The shock of the atomic bomb and Japan's decision to surrender - A reconsideration

Pacific Historical Review

Volumn 67, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 477-512

  Asada, Sadao ^a  

^a DOSHISHA UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0012994335     PISSN: 00308684     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/3641184     Document Type: Article

References (231)

1. Edward J. Drea, "Previews of Hell: The End of the War with Japan," Military History Quarterly, 7 (1995), 79.
2. Diary of Lieutenant General Miyazaki Shuichi, Aug. 6, 1945, Library, Military History Department, National Institute for Defense Studies, Defense Agency, Tokyo.
3. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: The Conference of Berlin (Potsdam) (2 vols., Washington, D.C., 1960), 2: 1376-1377.
4. The gist of this paper was presented at the meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held in Annapolis, Md., in June 1995 and the meeting of the Japan Association of International Relations held in Hiroshima in October 1995. A summary was published in the liberal-progressive monthly journal Sekai, No. 616 (1995), 232-242.
5. An early Japanese version was presented at the International Conference on the Close of the Pacific War, held in Ito, Japan, in August 1995 and was later published as Asada Sadao, "Gembaku toka no shogeki to kofuku no kettei" (The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan's Decision to Surrender") in Hosoya Chihiro et al., eds., Taiheiyo senso no shuketsu [The close of the Pacific War] (Tokyo, 1997), 195-221.
6. The cabinet system, as inaugurated in 1889, in practice required a unanimity of views among its members for any decision making. The army and navy ministers were privileged members and, by resigning and refusing to name their successors, they could overthrow the government.
7. A recent historiographical essay is J. Samuel Walker, "The Decision to Use the Bomb: A Historiographical Update," in Michael J. Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory (New York, 1996), 11-37.
8. Robert J. C. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender (Stanford, Calif., 1954).
9. This book was translated into Japanese and was well received: Butow, Shushen gaishi: Mujoken kofuku made no keii, trans. Oi Atsushi (Tokyo, 1958).
10. Herbert P. Bix, "Japan's Delayed Surrender: A Reinterpretation," Diplomatic History, 19 (1995), 197-225.
11. In Saki Dockrill, ed., From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima: The Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-45 (London, 1994), 191-212.
12. Barton J. Bernstein, "The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered," Foreign Affairs, 74 (1995), 135-152;
13. Bernstein, "Understanding the Atomic Bomb and the Japanese Surrender: Missed Opportunities, Little Known Near Disasters, and Modern Memory," in Hogan, ed., Hiroshima in History and Memory, 38-79;
14. and Bernstein, "The Struggle Over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative," in Philip Nobile, ed., Judgment at the Smithsonian (NewYork, 1995), 127-256.
15. See also Bernstein, "The Perils and Politics of Surrender: Ending the War with Japan and Avoiding the Third Atomic Bomb," Pacific Historical Review, 46 (1977), 1-27.
16. Leon V. Sigal, Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945 (Ithaca, N.Y., 1988).
17. Paul Kecskemeti, Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat (Stanford, Calif., 1958).
18. Herbert Feis, Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific (Princeton, N.J., 1961).
19. In his revised version, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II (Princeton, N.J., 1966), Feis tentatively incorporates some thoughts on anti-Soviet motives of the bombing.
20. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam; The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York, 1965).
21. Martin Sherwin's most recent position is stated in "Hiroshima at Fifty: The Politics of History and Memory," IHJ Bulletin [A Quarterly Publication of the International House of Japan], 15 (1995), 1-10.
22. For a detailed discussion, see Sadao Asada, "The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches: Japanese and American Perceptions of the A-Bomb Decision, 1945-1995," Journal of American-East Asian Relations, 4 (1995), 95-116.
23. P. M. S. Blackett, Fear, War and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy (New York, 1949).
24. Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth (New York, 1995). Alperovitz's use of Japanese sources via a translator is inadequate.
25. Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial (New York, 1995).
26. Toyama Shigeki, Imai Seiichi, and Fujiwara Akira, Showashi (reused version) (Tokyo, 1959), 238.
27. Kodama Kota et al., Chugaku shakai: Rekishiteki bun'ya [Junior high school/social studies - History] (Tokyo, 1986), 197;
28. Kawata Tadashi, et al., Atarashii shakai: Rekishi [New society: History] (Tokyo, 1992), 24.
29. Nishijima Ariatsu, Gembaku wa naze toka saretaka: Nihon kofuku o meguru senryaku to gaiko [Why were the atomic bombs dropped? The strategy and diplomacy of Japanese surrender] (Tokyo, 1968, 1985; same pagination in both editions), 146-148. The author does not seem to have used English-language sources.
30. Rekishigaku Kenkyukai, ed., Taiheiyo sensoshi: Taiheiyo senso [A history of the Pacific War] (6 vols., Tokyo, 1973), 5: 363-366.
31. An early collaborative work is Nihon Gaiko Gakkai, ed., Taiheiyo senso shuketsu ron [The termination of the Pacific War] (Tokyo, 1958).
32. Hayashi Shigeru, ed., Nihon shusenshi [History of Japan's surrender] (3 vols., Tokyo, 1962), 2: 84-93, 94-95.
33. Arai Shin'ichi, Gembaku toka e no michi [The road leading to the use of the atomic bomb] (Tokyo, 1985).
34. Nagai Yonosuke, Reisen no kigen [The origins of the Cold War] (Tokyo, 1978), 147-189.
35. For further discussion on the subject, see Hatano Sumio's thoughtful historiographical essay and his exhaustive bibliography, both contained in volume 6 of Gaimusho [Foreign Ministry], ed., Shusen shiroku [Historical record relating to the termination of the war] (6 vols., Tokyo, originally 1952; annotated and expanded version, 1977-1978), 6: 230-253, 259-293.
36. Nicholas D. Kristof, "The Bomb: An Act That Haunts Japan and America," New York Times, Aug. 6, 1995.
37. For the nature of this "taboo," see Asada, "The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches."
38. "Interrogations of Japanese Officials on World War II" (2 vols.; hereafter cited as "Interrogations") and "Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II" (4 vols.; hereafter cited as "Statements"). These interviews were conducted in preparation for General Douglas MacArthur's official war history, Reports of General MacArthur: Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area (2 vols., Washington, D.C., 1966).
39. Portions of the original Japanese versions are available at the Library, Military History Department, Institute of Defense Studies; a complete English translation is available at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C. For the nature of the problems the historian faces, see Barton J. Bernstein, "Compelling Japan's Surrender Without the A-Bomb, Soviet Entry or Invasion: Reconsidering the US Bombing Survey's Early-Surrender Conclusions," Journal of Strategic Studies, 18 (1995), 109-137. Butow's Japan's Decision to Surrender is an example of what a critical use of these documents can yield. Whenever sources appear dubious and whenever it has been possible, I have attempted to check them with more reliable materials.
40. Kido Koichi Kenkyukai, ed., Kido Koichi nikki (2 vols., Tokyo, 1966).
41. Supplementing these diaries are Kido Koichi nikki: Tokyo saibanki [Diaries of Kido Koichi during the period of the Tokyo trials] (Tokyo, 1980) and
42. Kido Koichi kankei bunsho [Papers relating to Kido Koichi] (Tokyo, 1966).
43. Toshikazu Kase, Journey to the Missouri, ed. David Nelson Rowe (New Haven, Conn., 1950), 55.
44. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, especially volumes 3-5.
45. Kurihara Ken and Hatano Sumio, eds., Shusen kosaku no kiroku [Record of the efforts to end the war] (2 vols., Tokyo, 1975) .33.
46. Yomiuri Shimbunsha, ed., Showashi no tenno [The Emperor in the history of the Showa period] (30 vols., Tokyo, 1968), vol. 4.
47. Yomiuri Shimbunsha, ed., Showashi no tenno [The Emperor in the history of the Showa period] (30 vols., Tokyo, 1968), vol. 4.
48. Sanbo Honbu, comp., Hauen no kiroku [A record of the defeat] (Tokyo, 1979).
49. Togo Shigenori, Jidai no ichimen [An aspect of the Showa period] (Tokyo, 1952),
50. translated as The Cause of Japan, trans. and ed. Togo Fumihiko and B. B. Blakeney (New York, 1956) (throughout this article I have relied on my own translation).
51. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4:57;
52. Togo, Jidai no ichimen, 341-342;
53. Togo, The Cause of Japan, 314-315;
54. Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 354-555.
55. Togo, Jidai no ichimen, 342;
56. Togo, The Cause of Japan, 315;
57. Togo Shigenori, May 18, 1949, "Statements";
58. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 58;
59. Sakomizu Hisatsune, April 21, 1949, "Interrogations."
60. Togo, Jidai no ichimen, 342;
61. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 57-58, 60;
62. Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 355-356.
63. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 12.
64. Kido nikki, 2: 1222;
65. Kido nikki: Tokyo saibanki, 421;
66. Kido kankei bumho, 84;
67. Okabe Nagaakira, Aru jiju no kaisoroku [Memoirs of a chamberlain] (Tokyo, 1990), 177-179.
68. Fujita Hisanori, Jijucho no kaiso [Memoirs of a grand chamberlain] (Tokyo, 1987), 126.
69. Kido nikki: Tokyo saibanki, 421.
70. Yomiuri, ed., Showashi no tenno, 4: 310-311.
71. Togo, Jidai no ichimen, 342;
72. Togo, The Cause of Japan, 315-316;
73. Gaimusho, ed., Shushen shiroku, 4: 60;
74. Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 356;
75. Fujita, Jijucho no kaiso, 126.
76. Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku 2: 356;
77. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shimhu, 4: 98.
78. Sakomizu Hisatsune, Dai Nippon teikoku saiga no 4-kagetsu [The last four months of the Japanese empire] (Tokyo, 1973), 185.
79. Tominaga Kengo, ed., Gendaishi shiryo, 39, Taiheiyo senso (5) [Documents on contemporary history: The Pacific War] (45 total vols., of which 5 are on the Pacific War, Tokyo, 1975), 5: 756.
80. Sakomizu, May 3, 1949, "Interrogations."
81. "Shusen no shosho: fu shusen hiwa" [Imperial rescript on the war's end and the taped recording of Sakomizu's talk] (n.p., 1970?).
82. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 100;
83. Suzuki Hajime, ed., Suzuki Kantaro jiden [Autobiography of Suzuki Kantaro] (Tokyo, 1985), 294-295.
84. Ikeda Sumihisa, Nihon no magarikado [Japan at the crossroads] (Tokyo, 1968), 208-209;
85. Ikeda Sumihisa, Dec. 23, 1949, "Statements" (emphasis mine).
86. Togo, Jidai no ichimen, 342;
87. Togo, Cause of Japan, 316.
88. Kido kankei bunsho, 87;
89. Kido nikki, 2: 1223;
90. Kido Koichi, May 17, 1949, "Statements."
91. Fujita, Jijucho, 129.
92. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 107-112.
93. Toyoda Soemu, Saigo no teikoku kaigun [The last of the Imperial Navy] (Tokyo, 1950), 206-207.
94. Tominaga, ed., Gendaishi shiryo, 39:
95. Taiheiyo senso (5), 756.
96. Surprisingly; Army Minister Anami seems to have given some credence to the make-believe account that the United States had a stockpile of one hundred atomic bombs and that Tokyo would be the target for the next atomic bombing. The source of this fabrication was a P-51 fighter pilot by the name of Marcus McDila who had been downed and captured on August 8. (The United States, of course, had completed only two bombs at that time.) Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 119-120;
97. Boeicho Boei Kenshujo Senshi Shitsu (War History Office, Defense Agency), Senshi sosho: Daihon'ei rikugunbu [War history series: Imperial General Headquarters, The Army] (Tokyo, 1975), 10: 418,437 .
98. Okura Kimmochi, president of the Technological Research Mobilization Office, also heard a similar rumor. Naisei Kenkyukai and Nihon Kindai Shiryo Kenkyukai, eds., Okura Kimmochi nikki [Diaries] (Tokyo, 1971), 4: 321.
99. There was no separate decision to use the second bomb; the local commander was ordered to use additional bombs as they became ready.
100. Matsutani Makoto, Dai Toa Senso shushu no shinso [The truth about terminating the Greater East Asian War] (Tokyo, 1980), 172-173;
101. Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 365.
102. Shusen kosaku, Ibid., 2: 365;
103. Toyoda, Saiga, 207-209;
104. Suzuki, ed., Jiden, 295-296.
105. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 119-120, 122-123;
106. Toyoda, Saigo, 207-209;
107. Shigemitsu Mamoru, Showa no doran [Showa: Years of upheaval] (2 vols., Tokyo, 1952), 2: 285-286.
108. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 118-124;
109. Shimomura Kainan, Shusen hishi [The secret history of the termination of the war] (Tokyo, 1985), 96-103.
110. Sanbo Honbu, comp., Haisen no kiroku, 283;
111. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 118-119, 121-125;
112. Ikeda, Nihon no magarikado, 174;
113. Hattori Takushiro, Daitoa senso zenshi [The complete history of the Greater East Asian War] (8 vols., Tokyo, 1953-1956), 8: 102;
114. Oki Misao, Oki nikki [Oki diaries] (Tokyo, 1969), 335.
115. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 124.
116. Hata Ikuhiko, Showa tenno itsulsu no ketsudan [The five decisions of Showa Emperor] (Tokyo, 1994), 71.
117. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 122-142, 139, 142.
118. Shusen shiroku, Ibid., 139, 142;
119. Sanbo Honbu, comp., Haisen no kiroku, 362.
120. On the Japanese reaction, see Hatano Sumio, "'Kokutai goji' to Potsudamu sengen" [The 'national polity' and the Potsdam Declaration], Gaiko jiho, No. 1320 (1995), 28-35.
121. For the American side, see Bernstein, "The Perils and Politics," 7, 26.
122. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 5: 17-56;
123. Kido nikki: Tokyo saibanki, 443;
124. Togo, Jidai no ichimen, 350-358;
125. Toyoda, Saigo, 218-222;
126. Sakomizu, Dai Nihon teikoku, 233-242;
127. Kido nikki: Tokyo saibanki, 443.
128. Kido nikki: Tokyo saibanki, 444.
129. Kido nikki: Tokyo saibanki, 444. Ibid.
130. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York, 1948), 626. Stimson and his colleagues had been following the power struggle within the Japanese government through intercepted Japanese cable messages.
131. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 620-624, 630-632;
132. Diary of Henry L. Stimson (on microfilm; original in Yale University Library), entries of June 18 and July 2, 1945; Foreign Relations, 1945:
133. The Conference of Berlin, 1: 888-892.
134. Takagi Sokichi, Takagi kaigun shosho oboegaki [Memoranda of Rear Admiral Takagi] (Tokyo, 1979), 351;
135. Takagi Sokichi and Sanematsu Yuzuru, eds., Kaigun taisho Yonai Mitsumasa oboegaki [Memoranda of Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa] (Tokyo, 1978), 153-154.
136. Takagi, Takagi oboegaki, 227.
137. Tominaga, ed., Gendahhi shiryo, 39:
138. Taiheiyo senso (5), 743, 745;
139. Takagi, Takagi oboegaki, 180, 198, 227.
140. Kido nikki, 1: 28-29, 2: 1020;
141. Kido kankei bunsho, 46.
142. The position of Hirohito is critically treated in the following works: Tanaka Nobumasa, Dokyumento showa tenno, Vol. 5: Haisen 2 [A documentary history of Showa Emperor, Vol. 5: Defeat] (7 vols., Tokyo, 1988);
143. Yamada Akira and Koketsu Atsushi, Ososugita seidan: Showa tenno no senso shido to senso sekinin [The sacred decision that came too late: Showa Emperor's war guidance and war responsibility] (Tokyo, 1991);
144. and Yoshida Yutaka, Showa tenno no shusenshi [A history of Showa Emperor's war termination] (Tokyo, 1992). Bix's "Japan's Delayed Surrender" relies heavily on these works.
145. Togo, Jidan no ichimen, 329-330;
146. Togo, Cause of Japan, 299;
147. Hayashi, ed., Nihon shusenshi, vol. 2, passim.
148. Terasaki Hidenari and Mariko Terasaki Miller, eds., Showa tenno dokuhakuroku, Terasaki Hidenari goyogakari nikki [Monologues of Showa Emperor and the diaries of Terasaki Hidenari] (Tokyo, 1991), 101-102.
149. Takagi, Takagi oboegaki, 227-228.
150. Takagi oboegaki, Ibid., 228-229;
151. Hosokawa Morisada, Joho tenno ni tassezu [Information that never reached the emperor] (2 vols., Tokyo, 1953), 2: 385.
152. Kido nikki, 2: 1209-1210;
153. Kido kankei bunsho, 75-77;
154. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 3: 91-94.
155. Kido nikki, 2: 1212-1213.
156. Sakomizu, Dai Nihon teikoku, 28.
157. Kido nikki: Tokyo saibanki, 444;
158. Butow, Japan's Decision to Surrender, 231.
159. Akira Iriye, Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945 (Cambridge, Mass., 1981), 253-254.
160. Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (2 vols., Boston, 1952), 2: 1425-1428;
161. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service, 628.
162. Gar Alperovitz and Robert L. Messer, "Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb," International Security, 16 (1991/92), 204-214;
163. Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 634;
164. Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy (1985 edition), 27-32 (emphasis mine).
165. Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, 165, 233-237, 248, 412, 519, 536.
166. For Ambassador Sato's negative reaction to this telegram, see Sato Naotake, Kaiko hachiju-nen [Recollection of eighty years] (Tokyo, 1964), 490-491.
167. Nishijima, Gembaku, 224-226.
168. Sato, Kaiko, 481-497;
169. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 3: 136-204.
170. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 4-5, 13-14, 18;
171. Togo Shigehiko, Sofu Togo Shigenori no shogai [The life of my grandfather Togo Shigenori] (Tokyo, 1993), 373-375.
172. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 5, 13-17;
173. Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 334-337.
174. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 19-24.
175. For example, Alperovitz and Messer, "Marshall, Truman, and the Decision to Drop the Bomb," 204-206.
176. Among American scholars, Paul Kecskemeti has persuasively argued that the Soviet entry was "the main factor that determined the timing of Japan's surrender"; Strategic Surrender, 198-199 (emphasis mine).
177. Rekishigaku Kenkyukai, ed., Taiheiyo sensoshi, 5: 364, 366-369;
178. Arai Shin'ichi, Gembaku toka, 254-256, 266;
179. Nishijima, Gembaku, 235, 237-238;
180. Arai Shin'ichi, Dainiji sekai taisen [World War II] (Tokyo, 1973), 177.
181. Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 360-361.
182. Sanbo Honbu, comp., Haisen no kiroku, 272, 276, 278;
183. Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 360-361;
184. Boeicho Boei Kenshujo Senshi Shitsu (War History Office, Defense Agency), Senshi sosho: Kantogun [War history series: Kwantung Army], 3: 329.
185. Sanbo Honbu, comp., Haisen no kiroku, 276;
186. Miyazaki Shuichi, Dec. 29, 1949, "Interrogations"; Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 361.
187. Kawabe Torashiro, Kawabe Torashiro kaikoroku [Memoirs of Kawabe Torashiro] (Tokyo, 1979), 154-155;
188. Kawabe, Aug. 23, 1948, "Statements"; Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 342-343;
189. Oki nikki, 334.
190. On this point, see Freedman and Dockrill, "Hiroshima: A Strategy of Shock," in Dockrill, ed., From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima, 205, 207.
191. Kawabe, Kaikoroku, 155;
192. Oki nikki, 334.
193. Kido nikki: Tokyo saibanki, 444.
194. Sakomizu, May 3, 1949, "Interrogations."
195. Sakomizu, Dai Nippon teikoku, 183;
196. Ikeda Sumihisa, Dec. 23, 1949, "Statements."
197. Miyazaki diary, Aug. 6, 1945; Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 343.
198. Kawabe, Kaikoroku, 154;
199. Kawabe, Aug. 23, 1948, "Statements"; Kurihara and Hatano, eds., Shusen kosaku, 2: 342-343.
200. Arisue Seizo, Shusen hishi: Arisue kikancho no shuki [A secret history of the termination of the war: A memoir of Lieutenant General Arisue] (Tokyo, 1976), 26-33;
201. Sakomizu, Dai Nippon teikoku, 183.
202. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 4: 65-66.
203. Miyazaki diary, Aug. 8, 1945.
204. Yomiuri, ed., Showashi no tenno, 4: 310.
205. Ikeda, Nihon no magarikado, 178;
206. Yomiuri, ed., Shawashi no tenno, 4: 309-310.
207. Kido nikki: Tokyo saibanki, 443.
208. Sakomizu, Shusen no shinso [The truth about surrender] (privately printed, Tokyo, 1955?);
209. Sakomizu Hisatsune, "Kofukuji no shinso" [The truth about surrender], Jiyu kohumin (Feb. 1946), 60-61.
210. Sakomizu, Shusen no shinso, 36.
211. Boeicho Boei Kenshujo Senshi Shitsu (War History Office, Defense Agency), Senshi sosho: Hondo boku sakusen [War history series: Air defense of the homeland] (Tokyo, 1968), 632.
212. Yomiuri, ed., Showashi no tenno, 4: 310.
213. Morobuse Koshin, Senso shisho [Private wartime journal] (Tokyo, 1990), 330.
214. Okura Kimmochi nikki, 4: 319.
215. Hayashi, ed., Nihon shusenshi, 3: 195.
216. Mark Gayn, Japan Diary (Rutland, Vt., 1981), 269-271.
217. Ian Buruma, Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York, 1994).
218. For the changing memory and imagery of the atomic bomb over the past fifty years, see Asada, "The Mushroom Cloud and National Psyches."
219. Record of the imperial conference of June 8, 1945, in Sanbo Honbu, comp., Haisen no kiroku, 256-277;
220. Kido nikki, 2: 1208-1209.
221. Gaimusho, ed., Shusen shiroku, 3: 135, 208-209;
222. Gaimusho, Shusen shiroku, 4: 120.
223. Cited in Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II, 191.
224. For a detailed critique, see Bernstein, "Compelling Japan's Surrender," 113-148.
225. See also Robert P. Newman, "Ending the War with Japan: Paul Nitze's 'Early Surrender' Counterfactual," Pacific Historical Review, 64 (1995), 167-194.
226. Edward J. Drea, MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945 (Lawrence, Kans., 1992), 216-225;
227. John Ray Skates, The Invasion of Japan: Alternative to the Bomb (Columbia, S.C., 1994).
228. See Barton J. Bernstein, "Eclipsed by Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Early Thinking About Tactical Nuclear Weapons," International Security, 15 (1991), 149-173;
229. Marc Gallicchio, "After Nagasaki: General Marshall's Plan for Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Japan," Prologue, 23 (1991), 396-404.
230. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York, 1977),
231. states: "In the summer of 1945, the victorious Americans owed the Japanese people an experiment in negotiations. To use the atomic bomb... without even attempting such an experiment, was a double crime" (pp. 263-268). Would such an "experiment" have met conditions demanded by Japanese military? Martin Sherwin's "Hiroshima at Fifty" offers yet another scenario: Stimson could have declared that "our nation is too moral" to use the atomic weapon and dissuaded President Truman from using it. The moral ambiguities inherent in the use of the atomic bomb are more judiciously treated by Melvyn P. Leffler, "Truman's Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb" IHJ Bulletin, 15 (1995), 1-7. The psychological - and moral - implications of the bomb are discussed at length in Lifton and Mitchell, Hiroshima in America.