Domestic politics and the U.S.-China WTO agreement

Issues and Studies

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 105-138

  Zeng, Ka ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARKANSAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Domestic politics; Elite preferences; International integration; Trade negotiationns; World Trade Organization (WTO)

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010176867     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (74)

1. Quoted in Bruce Stokes, "The China WTO Dilemma," Berkeley Round Table on International Political Economy paper at 〈http://socrates.berkeley.edu/∼briewww/forum/stokes. html〉.
2. As early as 1992 Wu Yi and Long Yongtu (UTJC B), chief Chinese negotiators, sent Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) personnel to universities and on media interviews to explicate the rationale for China's WTO bid. A large number of books and articles in favor of WTO entry were published to educate consumer and industry groups about the positive effect of WTO admission for China. See Margaret M. Pearson "The Case of China's Accession to GATT/WTO," in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 364-65.
3. See Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 437-49; and Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
4. See Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 437-49; and Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
5. See the case studies in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy; Howard Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 600-644; Jefferey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations," International Organization 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 599-628; Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of International Side-Payments," ibid. 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 793-818; Xia Ming, "U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations," Issues & Studies 32, no. 4 (April 1996): 60-88; Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Robert Paalberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 413-44; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "(Mis)managing Diversity: Worker Rights and U.S. Trade Policy," International Negotiation 5, no. 1 (2000): 97-127; and Thomas Konig and Simon Hug, "Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts," European Union Politics 1, no. 1 (February 2000): 93-124.
6. See the case studies in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy; Howard Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 600-644; Jefferey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations," International Organization 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 599-628; Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of International Side-Payments," ibid. 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 793-818; Xia Ming, "U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations," Issues & Studies 32, no. 4 (April 1996): 60-88; Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Robert Paalberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 413-44; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "(Mis)managing Diversity: Worker Rights and U.S. Trade Policy," International Negotiation 5, no. 1 (2000): 97-127; and Thomas Konig and Simon Hug, "Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts," European Union Politics 1, no. 1 (February 2000): 93-124.
7. See the case studies in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy; Howard Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 600-644; Jefferey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations," International Organization 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 599-628; Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of International Side-Payments," ibid. 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 793-818; Xia Ming, "U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations," Issues & Studies 32, no. 4 (April 1996): 60-88; Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Robert Paalberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 413-44; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "(Mis)managing Diversity: Worker Rights and U.S. Trade Policy," International Negotiation 5, no. 1 (2000): 97-127; and Thomas Konig and Simon Hug, "Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts," European Union Politics 1, no. 1 (February 2000): 93-124.
8. See the case studies in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy; Howard Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 600-644; Jefferey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations," International Organization 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 599-628; Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of International Side-Payments," ibid. 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 793-818; Xia Ming, "U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations," Issues & Studies 32, no. 4 (April 1996): 60-88; Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Robert Paalberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 413-44; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "(Mis)managing Diversity: Worker Rights and U.S. Trade Policy," International Negotiation 5, no. 1 (2000): 97-127; and Thomas Konig and Simon Hug, "Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts," European Union Politics 1, no. 1 (February 2000): 93-124.
9. See the case studies in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy; Howard Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 600-644; Jefferey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations," International Organization 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 599-628; Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of International Side-Payments," ibid. 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 793-818; Xia Ming, "U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations," Issues & Studies 32, no. 4 (April 1996): 60-88; Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Robert Paalberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 413-44; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "(Mis)managing Diversity: Worker Rights and U.S. Trade Policy," International Negotiation 5, no. 1 (2000): 97-127; and Thomas Konig and Simon Hug, "Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts," European Union Politics 1, no. 1 (February 2000): 93-124.
10. See the case studies in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy; Howard Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 600-644; Jefferey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations," International Organization 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 599-628; Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of International Side-Payments," ibid. 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 793-818; Xia Ming, "U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations," Issues & Studies 32, no. 4 (April 1996): 60-88; Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Robert Paalberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 413-44; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "(Mis)managing Diversity: Worker Rights and U.S. Trade Policy," International Negotiation 5, no. 1 (2000): 97-127; and Thomas Konig and Simon Hug, "Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts," European Union Politics 1, no. 1 (February 2000): 93-124.
11. See the case studies in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy; Howard Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 600-644; Jefferey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations," International Organization 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 599-628; Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of International Side-Payments," ibid. 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 793-818; Xia Ming, "U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations," Issues & Studies 32, no. 4 (April 1996): 60-88; Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Robert Paalberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 413-44; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "(Mis)managing Diversity: Worker Rights and U.S. Trade Policy," International Negotiation 5, no. 1 (2000): 97-127; and Thomas Konig and Simon Hug, "Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts," European Union Politics 1, no. 1 (February 2000): 93-124.
12. See the case studies in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy; Howard Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 600-644; Jefferey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations," International Organization 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 599-628; Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of International Side-Payments," ibid. 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 793-818; Xia Ming, "U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations," Issues & Studies 32, no. 4 (April 1996): 60-88; Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Robert Paalberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 413-44; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "(Mis)managing Diversity: Worker Rights and U.S. Trade Policy," International Negotiation 5, no. 1 (2000): 97-127; and Thomas Konig and Simon Hug, "Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts," European Union Politics 1, no. 1 (February 2000): 93-124.
13. See the case studies in Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam, Double-Edged Diplomacy; Howard Lehman and Jennifer L. McCoy, "The Dynamics of the Two-Level Bargaining Game: The 1988 Brazilian Debt Negotiations," World Politics 44, no. 4 (July 1992): 600-644; Jefferey W. Knopf, "Beyond Two-Level Games: Domestic-International Interaction in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Negotiations," International Organization 47, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 599-628; Frederick W. Mayer, "Managing Domestic Differences in International Negotiations: The Strategic Use of International Side-Payments," ibid. 46, no. 4 (Autumn 1992): 793-818; Xia Ming, "U.S.-PRC Trade-Related Negotiations in the 1990s: Two-Level Game Analysis and Explanations," Issues & Studies 32, no. 4 (April 1996): 60-88; Leonard J. Schoppa, Bargaining with Japan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); Robert Paalberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" International Organization 51, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 413-44; Kimberly Ann Elliott, "(Mis)managing Diversity: Worker Rights and U.S. Trade Policy," International Negotiation 5, no. 1 (2000): 97-127; and Thomas Konig and Simon Hug, "Ratifying Maastricht: Parliamentary Votes on International Treaties and Theoretical Solution Concepts," European Union Politics 1, no. 1 (February 2000): 93-124.
14. Helen V. Milner, "Regional Economic Co-operation, Global Markets and Domestic Politics: A Comparison of NAFTA and the Maastricht Treaty," Journal of European Public Policy 2, no. 3 (September 1995): 341-44.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Indeed, from the point of view of the Dengist leadership, the ability to deliver economic growth provides the only way for the party to retain legitimacy and power. See, for example, Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar, "Dynamic Economy, Declining Party-State," in The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 5.
18. Pearson, "The Case of China's Accession to GATT/WTO," 353-56.
19. See Helen V. Milner, Interests, Isntitution, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 37-43. According to Milner (pp. 16-17), the structure of domestic preferences refers to the "relative position of the preferences of important domestic actors on the issues at hand," particularly those of the political executive, the legislature, and interest groups.
20. Ibid., 17.
21. Ibid.
22. This second agreement resolved the remaining issues obstructing China's WTO entry, particularly China's refusal to join the organization as a developed country, with correspondingly low farm subsidies.
23. Nicholas R. Lardy, China in the World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994), 45-46.
24. Denny Roy, China's Foreign Relations (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 93-94.
25. China Online at 〈http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/wto/wto.asp〉.
26. Joseph Fewsmith, "The Politics of China's Accession to the WTO," Current History 99, no. 638 (September 2000): 269.
27. In response to the "private" visit by ROC President Lee Teng-hui (****) to Cornell University Beijing carried out military exercises against Taiwan in 1995-96. The crisis strained U.S.-China relations and precluded the possibility of serious negotiations over China's WTO entry.
28. Nicholas R. Lardy, "Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China," Brookings Institution Policy Brief #58 (May 2000).
29. Asian Wall Street Journal, October 13, 1999.
30. Margaret M. Pearson, "The Major Multilateral Economic Institutions Engage China," in Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power, ed. Alastair lain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (London: Routledge, 1999), 220-21.
31. Yongzheng Yang, "China's WTO Accession: The Economics and Politics," Journal of World Trade 34, no. 4 (August 2000): 88.
32. Financial Times (London), April 10, 1999, 4.
33. South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), July 21, 1999, 8.
34. See note 23 above.
35. Business Week, November 22, 1999, 60-61.
36. Pearson, "The Case of China's Accession to GATT/WTO," 350.
37. See note 24 above.
38. Pearson, "The Case of China's Accession to GATT/WTO," 352.
39. South China Morning Post, May 7, 1997, 7.
40. Strait Times (Singapore), June 14, 1999, 34.
41. William R. Feeney, "China and the Multilateral Economic Institutions," in China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium, ed. Samuel S. Kim, fourth edition (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998), 258-59.
42. Marcus Noland "U.S.-China Economic Relations," in After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and U.S.-China Relations, ed. Robert S. Ross (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 111.
43. Thomas G. Moore, "China and Globalization," in East Asia and Globalization, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 107-8.
44. Robert S. Ross, "Engagement in U.S. China Policy," in Johnston and Ross, Engaging China, 190-91.
45. Pieter Bottelier, "The Impact of WTO Membership on China's Domestic Economy," China Online, January 3, 2001.
46. See note 19 above.
47. See note 30 above.
48. See note 19 above.
49. Denver News, November 4, 1999, 47A.
50. Straits Times, October 10, 1999, 42-43.
51. Renmin ribao (People's Daily), November 17, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-1117.
52. See note 17 above.
53. As Margaret Pearson has said, "opposition within China was not won over, ... but rather run over" and that "many of expectations as to the process and structure" of decision-making "were in the end thrown aside in favor of elite preference and authority." See Pearson, "The Case of China's Accession to GATT/WTO," 346, 374.
54. Ibid.
55. Jim Mann, "Clinton Set to Allow China Entry into WTO," Los Angeles Times, September 8, 1999, A5; Steven Mufson and Robert Kaiser, "Missed U.S.-China Deal Looms Large," Washington Post, November 10, 1999, A1.
56. Jim Mann, "Clinton Set to Allow China Entry into WTO," Los Angeles Times, September 8, 1999, A5; Steven Mufson and Robert Kaiser, "Missed U.S.-China Deal Looms Large," Washington Post, November 10, 1999, A1.
57. Mufson and Kaiser, "Missed U.S.-China Deal Looms Large," A1.
58. Shawn W. Crispin and Bruce Gilley, "Wide Open," Far Eastern Economic Review, April 22, 1999, 64-66.
59. Bob Davis and Jeffrey Taylor, "China WTO Pact to See Improved Chances in Congress," Wall Street Journal, November 16, 1999, A32.
60. See note 48 above.
61. Paul Magnusson and Dexter Roberts, "Sleepless After Seattle," Business Week, January 24, 2000, 122-28.
62. Robert Kaiser and Steven Mufson, "U.S. Business Lobby Poised for China Trade Deal," Washington Post, November 14, 1999, A1.
63. Steven Brostoff, "U.S. Insurers Push Clinton to Get China Into WTO," National Underwriter 103, no. 38 (September 20, 1999).
64. According to the report, the deal would cost American textile and apparel industries up to US$12 billion and could result in as many as 154,500 job losses. See Kit Marlow, "China Undeserving of Favoruable Concessions, Says U.S. Textile Group," China Online at 〈http: //www.chinaonline.com/issues/wto/currentnews/secure/c9111632.asp〉.
65. See note 48 above.
66. Edwin Chen, "Entry Likely to Be an Issue in U.S. Elections Next Year," Los Angeles Times, November 16, 1999,A10.
67. Business Times, June 18, 1999, 6.
68. John McCurry, "U.S., China Agree on WTO," Textile World, December 1999, 17.
69. Tom Barry, "WTO in Focus," Foreign Policy in Focus: Internet Gateway to Global Affairs, 2000.
70. John McCurry, "Congress Urged to Block China from WTO," Textile World, March 2000, 18.
71. "United States: Prepare for Fireworks," The Economist, January 22, 2000, 31.
72. William J. McMahon, "China Trade Protests Heat Up Capitol Hill," China Online, April 12, 2000.
73. See note 51 above.
74. Issues & Studies 37, no. 3 (May/June 2001): 142-162.