Negotiations in multi-issue committees

Journal of Public Economics

Volumn 65, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 323-342

  Winter, Eyal ^a,b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b Washington Univiversity ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Agenda; Committees; Negotiations

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031232109     PISSN: 00472727     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01627-1     Document Type: Article

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