Professional Soldiers and Politics: A Case of Central and Eastern Europe

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 99-118

  Sarvas, Stefan ^a,b,c,d  

^a Center for European Security Studies   (Netherlands)

^b BIOST   (Germany)

^c CHARLES UNIVERSITY   (Czech Republic)

^d NONE   (Czech Republic)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0010030225     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X9902600106     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Martin Edmonds, Armed Services & Society (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 94.
2. Samuel E. Finner, The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988).
3. Sam C. Sarkesian, "Military Professionalism and Civil-Military Relations in the West," International Science Review 2 (1981): 283-297.
4. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 88-89.
5. Maury D. Feld, "Professionalism, Nationalism, and the Alienation of the Military." in Armed Forces & Society: Sociological Essays, ed. Jacque van Doorr (The Hague: Mouton, 1968), 55.
6. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State.
7. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960).
8. See the conclusions drawn by David R. Segal, "Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Societies," in Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Third Milennium, ed. Jurgen Kuhlmann and David R. Segal (Munchen: SOWI Forum International 16, 1992), 37-48, and later works of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz. But see also Amos Perlmutter, Sam Sarkesian, Eric Nordlinger, Charles Moskos, David Segal, and James Williams, to name just few of many who have contributed to the understanding of civil-military relations.
9. Dale R. Herspring, "The Process of Change and Democratization in Eastern Europe: The Case of the Military," in East European Security Reconsidered, ed. John R. Lampe, Daniel N. Nelson, and Ronald Schönfeld (The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993), 70.
10. Concerning the relation between civil-military reforms and chances for Western integration, see Réka Szemerkényi, "Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk," Adelphi Paper 306, 1996, 70-73.
11. These tasks have been explored most thoroughly in the following works: Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) and Terry L. Karl and Philipphe C. Schmitter, "Democratization around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks," in World Security: Challenges for a Next Century, ed. Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 43-62.
12. These tasks have been explored most thoroughly in the following works: Robert Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982) and Terry L. Karl and Philipphe C. Schmitter, "Democratization around the Globe: Opportunities and Risks," in World Security: Challenges for a Next Century, ed. Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), 43-62.
13. Thomas S. Szayna and Stephen F. Larrabee, East European Military Reform after the Cold War: Implication for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995). 11. For a closer focus, see Anton Bebler, "Democratization and the East- Central European Professional Military," RUSI Journal (Spring 1991): 47-51, or Anton Bebler, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe," NATO Review 4 (1994): 28-32.
14. Thomas S. Szayna and Stephen F. Larrabee, East European Military Reform after the Cold War: Implication for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995). 11. For a closer focus, see Anton Bebler, "Democratization and the East-Central European Professional Military," RUSI Journal (Spring 1991): 47-51, or Anton Bebler, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe," NATO Review 4 (1994): 28-32.
15. Thomas S. Szayna and Stephen F. Larrabee, East European Military Reform after the Cold War: Implication for the United States (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995). 11. For a closer focus, see Anton Bebler, "Democratization and the East- Central European Professional Military," RUSI Journal (Spring 1991): 47-51, or Anton Bebler, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe," NATO Review 4 (1994): 28-32.
16. See the discussion among William E. Odom, Timothy J. Colton, and Roman Kolkowicz, in The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 103-105; William Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, ed. Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 27-51; Timothy J. Colton, Commissars and Commanders: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); and William E. Odom, "The Party- Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. The study written by Zoltan Barany dealing with this problem shows that the East and Central European militaries were reluctant and sometimes even unwilling to interfere in politics. It is evident that the militaries expressed more reservations than the units of the Ministries of Interior or militias under direct command of the Communist Parties. See Zoltan Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transition and Beyond," East European Quarterly 1 (1992): 1-30. Concerning differentiation of communist civil-military relations depending on the regime in power, see Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," Comparative Politics 1 (1997): 21-43.
17. See the discussion among William E. Odom, Timothy J. Colton, and Roman Kolkowicz, in The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 103-105; William Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, ed. Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 27-51; Timothy J. Colton, Commissars and Commanders: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); and William E. Odom, "The Party- Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. The study written by Zoltan Barany dealing with this problem shows that the East and Central European militaries were reluctant and sometimes even unwilling to interfere in politics. It is evident that the militaries expressed more reservations than the units of the Ministries of Interior or militias under direct command of the Communist Parties. See Zoltan Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transition and Beyond," East European Quarterly 1 (1992): 1-30. Concerning differentiation of communist civil-military relations depending on the regime in power, see Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," Comparative Politics 1 (1997): 21-43.
18. See the discussion among William E. Odom, Timothy J. Colton, and Roman Kolkowicz, in The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 103-105; William Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, ed. Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 27-51; Timothy J. Colton, Commissars and Commanders: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); and William E. Odom, "The Party- Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. The study written by Zoltan Barany dealing with this problem shows that the East and Central European militaries were reluctant and sometimes even unwilling to interfere in politics. It is evident that the militaries expressed more reservations than the units of the Ministries of Interior or militias under direct command of the Communist Parties. See Zoltan Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transition and Beyond," East European Quarterly 1 (1992): 1-30. Concerning differentiation of communist civil-military relations depending on the regime in power, see Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," Comparative Politics 1 (1997): 21-43.
19. See the discussion among William E. Odom, Timothy J. Colton, and Roman Kolkowicz, in The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 103-105; William Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, ed. Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 27-51; Timothy J. Colton, Commissars and Commanders: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); and William E. Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. The study written by Zoltan Barany dealing with this problem shows that the East and Central European militaries were reluctant and sometimes even unwilling to interfere in politics. It is evident that the militaries expressed more reservations than the units of the Ministries of Interior or militias under direct command of the Communist Parties. See Zoltan Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transition and Beyond," East European Quarterly 1 (1992): 1-30. Concerning differentiation of communist civil-military relations depending on the regime in power, see Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," Comparative Politics 1 (1997): 21-43.
20. See the discussion among William E. Odom, Timothy J. Colton, and Roman Kolkowicz, in The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 103-105; William Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, ed. Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 27-51; Timothy J. Colton, Commissars and Commanders: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); and William E. Odom, "The Party- Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. The study written by Zoltan Barany dealing with this problem shows that the East and Central European militaries were reluctant and sometimes even unwilling to interfere in politics. It is evident that the militaries expressed more reservations than the units of the Ministries of Interior or militias under direct command of the Communist Parties. See Zoltan Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transition and Beyond," East European Quarterly 1 (1992): 1-30. Concerning differentiation of communist civil-military relations depending on the regime in power, see Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," Comparative Politics 1 (1997): 21-43.
21. See the discussion among William E. Odom, Timothy J. Colton, and Roman Kolkowicz, in The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, ed. Roman Kolkowicz (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1967), 103-105; William Odom, "The Party-Military Connection: A Critique," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, ed. Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), 27-51; Timothy J. Colton, Commissars and Commanders: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979); and William E. Odom, "The Party- Military Connection: A Participatory Model," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems. The study written by Zoltan Barany dealing with this problem shows that the East and Central European militaries were reluctant and sometimes even unwilling to interfere in politics. It is evident that the militaries expressed more reservations than the units of the Ministries of Interior or militias under direct command of the Communist Parties. See Zoltan Barany, "East European Armed Forces in Transition and Beyond," East European Quarterly 1 (1992): 1-30. Concerning differentiation of communist civil-military relations depending on the regime in power, see Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military: The East European Experience," Comparative Politics 1 (1997): 21-43.
22. Amos Perlmutter, The Military and Politics in Modern Times (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 4.
23. Concerning these activities see Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, and Stanislav Stach, "Democratic Control over Security Policy and Armed Forces," in Demokratische und zivile Kontrolle von Sicherheitspolitik und Streikraften, ed. Laurent F. Carrel, Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, Andreas Schaer, and Stanislav Stach, Zurcher Beitrage zur Zicherheitpolitik und Konfliktforschung, 41 1997): 100-101.
24. See Michael Shafir, "New Revelations of the Military's Role in Ceausescu's Ouster", RFE/RL Report, May 11, 1990, 24-25.
25. With regard to tensions between civilian ministers and officer corps, see also Szayna and Larrabee, East European Military Reform, 23-26; Jeffrey Simon, "Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion," McNair Paper 39, (Washington: National Defense University, 1997), 100-102, and Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces," Chaillots Papers 23, (Paris: WEU ISS, 1996).
26. With regard to tensions between civilian ministers and officer corps, see also Szayna and Larrabee, East European Military Reform, 23-26; Jeffrey Simon, "Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion," McNair Paper 39, (Washington: National Defense University, 1997), 100-102, and Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces," Chaillots Papers 23, (Paris: WEU ISS, 1996).
27. With regard to tensions between civilian ministers and officer corps, see also Szayna and Larrabee, East European Military Reform, 23-26; Jeffrey Simon, "Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion," McNair Paper 39, (Washington: National Defense University, 1997), 100-102, and Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces," Chaillots Papers 23, (Paris: WEU ISS, 1996).
28. Rzeczpolita October 27, 1993, 2.
29. Chasa January 28, 1995, 6.
30. Reka Szemerkenyi, "Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk," 71. Concerning the description of the Hungarian situation, see Zoltan Pecze, "Civil-Military Relations in Hungary, 1989-1996, Harmonie Papers 2 (Groningen: The Centre for European Security Studies, 1998).
31. Reka Szemerkenyi, "Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk," 71. Concerning the description of the Hungarian situation, see Zoltan Pecze, "Civil-Military Relations in Hungary, 1989-1996, Harmonie Papers 2 (Groningen: The Centre for European Security Studies, 1998).
32. Daniel Nelson, "Civil Society Endangered: The Perils of Post-Communism," Transition: The World Bank Journal 16 (1995).
33. Pick, Sarvas, and Stach, "Democratic Control," in Demokratische und zivile Kontrolle, 108.
34. Ivo Samson, Integracia Slovenska do bezpecnostneho systemu Zapadu (Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, 1997), 84-85.
35. Duma, August 1, 1990.
36. The use of the military against internal enemies, in this case minorities.
37. See, for instance, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs 3 (1995). Concerning the Slovak situation, see Eduard Mracka, "The Ethnic Minority Issue from Slovakia's Point of View," in A Close-up View of European Security (Budapest: Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, 1996), 106-108.
38. See, for instance, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," Foreign Affairs 3 (1995). Concerning the Slovak situation, see Eduard Mracka, "The Ethnic Minority Issue from Slovakia's Point of View," in A Close-up View of European Security (Budapest: Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies, 1996), 106-108.
39. For valuable arguments, see also Ronald H. Linden, "Domestic Change and International Relations" in East European Security Reconsidered, 13-34.
40. Young military professionals tended to prefer managerial and technical skills more than their older colleagues, as stressed by Morris Janowitz. See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. It also closely corresponds with Charles Moskos' ideas about the shift toward the occupational character of the military profession. See Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Woods, eds., The Military: More Than Just a Job? (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988). As far as the communist period is concerned, similar tendencies could be found in the Czech case in 1968; see, for instance, Miroslav Purkrabek, Dustojnik v armadni instituci (Praha: VPA KG, 1969). The same trend in Poland and Hungary has been described in Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military."
41. Young military professionals tended to prefer managerial and technical skills more than their older colleagues, as stressed by Morris Janowitz. See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. It also closely corresponds with Charles Moskos' ideas about the shift toward the occupational character of the military profession. See Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Woods, eds., The Military: More Than Just a Job? (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988). As far as the communist period is concerned, similar tendencies could be found in the Czech case in 1968; see, for instance, Miroslav Purkrabek, Dustojnik v armadni instituci (Praha: VPA KG, 1969). The same trend in Poland and Hungary has been described in Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military."
42. Young military professionals tended to prefer managerial and technical skills more than their older colleagues, as stressed by Morris Janowitz. See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. It also closely corresponds with Charles Moskos' ideas about the shift toward the occupational character of the military profession. See Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Woods, eds., The Military: More Than Just a Job? (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988). As far as the communist period is concerned, similar tendencies could be found in the Czech case in 1968; see, for instance, Miroslav Purkrabek, Dustojnik v armadni instituci (Praha: VPA KG, 1969). The same trend in Poland and Hungary has been described in Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military."
43. Young military professionals tended to prefer managerial and technical skills more than their older colleagues, as stressed by Morris Janowitz. See Janowitz, The Professional Soldier. It also closely corresponds with Charles Moskos' ideas about the shift toward the occupational character of the military profession. See Charles C. Moskos and Frank R. Woods, eds., The Military: More Than Just a Job? (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988). As far as the communist period is concerned, similar tendencies could be found in the Czech case in 1968; see, for instance, Miroslav Purkrabek, Dustojnik v armadni instituci (Praha: VPA KG, 1969). The same trend in Poland and Hungary has been described in Zoltan Barany, "Democratic Consolidation and the Military."
44. PAP, July 12, 1993, Warsaw TVP, August 25, 1993, Wprost, July 25, 1993. For more detailed information see Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations, 59.
45. PAP, July 12, 1993, Warsaw TVP, August 25, 1993, Wprost, July 25, 1993. For more detailed information see Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations, 59.
46. PAP, July 12, 1993, Warsaw TVP, August 25, 1993, Wprost, July 25, 1993. For more detailed information see Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations, 59.
47. PAP, July 12, 1993, Warsaw TVP, August 25, 1993, Wprost, July 25, 1993. For more detailed information see Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations, 59.
48. Jeffrey Simon, Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion, in Civil-Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, ed. Anton Bebler (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 153.
49. Wprost, February 12, 1995.
50. In this case the military would be subordinated directly to the State Defence Secretary, a politician nominated by the government, who would replace the Chief of the General Staff. This was an attempt to subordinate the military to party control of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, as happened in the case of the Slovak police and secret service. The draft of the law was brought down with the help of the Slovak National Party and the Slovak Workers' Party, junior coalition partners of Meciar's Movement for Democratic Slovakia; see Lidove Noviny, November 25, 1997.
51. For instance, according to the Institute for Public Opinion Research in 1997, the professional soldier was placed at 19th place among 20 surveyed professions in the Czech Republic. See Jiri Hodny, "The Prestige of Professional Czech Soldiers in the Eyes of the General Public," The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 3 (1998): 97-104.
52. For instance, in February the Movement for Democratic Slovakia proposed laws that would worsen economic and social conditions of service in the military, which in Slovak political struggles remained more or less neutral, while simultaneously the social and economic conditions of the police and intelligence service, which in many cases behaved in congruence with the Movement for Democratic Slovakia's requirements, were changed for the better. The State Defence Secretary, Jozef Gajdos, indicated that salaries of the professional soldiers might increase but only after the 1998 elections and under the condition that the professional corps "will not fall short of expectations," Narodna Obroda, February 6, 1998.
53. Tamas Fellegi, "Regime Transformation and the Mid-Level Bureaucratic Forces in Hungary," in Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe, ed. Peter Volten (New York: The Institute for EastWest Studies, 1992), 149.
54. More on personnel policies can be found in Reka Szemerkenyi, Central European Civil-Military Reforms at Risk, 46-48.
55. For instance, the Romanian military budget for 1993 was equivalent to 364 million USD; in 1994 it was 709 million USD, and in 1995 the share increased to 779 USD. In relations to the GNP, defense expenditures amounted to 2.13% in 1993, 2.39% in 1994, and 2.52% in 1995. according to the data released by Colonel Vasile Corhanescu, chief of the Financial Directorate of the Romanian Ministry of National Defense in an interview for Observatorul Militar cited in Vocea Romaniei, April 1, 1995. In 1996 the budget gained 2.5%, and Romania was the only NATO candidate country that announced its intention to raise the defense budget to 3% by the millenium, the level recommended by NATO, which few NATO member themselves actually meet. Later development was substantially different and brought to the fore pressure upon downsizing and budget cuts. Concerning the Romanian defense budget, see also Gheorge Diaconescu, Floarea Serban, and Nicolae Pavel, Democratic Control Over the Army in Romania (Bucharest: Editura Enciclopedica, 1996).
56. Tomas S. Szayna and Stephen F. Larrabee. East European Military Reform, 26.
57. Concerning the defense community see Marco Carnovale, "NATO Partners and Allies: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces," NATO Review 2 (1997), 32-35.
58. I owe this term to Reka Szemerkenyi, who used it in a discussion at the conference, "National Security: The Political Aspects," in Lakitelek, Hungary, 23-24 January 1998.