Power and pay: The politics of CEO compensation

Journal of Management and Governance

Volumn 2, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 309-332

  Elhagrasey, Galal M ^a   Richard Harrison, J ^b   Buchholz, Rogene A ^c  

^a KUWAIT UNIVERSITY   (Kuwait)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NEW ORLEANS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012718572     PISSN: 13853457     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1009975019195     Document Type: Article

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