A Note on Multi-Issue Two-Sided Bargaining: Bilateral Procedures

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 30, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 216-227

  Fershtman, Chaim ^a,b  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b TILBURG UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012268630     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0727     Document Type: Article

References (9)

1. Fershtman C. The Importance of the Agenda in Bargaining. Games Econ. Behav. 2:1990;224-238.
2. Herrero, M. J. 1989, Single Package versus Issue-by-Issue Bargaining, mimeo, Carnegie Mellon University.
3. Krishna V., Serrano R. Multilateral Bargaining. Rev. Econ. Stud. 63:1996;61-80.
4. Merlo A., Wilson C. A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information. Econometrica. 63:1995;371-400.
5. Osborne M. J., Rubinstein A. Bargaining and Markets. 1990;Academic, New York.
6. Rubinstein A. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica. 50:1982;97-109.
7. Sutton J. Non-Cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction. Rev. Econ. Stud. 53:1986;709-724.
8. van Damme E., Selten R., Winter E. Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest Money Unit. Games Econ. Behav. 2:1990;188-201.
9. Winter E. Negotiation in Multi-Issue Committees. J. Public Econ. 65:1997;323-342.