Dynamic incentive contracts with uncorrelated private information and history-dependent outcomes

Japanese Economic Review

Volumn 47, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 321-334

  Gaudet, Gerard ^a   Lasserre, Pierre ^b   Van Long, Ngo ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^c MCGILL UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039974880     PISSN: 13524739     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5876.1996.tb00052.x     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. Baron, D. P. (1989) "Design of Regulatory Mechanisms and Institutions," in R. Schmalensee and R. D. Willig, eds., Handbook of Industrial Organization, New York: North Holland, pp. 1347-1447.
2. Besanko, D. and D. E. M. Sappington (1987) Designing Regulatory Policy with Limited Information, London: Harwood Academic Publishers.
3. Gaudet, G., P. Lasserre and N. V Long (1995a) "Optimal Resource Royalties with Unknown and Temporally Independent Extraction Cost Structures," International Economic Review, Vol. 36(3), pp. 715-49.
4. _, _ and _ (1995b) "Real Investment Decisions Under Information Constraints," Mimeo, Université du Québec à Montréal, Montréal.
5. Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (1988) "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Vol. 56, pp. 1153-1175.