Corporate value and ownership structure in the post-takeover period: What role do institutional investors play

Managerial and Decision Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 7-8, 1997, Pages 627-643

  Jones, Steven L ^a   Lee, Darrell ^b   Tompkins, James G ^b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b KENNESAW STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0011238718     PISSN: 01436570     EISSN: 10991468     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199711/12)18:7/8<627::AID-MDE851>3.0.CO;2-5     Document Type: Article

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