.J.1
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6
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-
0033416239
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Why america dropped the bomb
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Sept.
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Among those who argue that the bomb definitely saved American lives are Robert P. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult (East Lansing, Mich., 1995), 185-197; Robert J. Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later (Columbia, Mo., 1995), 137-164; and Donald Kagan, "Why America Dropped the Bomb," Commentary, 100 (Sept. 1995), 17-23. For critical analysis of some very high-casualty claims, see Bernstein, "Reconsidering Truman's Claim of 'Half A Million American Lives' Saved: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth," Journal of Strategic Studies, 22 (1999), 54-95.
-
(1995)
Commentary
, vol.100
, pp. 17-23
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-
Kagan, D.1
-
7
-
-
0033416239
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Reconsidering Truman's claim of 'half a million American lives' saved: The construction and deconstruction of a myth
-
Among those who argue that the bomb definitely saved American lives are Robert P. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult (East Lansing, Mich., 1995), 185-197; Robert J. Maddox, Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later (Columbia, Mo., 1995), 137-164; and Donald Kagan, "Why America Dropped the Bomb," Commentary, 100 (Sept. 1995), 17-23. For critical analysis of some very high-casualty claims, see Bernstein, "Reconsidering Truman's Claim of 'Half A Million American Lives' Saved: The Construction and Deconstruction of a Myth," Journal of Strategic Studies, 22 (1999), 54-95.
-
(1999)
Journal of Strategic Studies
, vol.22
, pp. 54-95
-
-
Bernstein1
-
8
-
-
0041836791
-
-
See, for example, Maddox, Weapons For Victory; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995); D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," Journal of Military History, 61 (1997), 577-580. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 20, very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative. Many antiHiroshima revisionists believe that the war, even without the atomic bombing, could not possibly have continued into November 1945; they thereby imply, or contend, that the invasion would not have occurred. The dispute over casualty estimates began in the mid-1980s in Barton J. Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-Bomb," Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1985, section 4, pp. 1-2; Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42 (June/July 1986), 38-41; Rufus Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half A Million American Lives Saved," International Security, 10 (Fall 1985), 121-140. These studies were seriously flawed because they did not know of the growing Japanese buildup on Kyushu in summer 1945; they thus exaggerated the importance of mid-june 1945's (low) battle-casualty estimates and also did not clearly assess whether Truman had actually seen some of those estimates. Miles also largely eschewed the use of archival sources and uncritically relied on Truman's letter of January 12, 1953, on the July 1945 casualty estimates. Brief acknowledgment of the summer buildup appears in the slightly revised Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," in Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, Conn., 1998), 132. Also see Bernstein, "Wrong Numbers," Independent Monthly (July 1995), 41-45, which makes some unfortunate factual errors, and Peter Maslowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," Military History Quarterly, 7 (Spring 1995), 105-107.
-
Weapons For Victory
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-
Maddox1
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9
-
-
0042337914
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-
New York
-
See, for example, Maddox, Weapons For Victory; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995); D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," Journal of Military History, 61 (1997), 577-580. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 20, very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative. Many antiHiroshima revisionists believe that the war, even without the atomic bombing, could not possibly have continued into November 1945; they thereby imply, or contend, that the invasion would not have occurred. The dispute over casualty estimates began in the mid-1980s in Barton J. Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-Bomb," Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1985, section 4, pp. 1-2; Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42 (June/July 1986), 38-41; Rufus Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half A Million American Lives Saved," International Security, 10 (Fall 1985), 121-140. These studies were seriously flawed because they did not know of the growing Japanese buildup on Kyushu in summer 1945; they thus exaggerated the importance of mid-june 1945's (low) battle-casualty estimates and also did not clearly assess whether Truman had actually seen some of those estimates. Miles also largely eschewed the use of archival sources and uncritically relied on Truman's letter of January 12, 1953, on the July 1945 casualty estimates. Brief acknowledgment of the summer buildup appears in the slightly revised Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," in Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, Conn., 1998), 132. Also see Bernstein, "Wrong Numbers," Independent Monthly (July 1995), 41-45, which makes some unfortunate factual errors, and Peter Maslowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," Military History Quarterly, 7 (Spring 1995), 105-107.
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(1995)
Code-name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb
-
-
Allen, T.1
Polmar, N.2
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10
-
-
0012900831
-
Casualty projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and policy implications
-
See, for example, Maddox, Weapons For Victory; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995); D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," Journal of Military History, 61 (1997), 577-580. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 20, very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative. Many antiHiroshima revisionists believe that the war, even without the atomic bombing, could not possibly have continued into November 1945; they thereby imply, or contend, that the invasion would not have occurred. The dispute over casualty estimates began in the mid-1980s in Barton J. Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-Bomb," Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1985, section 4, pp. 1-2; Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42 (June/July 1986), 38-41; Rufus Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half A Million American Lives Saved," International Security, 10 (Fall 1985), 121-140. These studies were seriously flawed because they did not know of the growing Japanese buildup on Kyushu in summer 1945; they thus exaggerated the importance of mid-june 1945's (low) battle-casualty estimates and also did not clearly assess whether Truman had actually seen some of those estimates. Miles also largely eschewed the use of archival sources and uncritically relied on Truman's letter of January 12, 1953, on the July 1945 casualty estimates. Brief acknowledgment of the summer buildup appears in the slightly revised Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," in Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, Conn., 1998), 132. Also see Bernstein, "Wrong Numbers," Independent Monthly (July 1995), 41-45, which makes some unfortunate factual errors, and Peter Maslowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," Military History Quarterly, 7 (Spring 1995), 105-107.
-
(1997)
Journal of Military History
, vol.61
, pp. 577-580
-
-
Giangreco, D.M.1
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11
-
-
0039347621
-
-
very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative
-
See, for example, Maddox, Weapons For Victory; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995); D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," Journal of Military History, 61 (1997), 577-580. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 20, very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative. Many antiHiroshima revisionists believe that the war, even without the atomic bombing, could not possibly have continued into November 1945; they thereby imply, or contend, that the invasion would not have occurred. The dispute over casualty estimates began in the mid-1980s in Barton J. Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-Bomb," Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1985, section 4, pp. 1-2; Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42 (June/July 1986), 38-41; Rufus Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half A Million American Lives Saved," International Security, 10 (Fall 1985), 121-140. These studies were seriously flawed because they did not know of the growing Japanese buildup on Kyushu in summer 1945; they thus exaggerated the importance of mid-june 1945's (low) battle-casualty estimates and also did not clearly assess whether Truman had actually seen some of those estimates. Miles also largely eschewed the use of archival sources and uncritically relied on Truman's letter of January 12, 1953, on the July 1945 casualty estimates. Brief acknowledgment of the summer buildup appears in the slightly revised Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," in Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, Conn., 1998), 132. Also see Bernstein, "Wrong Numbers," Independent Monthly (July 1995), 41-45, which makes some unfortunate factual errors, and Peter Maslowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," Military History Quarterly, 7 (Spring 1995), 105-107.
-
Truman and the Hiroshima Cult
, pp. 20
-
-
Newman1
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12
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0042337865
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The myth of lives saved by a-bomb
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July 28, section 4
-
See, for example, Maddox, Weapons For Victory; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995); D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," Journal of Military History, 61 (1997), 577-580. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 20, very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative. Many antiHiroshima revisionists believe that the war, even without the atomic bombing, could not possibly have continued into November 1945; they thereby imply, or contend, that the invasion would not have occurred. The dispute over casualty estimates began in the mid-1980s in Barton J. Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-Bomb," Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1985, section 4, pp. 1-2; Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42 (June/July 1986), 38-41; Rufus Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half A Million American Lives Saved," International Security, 10 (Fall 1985), 121-140. These studies were seriously flawed because they did not know of the growing Japanese buildup on Kyushu in summer 1945; they thus exaggerated the importance of mid-june 1945's (low) battle-casualty estimates and also did not clearly assess whether Truman had actually seen some of those estimates. Miles also largely eschewed the use of archival sources and uncritically relied on Truman's letter of January 12, 1953, on the July 1945 casualty estimates. Brief acknowledgment of the summer buildup appears in the slightly revised Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," in Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, Conn., 1998), 132. Also see Bernstein, "Wrong Numbers," Independent Monthly (July 1995), 41-45, which makes some unfortunate factual errors, and Peter Maslowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," Military History Quarterly, 7 (Spring 1995), 105-107.
-
(1985)
Los Angeles Times
, pp. 1-2
-
-
Bernstein, B.J.1
-
13
-
-
85174677557
-
A postwar myth: 500,000 lives saved
-
June/July
-
See, for example, Maddox, Weapons For Victory; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995); D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," Journal of Military History, 61 (1997), 577-580. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 20, very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative. Many antiHiroshima revisionists believe that the war, even without the atomic bombing, could not possibly have continued into November 1945; they thereby imply, or contend, that the invasion would not have occurred. The dispute over casualty estimates began in the mid-1980s in Barton J. Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-Bomb," Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1985, section 4, pp. 1-2; Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42 (June/July 1986), 38-41; Rufus Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half A Million American Lives Saved," International Security, 10 (Fall 1985), 121-140. These studies were seriously flawed because they did not know of the growing Japanese buildup on Kyushu in summer 1945; they thus exaggerated the importance of mid-june 1945's (low) battle-casualty estimates and also did not clearly assess whether Truman had actually seen some of those estimates. Miles also largely eschewed the use of archival sources and uncritically relied on Truman's letter of January 12, 1953, on the July 1945 casualty estimates. Brief acknowledgment of the summer buildup appears in the slightly revised Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," in Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, Conn., 1998), 132. Also see Bernstein, "Wrong Numbers," Independent Monthly (July 1995), 41-45, which makes some unfortunate factual errors, and Peter Maslowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," Military History Quarterly, 7 (Spring 1995), 105-107.
-
(1986)
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
, vol.42
, pp. 38-41
-
-
Bernstein1
-
14
-
-
84885565268
-
Hiroshima: The strange myth of half a million American lives saved
-
Fall
-
See, for example, Maddox, Weapons For Victory; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995); D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," Journal of Military History, 61 (1997), 577-580. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 20, very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative. Many antiHiroshima revisionists believe that the war, even without the atomic bombing, could not possibly have continued into November 1945; they thereby imply, or contend, that the invasion would not have occurred. The dispute over casualty estimates began in the mid-1980s in Barton J. Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-Bomb," Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1985, section 4, pp. 1-2; Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42 (June/July 1986), 38-41; Rufus Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half A Million American Lives Saved," International Security, 10 (Fall 1985), 121-140. These studies were seriously flawed because they did not know of the growing Japanese buildup on Kyushu in summer 1945; they thus exaggerated the importance of mid-june 1945's (low) battle-casualty estimates and also did not clearly assess whether Truman had actually seen some of those estimates. Miles also largely eschewed the use of archival sources and uncritically relied on Truman's letter of January 12, 1953, on the July 1945 casualty estimates. Brief acknowledgment of the summer buildup appears in the slightly revised Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," in Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, Conn., 1998), 132. Also see Bernstein, "Wrong Numbers," Independent Monthly (July 1995), 41-45, which makes some unfortunate factual errors, and Peter Maslowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," Military History Quarterly, 7 (Spring 1995), 105-107.
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(1985)
International Security
, vol.10
, pp. 121-140
-
-
Miles R., Jr.1
-
15
-
-
85037511552
-
A postwar myth
-
Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Stony Creek, Conn.
-
See, for example, Maddox, Weapons For Victory; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995); D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," Journal of Military History, 61 (1997), 577-580. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 20, very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative. Many antiHiroshima revisionists believe that the war, even without the atomic bombing, could not possibly have continued into November 1945; they thereby imply, or contend, that the invasion would not have occurred. The dispute over casualty estimates began in the mid-1980s in Barton J. Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-Bomb," Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1985, section 4, pp. 1-2; Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42 (June/July 1986), 38-41; Rufus Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half A Million American Lives Saved," International Security, 10 (Fall 1985), 121-140. These studies were seriously flawed because they did not know of the growing Japanese buildup on Kyushu in summer 1945; they thus exaggerated the importance of mid-june 1945's (low) battle-casualty estimates and also did not clearly assess whether Truman had actually seen some of those estimates. Miles also largely eschewed the use of archival sources and uncritically relied on Truman's letter of January 12, 1953, on the July 1945 casualty estimates. Brief acknowledgment of the summer buildup appears in the slightly revised Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," in Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, Conn., 1998), 132. Also see Bernstein, "Wrong Numbers," Independent Monthly (July 1995), 41-45, which makes some unfortunate factual errors, and Peter Maslowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," Military History Quarterly, 7 (Spring 1995), 105-107.
-
(1998)
Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy
, pp. 132
-
-
Bernstein1
-
16
-
-
0042337912
-
Wrong numbers
-
July
-
See, for example, Maddox, Weapons For Victory; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995); D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," Journal of Military History, 61 (1997), 577-580. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 20, very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative. Many antiHiroshima revisionists believe that the war, even without the atomic bombing, could not possibly have continued into November 1945; they thereby imply, or contend, that the invasion would not have occurred. The dispute over casualty estimates began in the mid-1980s in Barton J. Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-Bomb," Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1985, section 4, pp. 1-2; Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42 (June/July 1986), 38-41; Rufus Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half A Million American Lives Saved," International Security, 10 (Fall 1985), 121-140. These studies were seriously flawed because they did not know of the growing Japanese buildup on Kyushu in summer 1945; they thus exaggerated the importance of mid-june 1945's (low) battle-casualty estimates and also did not clearly assess whether Truman had actually seen some of those estimates. Miles also largely eschewed the use of archival sources and uncritically relied on Truman's letter of January 12, 1953, on the July 1945 casualty estimates. Brief acknowledgment of the summer buildup appears in the slightly revised Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," in Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, Conn., 1998), 132. Also see Bernstein, "Wrong Numbers," Independent Monthly (July 1995), 41-45, which makes some unfortunate factual errors, and Peter Maslowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," Military History Quarterly, 7 (Spring 1995), 105-107.
-
(1995)
Independent Monthly
, pp. 41-45
-
-
Bernstein1
-
17
-
-
0041836757
-
Truman, the bomb, and the numbers game
-
Spring
-
See, for example, Maddox, Weapons For Victory; Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, Code-Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan - and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb (New York, 1995); D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," Journal of Military History, 61 (1997), 577-580. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 20, very briefly mentions early August planning for an alternative. Many antiHiroshima revisionists believe that the war, even without the atomic bombing, could not possibly have continued into November 1945; they thereby imply, or contend, that the invasion would not have occurred. The dispute over casualty estimates began in the mid-1980s in Barton J. Bernstein, "The Myth of Lives Saved by A-Bomb," Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1985, section 4, pp. 1-2; Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 Lives Saved," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 42 (June/July 1986), 38-41; Rufus Miles, Jr., "Hiroshima: The Strange Myth of Half A Million American Lives Saved," International Security, 10 (Fall 1985), 121-140. These studies were seriously flawed because they did not know of the growing Japanese buildup on Kyushu in summer 1945; they thus exaggerated the importance of mid-june 1945's (low) battle-casualty estimates and also did not clearly assess whether Truman had actually seen some of those estimates. Miles also largely eschewed the use of archival sources and uncritically relied on Truman's letter of January 12, 1953, on the July 1945 casualty estimates. Brief acknowledgment of the summer buildup appears in the slightly revised Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," in Kai Bird and Larry Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow: Writings on the Denial of History and the Smithsonian Controversy (Stony Creek, Conn., 1998), 132. Also see Bernstein, "Wrong Numbers," Independent Monthly (July 1995), 41-45, which makes some unfortunate factual errors, and Peter Maslowski, "Truman, the Bomb, and the Numbers Game," Military History Quarterly, 7 (Spring 1995), 105-107.
-
(1995)
Military History Quarterly
, vol.7
, pp. 105-107
-
-
Maslowski, P.1
-
18
-
-
5844340015
-
Understanding the atomic bomb and the Japanese surrender: Missed opportunities, little-known near disasters, and modern memory
-
Barton J. Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory," Diplomatic History, 99 (1995), 230-231; John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternatives to the Bomb (Columbia, S.C., 1994), 18-47; Charles Brower, "The Debate Over Final Strategy for the Defeat of Japan, 1941-1945" Joint Perspectives, 2 (Spring 1982), 82-90; and Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: American Strategy and the War With Japan, 1943-1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1987), 201-299. Part of this dispute can be traced in the JCS 924 series, mostly in JCS Records, with some JCS 924s in entry 421, file 384 China (15 Dec. 43), file 384 Hainan (30 Oct. 44), and file 384 Ningpo-Chusan (15 Oct. 44), Records of the War Department General and Special Staff, RG 165, National Archives. The importance of some JCS 924 documents was first called to my attention by Charles Brower in about 1991-1992.
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(1995)
Diplomatic History
, vol.99
, pp. 230-231
-
-
Bernstein, B.J.1
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19
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0038046671
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-
Columbia, S.C.
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Barton J. Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory," Diplomatic History, 99 (1995), 230-231; John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternatives to the Bomb (Columbia, S.C., 1994), 18-47; Charles Brower, "The Debate Over Final Strategy for the Defeat of Japan, 1941-1945" Joint Perspectives, 2 (Spring 1982), 82-90; and Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: American Strategy and the War With Japan, 1943-1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1987), 201-299. Part of this dispute can be traced in the JCS 924 series, mostly in JCS Records, with some JCS 924s in entry 421, file 384 China (15 Dec. 43), file 384 Hainan (30 Oct. 44), and file 384 Ningpo-Chusan (15 Oct. 44), Records of the War Department General and Special Staff, RG 165, National Archives. The importance of some JCS 924 documents was first called to my attention by Charles Brower in about 1991-1992.
-
(1994)
The Invasion of Japan: Alternatives to the Bomb
, pp. 18-47
-
-
Skates, J.R.1
-
20
-
-
0041336126
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The debate over final strategy for the defeat of Japan, 1941-1945
-
Spring
-
Barton J. Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory," Diplomatic History, 99 (1995), 230-231; John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternatives to the Bomb (Columbia, S.C., 1994), 18-47; Charles Brower, "The Debate Over Final Strategy for the Defeat of Japan, 1941-1945" Joint Perspectives, 2 (Spring 1982), 82-90; and Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: American Strategy and the War With Japan, 1943-1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1987), 201-299. Part of this dispute can be traced in the JCS 924 series, mostly in JCS Records, with some JCS 924s in entry 421, file 384 China (15 Dec. 43), file 384 Hainan (30 Oct. 44), and file 384 Ningpo-Chusan (15 Oct. 44), Records of the War Department General and Special Staff, RG 165, National Archives. The importance of some JCS 924 documents was first called to my attention by Charles Brower in about 1991-1992.
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(1982)
Joint Perspectives
, vol.2
, pp. 82-90
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Brower, C.1
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21
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0042838840
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Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
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Barton J. Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little-Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory," Diplomatic History, 99 (1995), 230-231; John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternatives to the Bomb (Columbia, S.C., 1994), 18-47; Charles Brower, "The Debate Over Final Strategy for the Defeat of Japan, 1941-1945" Joint Perspectives, 2 (Spring 1982), 82-90; and Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: American Strategy and the War With Japan, 1943-1945" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1987), 201-299. Part of this dispute can be traced in the JCS 924 series, mostly in JCS Records, with some JCS 924s in entry 421, file 384 China (15 Dec. 43), file 384 Hainan (30 Oct. 44), and file 384 Ningpo-Chusan (15 Oct. 44), Records of the War Department General and Special Staff, RG 165, National Archives. The importance of some JCS 924 documents was first called to my attention by Charles Brower in about 1991-1992.
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(1987)
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy: American Strategy and the War With Japan, 1943-1945
, pp. 201-299
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Brower1
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22
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85037497451
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Minutes of white house meeting, June 18, 1945
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Department of State, hereafter, FRUS: Potsdam; 2 vols., Washington, D.C.
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Minutes of White House meeting, June 18, 1945, in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: Conference, of Berlin (Potsdam) (hereafter, FRUS: Potsdam; 2 vols., Washington, D.C., 1960), 1: 907-909.
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(1960)
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: Conference, of Berlin (Potsdam)
, Issue.1
, pp. 907-909
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23
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85037508771
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The draft minutes and a full set of corrected minutes (unlike the slightly abridged version in the printed copy) are in the George C. Marshall Papers, George C. Marshall Library, Lexington, Va. On William Leahy's earlier concerns, see Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 249-281.
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The Joint Chiefs of Staff
, pp. 249-281
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Brower1
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24
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85037513211
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Chester Nimitz to Ernest King, May 25, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
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Chester Nimitz to Ernest King, May 25, 1945, Nimitz Command Summary, Operational Archives, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, D.C.
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(1945)
Nimitz Command Summary
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25
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85037504482
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Leahy to Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 697/D, June 14
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Leahy to Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 697/D, June 14, 1945, Marshall Papers.
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(1945)
Marshall Papers
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26
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0041836792
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JWPC 369/1, June 15, file ABC Japan (3 May 1944), RG 165
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Joint War Plans Committee (hereafter JWPC), "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JWPC 369/1, June 15, 1945, file ABC Japan (3 May 1944), RG 165. It is unclear whether or not this battle-casualty estimate included naval casualties, and so far no scholar has provided any relevant archival evidence to resolve this matter, although a few have offered assertions.
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(1945)
Details of the Campaign Against Japan
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27
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85037500789
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June 17, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
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Truman Diary, June 17, 1945, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo.
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(1945)
Truman Diary
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28
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0041336140
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Washington, D.C.
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George C. Marshall to Douglas MacArthur, June 16, 1945, MacArthur to Marshall, June 17, 1945, Marshall to MacArthur, June 18, 1945, MacArthur to Marshall, June 18,1945, and Marshall to MacArthur, June 19, 1945, Record Group 4, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Va. MacArthur's June 17 cable specified 105,050 U.S. battle casualties (presumably among about 681,000 U.S. troops), but that cable also mentioned and then, significantly, did not provide a specific numerical estimate of additional battle casualties who could return to active duty. Those able-to-returns probably would have constituted about 46 percent of the number (105,050) who could not, a conclusion based on using a percentage in mid-june estimates by Admiral Nimitz. Appendix D in U.S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas report, July 25, 1945, box 1842 and entry 418, in RG 165. Using other data, the able-to-returns might be as high as about 56 percent of the number of unable-to-returns, thus producing, in MacArthur's implications, about 59,000 able-to-return battle casualties. Medical Department, U.S. Army, Medical Statistics in World War II (Washington, D.C., 1973), 120-121. Strangely, even proponents of high casualty estimates generally disregard this part of MacArthur's somewhat ambiguous cable about the American battle casualties able to return to combat.
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(1973)
Medical Statistics in World War II
, pp. 120-121
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29
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85037521560
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note
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On the varying size of Olympic, see MacArthur to Marshall (for figure of 681,000), June 17, 1945, RG 4. MacArthur Archives; Marshall, in White House meeting minutes (for figure of 766,700), June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 907; and General Richard Sutherland, General Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Pacific, "Staff Study: 'Olympic' Operations in Southern Kyushu" (for figure of 793,000), Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), Fort Leavenworth, Kans., courtesy of Pamela Kontowicz. This last document includes air force crews, whose numbers are not included here because the focus is on ground troops. For earlier erroneous arithmetic on able-to-returns, see Bernstein, "Reconsidering Truman's Claim of 'Half a Million American Lives Saved,'" note 30.
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31
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85037500920
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note
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White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 904-909. Edward Drea, who has most closely studied Ultra reports, concludes that U.S. intelligence in mid-June 1945 anticipated that the Japanese by November 1945 would have equally divided their Kyushu forces between north and south; Drea to author, Jan. 2, 1998. Some spring 1945 reports placed abovit one-quarter of the forces in southern Kyushu and three-quarters in northern Kyushu.
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32
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0041836793
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Washington, D.C., with 190,000 for late April 1945, and 227,000 for late May
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Scholars unaccustomed to using data on troop numbers in combat and the related casualty figures may be dismayed by the variations in seemingly authoritative official U.S. sources. The total U.S. ground troops in the Okinawa operation for April 1945 were on average in excess of 170,000, with about 154,000 in the seven combat divisions. The U.S. ground-force battle-casualty rate (even using the unduly low figure of 154,000 for the total number of troops) was actually under 26 percent. U.S. ground-troop numbers in Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, D.C., 1948), 25-26, 490 (with 190,000 for late April 1945, and 227,000 for late May). If naval battle casualties are also computed, the Okinawa battle-casualty totals slightly exceeded 49,600, but the naval battle casualties were under 3 percent of the total naval force, which exceeded 350,000 men in the operation. Thus, overall for Okinawa, U.S. battle casualties constituted slightly under 10 percent among the more than 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in the American operation. For Iwo Jima, see George Gerard and Truman Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C., 1971), 475-477, 797, in vol. 4 of History of U.S. Marine Corps in World War II (5 vols., Washington, D.C., 1958-1971). By most estimates, the total U.S. ground troops in the Iwo Jima operation slightly exceeded 70,000 in the early stages and ultimately grew to more than 110,000. If sailors on the fleet-supporting ships are also added, the total number of men in the Iwo Jima operation exceeded 250,000 Americans. Total U.S. ground casualties were about 23,200 (nearly a third of the early ground force of 70,200), and naval casualties another 2,800, for total battle casualties of about 26,000, thus constituting slightly over 10 percent in the entire operation. Total Japanese forces on Okinawa probably somewhat exceeded 100,000, and on Iwo Jima about 25,000. The numbers for the Japanese forces are necessarily rather loose. Thomas Huber, Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1990), 118-119; note 39 places the Japanese force at about 76,000, plus 24,000 native Okinawans. See Appleman, Okinawa, 473-474, which states 110,000. Also see Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York, 1985), 502, for Iwo Jima, and 532, for the size of U.S. forces on Okinawa. The quasi-official study by Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, N.J., 1951), 453, places the initial U.S. marine force on Iwo Jima at 68,000 and then adds in 14,000 more men. For comparative U.S./Japanese battle-casualty ratios, based on data in mid-June 1945, see White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 905. For much lower numbers for the total U.S. troops in the Okinawa and Iwo Jima campaigns, see Gilbert Beebe and Michael DeBakey, Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Considerations (Springfield, Ill., 1952), 50-51. Official U.S. military history figures generally do not jibe with Beebe and DeBakey's curiously low numbers for the average size of American ground forces in these two campaigns.
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(1948)
Okinawa: The Last Battle
, pp. 25-26
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Appleman, R.E.1
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33
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9644293063
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-
Washington, D.C.
-
Scholars unaccustomed to using data on troop numbers in combat and the related casualty figures may be dismayed by the variations in seemingly authoritative official U.S. sources. The total U.S. ground troops in the Okinawa operation for April 1945 were on average in excess of 170,000, with about 154,000 in the seven combat divisions. The U.S. ground-force battle-casualty rate (even using the unduly low figure of 154,000 for the total number of troops) was actually under 26 percent. U.S. ground-troop numbers in Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, D.C., 1948), 25-26, 490 (with 190,000 for late April 1945, and 227,000 for late May). If naval battle casualties are also computed, the Okinawa battle-casualty totals slightly exceeded 49,600, but the naval battle casualties were under 3 percent of the total naval force, which exceeded 350,000 men in the operation. Thus, overall for Okinawa, U.S. battle casualties constituted slightly under 10 percent among the more than 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in the American operation. For Iwo Jima, see George Gerard and Truman Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C., 1971), 475-477, 797, in vol. 4 of History of U.S. Marine Corps in World War II (5 vols., Washington, D.C., 1958-1971). By most estimates, the total U.S. ground troops in the Iwo Jima operation slightly exceeded 70,000 in the early stages and ultimately grew to more than 110,000. If sailors on the fleet-supporting ships are also added, the total number of men in the Iwo Jima operation exceeded 250,000 Americans. Total U.S. ground casualties were about 23,200 (nearly a third of the early ground force of 70,200), and naval casualties another 2,800, for total battle casualties of about 26,000, thus constituting slightly over 10 percent in the entire operation. Total Japanese forces on Okinawa probably somewhat exceeded 100,000, and on Iwo Jima about 25,000. The numbers for the Japanese forces are necessarily rather loose. Thomas Huber, Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1990), 118-119; note 39 places the Japanese force at about 76,000, plus 24,000 native Okinawans. See Appleman, Okinawa, 473-474, which states 110,000. Also see Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York, 1985), 502, for Iwo Jima, and 532, for the size of U.S. forces on Okinawa. The quasi-official study by Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, N.J., 1951), 453, places the initial U.S. marine force on Iwo Jima at 68,000 and then adds in 14,000 more men. For comparative U.S./Japanese battle-casualty ratios, based on data in mid-June 1945, see White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 905. For much lower numbers for the total U.S. troops in the Okinawa and Iwo Jima campaigns, see Gilbert Beebe and Michael DeBakey, Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Considerations (Springfield, Ill., 1952), 50-51. Official U.S. military history figures generally do not jibe with Beebe and DeBakey's curiously low numbers for the average size of American ground forces in these two campaigns.
-
(1971)
Western Pacific Operations
, pp. 475-477
-
-
Gerard, G.1
Strobridge, T.2
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34
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85037512343
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-
5 vols., Washington, D.C.
-
Scholars unaccustomed to using data on troop numbers in combat and the related casualty figures may be dismayed by the variations in seemingly authoritative official U.S. sources. The total U.S. ground troops in the Okinawa operation for April 1945 were on average in excess of 170,000, with about 154,000 in the seven combat divisions. The U.S. ground-force battle-casualty rate (even using the unduly low figure of 154,000 for the total number of troops) was actually under 26 percent. U.S. ground-troop numbers in Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, D.C., 1948), 25-26, 490 (with 190,000 for late April 1945, and 227,000 for late May). If naval battle casualties are also computed, the Okinawa battle-casualty totals slightly exceeded 49,600, but the naval battle casualties were under 3 percent of the total naval force, which exceeded 350,000 men in the operation. Thus, overall for Okinawa, U.S. battle casualties constituted slightly under 10 percent among the more than 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in the American operation. For Iwo Jima, see George Gerard and Truman Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C., 1971), 475-477, 797, in vol. 4 of History of U.S. Marine Corps in World War II (5 vols., Washington, D.C., 1958-1971). By most estimates, the total U.S. ground troops in the Iwo Jima operation slightly exceeded 70,000 in the early stages and ultimately grew to more than 110,000. If sailors on the fleet-supporting ships are also added, the total number of men in the Iwo Jima operation exceeded 250,000 Americans. Total U.S. ground casualties were about 23,200 (nearly a third of the early ground force of 70,200), and naval casualties another 2,800, for total battle casualties of about 26,000, thus constituting slightly over 10 percent in the entire operation. Total Japanese forces on Okinawa probably somewhat exceeded 100,000, and on Iwo Jima about 25,000. The numbers for the Japanese forces are necessarily rather loose. Thomas Huber, Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1990), 118-119; note 39 places the Japanese force at about 76,000, plus 24,000 native Okinawans. See Appleman, Okinawa, 473-474, which states 110,000. Also see Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York, 1985), 502, for Iwo Jima, and 532, for the size of U.S. forces on Okinawa. The quasi-official study by Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, N.J., 1951), 453, places the initial U.S. marine force on Iwo Jima at 68,000 and then adds in 14,000 more men. For comparative U.S./Japanese battle-casualty ratios, based on data in mid-June 1945, see White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 905. For much lower numbers for the total U.S. troops in the Okinawa and Iwo Jima campaigns, see Gilbert Beebe and Michael DeBakey, Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Considerations (Springfield, Ill., 1952), 50-51. Official U.S. military history figures generally do not jibe with Beebe and DeBakey's curiously low numbers for the average size of American ground forces in these two campaigns.
-
(1958)
History of U.s. Marine Corps in World War II
, vol.4
-
-
-
35
-
-
0038046673
-
-
Fort Leavenworth, Kans.
-
Scholars unaccustomed to using data on troop numbers in combat and the related casualty figures may be dismayed by the variations in seemingly authoritative official U.S. sources. The total U.S. ground troops in the Okinawa operation for April 1945 were on average in excess of 170,000, with about 154,000 in the seven combat divisions. The U.S. ground-force battle-casualty rate (even using the unduly low figure of 154,000 for the total number of troops) was actually under 26 percent. U.S. ground-troop numbers in Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, D.C., 1948), 25-26, 490 (with 190,000 for late April 1945, and 227,000 for late May). If naval battle casualties are also computed, the Okinawa battle-casualty totals slightly exceeded 49,600, but the naval battle casualties were under 3 percent of the total naval force, which exceeded 350,000 men in the operation. Thus, overall for Okinawa, U.S. battle casualties constituted slightly under 10 percent among the more than 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in the American operation. For Iwo Jima, see George Gerard and Truman Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C., 1971), 475-477, 797, in vol. 4 of History of U.S. Marine Corps in World War II (5 vols., Washington, D.C., 1958-1971). By most estimates, the total U.S. ground troops in the Iwo Jima operation slightly exceeded 70,000 in the early stages and ultimately grew to more than 110,000. If sailors on the fleet-supporting ships are also added, the total number of men in the Iwo Jima operation exceeded 250,000 Americans. Total U.S. ground casualties were about 23,200 (nearly a third of the early ground force of 70,200), and naval casualties another 2,800, for total battle casualties of about 26,000, thus constituting slightly over 10 percent in the entire operation. Total Japanese forces on Okinawa probably somewhat exceeded 100,000, and on Iwo Jima about 25,000. The numbers for the Japanese forces are necessarily rather loose. Thomas Huber, Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1990), 118-119; note 39 places the Japanese force at about 76,000, plus 24,000 native Okinawans. See Appleman, Okinawa, 473-474, which states 110,000. Also see Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York, 1985), 502, for Iwo Jima, and 532, for the size of U.S. forces on Okinawa. The quasi-official study by Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, N.J., 1951), 453, places the initial U.S. marine force on Iwo Jima at 68,000 and then adds in 14,000 more men. For comparative U.S./Japanese battle-casualty ratios, based on data in mid-June 1945, see White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 905. For much lower numbers for the total U.S. troops in the Okinawa and Iwo Jima campaigns, see Gilbert Beebe and Michael DeBakey, Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Considerations (Springfield, Ill., 1952), 50-51. Official U.S. military history figures generally do not jibe with Beebe and DeBakey's curiously low numbers for the average size of American ground forces in these two campaigns.
-
(1990)
Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945
, pp. 118-119
-
-
Huber, T.1
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36
-
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84956766517
-
-
Scholars unaccustomed to using data on troop numbers in combat and the related casualty figures may be dismayed by the variations in seemingly authoritative official U.S. sources. The total U.S. ground troops in the Okinawa operation for April 1945 were on average in excess of 170,000, with about 154,000 in the seven combat divisions. The U.S. ground-force battle-casualty rate (even using the unduly low figure of 154,000 for the total number of troops) was actually under 26 percent. U.S. ground-troop numbers in Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, D.C., 1948), 25-26, 490 (with 190,000 for late April 1945, and 227,000 for late May). If naval battle casualties are also computed, the Okinawa battle-casualty totals slightly exceeded 49,600, but the naval battle casualties were under 3 percent of the total naval force, which exceeded 350,000 men in the operation. Thus, overall for Okinawa, U.S. battle casualties constituted slightly under 10 percent among the more than 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in the American operation. For Iwo Jima, see George Gerard and Truman Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C., 1971), 475-477, 797, in vol. 4 of History of U.S. Marine Corps in World War II (5 vols., Washington, D.C., 1958-1971). By most estimates, the total U.S. ground troops in the Iwo Jima operation slightly exceeded 70,000 in the early stages and ultimately grew to more than 110,000. If sailors on the fleet-supporting ships are also added, the total number of men in the Iwo Jima operation exceeded 250,000 Americans. Total U.S. ground casualties were about 23,200 (nearly a third of the early ground force of 70,200), and naval casualties another 2,800, for total battle casualties of about 26,000, thus constituting slightly over 10 percent in the entire operation. Total Japanese forces on Okinawa probably somewhat exceeded 100,000, and on Iwo Jima about 25,000. The numbers for the Japanese forces are necessarily rather loose. Thomas Huber, Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1990), 118-119; note 39 places the Japanese force at about 76,000, plus 24,000 native Okinawans. See Appleman, Okinawa, 473-474, which states 110,000. Also see Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York, 1985), 502, for Iwo Jima, and 532, for the size of U.S. forces on Okinawa. The quasi-official study by Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, N.J., 1951), 453, places the initial U.S. marine force on Iwo Jima at 68,000 and then adds in 14,000 more men. For comparative U.S./Japanese battle-casualty ratios, based on data in mid-June 1945, see White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 905. For much lower numbers for the total U.S. troops in the Okinawa and Iwo Jima campaigns, see Gilbert Beebe and Michael DeBakey, Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Considerations (Springfield, Ill., 1952), 50-51. Official U.S. military history figures generally do not jibe with Beebe and DeBakey's curiously low numbers for the average size of American ground forces in these two campaigns.
-
Okinawa
, pp. 473-474
-
-
Appleman1
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37
-
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0005539730
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-
New York, for Iwo Jima, and 532, for the size of U.S. forces on Okinawa
-
Scholars unaccustomed to using data on troop numbers in combat and the related casualty figures may be dismayed by the variations in seemingly authoritative official U.S. sources. The total U.S. ground troops in the Okinawa operation for April 1945 were on average in excess of 170,000, with about 154,000 in the seven combat divisions. The U.S. ground-force battle-casualty rate (even using the unduly low figure of 154,000 for the total number of troops) was actually under 26 percent. U.S. ground-troop numbers in Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, D.C., 1948), 25-26, 490 (with 190,000 for late April 1945, and 227,000 for late May). If naval battle casualties are also computed, the Okinawa battle-casualty totals slightly exceeded 49,600, but the naval battle casualties were under 3 percent of the total naval force, which exceeded 350,000 men in the operation. Thus, overall for Okinawa, U.S. battle casualties constituted slightly under 10 percent among the more than 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in the American operation. For Iwo Jima, see George Gerard and Truman Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C., 1971), 475-477, 797, in vol. 4 of History of U.S. Marine Corps in World War II (5 vols., Washington, D.C., 1958-1971). By most estimates, the total U.S. ground troops in the Iwo Jima operation slightly exceeded 70,000 in the early stages and ultimately grew to more than 110,000. If sailors on the fleet-supporting ships are also added, the total number of men in the Iwo Jima operation exceeded 250,000 Americans. Total U.S. ground casualties were about 23,200 (nearly a third of the early ground force of 70,200), and naval casualties another 2,800, for total battle casualties of about 26,000, thus constituting slightly over 10 percent in the entire operation. Total Japanese forces on Okinawa probably somewhat exceeded 100,000, and on Iwo Jima about 25,000. The numbers for the Japanese forces are necessarily rather loose. Thomas Huber, Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1990), 118-119; note 39 places the Japanese force at about 76,000, plus 24,000 native Okinawans. See Appleman, Okinawa, 473-474, which states 110,000. Also see Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York, 1985), 502, for Iwo Jima, and 532, for the size of U.S. forces on Okinawa. The quasi-official study by Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, N.J., 1951), 453, places the initial U.S. marine force on Iwo Jima at 68,000 and then adds in 14,000 more men. For comparative U.S./Japanese battle-casualty ratios, based on data in mid-June 1945, see White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 905. For much lower numbers for the total U.S. troops in the Okinawa and Iwo Jima campaigns, see Gilbert Beebe and Michael DeBakey, Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Considerations (Springfield, Ill., 1952), 50-51. Official U.S. military history figures generally do not jibe with Beebe and DeBakey's curiously low numbers for the average size of American ground forces in these two campaigns.
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(1985)
Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan
, pp. 502
-
-
Spector, R.1
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38
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0041336138
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Princeton, N.J., places the initial U.S. marine force on Iwo Jima at 68,000 and then adds in 14,000 more men.
-
Scholars unaccustomed to using data on troop numbers in combat and the related casualty figures may be dismayed by the variations in seemingly authoritative official U.S. sources. The total U.S. ground troops in the Okinawa operation for April 1945 were on average in excess of 170,000, with about 154,000 in the seven combat divisions. The U.S. ground-force battle-casualty rate (even using the unduly low figure of 154,000 for the total number of troops) was actually under 26 percent. U.S. ground-troop numbers in Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, D.C., 1948), 25-26, 490 (with 190,000 for late April 1945, and 227,000 for late May). If naval battle casualties are also computed, the Okinawa battle-casualty totals slightly exceeded 49,600, but the naval battle casualties were under 3 percent of the total naval force, which exceeded 350,000 men in the operation. Thus, overall for Okinawa, U.S. battle casualties constituted slightly under 10 percent among the more than 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in the American operation. For Iwo Jima, see George Gerard and Truman Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C., 1971), 475-477, 797, in vol. 4 of History of U.S. Marine Corps in World War II (5 vols., Washington, D.C., 1958-1971). By most estimates, the total U.S. ground troops in the Iwo Jima operation slightly exceeded 70,000 in the early stages and ultimately grew to more than 110,000. If sailors on the fleet-supporting ships are also added, the total number of men in the Iwo Jima operation exceeded 250,000 Americans. Total U.S. ground casualties were about 23,200 (nearly a third of the early ground force of 70,200), and naval casualties another 2,800, for total battle casualties of about 26,000, thus constituting slightly over 10 percent in the entire operation. Total Japanese forces on Okinawa probably somewhat exceeded 100,000, and on Iwo Jima about 25,000. The numbers for the Japanese forces are necessarily rather loose. Thomas Huber, Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1990), 118-119; note 39 places the Japanese force at about 76,000, plus 24,000 native Okinawans. See Appleman, Okinawa, 473-474, which states 110,000. Also see Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York, 1985), 502, for Iwo Jima, and 532, for the size of U.S. forces on Okinawa. The quasi-official study by Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, N.J., 1951), 453, places the initial U.S. marine force on Iwo Jima at 68,000 and then adds in 14,000 more men. For comparative U.S./Japanese battle-casualty ratios, based on data in mid-June 1945, see White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 905. For much lower numbers for the total U.S. troops in the Okinawa and Iwo Jima campaigns, see Gilbert Beebe and Michael DeBakey, Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Considerations (Springfield, Ill., 1952), 50-51. Official U.S. military history figures generally do not jibe with Beebe and DeBakey's curiously low numbers for the average size of American ground forces in these two campaigns.
-
(1951)
The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific
, pp. 453
-
-
Isely, J.1
Crowl, P.2
-
39
-
-
85037504396
-
White house meeting minutes
-
June 18
-
Scholars unaccustomed to using data on troop numbers in combat and the related casualty figures may be dismayed by the variations in seemingly authoritative official U.S. sources. The total U.S. ground troops in the Okinawa operation for April 1945 were on average in excess of 170,000, with about 154,000 in the seven combat divisions. The U.S. ground-force battle-casualty rate (even using the unduly low figure of 154,000 for the total number of troops) was actually under 26 percent. U.S. ground-troop numbers in Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, D.C., 1948), 25-26, 490 (with 190,000 for late April 1945, and 227,000 for late May). If naval battle casualties are also computed, the Okinawa battle-casualty totals slightly exceeded 49,600, but the naval battle casualties were under 3 percent of the total naval force, which exceeded 350,000 men in the operation. Thus, overall for Okinawa, U.S. battle casualties constituted slightly under 10 percent among the more than 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in the American operation. For Iwo Jima, see George Gerard and Truman Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C., 1971), 475-477, 797, in vol. 4 of History of U.S. Marine Corps in World War II (5 vols., Washington, D.C., 1958-1971). By most estimates, the total U.S. ground troops in the Iwo Jima operation slightly exceeded 70,000 in the early stages and ultimately grew to more than 110,000. If sailors on the fleet-supporting ships are also added, the total number of men in the Iwo Jima operation exceeded 250,000 Americans. Total U.S. ground casualties were about 23,200 (nearly a third of the early ground force of 70,200), and naval casualties another 2,800, for total battle casualties of about 26,000, thus constituting slightly over 10 percent in the entire operation. Total Japanese forces on Okinawa probably somewhat exceeded 100,000, and on Iwo Jima about 25,000. The numbers for the Japanese forces are necessarily rather loose. Thomas Huber, Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1990), 118-119; note 39 places the Japanese force at about 76,000, plus 24,000 native Okinawans. See Appleman, Okinawa, 473-474, which states 110,000. Also see Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New York, 1985), 502, for Iwo Jima, and 532, for the size of U.S. forces on Okinawa. The quasi-official study by Jeter Isely and Philip Crowl, The U.S. Marines and Amphibious Warfare: Its Theory and Its Practice in the Pacific (Princeton, N.J., 1951), 453, places the initial U.S. marine force on Iwo Jima at 68,000 and then adds in 14,000 more men. For comparative U.S./Japanese battle-casualty ratios, based on data in mid-June 1945, see White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 905. For much lower numbers for the total U.S. troops in the Okinawa and Iwo Jima campaigns, see Gilbert Beebe and Michael DeBakey, Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Considerations (Springfield, Ill., 1952), 50-51. Official U.S. military history figures generally do not jibe with Beebe and DeBakey's curiously low numbers for the average size of American ground forces in these two campaigns.
-
(1945)
FRUS: Potsdam
, vol.1
, pp. 905
-
-
-
40
-
-
0003428643
-
-
Springfield, Ill.
-
Scholars unaccustomed to using data on troop numbers in combat and the related casualty figures may be dismayed by the variations in seemingly authoritative official U.S. sources. The total U.S. ground troops in the Okinawa operation for April 1945 were on average in excess of 170,000, with about 154,000 in the seven combat divisions. The U.S. ground-force battle-casualty rate (even using the unduly low figure of 154,000 for the total number of troops) was actually under 26 percent. U.S. ground-troop numbers in Roy E. Appleman et al., Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, D.C., 1948), 25-26, 490 (with 190,000 for late April 1945, and 227,000 for late May). If naval battle casualties are also computed, the Okinawa battle-casualty totals slightly exceeded 49,600, but the naval battle casualties were under 3 percent of the total naval force, which exceeded 350,000 men in the operation. Thus, overall for Okinawa, U.S. battle casualties constituted slightly under 10 percent among the more than 500,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines in the American operation. For Iwo Jima, see George Gerard and Truman Strobridge, Western Pacific Operations (Washington, D.C., 1971), 475-477, 797, in vol. 4 of History of U.S. Marine Corps in World War II (5 vols., Washington, D.C., 1958-1971). By most estimates, the total U.S. ground troops in the Iwo Jima operation slightly exceeded 70,000 in the early stages and ultimately grew to more than 110,000. If sailors on the fleet-supporting ships are also added, the total number of men in the Iwo Jima operation exceeded 250,000 Americans. Total U.S. ground casualties were about 23,200 (nearly a third of the early ground force of 70,200), and naval casualties another 2,800, for total battle casualties of about 26,000, thus constituting slightly over 10 percent in the entire operation. Total Japanese forces on Okinawa probably somewhat exceeded 100,000, and on Iwo Jima about 25,000. The numbers for the Japanese forces are necessarily rather loose. Thomas Huber, Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans., 1990), 118-119; note 39 places the Japanese force at about 76,000, plus 24,000 native Okinawans. See Appleman, Okinawa, 473-474, which states 110,000. Also see Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan (New
-
(1952)
Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality, and Logistic Considerations
, pp. 50-51
-
-
Beebe, G.1
DeBakey, M.2
-
41
-
-
84967686121
-
-
See, among others, Skates, Invasion of Japan, 80-82; Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 210-211; Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 283-285; and Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 2-4, 55-63. Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 284, may have first cited Marshall's 63,000 estimate For a strained interpretation, which generally avoids citing and apparently disregards the major scholarship on this meeting, see Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 552-555, which also miscites in his text the title and in his footnote (number 106) the source for these minutes.
-
Invasion of Japan
, pp. 80-82
-
-
Skates1
-
42
-
-
0041836790
-
-
See, among others, Skates, Invasion of Japan, 80-82; Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 210-211; Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 283-285; and Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 2-4, 55-63. Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 284, may have first cited Marshall's 63,000 estimate For a strained interpretation, which generally avoids citing and apparently disregards the major scholarship on this meeting, see Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 552-555, which also miscites in his text the title and in his footnote (number 106) the source for these minutes.
-
MacArthur's Ultra
, pp. 210-211
-
-
Drea1
-
43
-
-
85037508771
-
-
See, among others, Skates, Invasion of Japan, 80-82; Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 210-211; Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 283-285; and Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 2-4, 55-63. Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 284, may have first cited Marshall's 63,000 estimate For a strained interpretation, which generally avoids citing and apparently disregards the major scholarship on this meeting, see Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 552-555, which also miscites in his text the title and in his footnote (number 106) the source for these minutes.
-
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
, pp. 283-285
-
-
Brower1
-
44
-
-
0041836791
-
-
See, among others, Skates, Invasion of Japan, 80-82; Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 210-211; Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 283-285; and Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 2-4, 55-63. Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 284, may have first cited Marshall's 63,000 estimate For a strained interpretation, which generally avoids citing and apparently disregards the major scholarship on this meeting, see Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 552-555, which also miscites in his text the title and in his footnote (number 106) the source for these minutes.
-
Weapons for Victory
, pp. 2-4
-
-
Maddox1
-
45
-
-
85037508771
-
-
See, among others, Skates, Invasion of Japan, 80-82; Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 210-211; Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 283-285; and Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 2-4, 55-63. Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 284, may have first cited Marshall's 63,000 estimate For a strained interpretation, which generally avoids citing and apparently disregards the major scholarship on this meeting, see Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 552-555, which also miscites in his text the title and in his footnote (number 106) the source for these minutes.
-
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
, pp. 284
-
-
Brower1
-
46
-
-
0041836786
-
-
See, among others, Skates, Invasion of Japan, 80-82; Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 210-211; Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 283-285; and Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 2-4, 55-63. Brower, "The Joint Chiefs of Staff," 284, may have first cited Marshall's 63,000 estimate For a strained interpretation, which generally avoids citing and apparently disregards the major scholarship on this meeting, see Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 552-555, which also miscites in his text the title and in his footnote (number 106) the source for these minutes.
-
Casualty Projections
, pp. 552-555
-
-
Giangreco1
-
47
-
-
0041836792
-
-
JCS 1388, June 16, JCS Records
-
Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388, June 16, 1945, JCS Records; and White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 904-909. Also see General John Hull memorandum to Marshall, "Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President," n.d. [June 16-18, 1945], Marshall Papers, and also in file ABC 384 Japan (3 May 44), Records of the Army Staff, RG 319. For Marshall's reluctance after the June 18, 1945, meeting to provide casualty estimates, see Marshall, "Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388/2, June 26, 1945. On July 11, 1945, in "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," 1388/4, in ibid., the Joint Staff Planners presented essentially the same casualty statement that was provided in the formal digest that Marshall read from at the June 18, 1945, White House meeting; that July 11 paper was based on Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JPS 697/2, July 9, 1945, file Japan (May 3, 1944), RG 165.
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(1945)
Details of the Campaign Against Japan
-
-
-
48
-
-
85037504396
-
White house meeting minutes
-
June 18
-
Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388, June 16, 1945, JCS Records; and White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 904-909. Also see General John Hull memorandum to Marshall, "Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President," n.d. [June 16-18, 1945], Marshall Papers, and also in file ABC 384 Japan (3 May 44), Records of the Army Staff, RG 319. For Marshall's reluctance after the June 18, 1945, meeting to provide casualty estimates, see Marshall, "Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388/2, June 26, 1945. On July 11, 1945, in "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," 1388/4, in ibid., the Joint Staff Planners presented essentially the same casualty statement that was provided in the formal digest that Marshall read from at the June 18, 1945, White House meeting; that July 11 paper was based on Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JPS 697/2, July 9, 1945, file Japan (May 3, 1944), RG 165.
-
(1945)
FRUS: Potsdam
, vol.1
, pp. 904-909
-
-
-
49
-
-
85037496919
-
-
n.d. June 16-18
-
Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388, June 16, 1945, JCS Records; and White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 904-909. Also see General John Hull memorandum to Marshall, "Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President," n.d. [June 16-18, 1945], Marshall Papers, and also in file ABC 384 Japan (3 May 44), Records of the Army Staff, RG 319. For Marshall's reluctance after the June 18, 1945, meeting to provide casualty estimates, see Marshall, "Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388/2, June 26, 1945. On July 11, 1945, in "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," 1388/4, in ibid., the Joint Staff Planners presented essentially the same casualty statement that was provided in the formal digest that Marshall read from at the June 18, 1945, White House meeting; that July 11 paper was based on Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JPS 697/2, July 9, 1945, file Japan (May 3, 1944), RG 165.
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(1945)
Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President
-
-
Hull, J.1
-
50
-
-
85037512682
-
-
JCS 1388/2, June 26
-
Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388, June 16, 1945, JCS Records; and White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 904-909. Also see General John Hull memorandum to Marshall, "Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President," n.d. [June 16-18, 1945], Marshall Papers, and also in file ABC 384 Japan (3 May 44), Records of the Army Staff, RG 319. For Marshall's reluctance after the June 18, 1945, meeting to provide casualty estimates, see Marshall, "Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388/2, June 26, 1945. On July 11, 1945, in "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," 1388/4, in ibid., the Joint Staff Planners presented essentially the same casualty statement that was provided in the formal digest that Marshall read from at the June 18, 1945, White House meeting; that July 11 paper was based on Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JPS 697/2, July 9, 1945, file Japan (May 3, 1944), RG 165.
-
(1945)
Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan
-
-
Marshall1
-
51
-
-
85037508972
-
-
July 11
-
Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388, June 16, 1945, JCS Records; and White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 904-909. Also see General John Hull memorandum to Marshall, "Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President," n.d. [June 16-18, 1945], Marshall Papers, and also in file ABC 384 Japan (3 May 44), Records of the Army Staff, RG 319. For Marshall's reluctance after the June 18, 1945, meeting to provide casualty estimates, see Marshall, "Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388/2, June 26, 1945. On July 11, 1945, in "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," 1388/4, in ibid., the Joint Staff Planners presented essentially the same casualty statement that was provided in the formal digest that Marshall read from at the June 18, 1945, White House meeting; that July 11 paper was based on Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JPS 697/2, July 9, 1945, file Japan (May 3, 1944), RG 165.
-
(1945)
Details of the Campaign Against Japan
, vol.1388
, Issue.4
-
-
-
52
-
-
0042337864
-
-
Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388, June 16, 1945, JCS Records; and White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 904-909. Also see General John Hull memorandum to Marshall, "Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President," n.d. [June 16-18, 1945], Marshall Papers, and also in file ABC 384 Japan (3 May 44), Records of the Army Staff, RG 319. For Marshall's reluctance after the June 18, 1945, meeting to provide casualty estimates, see Marshall, "Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388/2, June 26, 1945. On July 11, 1945, in "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," 1388/4, in ibid., the Joint Staff Planners presented essentially the same casualty statement that was provided in the formal digest that Marshall read from at the June 18, 1945, White House meeting; that July 11 paper was based on Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JPS 697/2, July 9, 1945, file Japan (May 3, 1944), RG 165.
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(1945)
Details of the Campaign Against Japan
, vol.1388
, Issue.4
-
-
-
53
-
-
0041836792
-
-
JPS 697/2, July 9, file Japan (May 3, 1944), RG 165
-
Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388, June 16, 1945, JCS Records; and White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 904-909. Also see General John Hull memorandum to Marshall, "Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President," n.d. [June 16-18, 1945], Marshall Papers, and also in file ABC 384 Japan (3 May 44), Records of the Army Staff, RG 319. For Marshall's reluctance after the June 18, 1945, meeting to provide casualty estimates, see Marshall, "Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JCS 1388/2, June 26, 1945. On July 11, 1945, in "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," 1388/4, in ibid., the Joint Staff Planners presented essentially the same casualty statement that was provided in the formal digest that Marshall read from at the June 18, 1945, White House meeting; that July 11 paper was based on Joint Staff Planners, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JPS 697/2, July 9, 1945, file Japan (May 3, 1944), RG 165.
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(1945)
Details of the Campaign Against Japan
-
-
-
54
-
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85037504396
-
White house meeting minutes
-
June 18
-
White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 904-907. For the background of the 31,000 estimate, see General George Lincoln to General John Hull, June 18, 1945, box 6, George A. Lincoln Papers, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.; also Lincoln to Hull, June 16, 1945, courtesy of Edward Drea.
-
(1945)
FRUS: Potsdam
, vol.1
, pp. 904-907
-
-
-
55
-
-
0041836791
-
-
Leahy Diary, June 18, 1945, William Leahy Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Curiously, Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 2-5, pummels historians for using this 63,000 number from mid-june as useful in seeking to understand high-level July-August 1945 beliefs, but he entirely omits this 63,000 estimate when focusing on the events involving and surrounding the June 18 White House meeting. Ibid., 58-62. In contrast, see Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 202, note 44.
-
Weapons for Victory
, pp. 2-5
-
-
Maddox1
-
56
-
-
85037503053
-
-
Leahy Diary, June 18, 1945, William Leahy Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Curiously, Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 2-5, pummels historians for using this 63,000 number from mid-june as useful in seeking to understand high-level July-August 1945 beliefs, but he entirely omits this 63,000 estimate when focusing on the events involving and surrounding the June 18 White House meeting. Ibid., 58-62. In contrast, see Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 202, note 44.
-
Weapons for Victory
, pp. 58-62
-
-
-
57
-
-
85037505736
-
-
note 44
-
Leahy Diary, June 18, 1945, William Leahy Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Curiously, Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 2-5, pummels historians for using this 63,000 number from mid-june as useful in seeking to understand high-level July-August 1945 beliefs, but he entirely omits this 63,000 estimate when focusing on the events involving and surrounding the June 18 White House meeting. Ibid., 58-62. In contrast, see Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 202, note 44.
-
Truman and the Hiroshima Cult
, vol.202
-
-
Newman1
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58
-
-
85037504396
-
White house meeting minutes
-
June 18
-
White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 907.
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(1945)
FRUS: Potsdam
, vol.1
, pp. 907
-
-
-
60
-
-
85037494846
-
-
Marshall to MacArthur, June 19, 1945, RG 4, MacArthur Archives
-
Marshall to MacArthur, June 19, 1945, RG 4, MacArthur Archives.
-
-
-
-
61
-
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0041836747
-
-
June 18
-
. Leahy Diary, June 18, 1945; Henry L. Stimson Diary, June 18, 1945, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; James Forrestal Diary, June 18, 1945, Forrestal Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.;
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(1945)
Leahy Diary
-
-
-
62
-
-
85037497973
-
-
June 18, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
-
. Leahy Diary, June 18, 1945; Henry L. Stimson Diary, June 18, 1945, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; James Forrestal Diary, June 18, 1945, Forrestal Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.;
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(1945)
Henry L. Stimson Diary
-
-
-
63
-
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85037497089
-
-
June 18, Forrestal Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
-
. Leahy Diary, June 18, 1945; Henry L. Stimson Diary, June 18, 1945, Sterling Library, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; James Forrestal Diary, June 18, 1945, Forrestal Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.;
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(1945)
James Forrestal Diary
-
-
-
64
-
-
85037512296
-
-
June 18, McCloy Papers, Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
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John J. McCloy Diary, June 18, 1945, McCloy Papers, Amherst College, Amherst, Mass.
-
(1945)
John J. Mccloy Diary
-
-
-
65
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85037504396
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White house meeting minutes
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June 18
-
White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 909.
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(1945)
FRUS: Potsdam
, vol.1
, pp. 909
-
-
-
66
-
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0012898923
-
-
Washington, D.C.
-
Ultra numbers summarized in Douglas MacEachim, The Final Months of the War with Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision (Washington, D.C., 1998), 20-21.
-
(1998)
The Final Months of the War with Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-bomb Decision
, pp. 20-21
-
-
MacEachim, D.1
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67
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85037496190
-
-
note
-
Larry Bland, editor of the Marshall Papers, concludes that Truman normally received a daily delivery of Ultra by an army or navy officer, with the two military services alternating, and it seems highly likely that this procedure generally continued at Potsdam, although possibly in somewhat modified form.
-
-
-
-
68
-
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85037506027
-
-
Marshall in meeting of July 24, 1945, with Soviets, in JCS minutes, in FRUS: Potsdam, 2: 346-347. Three days earlier, according to a G-2 report, American intelligence estimates placed the total on Kyushu at about 440,000 Japanese troops, with 196,000 in the south. G-2, Headquarters, 6th Army, "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation, Olympic Operation, Aug. 1, 1945, box 1843, in entry 418, in Office of the Director of Plans and Operations, RG 165.
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FRUS: Potsdam
, vol.2
, pp. 346-347
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-
-
69
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85037494284
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July 16-Aug. 5, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Truman Library
-
In matters involving American decisionmaking, the 1945 use of the A-bomb, and the ending of the war in the Pacific, it is usually very dangerous, in the absence of specific pre-Hiroshima or pre-Nagasaki archival materials, to make substantial assumptions about the content or even the existence of key meetings, partly because memoirs and other postwar recollections (including interviews) were often unreliable and either intentionally or otherwise distorted pre-Nagasaki matters from 1945. The main analysis in this essay does not depend upon the existence of this discussion at a Potsdam meeting, although the inferential evidence suggests that such a discussion was somewhat likely. For diaries, see Truman, "Potsdam Diary," July 16-Aug. 5, 1945, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Truman Library; Henry Arnold, "Trip to Terminal," Henry Arnold Papers, Library of Congress; Walter Brown notes, July 16-Aug. 6, 1945, files 54 (1) and 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.; Joseph Davies Papers, July 15-Aug. 4, 1945, Library of Congress; Leahy Diary, July 14-Aug. 6, 1945; Forrestal Diary, July 18-31, 1945; and Stimson Diary, July 15-27, 1945. For an intelligent wariness in not trusting Truman's Jan. 12, 1953, letter about a Potsdam conference casualty meeting with Marshall, see MacEachim, The Final Months of the War Against Japan, 26-27. Lt. William Rigdon, "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference," July 6-Aug. 7, 1945, Truman Library, is also available for the general Potsdam Conference period, and McCloy's diary is on part of this period.
-
(1945)
Potsdam Diary
-
-
Truman1
-
70
-
-
85037509165
-
-
Henry Arnold Papers, Library of Congress
-
In matters involving American decisionmaking, the 1945 use of the A-bomb, and the ending of the war in the Pacific, it is usually very dangerous, in the absence of specific pre-Hiroshima or pre-Nagasaki archival materials, to make substantial assumptions about the content or even the existence of key meetings, partly because memoirs and other postwar recollections (including interviews) were often unreliable and either intentionally or otherwise distorted pre-Nagasaki matters from 1945. The main analysis in this essay does not depend upon the existence of this discussion at a Potsdam meeting, although the inferential evidence suggests that such a discussion was somewhat likely. For diaries, see Truman, "Potsdam Diary," July 16-Aug. 5, 1945, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Truman Library; Henry Arnold, "Trip to Terminal," Henry Arnold Papers, Library of Congress; Walter Brown notes, July 16-Aug. 6, 1945, files 54 (1) and 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.; Joseph Davies Papers, July 15-Aug. 4, 1945, Library of Congress; Leahy Diary, July 14-Aug. 6, 1945; Forrestal Diary, July 18-31, 1945; and Stimson Diary, July 15-27, 1945. For an intelligent wariness in not trusting Truman's Jan. 12, 1953, letter about a Potsdam conference casualty meeting with Marshall, see MacEachim, The Final Months of the War Against Japan, 26-27. Lt. William Rigdon, "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference," July 6-Aug. 7, 1945, Truman Library, is also available for the general Potsdam Conference period, and McCloy's diary is on part of this period.
-
Trip to Terminal
-
-
Arnold, H.1
-
71
-
-
85037506052
-
-
July 16-Aug. 6, files 54 (1) and 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.
-
In matters involving American decisionmaking, the 1945 use of the A-bomb, and the ending of the war in the Pacific, it is usually very dangerous, in the absence of specific pre-Hiroshima or pre-Nagasaki archival materials, to make substantial assumptions about the content or even the existence of key meetings, partly because memoirs and other postwar recollections (including interviews) were often unreliable and either intentionally or otherwise distorted pre-Nagasaki matters from 1945. The main analysis in this essay does not depend upon the existence of this discussion at a Potsdam meeting, although the inferential evidence suggests that such a discussion was somewhat likely. For diaries, see Truman, "Potsdam Diary," July 16-Aug. 5, 1945, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Truman Library; Henry Arnold, "Trip to Terminal," Henry Arnold Papers, Library of Congress; Walter Brown notes, July 16-Aug. 6, 1945, files 54 (1) and 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.; Joseph Davies Papers, July 15-Aug. 4, 1945, Library of Congress; Leahy Diary, July 14-Aug. 6, 1945; Forrestal Diary, July 18-31, 1945; and Stimson Diary, July 15-27, 1945. For an intelligent wariness in not trusting Truman's Jan. 12, 1953, letter about a Potsdam conference casualty meeting with Marshall, see MacEachim, The Final Months of the War Against Japan, 26-27. Lt. William Rigdon, "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference," July 6-Aug. 7, 1945, Truman Library, is also available for the general Potsdam Conference period, and McCloy's diary is on part of this period.
-
(1945)
Walter Brown Notes
-
-
-
72
-
-
85037507397
-
-
July 15-Aug. 4, Library of Congress
-
In matters involving American decisionmaking, the 1945 use of the A-bomb, and the ending of the war in the Pacific, it is usually very dangerous, in the absence of specific pre-Hiroshima or pre-Nagasaki archival materials, to make substantial assumptions about the content or even the existence of key meetings, partly because memoirs and other postwar recollections (including interviews) were often unreliable and either intentionally or otherwise distorted pre-Nagasaki matters from 1945. The main analysis in this essay does not depend upon the existence of this discussion at a Potsdam meeting, although the inferential evidence suggests that such a discussion was somewhat likely. For diaries, see Truman, "Potsdam Diary," July 16-Aug. 5, 1945, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Truman Library; Henry Arnold, "Trip to Terminal," Henry Arnold Papers, Library of Congress; Walter Brown notes, July 16-Aug. 6, 1945, files 54 (1) and 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.; Joseph Davies Papers, July 15-Aug. 4, 1945, Library of Congress; Leahy Diary, July 14-Aug. 6, 1945; Forrestal Diary, July 18-31, 1945; and Stimson Diary, July 15-27, 1945. For an intelligent wariness in not trusting Truman's Jan. 12, 1953, letter about a Potsdam conference casualty meeting with Marshall, see MacEachim, The Final Months of the War Against Japan, 26-27. Lt. William Rigdon, "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference," July 6-Aug. 7, 1945, Truman Library, is also available for the general Potsdam Conference period, and McCloy's diary is on part of this period.
-
(1945)
Joseph Davies Papers
-
-
-
73
-
-
0041836747
-
-
July 14-Aug. 6
-
In matters involving American decisionmaking, the 1945 use of the A-bomb, and the ending of the war in the Pacific, it is usually very dangerous, in the absence of specific pre-Hiroshima or pre-Nagasaki archival materials, to make substantial assumptions about the content or even the existence of key meetings, partly because memoirs and other postwar recollections (including interviews) were often unreliable and either intentionally or otherwise distorted pre-Nagasaki matters from 1945. The main analysis in this essay does not depend upon the existence of this discussion at a Potsdam meeting, although the inferential evidence suggests that such a discussion was somewhat likely. For diaries, see Truman, "Potsdam Diary," July 16-Aug. 5, 1945, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Truman Library; Henry Arnold, "Trip to Terminal," Henry Arnold Papers, Library of Congress; Walter Brown notes, July 16-Aug. 6, 1945, files 54 (1) and 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.; Joseph Davies Papers, July 15-Aug. 4, 1945, Library of Congress; Leahy Diary, July 14-Aug. 6, 1945; Forrestal Diary, July 18-31, 1945; and Stimson Diary, July 15-27, 1945. For an intelligent wariness in not trusting Truman's Jan. 12, 1953, letter about a Potsdam conference casualty meeting with Marshall, see MacEachim, The Final Months of the War Against Japan, 26-27. Lt. William Rigdon, "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference," July 6-Aug. 7, 1945, Truman Library, is also available for the general Potsdam Conference period, and McCloy's diary is on part of this period.
-
(1945)
Leahy Diary
-
-
-
74
-
-
85037498112
-
-
July 18-31
-
In matters involving American decisionmaking, the 1945 use of the A-bomb, and the ending of the war in the Pacific, it is usually very dangerous, in the absence of specific pre-Hiroshima or pre-Nagasaki archival materials, to make substantial assumptions about the content or even the existence of key meetings, partly because memoirs and other postwar recollections (including interviews) were often unreliable and either intentionally or otherwise distorted pre-Nagasaki matters from 1945. The main analysis in this essay does not depend upon the existence of this discussion at a Potsdam meeting, although the inferential evidence suggests that such a discussion was somewhat likely. For diaries, see Truman, "Potsdam Diary," July 16-Aug. 5, 1945, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Truman Library; Henry Arnold, "Trip to Terminal," Henry Arnold Papers, Library of Congress; Walter Brown notes, July 16-Aug. 6, 1945, files 54 (1) and 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.; Joseph Davies Papers, July 15-Aug. 4, 1945, Library of Congress; Leahy Diary, July 14-Aug. 6, 1945; Forrestal Diary, July 18-31, 1945; and Stimson Diary, July 15-27, 1945. For an intelligent wariness in not trusting Truman's Jan. 12, 1953, letter about a Potsdam conference casualty meeting with Marshall, see MacEachim, The Final Months of the War Against Japan, 26-27. Lt. William Rigdon, "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference," July 6-Aug. 7, 1945, Truman Library, is also available for the general Potsdam Conference period, and McCloy's diary is on part of this period.
-
(1945)
Forrestal Diary
-
-
-
75
-
-
0042838835
-
-
July 15-27
-
In matters involving American decisionmaking, the 1945 use of the A-bomb, and the ending of the war in the Pacific, it is usually very dangerous, in the absence of specific pre-Hiroshima or pre-Nagasaki archival materials, to make substantial assumptions about the content or even the existence of key meetings, partly because memoirs and other postwar recollections (including interviews) were often unreliable and either intentionally or otherwise distorted pre-Nagasaki matters from 1945. The main analysis in this essay does not depend upon the existence of this discussion at a Potsdam meeting, although the inferential evidence suggests that such a discussion was somewhat likely. For diaries, see Truman, "Potsdam Diary," July 16-Aug. 5, 1945, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Truman Library; Henry Arnold, "Trip to Terminal," Henry Arnold Papers, Library of Congress; Walter Brown notes, July 16-Aug. 6, 1945, files 54 (1) and 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.; Joseph Davies Papers, July 15-Aug. 4, 1945, Library of Congress; Leahy Diary, July 14-Aug. 6, 1945; Forrestal Diary, July 18-31, 1945; and Stimson Diary, July 15-27, 1945. For an intelligent wariness in not trusting Truman's Jan. 12, 1953, letter about a Potsdam conference casualty meeting with Marshall, see MacEachim, The Final Months of the War Against Japan, 26-27. Lt. William Rigdon, "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference," July 6-Aug. 7, 1945, Truman Library, is also available for the general Potsdam Conference period, and McCloy's diary is on part of this period.
-
(1945)
Stimson Diary
-
-
-
76
-
-
85037516709
-
-
In matters involving American decisionmaking, the 1945 use of the A-bomb, and the ending of the war in the Pacific, it is usually very dangerous, in the absence of specific pre-Hiroshima or pre-Nagasaki archival materials, to make substantial assumptions about the content or even the existence of key meetings, partly because memoirs and other postwar recollections (including interviews) were often unreliable and either intentionally or otherwise distorted pre-Nagasaki matters from 1945. The main analysis in this essay does not depend upon the existence of this discussion at a Potsdam meeting, although the inferential evidence suggests that such a discussion was somewhat likely. For diaries, see Truman, "Potsdam Diary," July 16-Aug. 5, 1945, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Truman Library; Henry Arnold, "Trip to Terminal," Henry Arnold Papers, Library of Congress; Walter Brown notes, July 16-Aug. 6, 1945, files 54 (1) and 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.; Joseph Davies Papers, July 15-Aug. 4, 1945, Library of Congress; Leahy Diary, July 14-Aug. 6, 1945; Forrestal Diary, July 18-31, 1945; and Stimson Diary, July 15-27, 1945. For an intelligent wariness in not trusting Truman's Jan. 12, 1953, letter about a Potsdam conference casualty meeting with Marshall, see MacEachim, The Final Months of the War Against Japan, 26-27. Lt. William Rigdon, "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference," July 6-Aug. 7, 1945, Truman Library, is also available for the general Potsdam Conference period, and McCloy's diary is on part of this period.
-
The Final Months of the War Against Japan
, pp. 26-27
-
-
MacEachim1
-
77
-
-
85037507891
-
-
July 6-Aug. 7, Truman Library, is also available for the general Potsdam Conference period, and McCloy's diary is on part of this period
-
In matters involving American decisionmaking, the 1945 use of the A-bomb, and the ending of the war in the Pacific, it is usually very dangerous, in the absence of specific pre-Hiroshima or pre-Nagasaki archival materials, to make substantial assumptions about the content or even the existence of key meetings, partly because memoirs and other postwar recollections (including interviews) were often unreliable and either intentionally or otherwise distorted pre-Nagasaki matters from 1945. The main analysis in this essay does not depend upon the existence of this discussion at a Potsdam meeting, although the inferential evidence suggests that such a discussion was somewhat likely. For diaries, see Truman, "Potsdam Diary," July 16-Aug. 5, 1945, President's Secretary's Files (PSF), Truman Library; Henry Arnold, "Trip to Terminal," Henry Arnold Papers, Library of Congress; Walter Brown notes, July 16-Aug. 6, 1945, files 54 (1) and 602, James F. Byrnes Papers, Clemson University Library, Clemson University, Clemson, S.C.; Joseph Davies Papers, July 15-Aug. 4, 1945, Library of Congress; Leahy Diary, July 14-Aug. 6, 1945; Forrestal Diary, July 18-31, 1945; and Stimson Diary, July 15-27, 1945. For an intelligent wariness in not trusting Truman's Jan. 12, 1953, letter about a Potsdam conference casualty meeting with Marshall, see MacEachim, The Final Months of the War Against Japan, 26-27. Lt. William Rigdon, "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference," July 6-Aug. 7, 1945, Truman Library, is also available for the general Potsdam Conference period, and McCloy's diary is on part of this period.
-
(1945)
Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference
-
-
Rigdon, W.1
-
78
-
-
0042838831
-
-
Truman to James L. Cate, Jan. 12, 1953, 7 vols., Chicago, unnumbered pages between 712-713
-
Truman to James L. Cate, Jan. 12, 1953, in Wesley F. Craven and James Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (7 vols., Chicago, 1953), 5: unnumbered pages between 712-713. For uncritical acceptance of this letter, see for example, Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 222, and Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 569-574. For serious doubts about the reliability of this letter, which after being rewritten by assistants reached to one-million casualties, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Writing, Righting, or Wronging the Historical Record," Diplomatic History, 16 (1992), 163-173, and Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1995), 517-520.
-
(1953)
The Army Air Forces in World War II
, pp. 5
-
-
Craven, W.F.1
Cate, J.2
-
79
-
-
0041836790
-
-
Truman to James L. Cate, Jan. 12, 1953, in Wesley F. Craven and James Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (7 vols., Chicago, 1953), 5: unnumbered pages between 712-713. For uncritical acceptance of this letter, see for example, Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 222, and Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 569-574. For serious doubts about the reliability of this letter, which after being rewritten by assistants reached to one-million casualties, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Writing, Righting, or Wronging the Historical Record," Diplomatic History, 16 (1992), 163-173, and Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1995), 517-520.
-
MacArthur's Ultra
, pp. 222
-
-
Drea1
-
80
-
-
0041836786
-
-
Truman to James L. Cate, Jan. 12, 1953, in Wesley F. Craven and James Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (7 vols., Chicago, 1953), 5: unnumbered pages between 712-713. For uncritical acceptance of this letter, see for example, Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 222, and Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 569-574. For serious doubts about the reliability of this letter, which after being rewritten by assistants reached to one-million casualties, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Writing, Righting, or Wronging the Historical Record," Diplomatic History, 16 (1992), 163-173, and Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1995), 517-520.
-
Casualty Projections
, pp. 569-574
-
-
Giangreco1
-
81
-
-
84963071632
-
Writing, righting, or wronging the historical record
-
Truman to James L. Cate, Jan. 12, 1953, in Wesley F. Craven and James Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (7 vols., Chicago, 1953), 5: unnumbered pages between 712-713. For uncritical acceptance of this letter, see for example, Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 222, and Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 569-574. For serious doubts about the reliability of this letter, which after being rewritten by assistants reached to one-million casualties, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Writing, Righting, or Wronging the Historical Record," Diplomatic History, 16 (1992), 163-173, and Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1995), 517-520.
-
(1992)
Diplomatic History
, vol.16
, pp. 163-173
-
-
Bernstein, B.J.1
-
82
-
-
0039485301
-
-
New York
-
Truman to James L. Cate, Jan. 12, 1953, in Wesley F. Craven and James Cate, eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II (7 vols., Chicago, 1953), 5: unnumbered pages between 712-713. For uncritical acceptance of this letter, see for example, Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 222, and Giangreco, "Casualty Projections," 569-574. For serious doubts about the reliability of this letter, which after being rewritten by assistants reached to one-million casualties, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Writing, Righting, or Wronging the Historical Record," Diplomatic History, 16 (1992), 163-173, and Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1995), 517-520.
-
(1995)
The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb
, pp. 517-520
-
-
Alperovitz, G.1
-
83
-
-
85037501206
-
-
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, "Amendment No. 1," July 29, 1945, to April 25, 1945," box 6, Stephen J. Chamberlin Papers, U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and also in MacArthur Archives and in CARL
-
General Charles Willoughby, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, "Amendment No. 1," July 29, 1945, to "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation Southern Kyushu," April 25, 1945, box 6, Stephen J. Chamberlin Papers, U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and also in MacArthur Archives and in CARL. For Ultra estimates, Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 219. In a remarkable error, Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 126, in discussing Ultra's numbers in early August 1945, fails to distinguish between U.S. intelligence estimates for all of Kyushu and for the southern part; thus Maddox incorrectly places the then-estimated force of 600,000 Japanese troops entirely in the south. After the war, it appeared that about 900,000 were in Kyushu in August, and thus about 540,000 in the south, but many of the 900,000 were hastily raised, ill-equipped, and ill-trained. For a much lower postwar number of about 735,000 Japanese troops, based on postwar Japanese military reports, see Col. H. V. White, "The Japanese Plans for the Defense of Kyushu," Dec. 31, 1945, John Toison Papers, American Military History Institute. That report included approximately 25,000 Japanese troops in off-lying islands near Kyushu and also claimed that there was a pre-surrender U.S. estimate of 680,000 Japanese troops on all of Kyushu, but it does not specify the date of that estimate.
-
G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation Southern Kyushu
-
-
Willoughby, C.1
-
84
-
-
0041836790
-
-
General Charles Willoughby, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, "Amendment No. 1," July 29, 1945, to "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation Southern Kyushu," April 25, 1945," box 6, Stephen J. Chamberlin Papers, U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and also in MacArthur Archives and in CARL. For Ultra estimates, Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 219. In a remarkable error, Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 126, in discussing Ultra's numbers in early August 1945, fails to distinguish between U.S. intelligence estimates for all of Kyushu and for the southern part; thus Maddox incorrectly places the then-estimated force of 600,000 Japanese troops entirely in the south. After the war, it appeared that about 900,000 were in Kyushu in August, and thus about 540,000 in the south, but many of the 900,000 were hastily raised, ill-equipped, and ill-trained. For a much lower postwar number of about 735,000 Japanese troops, based on postwar Japanese military reports, see Col. H. V. White, "The Japanese Plans for the Defense of Kyushu," Dec. 31, 1945, John Toison Papers, American Military History Institute. That report included approximately 25,000 Japanese troops in off-lying islands near Kyushu and also claimed that there was a pre-surrender U.S. estimate of 680,000 Japanese troops on all of Kyushu, but it does not specify the date of that estimate.
-
MacArthur's Ultra
, pp. 219
-
-
Drea1
-
85
-
-
0041836791
-
-
in discussing Ultra's numbers in early August 1945, fails to distinguish between U.S. intelligence estimates for all of Kyushu and for the southern part; thus Maddox incorrectly places the then-estimated force of 600,000 Japanese troops entirely in the south
-
General Charles Willoughby, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, "Amendment No. 1," July 29, 1945, to "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation Southern Kyushu," April 25, 1945," box 6, Stephen J. Chamberlin Papers, U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and also in MacArthur Archives and in CARL. For Ultra estimates, Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 219. In a remarkable error, Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 126, in discussing Ultra's numbers in early August 1945, fails to distinguish between U.S. intelligence estimates for all of Kyushu and for the southern part; thus Maddox incorrectly places the then-estimated force of 600,000 Japanese troops entirely in the south. After the war, it appeared that about 900,000 were in Kyushu in August, and thus about 540,000 in the south, but many of the 900,000 were hastily raised, ill-equipped, and ill-trained. For a much lower postwar number of about 735,000 Japanese troops, based on postwar Japanese military reports, see Col. H. V. White, "The Japanese Plans for the Defense of Kyushu," Dec. 31, 1945, John Toison Papers, American Military History Institute. That report included approximately 25,000 Japanese troops in off-lying islands near Kyushu and also claimed that there was a pre-surrender U.S. estimate of 680,000 Japanese troops on all of Kyushu, but it does not specify the date of that estimate.
-
Weapons for Victory
, pp. 126
-
-
Maddox1
-
86
-
-
85037498376
-
-
Dec. 31, John Toison Papers, American Military History Institute
-
General Charles Willoughby, Military Intelligence Section, General Staff, General Headquarters, U.S. Army Forces in the Pacific, "Amendment No. 1," July 29, 1945, to "G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation Southern Kyushu," April 25, 1945," box 6, Stephen J. Chamberlin Papers, U.S. Army Military Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., and also in MacArthur Archives and in CARL. For Ultra estimates, Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 219. In a remarkable error, Maddox, Weapons for Victory, 126, in discussing Ultra's numbers in early August 1945, fails to distinguish between U.S. intelligence estimates for all of Kyushu and for the southern part; thus Maddox incorrectly places the then-estimated force of 600,000 Japanese troops entirely in the south. After the war, it appeared that about 900,000 were in Kyushu in August, and thus about 540,000 in the south, but many of the 900,000 were hastily raised, ill-equipped, and ill-trained. For a much lower postwar number of about 735,000 Japanese troops, based on postwar Japanese military reports, see Col. H. V. White, "The Japanese Plans for the Defense of Kyushu," Dec. 31, 1945, John Toison Papers, American Military History Institute. That report included approximately 25,000 Japanese troops in off-lying islands near Kyushu and also claimed that there was a pre-surrender U.S. estimate of 680,000 Japanese troops on all of Kyushu, but it does not specify the date of that estimate.
-
(1945)
The Japanese Plans for the Defense of Kyushu
-
-
White, H.V.1
-
87
-
-
0041836784
-
-
Washington, D.C.
-
Ray Cline, Washington Command Post: The Operations Division (Washington, D.C., 1951), 103, 227-247, 337-344.
-
(1951)
Washington Command Post: The Operations Division
, vol.103
, pp. 227-247
-
-
Cline, R.1
-
88
-
-
85037492054
-
Enemy reaction to an assault against northern honshu
-
JIS 194/M, Aug. 2
-
JIS (Service Members), "Enemy Reaction to An Assault Against Northern Honshu," JIS 194/M, Aug. 2, 1945, JCS Records, RG 218.
-
(1945)
JCS Records
-
-
-
89
-
-
85037520479
-
-
as enclosure B (JIC 311)
-
Service Members, Joint Intelligence Committee (hereafter, JIC), "Defensive Preparations in Japan," as enclosure B (JIC 311), in JWPC, "Alternatives to Olympic," JWPC 397, Aug. 4, 1945, file 381 Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), ibid. This enclosure B (JIC 311) is also the source for the next five paragraphs in the text.
-
Defensive Preparations in Japan
-
-
-
90
-
-
85037507345
-
Alternatives to olympic
-
Aug. 4, file 381 Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43)
-
Service Members, Joint Intelligence Committee (hereafter, JIC), "Defensive Preparations in Japan," as enclosure B (JIC 311), in JWPC, "Alternatives to Olympic," JWPC 397, Aug. 4, 1945, file 381 Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), ibid. This enclosure B (JIC 311) is also the source for the next five paragraphs in the text.
-
(1945)
JWPC
, vol.397
-
-
-
91
-
-
85037500515
-
-
This enclosure B (JIC 311) is also the source for the next five paragraphs in the text
-
Service Members, Joint Intelligence Committee (hereafter, JIC), "Defensive Preparations in Japan," as enclosure B (JIC 311), in JWPC, "Alternatives to Olympic," JWPC 397, Aug. 4, 1945, file 381 Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), ibid. This enclosure B (JIC 311) is also the source for the next five paragraphs in the text.
-
JWPC
-
-
-
92
-
-
85037497980
-
Enclosure B
-
Enclosure B, ibid.
-
JWPC
-
-
-
93
-
-
0041836754
-
-
Aug. 8, Marshall Papers, Marshall Library
-
JPS, 213th meeting minutes, Aug. 8, 1945, Marshall Papers, Marshall Library.
-
(1945)
213th Meeting Minutes
-
-
-
94
-
-
85037493860
-
Japanese reaction to an assault against Northern Honshu
-
Aug. 6, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44)
-
JIC (Service Members), "Japanese Reaction to An Assault Against Northern Honshu," JIC 312, Aug. 6, 1945, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44), JCS Records, RG 218. This document is also the source for the next two paragraphs in the text.
-
(1945)
JIC
, vol.312
-
-
-
95
-
-
85037521504
-
-
JIC (Service Members), "Japanese Reaction to An Assault Against Northern Honshu," JIC 312, Aug. 6, 1945, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44), JCS Records, RG 218. This document is also the source for the next two paragraphs in the text.
-
JCS Records
-
-
-
96
-
-
85037494855
-
-
Lincoln to Hull, Aug. 6, 1945, box 6, Lincoln Papers. This document is also the source for otherwise undocumented material in the next paragraph
-
Lincoln to Hull, Aug. 6, 1945, box 6, Lincoln Papers. This document is also the source for otherwise undocumented material in the next paragraph.
-
-
-
-
97
-
-
85037515968
-
-
Draft, Marshall to MacArthur, no date, attached to ibid.
-
Draft, Marshall to MacArthur, no date, attached to ibid.
-
-
-
-
98
-
-
85037492023
-
-
Hull to Marshall, Aug. 6, 1945, ibid.
-
Hull to Marshall, Aug. 6, 1945, ibid.
-
-
-
-
99
-
-
85037517651
-
-
Marshall to MacArthur, Aug. 7, 1945, MacArthur Archives. This cable is also the source for the next two paragraphs in the text
-
Marshall to MacArthur, Aug. 7, 1945, MacArthur Archives. This cable is also the source for the next two paragraphs in the text.
-
-
-
-
100
-
-
85037512082
-
-
MacArthur to Marshall, Aug. 9, 1945, ibid.
-
MacArthur to Marshall, Aug. 9, 1945, ibid.
-
-
-
-
101
-
-
0041836790
-
-
This interpretation is partly indebted to Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 213, 227.
-
Macarthur's Ultra
, pp. 213
-
-
Drea1
-
102
-
-
0041836790
-
-
MacArthur to Marshall, Aug. 9, 1945, MacArthur Archives. This document is also the source on MacArthur for the next three paragraphs. on Ultra's general accuracy. For an example of MacArthur's postwar rewriting of this period of history, see MacArthur to Carl Shermer, March 15, 1961, RG 10, MacArthur Archives
-
MacArthur to Marshall, Aug. 9, 1945, MacArthur Archives. This document is also the source on MacArthur for the next three paragraphs. See Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 202-225, on Ultra's general accuracy. For an example of MacArthur's postwar rewriting of this period of history, see MacArthur to Carl Shermer, March 15, 1961, RG 10, MacArthur Archives.
-
Macarthur's Ultra
, pp. 202-225
-
-
Drea1
-
103
-
-
85037497855
-
-
King to Nimitz, Aug. 9, 1945, Nimitz Command Summary; I am grateful to Richard Frank for reminding me of this cable
-
King to Nimitz, Aug. 9, 1945, Nimitz Command Summary; I am grateful to Richard Frank for reminding me of this cable.
-
-
-
-
104
-
-
85037498130
-
-
General Leslie Groves to Marshall, Aug. 10, 1945, Marshall Papers
-
General Leslie Groves to Marshall, Aug. 10, 1945, Marshall Papers; and Barton J. Bernstein, "Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking About Tactical Nuclear Weapons," International Security, 15 (Spring 1991),149-168.
-
-
-
-
105
-
-
84928439865
-
Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early thinking about tactical nuclear weapons
-
Spring
-
General Leslie Groves to Marshall, Aug. 10, 1945, Marshall Papers; and Barton J. Bernstein, "Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking About Tactical Nuclear Weapons," International Security, 15 (Spring 1991),149-168.
-
(1991)
International Security
, vol.15
, pp. 149-168
-
-
Bernstein, B.J.1
-
107
-
-
85037504396
-
White House meeting minutes
-
June 18
-
White House meeting minutes, June 18, 1945, FRUS: Potsdam, 1: 905-909.
-
(1945)
FRUS: Potsdam
, vol.1
, pp. 905-909
-
-
-
108
-
-
85037519493
-
-
Rigdon log, Aug. 7, 1945, and President's appointment schedule, Aug. 8, 1945, both in Truman Library
-
Rigdon log, Aug. 7, 1945, and President's appointment schedule, Aug. 8, 1945, both in Truman Library.
-
-
-
-
109
-
-
85037509096
-
Plan For the Invasion of Northern Honshu (Alternative to Invasion of Southern Kyushu)
-
Aug. 9, 1945, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44), JCS Records, RG 218. I am indebted to Robert Newman for providing a few pages of JWPC 398/1 that I had failed to xerox from the bulky document at the National Archives. JWPC 398/1 is also the source for otherwise undocumented material in the next five paragraphs in the text
-
JWPC, "Plan For the Invasion of Northern Honshu (Alternative to Invasion of Southern Kyushu), JWPC 398/1, Aug. 9, 1945, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44), JCS Records, RG 218. I am indebted to Robert Newman for providing a few pages of JWPC 398/1 that I had failed to xerox from the bulky document at the National Archives. JWPC 398/1 is also the source for otherwise undocumented material in the next five paragraphs in the text.
-
JWPC
, vol.398
, Issue.1
-
-
-
110
-
-
85037496962
-
-
An assessment of the troubling October weather appears in "Analysis by Captain Douglas Clark, Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.," summarized in referee's report
-
An assessment of the troubling October weather appears in "Analysis by Captain Douglas Clark, Department of Geography and Environmental Engineering, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.," summarized in referee's report.
-
-
-
-
111
-
-
85037494552
-
-
JIC 218/10, Aug. 10, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44)
-
Joint Intelligence Committee, "Japanese Reaction to An Assault on the Sendai Plain," JIC 218/10, Aug. 10, 1945, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44), JCS Records, RG 218. This document is also the source for the next paragraph in the text.
-
(1945)
Japanese Reaction to an Assault on the Sendai Plain
-
-
-
112
-
-
85037521504
-
-
Joint Intelligence Committee, "Japanese Reaction to An Assault on the Sendai Plain," JIC 218/10, Aug. 10, 1945, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44), JCS Records, RG 218. This document is also the source for the next paragraph in the text.
-
JCS Records
-
-
-
113
-
-
85037518587
-
-
Oct. 25, Marshall Papers, Marshall Library
-
JPS, 176th meeting minutes, Oct. 25, 1944, Marshall Papers, Marshall Library. On 1944 comparisons between southern Kyushu and Hokkaido as invasion sites, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa," JCS 924, June 30, 1944 (and approved by the JCS on July 11, 1944), and Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/5, Oct. 27, 1944, file Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), JCS Records, RG 218. For questions and an expression of annoyance by Admiral King about the JPS's consideration of Hokkaido, see King, "Operations for the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/6, Nov. 3, 1944; and, for Arnold's support for a May 1945 invasion of Hokkaido because of the desirability of air bases near Honshu and the need to delay the Kyushu operation until autumn 1945, see Arnold, "Operations For the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/7, Nov. 6, 1944, both in file 381 Pacific Ocean (6-10-43), JCS Records. Also on Hokkaido, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/8, Nov. 23, 1944, ibid. That November 23 study stressed the advantages of invading Kyushu, not Hokkaido, because it would be easier to bomb and blockade from Kyushu, and because Kyushu was closer to established U.S. bases.
-
(1944)
176th Meeting Minutes
-
-
-
114
-
-
85037500832
-
Operations against Japan subsequent to formosa
-
June 30, and approved by the JCS on July 11, 1944
-
JPS, 176th meeting minutes, Oct. 25, 1944, Marshall Papers, Marshall Library. On 1944 comparisons between southern Kyushu and Hokkaido as invasion sites, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa," JCS 924, June 30, 1944 (and approved by the JCS on July 11, 1944), and Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/5, Oct. 27, 1944, file Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), JCS Records, RG 218. For questions and an expression of annoyance by Admiral King about the JPS's consideration of Hokkaido, see King, "Operations for the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/6, Nov. 3, 1944; and, for Arnold's support for a May 1945 invasion of Hokkaido because of the desirability of air bases near Honshu and the need to delay the Kyushu operation until autumn 1945, see Arnold, "Operations For the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/7, Nov. 6, 1944, both in file 381 Pacific Ocean (6-10-43), JCS Records. Also on Hokkaido, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/8, Nov. 23, 1944, ibid. That November 23 study stressed the advantages of invading Kyushu, not Hokkaido, because it would be easier to bomb and blockade from Kyushu, and because Kyushu was closer to established U.S. bases.
-
(1944)
JCS
, vol.924
-
-
-
115
-
-
85037510995
-
Operations for the defeat of Japan
-
Oct. 27, file Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), JCS Records, RG 218
-
JPS, 176th meeting minutes, Oct. 25, 1944, Marshall Papers, Marshall Library. On 1944 comparisons between southern Kyushu and Hokkaido as invasion sites, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa," JCS 924, June 30, 1944 (and approved by the JCS on July 11, 1944), and Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/5, Oct. 27, 1944, file Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), JCS Records, RG 218. For questions and an expression of annoyance by Admiral King about the JPS's consideration of Hokkaido, see King, "Operations for the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/6, Nov. 3, 1944; and, for Arnold's support for a May 1945 invasion of Hokkaido because of the desirability of air bases near Honshu and the need to delay the Kyushu operation until autumn 1945, see Arnold, "Operations For the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/7, Nov. 6, 1944, both in file 381 Pacific Ocean (6-10-43), JCS Records. Also on Hokkaido, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/8, Nov. 23, 1944, ibid. That November 23 study stressed the advantages of invading Kyushu, not Hokkaido, because it would be easier to bomb and blockade from Kyushu, and because Kyushu was closer to established U.S. bases.
-
(1944)
JCS
, vol.924
, Issue.5
-
-
-
116
-
-
85037510995
-
Operations for the defeat of Japan
-
Nov. 3
-
JPS, 176th meeting minutes, Oct. 25, 1944, Marshall Papers, Marshall Library. On 1944 comparisons between southern Kyushu and Hokkaido as invasion sites, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa," JCS 924, June 30, 1944 (and approved by the JCS on July 11, 1944), and Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/5, Oct. 27, 1944, file Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), JCS Records, RG 218. For questions and an expression of annoyance by Admiral King about the JPS's consideration of Hokkaido, see King, "Operations for the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/6, Nov. 3, 1944; and, for Arnold's support for a May 1945 invasion of Hokkaido because of the desirability of air bases near Honshu and the need to delay the Kyushu operation until autumn 1945, see Arnold, "Operations For the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/7, Nov. 6, 1944, both in file 381 Pacific Ocean (6-10-43), JCS Records. Also on Hokkaido, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/8, Nov. 23, 1944, ibid. That November 23 study stressed the advantages of invading Kyushu, not Hokkaido, because it would be easier to bomb and blockade from Kyushu, and because Kyushu was closer to established U.S. bases.
-
(1944)
JCS
, vol.924
, Issue.6
-
-
King1
-
117
-
-
85037510995
-
Operations for the defeat of Japan
-
Nov. 6, both in file 381 Pacific Ocean (6-10-43), JCS Records
-
JPS, 176th meeting minutes, Oct. 25, 1944, Marshall Papers, Marshall Library. On 1944 comparisons between southern Kyushu and Hokkaido as invasion sites, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa," JCS 924, June 30, 1944 (and approved by the JCS on July 11, 1944), and Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/5, Oct. 27, 1944, file Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), JCS Records, RG 218. For questions and an expression of annoyance by Admiral King about the JPS's consideration of Hokkaido, see King, "Operations for the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/6, Nov. 3, 1944; and, for Arnold's support for a May 1945 invasion of Hokkaido because of the desirability of air bases near Honshu and the need to delay the Kyushu operation until autumn 1945, see Arnold, "Operations For the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/7, Nov. 6, 1944, both in file 381 Pacific Ocean (6-10-43), JCS Records. Also on Hokkaido, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/8, Nov. 23, 1944, ibid. That November 23 study stressed the advantages of invading Kyushu, not Hokkaido, because it would be easier to bomb and blockade from Kyushu, and because Kyushu was closer to established U.S. bases.
-
(1944)
JCS
, vol.924
, Issue.7
-
-
Arnold1
-
118
-
-
85037510995
-
Operations for the defeat of Japan
-
Nov. 23
-
JPS, 176th meeting minutes, Oct. 25, 1944, Marshall Papers, Marshall Library. On 1944 comparisons between southern Kyushu and Hokkaido as invasion sites, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa," JCS 924, June 30, 1944 (and approved by the JCS on July 11, 1944), and Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/5, Oct. 27, 1944, file Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), JCS Records, RG 218. For questions and an expression of annoyance by Admiral King about the JPS's consideration of Hokkaido, see King, "Operations for the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/6, Nov. 3, 1944; and, for Arnold's support for a May 1945 invasion of Hokkaido because of the desirability of air bases near Honshu and the need to delay the Kyushu operation until autumn 1945, see Arnold, "Operations For the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/7, Nov. 6, 1944, both in file 381 Pacific Ocean (6-10-43), JCS Records. Also on Hokkaido, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/8, Nov. 23, 1944, ibid. That November 23 study stressed the advantages of invading Kyushu, not Hokkaido, because it would be easier to bomb and blockade from Kyushu, and because Kyushu was closer to established U.S. bases.
-
(1944)
JCS
, vol.924
, Issue.8
-
-
-
119
-
-
0041836785
-
-
JPS, 176th meeting minutes, Oct. 25, 1944, Marshall Papers, Marshall Library. On 1944 comparisons between southern Kyushu and Hokkaido as invasion sites, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations Against Japan Subsequent to Formosa," JCS 924, June 30, 1944 (and approved by the JCS on July 11, 1944), and Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/5, Oct. 27, 1944, file Pacific Ocean Area (6-10-43), JCS Records, RG 218. For questions and an expression of annoyance by Admiral King about the JPS's consideration of Hokkaido, see King, "Operations for the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/6, Nov. 3, 1944; and, for Arnold's support for a May 1945 invasion of Hokkaido because of the desirability of air bases near Honshu and the need to delay the Kyushu operation until autumn 1945, see Arnold, "Operations For the Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/7, Nov. 6, 1944, both in file 381 Pacific Ocean (6-10-43), JCS Records. Also on Hokkaido, see Joint Staff Planners, "Operations For The Defeat of Japan," JCS 924/8, Nov. 23, 1944, ibid. That November 23 study stressed the advantages of invading Kyushu, not Hokkaido, because it would be easier to bomb and blockade from Kyushu, and because Kyushu was closer to established U.S. bases.
-
(1944)
JCS
, vol.924
, Issue.8
-
-
-
120
-
-
85037519775
-
Memorandum of request: Japanese reaction to an assault on the Kanto (Tokyo) plain
-
Aug. 9, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44), JCS Records, RG 218
-
JIS, "Memorandum of Request: Japanese Reaction to an Assault on the Kanto (Tokyo) Plain," JIS 130/3M, Aug. 9, 1945, file 381 Honshu (7-19-44), JCS Records, RG 218.
-
(1945)
JIS
, vol.130
, Issue.3 M
-
-
-
121
-
-
85037500563
-
Japanese reaction to an assault on the Kanto (Tokyo) plain
-
Aug. 13, ibid. This document is also the source for the next paragraph
-
JIC (Service Members), "Japanese Reaction to an Assault on the Kanto (Tokyo) Plain," JIC 218/11, Aug. 13, 1945, ibid. This document is also the source for the next paragraph.
-
(1945)
JIC
, vol.218
, Issue.11
-
-
-
122
-
-
0041336093
-
Invasion most costly
-
Aug. who misread the nonbattle casualties as battle casualties
-
There is available a 1950s or 1960s summary by a military historian (Warren Daboll) of a July 1945 medical estimate, prepared by Lt. Col. D. B. Kendrick on MacArthur's staff, on the subject of blood needs and related U.S. battle and nonbattle casualties in Olympic. See chapter 15 ("From Olympic to Blacklist"), 18, in "Medical Service in the Asia and Pacific Theaters" (unpublished 1950s-1960s manuscript), Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., and courtesy of Mary Ellen Condon-Rall. So far, despite my few days' research efforts, Kendrick's July 1945 report(s) cannot be found at the National Archives, nor could Condon-Rall in the mid-1990s locate a copy in the Center's files. Some analysts have miscited or misunderstood this 1950s-1960s history, most notably Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen, "Invasion Most Costly," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 121 (Aug. 1995), 55-56, who misread the nonbattle casualties as battle casualties. For a general critique of their prize-winning essay, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering 'Invasion Most Costly': Popular-History Scholarship, Publishing Standards, and the Claim of High U.S. Casualty Estimates to Help Legitimize the Atomic Bombings," Peace & Change, 24 (1999), 219-247. There is also a July 21, 1945, study with alarmingly high casualty estimates by physicist William Shockley to Edward Bowles, "Proposal for Increasing the Scope of Casualty Studies," box 34, Edward Bowles Papers, Library of Congress, and also in Shockley Papers, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 18-19, emphasizes this report, but there is no evidence that it ever reached Stimson, much less Truman. McGeorge Bundy, who "ghosted"
-
(1995)
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
, vol.121
, pp. 55-56
-
-
Polmar, N.1
Allen, T.2
-
123
-
-
84937180612
-
Reconsidering 'invasion most costly': Popular-history scholarship, publishing standards, and the claim of high U.S. Casualty estimates to help legitimize the atomic bombings
-
There is available a 1950s or 1960s summary by a military historian (Warren Daboll) of a July 1945 medical estimate, prepared by Lt. Col. D. B. Kendrick on MacArthur's staff, on the subject of blood needs and related U.S. battle and nonbattle casualties in Olympic. See chapter 15 ("From Olympic to Blacklist"), 18, in "Medical Service in the Asia and Pacific Theaters" (unpublished 1950s-1960s manuscript), Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., and courtesy of Mary Ellen Condon-Rall. So far, despite my few days' research efforts, Kendrick's July 1945 report(s) cannot be found at the National Archives, nor could Condon-Rall in the mid-1990s locate a copy in the Center's files. Some analysts have miscited or misunderstood this 1950s-1960s history, most notably Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen, "Invasion Most Costly," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 121 (Aug. 1995), 55-56, who misread the nonbattle casualties as battle casualties. For a general critique of their prize-winning essay, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering 'Invasion Most Costly': Popular-History Scholarship, Publishing Standards, and the Claim of High U.S. Casualty Estimates to Help Legitimize the Atomic Bombings," Peace & Change, 24 (1999), 219-247. There is also a July 21, 1945, study with alarmingly high casualty estimates by physicist William Shockley to Edward Bowles, "Proposal for Increasing the Scope of Casualty Studies," box 34, Edward Bowles Papers, Library of Congress, and also in Shockley Papers, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 18-19, emphasizes this report, but there is no evidence that it ever reached Stimson, much less Truman. McGeorge Bundy, who "ghosted" Stimson's famous 1947 A-bomb essay defense, believed that Stimson would not have taken seriously such a mechanical study, and Bundy stated in the mid-1990s that he was quite sure he had never seen Shockley's report when working in 1946-1947 on Stimson's memoirs and essays. Such a recollection against interest is in principle more reliable than one congruent with interest, but a recollection after nearly a half-century is still a frail source.
-
(1999)
Peace & Change
, vol.24
, pp. 219-247
-
-
Bernstein, B.J.1
-
124
-
-
0039347621
-
-
emphasizes this report, but there is no evidence that it ever reached Stimson, much less Truman
-
There is available a 1950s or 1960s summary by a military historian (Warren Daboll) of a July 1945 medical estimate, prepared by Lt. Col. D. B. Kendrick on MacArthur's staff, on the subject of blood needs and related U.S. battle and nonbattle casualties in Olympic. See chapter 15 ("From Olympic to Blacklist"), 18, in "Medical Service in the Asia and Pacific Theaters" (unpublished 1950s-1960s manuscript), Center of Military History, Washington, D.C., and courtesy of Mary Ellen Condon-Rall. So far, despite my few days' research efforts, Kendrick's July 1945 report(s) cannot be found at the National Archives, nor could Condon-Rall in the mid-1990s locate a copy in the Center's files. Some analysts have miscited or misunderstood this 1950s-1960s history, most notably Norman Polmar and Thomas Allen, "Invasion Most Costly," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 121 (Aug. 1995), 55-56, who misread the nonbattle casualties as battle casualties. For a general critique of their prize-winning essay, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering 'Invasion Most Costly': Popular-History Scholarship, Publishing Standards, and the Claim of High U.S. Casualty Estimates to Help Legitimize the Atomic Bombings," Peace & Change, 24 (1999), 219-247. There is also a July 21, 1945, study with alarmingly high casualty estimates by physicist William Shockley to Edward Bowles, "Proposal for Increasing the Scope of Casualty Studies," box 34, Edward Bowles Papers, Library of Congress, and also in Shockley Papers, Stanford University, Stanford, Calif. Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult, 18-19, emphasizes this report, but there is no evidence that it ever reached Stimson, much less Truman. McGeorge Bundy, who "ghosted" Stimson's famous 1947 A-bomb essay defense, believed that Stimson would not have taken seriously such a mechanical study, and Bundy stated in the mid-1990s that he was quite sure he had never seen Shockley's report when working in 1946-1947 on Stimson's memoirs and essays. Such a recollection against interest is in principle more reliable than one congruent with interest, but a recollection after nearly a half-century is still a frail source.
-
Truman and the Hiroshima Cult
, pp. 18-19
-
-
Newman1
-
125
-
-
84948502582
-
-
Allen and Polmar, Code-Name Downfall, 275-294; Skates, Invasion of Japan, 84-99; Barton J. Bernstein, "America's Biological Program in the Second World War," Journal of Strategic Studies, 11 (1988), 308-317.
-
Code-name Downfall
, pp. 275-294
-
-
Allen1
Polmar2
-
126
-
-
84948502582
-
-
Allen and Polmar, Code-Name Downfall, 275-294; Skates, Invasion of Japan, 84-99; Barton J. Bernstein, "America's Biological Program in the Second World War," Journal of Strategic Studies, 11 (1988), 308-317.
-
Invasion of Japan
, pp. 84-99
-
-
Skates1
-
127
-
-
84948502582
-
America's biological program in the second world war
-
Allen and Polmar, Code-Name Downfall, 275-294; Skates, Invasion of Japan, 84-99; Barton J. Bernstein, "America's Biological Program in the Second World War," Journal of Strategic Studies, 11 (1988), 308-317.
-
(1988)
Journal of Strategic Studies
, vol.11
, pp. 308-317
-
-
Bernstein, B.J.1
-
128
-
-
84936823768
-
-
New York
-
John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, 1986) 294-300, 363-364; The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Philadelphia, 1947), 274; and Benjamin L. DeWhitt, "Records Relating to Personal Participation in World War II: American Military Casualties and Burials," Reference Information Paper, 82 (Washington, D.C., 1993), 44-49. There are discrepancies between Marshall's numbers for U.S. army (including army air force) casualties and Dower's (based on other U.S. official sources), and also with DeWhitt's (based on various U.S. documents), but no important argument in the present essay rests on these differences. The overall casualty/fatality numbers are basically horrendous, and the differences among postwar reports are comparatively minor when placed in context for this essay's analysis.
-
(1986)
War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War
, pp. 294-300
-
-
Dower, J.1
-
129
-
-
0041336125
-
-
Philadelphia
-
John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, 1986) 294-300, 363-364; The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Philadelphia, 1947), 274; and Benjamin L. DeWhitt, "Records Relating to Personal Participation in World War II: American Military Casualties and Burials," Reference Information Paper, 82 (Washington, D.C., 1993), 44-49. There are discrepancies between Marshall's numbers for U.S. army (including army air force) casualties and Dower's (based on other U.S. official sources), and also with DeWhitt's (based on various U.S. documents), but no important argument in the present essay rests on these differences. The overall casualty/fatality numbers are basically horrendous, and the differences among postwar reports are comparatively minor when placed in context for this essay's analysis.
-
(1947)
The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King
, pp. 274
-
-
-
130
-
-
0042337866
-
Records relating to personal participation in World War II: American military casualties and burials
-
Washington, D.C.
-
John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, 1986) 294-300, 363-364; The War Reports of General of the Army George C. Marshall, General of the Army H. H. Arnold, Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Philadelphia, 1947), 274; and Benjamin L. DeWhitt, "Records Relating to Personal Participation in World War II: American Military Casualties and Burials," Reference Information Paper, 82 (Washington, D.C., 1993), 44-49. There are discrepancies between Marshall's numbers for U.S. army (including army air force) casualties and Dower's (based on other U.S. official sources), and also with DeWhitt's (based on various U.S. documents), but no important argument in the present essay rests on these differences. The overall casualty/fatality numbers are basically horrendous, and the differences among postwar reports are comparatively minor when placed in context for this essay's analysis.
-
(1993)
Reference Information Paper
, vol.82
, pp. 44-49
-
-
DeWhitt, B.L.1
-
131
-
-
85037502709
-
Details of the campaign against Japan
-
June 15, and MacArthur to Marshall, June 17, 1945
-
JWPC, "Details of the Campaign Against Japan," JWPC 369/1, June 15, 1945; and MacArthur to Marshall, June 17, 1945.
-
(1945)
JWPC
, vol.369
, Issue.1
-
-
-
132
-
-
0004192228
-
-
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
-
On organizational theory, see, for example, the now-classic study by Richard Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963); for recent redefinitions and applications, see Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety (Princeton, N.J., 1993), and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1999). Also see the now-classic book, Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, 1983), which stated, but exaggerated, the power of the desires for consensus and for harmony in maintaining momentum.
-
(1963)
A Behavioral Theory of the Firm
-
-
Cyert, R.1
March, J.2
-
133
-
-
0004170717
-
-
Princeton, N.J.
-
On organizational theory, see, for example, the now-classic study by Richard Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963); for recent redefinitions and applications, see Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety (Princeton, N.J., 1993), and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1999). Also see the now-classic book, Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, 1983), which stated, but exaggerated, the power of the desires for consensus and for harmony in maintaining momentum.
-
(1993)
The Limits of Safety
-
-
Sagan, S.1
-
134
-
-
0003491884
-
-
Boston
-
On organizational theory, see, for example, the now-classic study by Richard Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963); for recent redefinitions and applications, see Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety (Princeton, N.J., 1993), and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1999). Also see the now-classic book, Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, 1983), which stated, but exaggerated, the power of the desires for consensus and for harmony in maintaining momentum.
-
(1999)
Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis
-
-
Allison, G.1
Zelikow, P.2
-
135
-
-
0003393379
-
-
Boston
-
On organizational theory, see, for example, the now-classic study by Richard Cyert and James March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963); for recent redefinitions and applications, see Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety (Princeton, N.J., 1993), and Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1999). Also see the now-classic book, Irving Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes (Boston, 1983), which stated, but exaggerated, the power of the desires for consensus and for harmony in maintaining momentum.
-
(1983)
Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes
-
-
Janis, I.1
-
136
-
-
0040124263
-
-
New York
-
Such interpretations of King, Arnold, and Leahy should not be misconstrued as indicating that they had raised doubts before Hiroshima about the use of the atomic bombs on Japan, although they may have been unsure whether the atomic bombing would be essential in the effort to end the war before November 1945. In their postwar memoirs, by statement or implication, they exaggerated their pre-Hiroshima doubts. See Henry Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), 588-598; Arnold, "Trip to Terminal"; Ernest King, with Walter Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (Boston, 1952), 620-624; William Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), 404-442; and Leahy Diary, June-August 1945. But compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 319-366, and Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender," 249-251.
-
(1949)
Global Mission
, pp. 588-598
-
-
Arnold, H.1
-
137
-
-
85037520471
-
-
Such interpretations of King, Arnold, and Leahy should not be misconstrued as indicating that they had raised doubts before Hiroshima about the use of the atomic bombs on Japan, although they may have been unsure whether the atomic bombing would be essential in the effort to end the war before November 1945. In their postwar memoirs, by statement or implication, they exaggerated their pre-Hiroshima doubts. See Henry Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), 588-598; Arnold, "Trip to Terminal"; Ernest King, with Walter Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (Boston, 1952), 620-624; William Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), 404-442; and Leahy Diary, June-August 1945. But compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 319-366, and Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender," 249-251.
-
Trip to Terminal
-
-
Arnold1
-
138
-
-
0037729626
-
-
Boston
-
Such interpretations of King, Arnold, and Leahy should not be misconstrued as indicating that they had raised doubts before Hiroshima about the use of the atomic bombs on Japan, although they may have been unsure whether the atomic bombing would be essential in the effort to end the war before November 1945. In their postwar memoirs, by statement or implication, they exaggerated their pre-Hiroshima doubts. See Henry Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), 588-598; Arnold, "Trip to Terminal"; Ernest King, with Walter Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (Boston, 1952), 620-624; William Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), 404-442; and Leahy Diary, June-August 1945. But compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 319-366, and Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender," 249-251.
-
(1952)
Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record
, pp. 620-624
-
-
King, E.1
Whitehill, W.2
-
139
-
-
0041836746
-
-
New York
-
Such interpretations of King, Arnold, and Leahy should not be misconstrued as indicating that they had raised doubts before Hiroshima about the use of the atomic bombs on Japan, although they may have been unsure whether the atomic bombing would be essential in the effort to end the war before November 1945. In their postwar memoirs, by statement or implication, they exaggerated their pre-Hiroshima doubts. See Henry Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), 588-598; Arnold, "Trip to Terminal"; Ernest King, with Walter Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (Boston, 1952), 620-624; William Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), 404-442; and Leahy Diary, June-August 1945. But compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 319-366, and Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender," 249-251.
-
(1950)
I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time
, pp. 404-442
-
-
Leahy, W.1
-
140
-
-
0041836747
-
-
June-August
-
Such interpretations of King, Arnold, and Leahy should not be misconstrued as indicating that they had raised doubts before Hiroshima about the use of the atomic bombs on Japan, although they may have been unsure whether the atomic bombing would be essential in the effort to end the war before November 1945. In their postwar memoirs, by statement or implication, they exaggerated their pre-Hiroshima doubts. See Henry Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), 588-598; Arnold, "Trip to Terminal"; Ernest King, with Walter Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (Boston, 1952), 620-624; William Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), 404-442; and Leahy Diary, June-August 1945. But compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 319-366, and Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender," 249-251.
-
(1945)
Leahy Diary
-
-
-
141
-
-
0039485301
-
-
Such interpretations of King, Arnold, and Leahy should not be misconstrued as indicating that they had raised doubts before Hiroshima about the use of the atomic bombs on Japan, although they may have been unsure whether the atomic bombing would be essential in the effort to end the war before November 1945. In their postwar memoirs, by statement or implication, they exaggerated their pre-Hiroshima doubts. See Henry Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), 588-598; Arnold, "Trip to Terminal"; Ernest King, with Walter Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (Boston, 1952), 620-624; William Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), 404-442; and Leahy Diary, June-August 1945. But compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 319-366, and Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender," 249-251.
-
The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb
, pp. 319-366
-
-
Alperovitz1
-
142
-
-
0042337861
-
-
Such interpretations of King, Arnold, and Leahy should not be misconstrued as indicating that they had raised doubts before Hiroshima about the use of the atomic bombs on Japan, although they may have been unsure whether the atomic bombing would be essential in the effort to end the war before November 1945. In their postwar memoirs, by statement or implication, they exaggerated their pre-Hiroshima doubts. See Henry Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), 588-598; Arnold, "Trip to Terminal"; Ernest King, with Walter Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record (Boston, 1952), 620-624; William Leahy, I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (New York, 1950), 404-442; and Leahy Diary, June-August 1945. But compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 319-366, and Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender," 249-251.
-
Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender
, pp. 249-251
-
-
Bernstein1
-
144
-
-
85037496205
-
-
For "peace feelers," see the intercepted and decrypted messages from early July through early August 1945 in the so-called "Magic" files, Records of the National Security Agency, RG 457, National Archives
-
For "peace feelers," see the intercepted and decrypted messages from early July through early August 1945 in the so-called "Magic" files, Records of the National Security Agency, RG 457, National Archives.
-
-
-
-
145
-
-
85037521563
-
-
See, for example, for postwar reflections on 1945 efforts (though not clearly addressing the counterfactual), Joseph Grew to Stimson, Feb. 12, 1947, and Stimson to Grew, June 19, 1947, in Joseph Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., and also in Stimson Papers
-
See, for example, for postwar reflections on 1945 efforts (though not clearly addressing the counterfactual), Joseph Grew to Stimson, Feb. 12, 1947, and Stimson to Grew, June 19, 1947, in Joseph Grew Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., and also in Stimson Papers.
-
-
-
-
146
-
-
0003968315
-
-
New York, though Bundy occasionally stumbled into factual error (as with the J. Robert Oppenheimer loyalty-security case and James Conant's efforts)
-
For other useful excursions into counterfactual history, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), though Bundy occasionally stumbled into factual error (as with the J. Robert Oppenheimer loyalty-security case and James Conant's efforts); Frederik Logevall, "Vietnam and the Question of What Might Have Been," in Mark White, ed., Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (London, 1998), 19-62; Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton, N.J., 1996). On the underlying conception of counterfactuals and their often-implicit role in the efforts by historians and others in developing and determining causal interpretations, see James Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politics, 43 (1991), 169-195. Historians usually do not truly employ even "soft" covering laws most of the time, but rather use loose general theory and apply it to particular situations, in which the historian, in an often-unspoken "thought experiment," excludes one or more factors in the causal nexus in order to determine what cause or causes are crucial, and which are ancillary. Probably few historians in the 1990s, or even earlier, subscribed to Carl Hempel's "covering law" view of historical interpretation, and undoubtedly many rejected even "softer" conceptions.
-
(1988)
Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years
-
-
Bundy, M.1
-
147
-
-
0042337863
-
Vietnam and the question of what might have been
-
Mark White, ed., London
-
For other useful excursions into counterfactual history, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), though Bundy occasionally stumbled into factual error (as with the J. Robert Oppenheimer loyalty-security case and James Conant's efforts); Frederik Logevall, "Vietnam and the Question of What Might Have Been," in Mark White, ed., Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (London, 1998), 19-62; Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton, N.J., 1996). On the underlying conception of counterfactuals and their often-implicit role in the efforts by historians and others in developing and determining causal interpretations, see James Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politics, 43 (1991), 169-195. Historians usually do not truly employ even "soft" covering laws most of the time, but rather use loose general theory and apply it to particular situations, in which the historian, in an often-unspoken "thought experiment," excludes one or more factors in the causal nexus in order to determine what cause or causes are crucial, and which are ancillary. Probably few historians in the 1990s, or even earlier, subscribed to Carl Hempel's "covering law" view of historical interpretation, and undoubtedly many rejected even "softer" conceptions.
-
(1998)
Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited
, pp. 19-62
-
-
Logevall, F.1
-
148
-
-
0004186221
-
-
Princeton, N.J.
-
For other useful excursions into counterfactual history, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), though Bundy occasionally stumbled into factual error (as with the J. Robert Oppenheimer loyalty-security case and James Conant's efforts); Frederik Logevall, "Vietnam and the Question of What Might Have Been," in Mark White, ed., Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (London, 1998), 19-62; Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton, N.J., 1996). On the underlying conception of counterfactuals and their often-implicit role in the efforts by historians and others in developing and determining causal interpretations, see James Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politics, 43 (1991), 169-195. Historians usually do not truly employ even "soft" covering laws most of the time, but rather use loose general theory and apply it to particular situations, in which the historian, in an often-unspoken "thought experiment," excludes one or more factors in the causal nexus in order to determine what cause or causes are crucial, and which are ancillary. Probably few historians in the 1990s, or even earlier, subscribed to Carl Hempel's "covering law" view of historical interpretation, and undoubtedly many rejected even "softer" conceptions.
-
(1996)
Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives
-
-
Tetlock, P.1
Belkin, A.2
-
149
-
-
84959595354
-
Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science
-
For other useful excursions into counterfactual history, see McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York, 1988), though Bundy occasionally stumbled into factual error (as with the J. Robert Oppenheimer loyalty-security case and James Conant's efforts); Frederik Logevall, "Vietnam and the Question of What Might Have Been," in Mark White, ed., Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited (London, 1998), 19-62; Philip Tetlock and Aaron Belkin, eds., Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives (Princeton, N.J., 1996). On the underlying conception of counterfactuals and their often-implicit role in the efforts by historians and others in developing and determining causal interpretations, see James Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," World Politics, 43 (1991), 169-195. Historians usually do not truly employ even "soft" covering laws most of the time, but rather use loose general theory and apply it to particular situations, in which the historian, in an often-unspoken "thought experiment," excludes one or more factors in the causal nexus in order to determine what cause or causes are crucial, and which are ancillary. Probably few historians in the 1990s, or even earlier, subscribed to Carl Hempel's "covering law" view of historical interpretation, and undoubtedly many rejected even "softer" conceptions.
-
(1991)
World Politics
, vol.43
, pp. 169-195
-
-
Fearon, J.1
-
150
-
-
0041836790
-
-
On security and slight breaches on Ultra, see Drea, MacArthur's Ultra, 271-273.
-
MacArthur's Ultra
, pp. 271-273
-
-
Drea1
-
151
-
-
0039485301
-
-
Compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb; Alperovitz and Robert Messer, and Barton J. Bernstein, "Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb," International Security, 16 (1991/92), 204-221; and Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombing Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs, 74 (1995), 135-152. For A-bomb historiography, Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb," 11-37. The A-bomb interpretation in this section of the text relies heavily on Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered."
-
The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb
-
-
Alperovitz1
-
152
-
-
0042838802
-
Marshall, Truman, and the decision to drop the bomb
-
Compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb; Alperovitz and Robert Messer, and Barton J. Bernstein, "Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb," International Security, 16 (1991/92), 204-221; and Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombing Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs, 74 (1995), 135-152. For A-bomb historiography, Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb," 11-37. The A-bomb interpretation in this section of the text relies heavily on Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered."
-
(1991)
International Security
, vol.16
, pp. 204-221
-
-
Alperovitz1
Messer, R.2
Bernstein, B.J.3
-
153
-
-
84937290304
-
The atomic bombing reconsidered
-
Compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb; Alperovitz and Robert Messer, and Barton J. Bernstein, "Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb," International Security, 16 (1991/92), 204-221; and Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombing Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs, 74 (1995), 135-152. For A-bomb historiography, Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb," 11-37. The A-bomb interpretation in this section of the text relies heavily on Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered."
-
(1995)
Foreign Affairs
, vol.74
, pp. 135-152
-
-
Bernstein1
-
154
-
-
0042337917
-
-
Compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb; Alperovitz and Robert Messer, and Barton J. Bernstein, "Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb," International Security, 16 (1991/92), 204-221; and Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombing Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs, 74 (1995), 135-152. For A-bomb historiography, Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb," 11-37. The A-bomb interpretation in this section of the text relies heavily on Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered."
-
The Decision to Use the Bomb
, pp. 11-37
-
-
Walker1
-
155
-
-
85037493722
-
-
Compare Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb; Alperovitz and Robert Messer, and Barton J. Bernstein, "Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb," International Security, 16 (1991/92), 204-221; and Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombing Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs, 74 (1995), 135-152. For A-bomb historiography, Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb," 11-37. The A-bomb interpretation in this section of the text relies heavily on Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered."
-
The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered
-
-
Bernstein1
-
156
-
-
85037500118
-
-
The single exception might be Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, but he was not close to Truman and not a top-level adviser. Ralph Bard, "Memorandum on the Use of S-1 Bomb, June 27, 1945, Harrison-Bundy files 77, Records of the Manhattan Engineer District, Record Group 77, National Archives
-
The single exception might be Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard, but he was not close to Truman and not a top-level adviser. Ralph Bard, "Memorandum on the Use of S-1 Bomb, June 27, 1945, Harrison-Bundy files 77, Records of the Manhattan Engineer District, Record Group 77, National Archives.
-
-
-
-
157
-
-
84968148976
-
The perils and politics of surrender: Ending the war with Japan and avoiding the third atomic bomb
-
Barton J. Bernstein, "The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the War With Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb," Pacific Historical Review, 46 (1977), 1-27; Sadao Asada, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration," ibid., 67 (1998), 477-512.
-
(1977)
Pacific Historical Review
, vol.46
, pp. 1-27
-
-
Bernstein, B.J.1
-
158
-
-
0012994335
-
The shock of the atomic bomb and Japan's decision to surrender - A reconsideration
-
Barton J. Bernstein, "The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the War With Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb," Pacific Historical Review, 46 (1977), 1-27; Sadao Asada, "The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender - A Reconsideration," ibid., 67 (1998), 477-512.
-
(1998)
Pacific Historical Review
, vol.67
, pp. 477-512
-
-
Asada, S.1
-
159
-
-
85037517510
-
-
Herbert Hoover to Stimson, May 15, 1945, with memorandum, n.d. (May 14-15, 1945), in Post-Presidential Individual [PPI] (Stimson) file, Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch, Iowa; Hoover to Charles Ross, May 30, 1945, with Hoover to Truman, May 30, 1945, and "Memorandum on Ending the Japanese War," n.d. (May 30, 1945), in Confidential file, box 43, Truman Library, and with a May 30, 1945, date in PPI (Truman) file, Hoover Library. Responses by Joseph Grew and Cordell Hull to Hoover's second memorandum are in that Truman Library file, and some responses, including military assessments by Generals Lincoln and Marshall, are in the Safe File, Records of the Secretary of War, RG 107, National Archives. Military responses are also in box 6, Lincoln Papers, and in the Marshall Papers. Apparently, there is no record of a response by Stimson
-
Herbert Hoover to Stimson, May 15, 1945, with memorandum, n.d. (May 14-15, 1945), in Post-Presidential Individual [PPI] (Stimson) file, Herbert Hoover Library, West Branch, Iowa; Hoover to Charles Ross, May 30, 1945, with Hoover to Truman, May 30, 1945, and "Memorandum on Ending the Japanese War," n.d. (May 30, 1945), in Confidential file, box 43, Truman Library, and with a May 30, 1945, date in PPI (Truman) file, Hoover Library. Responses by Joseph Grew and Cordell Hull to Hoover's second memorandum are in that Truman Library file, and some responses, including military assessments by Generals Lincoln and Marshall, are in the Safe File, Records of the Secretary of War, RG 107, National Archives. Military responses are also in box 6, Lincoln Papers, and in the Marshall Papers. Apparently, there is no record of a response by Stimson. The major difference between the two Hoover memoranda is that only the second one specified the retention of the emperor system, but the second one, unlike the first, did specify war-crime trials.
-
-
-
-
160
-
-
0042838804
-
-
For the many contested meanings of the atomic bombings, see, among others, Bird and Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow, Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory; Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult; and Paul Fussell, Thank God For the Atom Bomb (New York, 1988), 1-35. Purposely, this essay does not get into the interesting, speculative question of whether, without the American August 1945 use of the A-bombs on Japan, the typhoon in October would have so delayed Olympic, even if the operation had not been jettisoned earlier, so that Japan might have surrendered before that necessarily weather-delayed military invasion could have been launched later in autumn 1945. On the typhoon, see Col. R. F. Ennis to Chief, Strategic Policy Section, S & P Group, OPD, "Use of Atomic Bomb on Japan, April 30, 1946, file ABC 471.6 Atom (Aug. 17, 1945), entry 421, RG 165.
-
Hiroshima's Shadow
-
-
Bird1
Lifschultz2
-
161
-
-
0038046722
-
-
For the many contested meanings of the atomic bombings, see, among others, Bird and Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow, Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory; Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult; and Paul Fussell, Thank God For the Atom Bomb (New York, 1988), 1-35. Purposely, this essay does not get into the interesting, speculative question of whether, without the American August 1945 use of the A-bombs on Japan, the typhoon in October would have so delayed Olympic, even if the operation had not been jettisoned earlier, so that Japan might have surrendered before that necessarily weather-delayed military invasion could have been launched later in autumn 1945. On the typhoon, see Col. R. F. Ennis to Chief, Strategic Policy Section, S & P Group, OPD, "Use of Atomic Bomb on Japan, April 30, 1946, file ABC 471.6 Atom (Aug. 17, 1945), entry 421, RG 165.
-
Hiroshima in History and Memory
-
-
Hogan1
-
162
-
-
0039347621
-
-
For the many contested meanings of the atomic bombings, see, among others, Bird and Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow, Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory; Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult; and Paul Fussell, Thank God For the Atom Bomb (New York, 1988), 1-35. Purposely, this essay does not get into the interesting, speculative question of whether, without the American August 1945 use of the A-bombs on Japan, the typhoon in October would have so delayed Olympic, even if the operation had not been jettisoned earlier, so that Japan might have surrendered before that necessarily weather-delayed military invasion could have been launched later in autumn 1945. On the typhoon, see Col. R. F. Ennis to Chief, Strategic Policy Section, S & P Group, OPD, "Use of Atomic Bomb on Japan, April 30, 1946, file ABC 471.6 Atom (Aug. 17, 1945), entry 421, RG 165.
-
Truman and the Hiroshima Cult
-
-
Newman1
-
163
-
-
61049139013
-
-
New York
-
For the many contested meanings of the atomic bombings, see, among others, Bird and Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow, Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory; Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult; and Paul Fussell, Thank God For the Atom Bomb (New York, 1988), 1-35. Purposely, this essay does not get into the interesting, speculative question of whether, without the American August 1945 use of the A-bombs on Japan, the typhoon in October would have so delayed Olympic, even if the operation had not been jettisoned earlier, so that Japan might have surrendered before that necessarily weather-delayed military invasion could have been launched later in autumn 1945. On the typhoon, see Col. R. F. Ennis to Chief, Strategic Policy Section, S & P Group, OPD, "Use of Atomic Bomb on Japan, April 30, 1946, file ABC 471.6 Atom (Aug. 17, 1945), entry 421, RG 165.
-
(1988)
Thank God For the Atom Bomb
, pp. 1-35
-
-
Fussell, P.1
-
164
-
-
85037495541
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Col. R. F. Ennis to Chief, Strategic Policy Section, S & P Group, OPD, April 30, file ABC 471.6 Atom (Aug. 17, 1945), entry 421, RG 165
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For the many contested meanings of the atomic bombings, see, among others, Bird and Lifschultz, eds., Hiroshima's Shadow, Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory; Newman, Truman and the Hiroshima Cult; and Paul Fussell, Thank God For the Atom Bomb (New York, 1988), 1-35. Purposely, this essay does not get into the interesting, speculative question of whether, without the American August 1945 use of the A-bombs on Japan, the typhoon in October would have so delayed Olympic, even if the operation had not been jettisoned earlier, so that Japan might have surrendered before that necessarily weather-delayed military invasion could have been launched later in autumn 1945. On the typhoon, see Col. R. F. Ennis to Chief, Strategic Policy Section, S & P Group, OPD, "Use of Atomic Bomb on Japan, April 30, 1946, file ABC 471.6 Atom (Aug. 17, 1945), entry 421, RG 165.
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(1946)
Use of Atomic Bomb on Japan
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